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SECTION 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 This report was prepared by Price Waterhouse and represents the 
results of an economic study of the costs of "Non Europe" in 
financial services. The study's geographical coverage was as 
follows: 
Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, the United Kingdom, 
the Benelux countries and Spain. 
1.2 The principal objectives of this study were to: 
assess the importance of financial services to the Community 
economy; 
analyse the present organisation of the market for financial 
services; 
evaluate the economic impact of completing the internal 
market in financial services. 
1.3 For clarity and ease of reference, the organisation of the main 
report is described below and a brief outline of each section is 
given in this executive summary. 
In Section 2 a review of methodological issues is presented. 
This is followed in Section 3 by a macroeconomic and 
sectoral analysis with the object of evaluating the 
importance of financial services to eight jFonomies of the 
Community under review. 
/ 
In Section 4 an overview of the pres7nt structure of the 
financial services market is set o~. The focus of this 
section is on regulatory barrier~which have the potential 
to affect the establishment of t1nancial service 
institutions in overseas market's or the potential to affect 
cross border trade directly. 
1 
In Section 5 an analysis of the scope for quantitative 
assessment of the effects of completing the internal market 
is considered. 
J 
Finally, in Section 6, ~he estimation of the economic impact 
of integration is presented. Detailed analyses relating to 
a number of important ~reas of the study have been included 
as appendices to the ~in report. 
I 
1.4 In view of the complex and sensitive nature of the information 
and analysis in this r:~rt it is important that disclosure of 
specific parts of theii udy are not made out of context. 
I 
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It should be appreciated that certain key assumptions were made 
in the conduct of our field work and in the preparation of this 
report. These include, inter alia, the assumption that the 
central aim of the Commission is to create a framework for a free 
and competitive internal market in financial services whilst at 
the same time ensuring adequate standards of consumer protection. 
The intention is that this will be achieved through a legislative 
programme which is aimed at stimulating cross-border trade and 
encouraging investment and establishment in foreign territories. 
It is also envisaged that the economic climate thus created will 
lead to an intensified interest in Pan-European acquisition and 
merger opportunities and that this will need to be supported by 
an appropriate regime of freedom for capital movements. Our 
analysis considers the likely economic consequences for the 
Community of this scenario. 
An evaluation of the likelihood of progress towards an integrated 
financial services market or the likely responses from national 
governments to opening up of the financial markets is outside of 
the scope of the study. Similarly, an evaluation of the likely 
response of producers in different countries to the assumed 
integrated market is outside the scope of this economic study. 
It should also be recognised that in the achievement of the 
economic goals, summarised above, any significant changes in the 
pattern of market concentration may need to be k1~pt under review 
fn the early stages leading up to the following liberalisation in 
order to alleviate market distortion effects whieh undermine the 
aims of the 1992 initiative. This will have a wide range of 
implications for Commission competition policy, for example in 
the approaq~ adopted towards multi-national industry groupings 
and the balance of investment opportunities betwE~en Community and 
external providers of financial services. 
\ 
We would like to ~nk the Steering Committee for advice provided 
to the consultancy t~ during the course of the study and for 
input made by extemal\advisors. We would also like to thank all 
individuals and institu~ions who provided info~Ltion, during 
this study. '\ 
\ 
' 
\ 
\ 
' \ 
\ 
\ 
\ 
\ 
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SECTION 2: METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES 
2.1 The purpose of this section is to resolve three methodological 
problems: 
0 
0 
0 
to provide a comprehensive operational definition of 
financial services. 
to Jentify producers and users of financial services. 
to clarify the link between liberalising the market for 
financial services and liberalising capital movements. 
2.2 Definition of Financial Services 
It was agreed with the Commission at the outset that financial 
services should be defined to include the provision of a 
financial service or the sale of a financial product or both and 
that the following activities should be included in the 
definition. 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
international, commercial and private banking 
corporate financial services 
offshore banking and money market activities 
braking 
funds management 
assurance, insurance, and reinsurance 
consumer credit 
building societies 
stock exchange services. 
A description of the financial products and services covered by 
each of these activities is outlined in the main report. The 
activities can be grouped under three headings: 
0 
0 
0 
banking and credit services 
insurance services 
brokerage and securities services 
These categories have been used, as far as possible, throughout 
the study, and particularly in the macroeconomic and sectoral 
analysis and in the analysis of the market. In the examination 
of the scope for a quantitative assessment of the effects of 
completing the internal market, representative services have been 
selected from each of the above groups of activities. 
2.3 Identification of Producers and Users 
It was necessary from a methodological viewpoint to decide how to 
treat the identification of producers and users in the sectoral 
analysis. It was also clear that, in identifying producers and 
users of financial services, segmental differences between 
countries would need to be recognised. In addition it was 
decided that only primary users could be identified. 
- 1 ? -
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This methodological decision implied the need for sectoral 
analysis to be undertaken on a country-by-country basis. It also 
highlighted the need to attempt to identify differences in the 
type and range of services offered by different institutions in 
different member countries. This issue is considered at some 
length under the section on macroeconomic and sectoral analysis 
in the main report. It should also be appreciated that in the 
analysis of the economic impact of integration in Section 6, 
consumers are defined as including all consumers including 
private, commercial and institutional groups. 
2.4 The Link Between Trade in Financial Services and Capital 
Movements 
An important methodological issue examined related to the link 
between trade in financial services and exchange controls. In 
view of its importance and complexity we consider this issue in 
detail in Appendix 3 of the main report. The main question 
addressed is the extent to which freedom of trade or overseas 
establishment can yield consumer benefits despite the persistence 
of controls on capital movements. The Commission's objective is 
a regime of freedom of capital movements as well as freedom to 
establish and trade, with,home country prudential regulation 
being recognised in the first place. However it is important to 
assess also the consequences of a partial or intermediate stage 
in the achievement of this objective. 
Our analysis indicates that maintenance of strict exchange 
controls may well inhibit the full consumer benefits from freedom 
of trade and freedom of establishment. This is principally 
because financial institutions will not be able to take full 
advantage of the economies of a wider market. Although an 
attempt to maintain a regime of strict regulation may well run 
into difficulties under a system of home country control, it is 
not certain that these regulations will create competitive 
disadvantages for home financial institutions. Market 
segmentation rather than global loss of competitiveness may often 
be the consequence. 
Under host country regulations, the result of freedom of 
establishment may be very little improvement where uncompetitive 
market structures exist or may result. In contrast, the prospect 
for welfare gains from a liberalisation of exchange controls does 
not seem to depend so heavily on freedom of establishment, at 
least for financial services of a wholesale type. 
At present the persistence of exchange controls prevents the free 
flow of capital from moving to the countries with the highest 
rates of return. Even if there were no differences between the 
efficiency of the financial services in various member states, 
the removal of exchange controls could therefore be expected to 
have beneficial effects. 
- 13 
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SECTION 3: MACROECONOMIC AND SECTORAL ANALYSIS 
3.1 In this section aggregate data is presented for each of the 
countries in the study to indicate the relative economic 
importance of the financial services sector. Data will be found 
covering: 
employment; 
value added; 
output; 
In the main report we also present information on the demand for 
financial services by households, companies and government. In 
addition data is presented on external transactions in financial 
services and on the profitability of the banking and insurance 
sectors. 
3.2 Employment in Financial Services 
Total Employment 
Table 3.1 shows that employment in the banking, finance and 
insurance sectors in the countries studied exceeded 3.1 million 
in 1985. Banking and finance employed in excess of 1.7 million; 
and there were more than 700,000 employed in insurance (Note 1). 
Banking, finance and insurance represented 3.5 per cent of total 
employees in the eight countries in 1985. Individually, most 
countries were close to this average except Luxembourg at 7.7 per 
cent and Italy at 2.5 per cent. 
Table 3.1: Employment in Banting and Insurance by Country 
1985 (See Note 2) 
Employment ( 1 000) 
Country 
Banting 
and Finance Insurance Total 
Total as % of 
Total Employees 
B 89 30.0 119 3.9 
D 604 230 834 3.7 
ES n.a. n.a. 292 3.9 
F 448 154 602 3.4 
I n.a. n.a. 379 2.5 
L 9.9 0.9 11 7.7 
NL 111 42 153 3.5 
UK 527 245 772 3.6 
TOTAL 3,162 3.5 
Source: Statistical Office of the European Commission (S.O.E.C.) 
Notes: (1) These figures exclude Italy and Spain for which there 
is no breakdown between employment in insurance and 
banking. _ 
(2) These data exclude agents not acting as principals in 
the financial sector. 
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3.3 Value Added 
In the subsequent economic analysis, value added represents the 
sum of compensation of employees and profits accruing to the 
resources employed. It is an important indication of the 
economic significance of financial services. The table below 
shows value added for credit and insurance. 
In the National Accounts data, transactions are classified by 
branch and by sector. Branches consist of units of homogeneous 
production engaged in the production of a single product or group 
of products and sectors are based on the institutional 
arrangements in force. The sectoral data shows a breakdown 
between credit and insurance and is broadly comparable with the 
employment data. Data on value added by both branch and sector 
are shown in the table below. The data on value added is 
provisional and may be subject to revisions. 
In 1985, value added at market prices in credit and insurance on 
the basis of branch data represented 6.7 per cent of GDP. The 
countries with the highest contribution were Luxembourg (14.0%) 
and the UK (12.6%). The lowest percentages were in France 
Netherlands and Germany. 
Table 3.2: Value Added in Credit and Insurance in 1983 & 1985 
Country 
B 
D 
ES 
F 
I 
L (Note 1) 
NL 
UK 
Total 
1985 
ECUm 
(Branch) 
5,966 
44,417 
13,929 
29' 277 
26,998 
535 
8,537 
70,240 
199,899 
(1) 1982 data 
Source: S.O.E.C. 
% GDP 
5.9 
5.5 
6.1 
4.5 
5.6 
14.0 
5.4 
12.6 
6.7 
1983 
ECUm 
(Branch) 
4,442 
40,925 
8,889 
22,156 
24,051 
535 
8,049 
53,896 
162,943 
% GDP 1983 % GDP 
(ECUm) 
(Sector) 
4.9 4,584 5.1 
5.7 41,874 5.7 
5.1 9,131 5.1 
3.9 28,462 4.9 
6.0 25,027 6.3 
14.0 535 14.0 
5.4 8,207 5.5 
11.2 30,004 5.9 
6.2 147,824 5.6 
1 C)-
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3.4 Output/Turnover in Financial Services 
In this analysis a number of turnover measures are related to GDP 
as further indicators of the significance of financial services 
in each member state. 
Table 3. 3: Insurance Premiums, Bank Loans Outstanding 
and Stock Market Capitalisation as % of GDP 
Country 
Insurance 
Premiums 
1984 
B 3.9 
D 6.6 
ES 2.5 
F 4.3 
I 2.2 
L 1.1 
NL 6.1 
UK 8.1 
Bank Loans 
1984 
Stock Market 
Capitalisation (Note 2) 
142 (Note 1) 92 
139 89 
99 69 
93 (Note 1) 85 
96 75 
6,916 11,125 
130 165 
208 149 
Source: S.O.E.C, Sigma, O.E.C.D., F.I.B.V 
(1) 1982 data 
(2) End 1986 data 
Table 3.3 shows that relative to GDP the banking and securities 
markets were by far the largest in Luxembourg and that the 
insurance market relative to GDP was largest in the UK. 
- 10 -
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SECTION 4: ANALYSIS OF THE PRESENT STRUCTURE OF THE FINANCIAL 
SERVICES MARIETS 
4.1 This section focuses on regulatory barriers and how they are 
implemented. In particular, attention is given to those barriers 
affecting the establishment of a financial service in a foreign 
state and affecting trade directly. In this section we use 
"foreign" to refer to other European Conununity countries as well 
as to countries outside the EC. 
4.2 Regulatory Barriers to Trade and Establishment in Banking 
In general there are no overt barriers to the establishment of 
foreign banks in the countries surveyed. 
Foreign banks must in general comply with the same procedures as 
domestic banks. This does not imply that successful entry by a 
foreign bank is easy since the costs involved in meeting the 
requirements for establishment of branches and subsidiaries may 
be considerable. There is however control over the acquisition 
of domestic banks by foreign entities in all the countries in the 
study and some details of licensing requirements in each country 
are outlined in the main report. 
In all countries except the UK, branches of banks are required to 
maintain their own minimum endowment capital. Some countries 
also impose solvency ratios. While it has not proved feasible to 
quantify the impact of differences in such ratios a study carried 
out by the Economists Advisory Group reflected a consensus in the 
banking world that lack of harmonis~tion in this area constituted 
a barrier to trade. 
r,iorcoverr there are often restrictions on the services loJhich may 
be offered by a branch or subsidiary of a foreign bank. 
The overall conclusion drawn in this section is that barriers lie 
not in overt rules or practices but in national practices that 
apply equally to all banks. Clearly differences in national 
practices may make some countries more attractive than others for 
foreign banks wishing to establish operations. 
4.3 Regulatory Barriers to Trade and Establishment in Securities 
Exchange controls may be a significant barrier in this market 
sector. Many of the ope~ators in this market are banks and the 
points made earlier in relation to freedom of trade and 
establishment in banking apply equally. 
- 17 -
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The major obstacle to establishing a presence in a foreign 
securities market would appear to be regulations which prevent 
foreigners being licensed as brokers. However, this may not be a 
significant drawback if securities may be dealt directly between 
banks. Some difficulties may be encountered for companies which 
wish to offer only security trading, in markets such as Germany 
and Belgium, where full banking licenses can only be obtained if 
a full range of services is offered. There are some signs of an 
easing in this position though. There are also restrictions on 
the establishment of offices to solicit secondary market business 
and on dealing directly with the public to execute such business. 
In addition to exchange controls there are some restrictions on 
the balance sheet holdings of foreign securities. In addition, 
in a small number of countries discriminatory taxes are levied on 
purchases of foreign securities. 
4.4 Regulatory Barriers to Trade and Establishment in Insurance 
The position in insurance is similar to that in banking. In 
general there is freedom to establish but restriction on trade 
without establishment. 
Generally a permanent presence is required in the importing 
country in order to sell insurance. This position may change 
following a recent case brought to the Court of Justice by the 
Commission. Compulsory insurances are exempt from the ruling but 
member states may insist that insurers have a permanent presence. 
Some of the eight countries again have discriminatory tax 
measures against foreign insurers. 
4.5 Exchange Control Restrictions on Trade in Financial Services 
Free movement of capital is allowed in Germany, the Netherlands, 
Belgium and Luxembourg, although there are reporting and 
authorising procedures in force for certain transactions. France 
and Italy are in the process of liberalising controls while they 
remain in Spain. Exchange controls have been removed in the UK. 
As we indicated earlier, exchange controls form an important 
barrier to trade in financial services where they continue to be 
applied. 
- 19. 
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SECTION 5. QUANTIFICATION OF THE EFFECTS OF REGULATIONS 
5.1 Introduction and Review of Approaches 
The object of this section is to determine the scope for a 
quantitative assessment of the effects of completing the internal 
market in financial services. In particular, the section provides 
quantitative measures of the effect of regulation, and of the lack of 
Community wide competition. 
In the main report we present a quantification of the impact of 
regulation on the basis of a set of prices for selected financial 
services and products. We believe, however, that such an approach is 
on its own not sufficient and we have therefore obtained additional 
measures of the effects of regulation from other sources. 
In attempting to quantify the effects of regulation we considered a 
wide range of approaches including the following: 
Comparative prices of specific products/services; 
Value added/output ratios; 
Survey data on net margins; 
Indirect measures of impact of specific regulations. 
A case study of the impact of deregulation. 
The rationale and the limitations of each of the above approaches 
are discussed below. 
(1) Comparative Prices of Specific Products/Services 
In reviewing comparative prices as a measure of the effect of 
regulation or market segmentation, there are both conceptual and 
technical difficulties to be resolved. 
A conceptual difficulty with using price differences as a measure 
of the effect of regulation is indicated by the fact that there 
are significant price differences within national markets 
although suppliers in these markets are faced with the same 
regulations. It is, therefore, unlikely that the removal of 
regulatory barriers to trade would result in a single price. It 
is also important to realise that there are market as well as 
regulatory barriers to trade. An example of a market barrier is 
the information required to gain entry. We formed the opinion 
that price divergence within countries may well be due to 
information barriers as well as to legislative obstacles. ~ 
19 -
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In addition to this conceptual difficulty there are severe 
technical difficulties in measuring prices. Firstly, there is 
the question of comparability of products. For example the price 
of motor insurance for the same class of insurance etc may differ 
as a reflection of differences in the underlying risk. The issue 
of comparability of price data is particularly important and the 
difficulties in obtaining strictly comparable data are discussed 
in detail in the main report. A second problem arises due to the 
effect of cross subsidies between financial services products. 
In our analysis, we have selected a range of products/services in 
such a way as to attempt to minimise these factors. There are 
also severe practical difficulties in obtaining price comparisons 
as relative prices can change rapidly and clearly given 
significant price variations within countries there is also a 
danger that price divergences between countries may reflect 
sampling errors. 
(2) Value Added/Output Ratios 
In considering value added to output ratios we have attempted to 
quantify the effect of market segmentation by measuring the 
resources used in producing a unit of output. In many service 
industries the ambiguity of the concept of output, and the 
difficulty of measuring it, has often led statisticians to turn 
to resource inputs themselves in order to overcome these 
difficulties. It should be appreciated that the measure of 
output used has to be conceptually independent of inputs. 
There are also deficiencies in using value added/output ratios as 
an indication of efficiency and these are discussed in detail in 
the main report. These deficiencies are likely to be 
particularly severe in making comparisons between individual 
financial institutions. Aggregation over all institutions, and 
the use of time series for cross-country comparison will tend to 
reduce limitations in this respect. Notwithstanding the residual 
problems which have been recognised we believe this provides a 
useful aggregate check on the micro data. 
(3) Survey Data on Net Margins 
An alternative approach to exam1n1ng prices is to look at differences 
in the costs or profits obtained by different financial institutions 
in the different countries. In particular, an examination of margins 
in the banking sector and of cost-to-output ratios in such 
sectors as insurance can be of use in evaluating the effect of 
regulations. This represents a micro cross-check on the value 
added to output ratios considered above. 
- 20 -
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(4) Indirect Measures of Impact of Specific Regulations 
It was recognised at the outset of the study that the impact of 
selected specific regulations could also provide useful input 
into the quantification of the effect of regulation. This, 
however, would only measure static effects. In addition, it 
would only measure the impact on institutions who decided to "pay 
the cost" of meeting the regulations. Our judgement is that such 
an approach is very unlikely to prove worthwhile. For 
illustrative purposes we have however reported on the results of 
selective research on the impact of specific regulations in the 
banking and insurance sectors. 
(5) Case Studies of Impact of Deregulation within a National Boundary 
A potential approach to quantifying the effect of regulation is 
offered by individual case studies on the price impact of 
deregulation within a national boundary. This could be a useful 
additional source of input into the evaluation of the effects of 
removing or reducing regulations in Europe. We have, therefore, 
taken as a case study the example of deregulation of the UK 
securities business. 
The remainder of this section sets out the quantified data for 
comparative prices, value added/output ratios, survey data on net 
margins, indirect measures of the impact of specific regulations, and 
the case study of impact of deregulation. 
-· 21 -
- 13 -
5.2 Quantification of Comparative Prices 
In the following paragraphs we present a quantification of 
comparative prices for a range of financial services products 
in the eight countries. We present details of prices in the 
banking and credit sectors, in insurance, and in the securities 
and brokerage sectors. In particular, we analyse details of 
prices for the following services/products: 
cost of commercial loans; 
cost of consumer credit; 
cost of mortgages; 
cost of credit cards; 
cost of purchasing foreign exchange drafts and travellers 
cheques; 
cost of letters of credit; 
cost of current bank accounts; 
cost of term insurance; 
cost of home and contents insurance; 
cost of motor insurance; 
cost of fire and theft insurance; 
cost of public liability insurance; 
and cost of stock exchange transactions. 
Our selection of products was designed and agreed with the 
Commission to overcome some of the difficulties referred to 
earlier in Section 5.1. 
Many of the prices have been obtained directly via a sample of 
financial providers. As we have already noted however, it is 
important to treat comparative price data with care. Prices of 
financial services change frequently and the data presented 
represents a "snap-shot" at a given point in time. Also of 
critical importance is that for a wide range of financial 
services there is a substantial variation in possible prices on 
offer, and in many cases there is cross-subsidisation between 
different financial services. 
·- 22 -
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Another important issue relates to how representative the chosen 
products are, of the output of the financial services sector as a 
whole. This is a difficult issue to judge but given the large 
number of different services chosen which cover both private 
consumer and commercial services in the banking, insurance and 
securities sectors, these services are believed to be broadly 
representative. The services covered do not include advisory 
services. The reason for this is methodological in that it was 
not felt possible to obtain prices for standardised advisory 
services. The sources of the data presented are indicated. 
It should be appreciated that we have attempted to present 
information in a standard manner for the same financial services 
products in different countries. In certain cases regulatory or 
market practices have prevented this and these cases are 
discussed in our main report. We have also attempted to 
standardise the presentation for different types of financial 
services products. 
A key issue in interpreting the price data is that we have 
attempted to focus on the cost of the service provided by the 
financial institutional and have adjusted the figures to remove 
the influence of interest rate differentials. The impact of 
interest rate differentials is considered separately in 
Section 6. In the table overleaf we define the financial 
services and products for which prices were obtained. As many of 
the products represent the margin over wholesale money market 
rates the prices do not represent the cost to the consumer. This 
is consistent with our economic modelling requirements. The data 
would not be suitable as a definitive measure of consumer prices 
in different countries. 
- 23 --
"Standard" Service 
Banking Services 
Commercial Loans 
Consumer Credit 
Credit Cards 
Mortgage 
Commercial Draft 
Travellers 
Cheques 
Current Cheque 
Account 
Letter of Credit 
Insurance Services 
Term Insurance 
Home Insurance 
Motor Insurance 
Commercial Fire 
and Theft 
Public Liability 
Cover 
Brokerage Services 
Private Equity 
Transactions 
Private Gilts 
Transactions 
Institutional 
Equity 
Transactions 
- 15 -
TABLE 5.1 
Description of Service 
Annual cost to a medium size firm of a commercial 
loan of 250,000 ECUs. Measured as excess over 
inter-bank rates. 
Annual cost of consumer loan of 500 ECUs. Excess 
interest rate over money market rates. 
Annual cost assuming 500 ECU debit. Excess 
interest rate over money market rates. 
Annual cost of home loan of 25,000 ECU. Excess 
interest rate over money market rates. 
Cost to a large commercial client of 
purchasing a commercial draft for 30,000 ECUs. 
Cost for a private consumer of purchasing 
100 ECU's worth of Travellers Cheques. 
Annual cost assuming 200 cheques P.A., 20 standing 
orders, 50 cash withdrawals, 20 credits. 
Cost of letter of credit of 50,000 ECUs for 
three months. 
Average annual cost of term insurance. 
Annual cost of fire and theft cover for house 
valued at 70,000 ECUs with 28,000 ECUs contents. 
Annual cost of comprehensive insurance, 1.6 litre 
car, driver 10 years experience, maximum no claims 
bonus. 
Annual cover for premises valued at 387,240 
ECUs with stock and contents at 232,344 ECUs. 
Annual premium for Engineering company with 20 
employees and annual turnover of 1.29 million 
ECUs. Includes employer liability cover. 
Commission costs of cash bargain of 
1,440 ECUs. 
Commission costs of cash bargain of 
14,000 ECUs. 
Commission costs of cash bargain of 288,000 ECUs 
Institutional Gilt 
Transactions Commission costs of cash bargains of 7.2m ECUs. 
24 
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Prices of a number of the financial services examined in the eight 
countries are presented below. Additional details are presented in 
the main report. 
Table 5. 2: Comparative "Prices" of Purchases 
of a Range of Financial Services in the Eight Countries 
Banking Services 
Commercial Loans 
Consumer Credit 
Credit Cards 
Mortgages 
Foreign Exchange 
Drafts 
Travellers Cheques 
Current Accounts 
Letters of Credit 
Insurance Services 
Term Insurance 
House Insurance 
Motor Insurance 
Commercial Fire and 
B 
4,500 
12 
94 
480 
43 
7.3 
0 
575 
380 
118 
494 
D 
5,000 
46 
84 
575 
53 
5.0 
117 
425 
225 
144 
436 
ES 
5,625 
27 
66 
800 
120 
7.0 
2 
750 
294 
135 
758 
ECU 
F 
4,375 
40 
37 
653 
63 
7.5 
10 
438 
285 
195 
413 
I 
5,125 
43 
99 
350 
50 
6.6 
240 
515 
392 
253 
942 
L 
5,000 
14 
46 
499 
54 
5.0 
8 
600 
355 
220 
671 
NL 
6,750 
26 
75 
343 
22 
7.2 
0 
550 
195 
164 
354 
UK 
6,875 
43 
61 
290 
47 
5.0 
112 
510 
150 
266 
316 
Theft 1,296 2,023 1,765 3,587 4,896 1,204 1,412 1,797 
Public Liability 
Cover 
Securities Services 
Private Equity 
Transactions 
Private Gilts 
Transactions 
Institutional Equity 
Transactions 
968 1,257 1,364 1,852 
14 11 17 9 
65 108 180 69 
1,727 2,302 3,453 1,292 
1,508 934 714 
10 11 22 
21 72 148 
2,014 2,302 1,726 
Institutional Gilt 
Transactions 21,583 5,395 8,993 8,844 10,791 3,597 4,640 
Source: Survey Results 
798 
23 
77 
719 
n/a 
1) Consumer credit in Italy assumed to be equal to the average of Germany, 
France and UK 
2) The London Gilt market is now on a net of commission basis 
3) Mortgages in Luxembourg assumed to be equal to average in other Countries 
Caution must be exercised in interpreting the above price comparisons, and 
the analysis in the report concerning cross subsidisation and the problems 
in price comparability must be noted. It is also important to stress as 
indicated earlier that many of the products represent the margin over 
wholesale money market rates and therefore the "prices" do not represent the 
cost to the consumer. This is consistent with our economic modelling 
requirements but the data would not be suitable as a measure of consumer 
prices. Prices are also exclusive of consumer taxes. 
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5.3 Value-Added to Output Ratios 
The value-added to output ratios provided in the main report 
gave some indication of the resources used to produce a unit of 
output, since value-added represents the return to labour and 
capital before allowance for depreciation and excluding 
transfers. In the case of banking, the measure of output 
generally used is loans outstanding. This is not entirely 
satisfactory since it does not take account of a number of 
elements affecting the output of banks such as differences in 
risk attaching to loans, the extent of deposit and money 
transmission services, and a number of off-balance sheet 
transactions. The comparisons made using aggregate data across 
countries tend to reduce some of these difficulties but 
nevertheless problems remain. Taking insurance as an example 
the use of premiums as a measure of output masks the problem 
that for some policies the premium may cover more than one year 
and in others may partly represent a pure investment sum. 
Insurance 
Value-added in the insurance sector does not include interest 
and dividend earnings which, for national accounts purposes, are 
regarded as transfers. The value-added to premiums ratio in 
1983 was highest in the UK at 25.5% and lowest in France at 
6.0%. However, when net interest earnings are taken into 
account the UK percentage falls to 1.1% and that of France 
rises. Belgium's percentage was highest at 32.2% in this case. 
When dividend earnings are also added to the value-added figure 
Germany emerges with the lowest ratio and Belgium remains the 
highest. 
Bank ins 
In the banking sector the value-added to loans ratio (including 
interest earnings) was lowest in the UK and the Netherlands at 
3.0% and highest in Italy at 6.3% on average over the period 
1978-84. 
5.4 Survey Data on Net Karsins/Costs 
This approach represents a micro cross-check on the value-added 
to output measures considered above. The data relating to 1982 
shows that the gross earnings margin in large banks was highest 
in the UK at 4.72% of assets and lowest in the Netherlands at 
2.9%. 
A sample of the accounts of insurance companies in different 
countries was evaluated to establish the ratio of expenses to 
premiums. Non-life insurance management expenses and 
commissions were the largest percentage of premiums in Belgium 
at 39.6% and lowest in the UK at 21.2%. 
In life insurance the percentage was highest in Spain and lowest 
in the UK though it was possible to identify life business 
separately in the published accounts for only three countries. 
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5.5 Indirect Measures of Specific Regulations 
This section summarises the main findings of studies carried out by 
EAG (1) on "the impact of prudential regulations on banking" and by 
Carter and Morgan (2) on the impact of regulation on insurance. 
Banking 
Banks in different countries may be required to observe a combination 
of minimum absolute capital requirements, gearing ratios, own 
funds/risk assets ratios, fixed asset ratios and large loan ratios. 
The EAG study indicated that it would not be possible to provide 
quantitative comparisons of the effects of these requirements but on 
the basis of the opinions of those interviewed it was felt that in 
the three major banking countries, the UK, France and Germany, French 
banks had a significant advantage over the other two. Banks in the 
UK probably enjoyed a slight competitive advantage over those in 
Germany. 
Insurance 
In life insurance the degree of regulation varied between countries. 
The supervisory authorities generally control the mortality rates to 
be used in premium calculation (apart from the UK) but controls in 
some cases cover interest rates, the calculation of expense overheads 
and the distribution of profits. The study carried out in 1986 by 
Carter and Morgan showed that the mortality rates used in the 
calculation of term insurance were in most cases 2-4 times more 
conservative than in the UK. The UK is the only country in which the 
mortality rates used are based on insured lives rather than 
population averages. As an example, pure premiums for a 20 year term 
using UK and Belgian mortality rates and 6 and 4% interest rates were 
calculated. This showed a difference of 227% of which only one 25th 
was accounted for by the interest differential. 
From this it can be seen that the measurement of the effect of 
specific regulations is difficult to quantify and more importantly, 
is likely to under-estimate the costs of "Non-Europe". 
5.6 Case Study Example of the Impact of the Deregulation 
The impact of deregulation of the London Stock Exchange has been 
taken as an example of the effects of regulation. The effect may be 
seen by examining commission rates, the number of market makers, 
equity dealing spreads and the depth of markets for different types 
of shares. These are considered in detail in the main report. 
Overall, the case study indicated that while there were small 
increases in commissions for small transactions, for the 
institutional transactions sector, commission rates fell by between 
20 and 36 per cent. It is not certain however if these price 
reductions will remain given the level of capacity in the market. 
(1) An Evaluation Of The Consequences Of The Existence Of Different 
Prudential Ratios For Competition Between Credit Institutions In The 
European Community, EAG Report 1986, Report Prepared for European 
Commission. 
(2) Carter R.L., Morgan E.V. Freedom To Offer Life Insurance Across 
EEC State Boundaries, EAG Report 1986. 
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SECTION 6: ESTIMATING THE GAINS FROM EUROPEAN ECON<IfiC INTEGRATION 
6.1 In this section we present our estimates of the gains from 
European economic integration. In particular we consider two 
aspects of this important issue. Firstly, we examine our 
estimates for the microeconomic gains from integration of 
European financial services markets. Secondly we review the 
macroeconomic welfare gains from integration of the European 
capital markets. In this connection we also consider the gains 
from risk pooling and equalisation of interest rates. 
6.2 Our estimates of the costs of "Non-Europe" are based primarily 
on assumptions of the likely movement of prices in an integrated 
financial market. Earlier in this study, data on the existing 
prices of financial products was presented. The data indicated 
a wide range of prices both within and between countries and it 
is clear that while prices for certain financial services were 
lower in some countries, the prices of other services were 
higher than in the other countries examined. Later in this 
section we consider our assumptions for the likely prices of 
financial services in an integrated market. 
6.3 At present in a non-integrated Europe the various barriers to 
the completion of the internal market in financial services 
result in different prices being charged in the different 
countries. The net effect is as if there were a set of tariffs 
protecting the producers of financial services in the high price 
countries. 
6.4 From this perspective the evaluation of welfare gains (i.e. net 
economic benefits) from the completion of the internal market 
involves an exercise similar to the calculation of the gains (in 
terms of consumer surplus, etc.) from a move to free trade, or 
the establishment of a customs union. 
6.5 In our main report we consider in detail a methodology for 
moving from assumptions of the likely range of future price 
changes to economic welfare gains. In this executive summary we 
focus on our assumptions for future prices and the results of 
our calculations. 
Future Price Levels 
6.6 The level by which prices of financial services will change in 
an integrated European market is by definition speculative and 
difficult to verify. Our analysis in this report is intended to 
provide a basis for producing estimates of the potential change 
in the value added element of prices that could be expected. In 
particular our estimates are guided by a number of factors 
including data on existing price differentials, value 
added/output ratios, net margins/cost data and the extent of 
specific regulations. Our future price scenarios are also 
guided by the case study example of the impact of deregulation 
within national boundaries. 
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The study of price reductions resulting from deregulation within 
a national market summarised earlier, referred to the UK 
securities market. This case study indicated that while there 
were small increases in commission for small transactions, for 
institutional transactions commission rates fell by between 
twenty and thirty six per cent. In arriving at an estimate of 
the costs of barriers, we have utilised scenarios where prices 
for the financial services sector are assumed to decline by 
between one and twenty six per cent in different countries. 
Again we stress that these assumed "price" reductions do not 
represent absolute reductions in consumer prices as in the 
banking sector they are based on prices or costs in excess of 
money market rates. The implied reduction in real consumer 
prices in these cases would be significantly less than the 
assumed price reductions used in this study. In view of the 
difficulties inherent in estimating likely price movements we 
have also considered in the main report the sensitivity of our 
findings to alternative price assumptions. 
It is possible to construct a wide range of possible price 
scenarios which could emerge in an integrated market. For 
example one could assume that prices would fall to the level of 
the lowest existing price observation. Indeed there would be 
some grounds for assuming that the expanded market opportunities 
presented by an integrated European financial services market 
would enable prices to fall below existing lowest prices, as 
economies of scale are exploited. In this study we have taken a 
more conservative estimate of the potential gains which could be 
secured. 
Our price scenarios are based on assuming a range of price 
reductions. In order to highlight the reasoning behind our 
future price scenarios it is useful to consider the existing 
price differentials. The points raised regarding relative 
prices in Section 5 of the report should be noted in 
interpreting the analysis in this section. In the main report 
we also analyse some of the other factors referred to in 6.6 
above. 
6.10 The price comparisons are based on assuming for each category of 
financial services (e.g. banking, insurance and securities) a 
weighting for each of the financial services prices presented 
within the category, based on estimates of the relative economic 
importance of the particular service. Details of the weighting 
system used are presented in the main report. 
6.11 In table 6.1 comparative "prices" for financial services in the 
eight countries are presented. In particular we present 
calculations of differences in prices compared with the average 
of the four lowest price observations together with figures for 
the implied potential price falls and assumed potential price 
falls. The costs of current accounts are excluded in 
recognition of the widespread belief that these are very 
significantly affected by cross subsidisation. The cost of 
credit cards and letters of credit used represent the particular 
examples referred to and defined in Section 5. 
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6.12 The comparative costs of insurance products and stock exchange 
transactions are also presented in the table overleaf. These 
include both consumer, company and institutional transactions. 
The particular examples used in the calculations were described 
and defined in Section 5. 
6.13 We believe the assumption that prices would fall to the average 
of the four lowest observations as measured by the implied 
weighted price reductions would still tend to overestimate the 
economic gains from integration. There are a number of reasons 
for this including the fact that the value added figures used in 
our economic model include value added incurred in producing 
financial services which are sold outside of the Community and 
also services at present subject to intense international 
competition. 
6.14 In addition, differences in prices undoubtedly reflect in part 
differences in underlying risks which are unlikely to be-
affected by European integration. 
6.15 In view of these factors and the recognised difficulties in 
obtaining comparative price figures we have therefore scaled 
down these implied price reductions to arrive at the assumed 
reductions which have been used in our estimates of economic 
welfare gains. In particular we have used a range of 
assumptions of between 40-60 per cent of the implied price 
reductions. We have also in our estimates of the economic gains 
from integration constructed a range of assumed potential price 
falls of five percentage points above and below our estimates. 
As indicated earlier these are based on our analysis of existing 
price levels and are also guided by our analysis of margins, 
cost structures and the extent of specific regulations. A more 
detailed analysis of the reasoning behind these price 
assumptions is included in our main report. 
Results of Impact of European Integration 
6.16 Using the assumptions regarding future price changes it is 
possible to estimate the impact of European integration. In the 
table on page 24, estimates of the economic impact of European 
integration of financial services as measured by the change in 
consumer surplus are presented for each of the countries 
examined. The estimates indicate that the gain in consumer 
surplus would be in the range ll-33bn ECUs. The lower estimate 
is based on a lower assumed price reduction while the higher 
estimate is based on a scenario of greater price reductions. 
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6.17 In the event of the consumer surplus gains being used as a 
measure of economic welfare gains we believe it would be prudent 
to use the mid-point in the range as the upper estimate of 
economic welfare gains. The results represent a snapshot of the 
position before and after integration. The figures also assume 
a competitive market structure after integration and indicate 
the net gains in consumer surplus country-by-country but do not 
make any assumptions about the redistributive effects between 
producers in different countries. Thus the results indicate the 
benefits to the consumers in each country and the overall gain 
in consumer surplus to the Community, after all of the benefits 
of integration have been achieved. 
Table 6.2 
Estimated Gain in Consumer Surplus Resulting from Integration of 
European Credit and Insurance Markets 
B 
D 
ES 
F 
I 
LU 
N 
UK 
ECUs M 
366 - 1,081 
2,264 - 7,074 
2,376 - 4,040 
2,105 - 5,330 
2,516 - 5,542 
16 - 73 
86 796 
1,415 - 8,837 
11,144 - 32,710 
Mid Point* 
Estimate 
685 
4,619 
3,189 
3,683 
3,996 
44 
347 
5,051 
21,614 
* Mid point refers to mid point in assumptions regarding price 
range and not the mid point in estimated gain in consumer 
surplus. 
6.18 The extent to which the above estimates represent a gain in 
economic welfare depends on the assumptions made regarding the 
extent to which the price reductions used result in a loss in 
producer surplus. The particular framework which we have adopted 
would indicate that it would be necessary to subtract from this 
gain in consumer surplus some estimates of the likely decline in 
producer surplus. In so doing we recognise that it could be 
argued that this results in an underestimation of the gains from 
European economic integration but consider that a conservative 
approach is more likely to represent the real situation as 
barriers are removed. In an appendix to our main report we 
present a methodology for estimating economic welfare gains. 
Macroeconomic Implications 
6.19 In addition to estimating the microeconomic impact of integration 
of the European financial services sector it is also necessary to 
consider the macroeconomic welfare gains from integration of 
European Capital markets. In particular it is important to 
consider the gains from risk pooling, and equalisation of 
interest rates. These issues are summarised in subsequent 
paragraphs. 
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Conclusions Regarding Risk Pooling by Capital Markets 
6.20 Our analysis of risk pooling indicates that the European capital 
markets are not integrated in the sense that rates of return do 
not fully reflect all diversification possibilities. 
Furthermore, investors who are restricted to domestic assets can 
not achieve as good a trade-off between risk and return as if 
there were freedom to choose from foreign assets. 
6.21 In terms of the importance of greater portfolio diversification 
possibilities, some estimates can be obtained by computing the 
expected rate of return on an internationally diversified 
portfolio with the same risk as the actual risk of the market 
portfolio in the particular country. The difference between this 
and the actual market return represents the annual gain in rate 
of return which could result from integration. For example, 
using data from previous research (Levy & Sarnat) an 
appropriately levered international portfolio could generate mean 
returns almost three-quarters as high as the mean return on the 
EEC-6 market portfolio, for the same risk. In fact research 
indicates a mean levered return, for the same risk, over 11% per 
annum higher. More recent US research, referring to the US 
rather than EEC-6, also suggests very substantial gains from 
international diversification. 
Equalisation of Risk Free Rates 
6.22 At present the existence of exchange controls prevent the free 
flow of capital from moving to the countries with the highest 
rates of return. Even if there were no differences between the 
efficiency of the financial services industries in the various 
Member States, the removal of exchange controls could be expected 
to have beneficial effects through the convergence of real 
interest rates. 
6.23 Given information on the marginal efficiency of capital and the 
real interest rates prevailing in the different countries, it is 
possible to quantify the gains from a move to common interest 
rates. A caveat should be recognised in respect of the 
assumption that the removal of exchange controls would 
necessarily equalise the real rates of interest across Europe. 
Until there is a much tighter exchange rate mechanism in the EMS, 
and one covering all of the countries, convergence of real 
interest rates will remain imperfect. In order to consider the 
potential benefits it is nevertheless useful to consider the 
economic impact of an equalisation of interest rates, resulting 
from the integration of European capital markets. 
6.24 The size of the welfare gains to be achieved from equalisation of 
real interest rates depends both on the size of the differences 
and on the responsiveness of the demand for capital to interest 
rate changes in different countries. 
1. Levy, Sarnat "International Diversification of Investment 
Portfolios" American Economic Review 1970. 
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6.25 The table below shows estimates, for real interest rates, of the 
responsiveness of the demand for capital to a one percentage 
point decline in the real cost of capital and deviations from the 
equilibrium real interest rate. The equilibrium rates are 
derived on the basis of an assumption that interest rates would 
tend over time to equalise. This analysis is based largely on 
O.E.C.D. (1) research and is described in detail in the main 
report. It is important to stress that real interest rate 
reductions will also affect consumer's income and welfare. 
Table 6.3 
Welfare Gains from the Equalisation of Real Interest Rates 
Real Interest Rates Changes Deviations From Deviations 
Rates 1986 in Demand Equilibrium From Long 
Short Long for Short Term Term 
Term Term Capital Interest Interest 
* ECU BN Rate Rate 
Percentage Points 
1 2 3 4 5 
B 9.4 6.9 16 1.3 0.8 
D 7.6 6.4 135 -0.4 0.3 
ES 5.7 3.6 33 -2.3 -2.5 
F 8.6 6.3 80 0.6 0.2 
I 8.8 6.2 104 0.7 0.8 
L 9.4 6.9 0.6 1.3 0.8 
NL 8.2 7.4 28 0.2 1.3 
UK 7.9 5.9 96 -0.1 -0.2 
* As a result of a 1 percentage point decline in interest rates. 
Sources: Real Interest Rates - Central Banks 
6.26 The potential welfare gains from equalisation of interest rates 
can be calculated using the deviations of real interest rates 
from equilibrium (columns 4 + 5 above), the estimates of the 
change in the demand for capital shown (column 3) and using the 
formula outlined in our main report for the approximation of the 
loss of non-integration. In view of the primary focus of this 
study on the microeconomic gains and the nature of the 
methodology described above we have not presented the results of 
the macroeconomic gains of interest rate equalisation in this 
report. The results using this methodology, however, indicate a 
much smaller welfare gain compared with our estimates of 
microeconomic benefits. 
(1) See "Internationalisation of Financial Markets: Some 
Implications for Macroeconomic Policy and for the Allocation of 
Capital". Furao, M. Hanozaki, M; OECD Working Paper, November 
1986. 
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Conclusion 
6.27 Our research indicates that there are significant potential gains 
to be secured in terms of increases in consumer surplus and 
economic welfare, resulting from integration of the European 
financial services markets. 
As we have indicated though, extreme caution must be exercised in 
interpreting any quantification of the potential gains as the 
results will of necessity be speculative. Viewed in this context 
our estimates indicate that the gain in consumer surplus would be 
of the order of ll-33bn ECUs. If the consumer surplus 
calculations are used as a measure of the net economic welfare 
gains we believe it would be prudent to use the mid-point in the 
price range namely, 22bn, as the upper estimate of the potential 
welfare gains. These gains represent the potential microeconomic 
benefits of integration of the main European Community financial 
services markets. 
6.28 In addition to the above gains, it is also likely there will be 
macroeconomic welfare gains from integration of the European 
capital markets. The gains from risk pooling by capital markets 
could generate mean returns almost three-quarters as high as the 
return on existing market portfolios. Also of importance is the 
potential gains from equalisation of interest rates. 
6.29 The gains from integration will result from the dynamic effect of 
economic integration and not simply as a result of removing the 
costs of meeting some of the existing regulations. In all 
countries consumers will benefit from European integration but 
some producers will come under pressure to survive in the single 
market. It is important to stress however that these benefits 
would only occur in a competitive market. 
6.30 In this study the importance of financial services in terms of 
output and employment was indicated. The critical macroeconomic 
importance of capital markets was also highlighted. From an 
economic standpoint. in view of the potential benefits of 
European integration of both financial and capital markets it is 
important that steps are taken to rapidly complete the internal 
market in financial services within the framework of free 
competition between and within member states. 
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SECTION 1 : INTRODUCTION 
1.1 This report was prepared by Price Waterhouse and represents the 
results of an economic study of the costs of "Non Europe" in 
financial services. The study's geographical coverage was as 
follows: 
Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, the United Kingdom, 
the Benelux countries and Spain. 
1.2 The principal objectives of this study were to: 
assess the importance of financial services to the Community 
economy; 
analyse the present organisation of the market for financial 
services; 
evaluate the economic impact of completing the internal 
market in financial services. 
1.3 For clarity and ease of reference, the organisation of the report 
is described below. 
In Section 2 a review of methodological issues is presented. 
This is followed in Section 3 by a macroeconomic and 
sectoral analysis with the object of evaluating the 
importance of financial services to eight economies of the 
Community under review. 
In Section 4 an overview of the present structure of the 
financial services market is set out. The focus of this 
section is on regulatory barriers which have the potential 
to affect the establishment of financial service 
institutions in overseas markets or the potential to affect 
cross border trade directly. 
In Section 5 an analysis of the scope for quantitative 
assessment of the effects of completing the internal market 
is considered. 
Finally, in Section 6, the estimation of the economic impact 
of integration is presented. 
1.4 For those readers who only require an analysis of the economic 
implications of the cost of Non Europe it would be sufficient to 
read Section 5 to 6. To place the significance of financial 
services in context it would be necessary to read Section 3 while 
Seetin 4 examines the existing barriers to trade. The detailed 
analyses of a number of important areas of the study have been 
included as appendices. We would in particular draw attention to 
Appendix 3 which considers the link between trade in financial 
services and capital movement. A background report of a sectoral 
analysis of financial services was presented as a separate 
statistical annex. 
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1.5 In view of the complex and sensitive nature of the information 
and analysis in this report it is important that disclosure of 
specific parts of the study are not made out of context. 
1.6 It should be appreciated that certain key assumptions were made 
in the conduct of our field work and in the preparation of this 
report. These include, inter alia, the assumption that the 
central aim of the Commission is to create a framework for a free 
and competitive internal market in financial services whilst at 
the same time ensuring adequate standards of consumer protection. 
The intention is that this will be achieved through a legislative 
programme which is aimed at stimulating cross-border trade and 
encouraging investment and establishment in foreign territories. 
1.7 It is also envisaged that the economic climate thus created will 
lead to an intensified interest in Pan-European acquisition and 
merger opportunities and that this will need to be supported by 
an appropriate regime of freedom for capital movements. In 
addition it is assumed that a competitive market environment 
would exist after the single market is created. Our analysis 
considers the likely economic consequences for the Community of 
this scenario. 
1.8 An evaluation of the likelihood of progress towards an integrated 
financial services market or the likely responses from national 
governments to opening up of the financial markets is outside of 
the scope of the study. Similarly, an evaluation of the likely 
response of producers in different countries to the assumed 
integrated market is outside the scope of this economic study. 
1.9 It should also be recognised that in the achievement of the 
economic goals, summarised above, any significant changes in the 
pattern of market concentration may need to be kept under review 
in the early stages leading up to the following liberalisation in 
order to alleviate market distortion effects which undermine the 
aims of the 1992 initiative. This will have·a wide range of 
implications for Commission competition policy, for example in 
the approach adopted towards multi-national industry groupings 
and the balance of investment opportunities between Community and 
external providers of financial services. 
1.10 We would like to thank the Steering Committee for advice provided 
to the consultancy team during the course of the study and for 
input made by external advisors. We would also like to thank all 
individuals and institutions who provided information, during 
this study. 
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SECTION 2. ME'l'BODOLOGICAL ISSUES 
2.1 This section deals with three methodological problems which 
were identified at the outset namely: 
to provide a comprehensive operational definition of 
financial services; 
to identify the producers and users of financial 
services; 
to clarify the link between liberalising the market for 
financial services and liberalisation of capital 
movements. 
2.2 Definition of Financial Services 
In defining financial services it was agreed with the 
Commission that financial services should be defined to 
include the provision of a financial service or a sale of a 
financial product or both. In particular we decided the 
following activities should, where possible, be included: 
international commercial and private banking, corporate 
financial services, offshore banking, and money market 
activities. We decided it should also include: broking, 
funds management, assurance, insurance and reinsurance; 
consumer credit including building societies and stock 
exchange businesses. In the examination of the economic 
significance of financial services it was evident that detailed 
comparative data would not be obtainable at a very disaggregate 
level but it was decided that ·aggregate data should include as 
wide a definition of financial services as feasible. In the 
review of the effects of regulations it was possible to target in 
more specifically on some of the sub sectors identified. 
The above definition of financial services needed to be placed 
in the context of a conceptual framework. We decided that the 
most appropriate classification would be a threefold one 
comprising of banking and credit markets, the insurance 
markets and the brokerage and securities market. Our 
macroeconomic and sectoral analysis has used this 
classification where feasible. Similarly in our analysis of 
the structure of the markets we have considered regulatory 
barriers in each of these groups of financial services. 
Finally, in our quantitative assessment of the effects of 
completing the internal market we have chosen representative 
services in each of the above areas. 
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2.3 Identification of Producers and Users 
It was necessary from a methodological viewpoint to decide 
how to treat the identification of producers and users in the 
sectoral analysis. It was clear that in identifying the 
producers and users of financial services it was important to 
ensure that segmental differences between countries were 
recognised. It was also decided that only primary users 
could be identified. 
This methodological decision implied the need for the sectoral 
analysis to be undertaken on a country by country basis. It 
also highlighted the need to attempt to identify differences 
in the type and range of services offered by different 
institutions in different member countries. This issue is 
considered in the section on macroeconomic and sectoral 
analysis. In the analysis of the economic impact of 
integration of financial markets, consumers are defined as 
including all consumers including private, commercial and 
institutional groups. 
2.4 The Link Between Trade in Financial Services and Capital 
Movements 
The most difficult and important methodological issue to be 
examined related to the link between trade in financial 
services and ·exchange controls. In view of its importance and 
complexity we consider this issue in detail in Appendix 3. 
The question addressed is to what extent freedom of trade in 
financial services or freedom of establishment can yield 
consumer benefits despite the persistence of controls on 
capital movements. The Commission's objective, of course, is 
a regime of freedom of capital movements as well as freedom to 
establish and trade, with home country prudential regulation 
being recognised. However it is important to assess the 
consequences of a partial or intermediate stage in the 
achievement of this objective. 
The dichotomy between trade and capital movements is somewhat 
artificial in the context of financial services, albeit 
familiar from the world of goods, and relevant, in particular, 
to existing GATT contractual commitments. Nevertheless it is 
a dichotomy which may well have practical implications for the 
future development of the internal market, as it may be some 
time before all member states have liberalised their exchange 
controls to the extent envisaged as an objective. 
The discussion in the appendix is necessarily somewhat 
speculative, reflecting the scarcity of relevant research 
findings. Furthermore, to avoid undue pedantry, only a 
selection of issues has been touched upon. The general 
conclusion however seems clear. Maintenance of strict 
exchange controls may well inhibit the full consumer benefits 
from freedom of trade and freedom of establishment for 
financial services in Europe. This is partly because 
financial institutions will not be able to avail of the 
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economies of a wider market. Although an attempt to maintain 
a regime of strict regulation will run into difficulties 
under a system of home country control, it is not certain 
that all of these regulations will create impossible 
competitive disadvantages for home financial institutions. 
Market segmentation rather than global loss of 
competitiveness may often be the consequence. 
Under host country regulations, the result of freedom of 
establishment may be very little improvement where 
uncompetitive market structures exist or may result. In 
contrast, the prospect for welfare gains from a liberalisation 
of exchange controls does not seem to depend so heavily on 
freedom of establishment, at least for financial services of a 
wholesale or standard type. An analysis of the rationale for 
these conclusions is presented in Appendix 3. 
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SECTION 3: MACROECO!Q([C Aim SEC'l'ORAL AIW.YSIS 
3 .1 INTRODUCTION 
The objective of this section is to assess the importance of 
financial services to the Community economy. A review of 
published data sources at Community and at national central 
statistics office levels has been undertaken. In addition, the 
main associations of financial services were contacted and 
available data reviewed. This has been supplemented by numerous 
individual data sources. Every attempt has been made to tackle 
the problems of the difficulty of measuring the output of 
services and the variation of data coverage between countries. 
While significant progress has been made in these areas some data 
gaps not surprisingly remain, although it has been possible to 
provide a comprehensive overview of the economic significance of 
financial services in the eight countries. Where feasible, data 
on banking, insurance and securities markets is presented. 
In this section we present aggregate data for financial 
services, covering, for each of the countries included in the 
study; 
a) turnover or output, value added, employment and 
profitability; 
b) the demand for financial services by households, 
companies and general government; 
c) external transactions. 
The data presented in this section includes both detailed 
cross-sectional analysis as well as time series. It 
primarily represents a macroeconomic analysis although some 
sectoral data is also presented. A detailed sectoral 
analysis is however presented as a separate statistical annex 
as background information to this study. This sectoral 
analysis presents the results for banking and credit markets, 
for the insurance markets and for brokerage and securities 
markets in each of the eight countries. 
In view of the fact that different services are provided by 
different institutions in each of the countries, we have 
prepared detailed transition tables which present a 
comparative overview of the areas of competition between 
financial institutions. These tables are presented in 
Appendix 5. Appendix 6 indicates the links between the 
different groupings of financial services and institutions 
used in the report. 
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In the remainder of this section we present data on the 
economic significance of financial services in the eight 
countries. In particular we analyse employment, value added 
and compensation of employees, output/turnover, 
profitability, breakdown of aggregate demand and external 
transactions. 
3. 2 EMPLOYMENT IN FINANCIAL SERVICES 
Total Employment 
Table 3.1 shows, in column 4, that 70 per cent of employment 
in Banking, Finance and Insurance in the eight countries is 
in Germany, the UK and France. From column 5 it may be seen 
that the proportion of total employment within each country 
represented by Banking, Finance and Insurance is highest in 
Luxembourg at 7.7 per cent. The other countries, with the 
exception of Italy (2.5%), range between 3.4% and 3.9% of 
total employment. 
Total employment in the eight countries in Banking, Finance 
and Insurance totalled more than 3.1 million. This does not 
include a range of other activities described in the 
statistics as ancilliary to banking and finance which include 
brokers acting as agents. 
TABLE 3.1: EMPLOYMIHT IN BANIIRG AHD INSURANCE 
BY COOITRY1 1985 
Employment ( 1 000) 
Country (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Banking Insurance (1)+(2) (3) % of (3) as % 
and Total of Total 
Finance of (3) Employment 
B 89 30 119 4 3.9 
D 604 230 834 26 3.7 
ES n.a. n.a. 292 9 3.9 
F 448 154 602 19 3.4 
I n.a. n.a. 379 12 2.5 
L 9.9 0.9 11 0.3 7.7 
NL 111 42 153 5 3.5 
UK 527 245 772 25 3.6 
Total 3162 100 
Source: Tables which follow below. 
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Table 3.2 shows that the fastest growth in employment in 
banking finance and insurance since 1978 has been in 
Luxembourg (50%) followed by Italy (25%) and the UK (23%). 
There was almost zero growth in Spain and the remaining 
countries had total growth of between 8% and 14% over the 
seven year period. Growth in banking and insurance in 
Luxembourg was the same over the period while in the UK, 
Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands banking employment rose 
faster than that in insurance. Employment in insurance 
decreased in Germany over the period. 
TABLE 3. 2: RATE or GRcxtl'B IR l!MPI.OYKENT IR BANIIRG 
AND IRSURAHCK BY comrrRY, 1978-1985 
Country Employment growth, 
B 
D 
ES 
F 
I 
L 
NL 
UK 
(1) 1980-85 
Banking & 
Finance 
11.0 
15.0 
n.a. 
8.6 
n.a. 
50.0 
15.1 
24.0 
Source: Based on Tables Below 
Belgilllt 
% 
Insurance 
8.3 
-5.7 
n.a. 
23.9 
n.a. 
50.0 
11.9 
21.3 
Total banking 
and finance 
10.2 
8.4 
0.7 
12.2 
25.5 
50.0 
14.2 
23.1 
Employment in financial services in Belgium rose by 10 per 
cent between 1978 and 1985, banking grew slightly faster than 
insurance. Total employment in the economy fell over the 
period and there was an increase in the proportion of total 
employment accounted for by financial services from 3.4 per 
cent in 1978 to 3.9 per cent in 1985. 
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TABLE 3.3: EMPLOYKENT IN FINANCIAL SERVICES IN BELGIUM, 1978-84 
Employment ('000) 
1978 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
Banking and Finance 80.2 83.9 84.6 85.7 87.7 89.0 
Insurance 27.7 29.1 29.1 29.7 30.0 30.0 
Total Banking, Finance 
& Insurance 107.9 113.0 113.7 115.4 117.7 119.0 
Total Employees in 
Employment 3,132.4 3,099.4 3,051.2 3,007.9 2,997.5 3,017.5 
Employment in Banking, 
Finance & Insurance as 
a 7. of Total 3.4 3.6 3.7 3.8 
Source: (Statistical Office of the European Commission; 
S.O.E.C.; Employment and Unemployment 1987. 
Germany 
3.9 3.9 
Table 3.4 gives details of employment in financial services 
in Germany. It is clear that employment in insurance has 
been falling while that in banking and finance has grown. 
Employment in financial services accounted for over 3.7 per 
cent of total employment in 1985 compared to 3.4 per cent in 
1978. 
TABLE 3. 4: EMPLOYKENT IN FINANCIAL SERVICES IN GERMANY, 
1978 - 85 
Banking and Finance 
Insurance 
Total Banking, 
Finance & Insurance 
Total Employees in 
Employment 
Employment in Banking, 
Finance & Insurance 
as 7. of total 
1978 
525.4 
244.1 
769.5 
22,268 
3.4 
Employment 
1982 1983 
572.5 582.5 
231.2 231.6 
803.7 814.1 
22,742 22,333 
3.5 3.6 
Source: S.O.E.C. Employment and Unemployment 1987. 
('000) 
1984 
588.5 
230.0 
818.5 
22,352 
3.7 
1985 
604.4 
230.1 
834.5 
22,487 
3.7 
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Table 3.5 shows that the decline in employment in insurance in 
Germany between 1980 and 1985 was felt equally across the main 
sectors of the industry as indicated by employment data for 
members of the Federation of Insurance Companies in Germany. 
T.ABI.B 3.5: BKPLOYMIRT IN INSURAHCB IN GBRtWIY, 1980-85 
Employment ('000) 
1980 1983 1984 1985 
Total Insurance 202.3 200.1 198.1 197.3 
- Non-Life 104.8 103.6 102.6 102.2 
- Life 67.2 66.5 65.8 65.5 
- Health 27.5 27.2 26.9 26.8 
- Re-insurance 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.8 
Source: Federation of Insurance Cc.qNIIliea in Germany 
Table 3.6 shows that employment in banking and finance in Spain 
barely increased between 1980 and 1985. The proportion of total 
employment in banking and finance increased as employment 
elsewhere in the economy fell. 
TABLB 3.6: BMPLOYMIIIT IN lDANCIAL SBIIVICBS IN SPAIR 1 1980-85 
1980 1983 1984 1985 
·
1 000 
Banking Finance & Insurance 290 299 295 292 
Total Employees in 
Employment 8,137 7,789 7,572 7,412 
Employment in Banking and 
Finance as % of Total 3.6 3.8 3.9 3.9 
Source: S.O.E.C. Op Cit 
France 
Employment in financial services has grown less rapidly in 
France than in the other large European countries apart from 
Germany. Table 3.7 shows that while insurance grew quite 
rapidly growth in banking employment was much more sluggish. 
Banking, Finance and Insurance accounted for 3.4 per cent of 
employees in employment in 1985 compared to 3.1.per cent in 
1978. 
- 51 - - 11 -
TABLI 3. 7: BMPLOYMilft' IN PIRANCIAL SERVICES IN DAHCE, 1978-85 
Employment ('000) 
1978 1982 1983 1984 1985 
Banking and Finance 412.0 429.2 439.3 443.8 447.6 
Insurance 124.6 145.6 149.6 152.3 154.4 
Total Banking, Finance & 
Insurance 536.6 574.8 588.9 596.1 602.0 
Total Employees in Employment 17,516 17,992 18,036 17,911 17,794 
Employment in Financial 
Services as Percentage 
of Total 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.3 3.4 
Source: S.O.E.C. Op Cit 
Italy 
In Italy the proportion of total employment accounted for by 
Banking, Finance and Insurance increased very rapidly between 
1978 and 1985. The proportion of this sectors employment in 
total employment reached 2.5 per cent in 1985 compared to 2.0 
per cent in 1978. 
TABLI 3. 8: EMPLOYMBlft' IN :rnwtCIAL SD.VICIS IN ITALY, 1978-85 
Employment ('000) 
1978 1982 1983 1984 1985 
Banking, Finance 
and Insurance 302 358 362 372 379 
Total Employees in 
Employment 14,665 15,119 15,007 14,949 15,098 
Employment Credit and 
Insurance as a 
Percentage of Total 2.0 2.4 2.4 2.5 2.5 
Source: S.O.E.C., Op Cit 
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Luxembours 
Both banking and insurance grew rapidly, though the insurance 
sector is small relative to banking. Employment in financial 
services increased more rapidly in Luxembourg than in any other 
country surveyed, with a rise of SO per cent between 1978 and 
1985. Employment in banking and finance accounted for 7.7 per 
cent of employment in 1985 compared to 5.4 per cent in 1978. 
TABLE 3. 9: BHPLOYMBN'l' IN liRANCIAL SERVICES IN LUXBHBOURG, 
1978-85 
1978 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
Banking 6,600 7,900 8,400 8,900 9,400 9,900 
Insurance 600 700 800 800 800 900 
Total Banking & Insurance 7,200 7,600 9,200 9,700 10,300 10,800 
Total Employment ('000) 133.3 138.7 138.7 138.5 138.3 140.6 
Employment in Banking and 
Insurance as a percentage 
of Total 5.4 5.5 6.6 7.0 7.4 7.7 
Source: s.o.x.c. Op Cit 
Netherlands 
Table 3.10 shows that employment in the Netherlands in banking 
and finance grew at a faster pace than in insurance over the 
1978 to 1985 period. Employment in financial services 
accounted for 3.5 per cent of total employees in 1985 compared 
to 3.3 per cent in 1978. 
TABLI 3.10: BHPLOYMBNT IN liRANCIAL SERVICES IN THE NE'.l'BERUMDS 
1978-85 
1978 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
Banking and Finance 
Insurance 
Total Banking, Finance 
& Insurance 
Total Employees in 
Employment 
Employment in Banking, 
Finance & Insurance 
Services as a 7. of total 
Source: S.O.E.C Op Cit 
96.2 111.1 111.2 n.a. 112.0 110.7 
37.9 40.4 38.8 43.8 43.3 42.4 
134.1 151.5 150.0 n.a. 155.3 153.1 
4,026.0 4,161.0 4,077.1 3,976.5 4,296.8 4,407.2 
3.3 3.6 3.7 n.a. 3.6 3.5 
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United Kingdom 
Tables 3.11 and 3.12 give alternative series for employment in 
financial services in the UK. Employment in both banking and 
insurance has increased rapidly since 1978. 
The financial services sector accounted for 3.6 per cent of employees 
in employment in 1985 as compared to less than 2.8 per cent in 1978. 
TABLE 3.11: EMPLOYMENT IN FINANCIAL SERVICES IN TBB UK 2 
1978 - 1985 
Employment ('000) 
1978 1982 1983 
Banking and Finance 425 477 490 
:Staff in Building 
Societies n.a. 58 61 
Insurance 202 226 229 
Total Banking, Finance & 
Insurance 627 703 719 
Total Employees in 
Employment 22,462 21,370 20,883 
Employees in Banking, 
Finance and Insurance 2.8 3.3 3.4 
as i. of Total 
Sources: S.O.E.C. Op Cit; Building Societies Fact Book 
(1) 1979 & 1980 data available. 
{1) 
1984 
513 
63 
235 
747 
21,081 
3.5 
1985 
527 
n.a. 
245 
772 
21,290 
3.6 
Table 3.12 shows some more detail of the composition of 
employment in the banking sector from a national source. It 
shows that though banking and bill discounting has grown, more 
rapid growth was experienced in other financial institutions. 
TABLE 3.12: EMPLOYMENT IN FINANCIAL SERVICES IN THE UK, 1981-86 
Employment ('000) 
Sept 81 Sept 84 Sept 85 Sept 86 
Banking and Finance 465.3 506.7 518.3 542.3 
Banking and bill 
discounting 360.9 389.6 395.1 409.4 
Other financial 
institutions 104.4 117 .o 123.2 132.8 
Insurance, except social 
security 223.8 223.0 230.7 236.8 
Source: Department of Employment; Gazette Table 1.4 Various issues 
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3.3 VALUE ADDED AND COMPENSATION OF BHPLOYEES IN FINANCUL 
SERVICES 
An important indication of the economic significance of 
financial services is data on value added and compensation of 
employees. This is also useful as an indication of the 
resources used by the sectors. In this section we examine 
value added and compensation of employees in credit and 
insurance institutions. 
The data presented in this section is in nominal terms and given 
the inflationary period under review it is necessary to consider 
annual changes with caution. The objective of this section is 
however to present an overview of the economic significance of 
financial services and this can be seen by the ratios of value 
added and other variables as a percentage of national output. 
Where available we have utilised international published sources 
such as Eurostat or OECD and this has been supplemented by 
national sources. The usual reservations regarding these 
sources apply. 
In the national accounts transactions are classified by branch 
and by sector. Branches consist of groups of units of 
homogeneous production engaged in the production of a single 
product or group of products. Sectors are groupings of 
institutional units and their output may fall into one or more 
branches. In some of the tables data is presented by branch and 
by sector. The sectoral breakdown corresponds reasonably 
closely with the breakdown of employment data above. The credit 
and insurance branch data is reasonably close to the sum of the 
credit and insurance sectors apart from the UK and France. 
In 1985 value added at market prices in credit and insurance on 
the basis of branch data, represented 6.7 per cent of GDP. The 
countries with the highest percentage were Luxembourg (14.0%) 
and the UK (12.6%). The lowest percentages were the Netherlands, 
France and Germany. The overall picture is broadly the same on 
the basis of sector data apart from the UK where credit and 
insurance sector appears as a much lower proportion of GDP (1). 
(1) These data are provisional and may be subject to revision. 
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TABLE 3.13: VALUE ADDED IN CREDIT AND INSURANCE IN 1983 & 1985 
1985 % GDP 1983 % GDP 1983at % GDP 
ECUm 
(Branch) 
B 5,966 
D 44,417 
ES 13,929 
F 29,277 
I 26,998 
L(1) 535 
NL 8,537 
UK 70,240 
TOTAL 199,899 
5.9 
5.5 
6.1 
4.5 
5.6 
14.0 
5.4 
12.6 
6.7 
ECUm 
(Branch) 
4,442 
40,925 
8,889 
22,156 
24,051 
535 
8,049 
53,896 
162,943 
Source: Based on Tables 3.15 - 3.22 below 
(1) 1982 
(ECUm) 
(Sector) 
4.9 4,584 
5.7 41,874 
5.1 9,131 
3.9 28,462 
6.0 25,027 
14.0 535 
5.4 8,207 
11.2 30,004 
6.2 147,824 
In the tables which follow only data based on the sectoral 
analysis is shown. 
5.1 
5.7 
5.1 
4.9 
6.3 
14.0 
5.5 
5.9 
5.6 
Between 1978 and 1983 value added by the credit and insurance 
companies in the eight countries studied rose from 4.7 to 5.6 
per cent of GDP. The banking sector expanded more rapidly, 
with value added rising from 3.9 to 4.8 per cent of GDP; 
insurance value added stayed constant at 0.8 per cent of GDP. 
Compensation of employees in the credit and insurance sector 
rose by 0.3 per cent of GDP between 1978 and 1983. 
TABLE 3.14: VALUE ADDED IN CREDIT AND INSURAMCE IN KIGHT 
COUNTRIES 1 1983 
Category 
Services of Credit and 
Insurance Companies 
: credit (1) 
: insurance 
Compensation of Employees 
(Credit and Insurance) 
Value Added 
(ECU m) 
1978 1983 
79,259 147,824 
65,122 125,871 
14,137 21,953 
43,039 77,026 
Source: Based on Tables 3.15 - 3.22 below. 
% of GDP 
1978 1983 
4.7 5.6 
3.9 4.8 
0.8 0.8 
2.6 2.9 
(1) For Luxembourg credit and insurance are both in this 
heading. The data is for 1980 rather than 1978. 
Trends over time in value added are shown for each country in 
Tables 3.15 - 3.22. 
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Belgium 
In Belgium value added for banking and insurance rose 
as a proportion of GDP - from 4.2 to 5.1 per cent between 
1978 and 1983 - although in 1983 the share of GDP remained 
lower than in the other countries except France and Spain. 
TABLE 3.15: VALUE ADDED IN CUDIT AND INSURANCE IN BELGIUM, 
1978 AND 1983 
Category 1983 1985 
Value 
1978 
Value 
Added 
(ECU m) 
% GDP Added % GDP % GDP 
(ECU m) 
Services of Credit and 
Insurance Companies 3,146 4.2 4,584 
: Credit 2,604 3.5 3,979 
: Insurance 542 0.7 605 
Compensation of Employees 
(Credit and Insurance) 2,369 3.3 3,296 
Source: S.O.E.C - National Accounts by Sector, 
National Accounts by Branch. 
Germany 
5.1 
4.4 
0.7 
3.8 3.7 
Table 3.16 shows that in Germany the credit and insurance 
sectors expanded rapidly, with the share of value added in 
GDP rising from 4.4 to 5.7 per cent between 1978 and 1983. 
As in Belgium, the main source of growth was the credit 
sector. 
TABLE 3.16: VALUE ADDED IN CREDIT AND INSURANCE IN GERMANY 
1978 AND 1983 
Category 
Services of Credit & 
Insurance Companies 
Credit 
Insurance 
Compensation of 
Employees 
(Credit and 
Insurance) 
1978 
Value 
Added 
(ECU m) 
23,046 
16,706 
5,340 
11,160 
1983 
Value 
% GDP Added 
(ECU m) 
4.4 41,874 
3.3 33,902 
1.1 7,972 
2.3 17,655 
Source: S.O.E.C. - National Accounts by Sector, 
National Accounts by Branch. 
1985 
% GDP % GDP 
5.7 
4.6 
1.1 
2.4 2.4 
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Table 3.17 shows in Spain the overall share of 
credit/insurance value added in GDP fell between 1980 and 
1983 - the only other country in this position was 
Luxembourg. In Spain there was a large fall in value added 
in banking as a proportion of GDP. 
TABLE 3.17: VALUE ADDED IN CREDIT AND INSURANCE IN SPAIN 
1980 AND 1983 
Category 1980 1983 1985 
Value Value 
Added % GDP Added % GDP % GDP 
(ECU m) (ECU m) 
Services of Credit and 
Insurance Companies 9,030 5.9 9,131 5.1 
: Credit 8,567 5.6 8,638 4.8 
: Insurance 463 0.3 493 0.3 
Compensation of 
Employees (Credit 
and Insurance) 4,564 3.0 5,505 3.1 3.0 
Source: S.O.E.C. - National Accounts by Sector, 
National Accounts by Branch. 
France 
In France there was a relatively low overall rate of increase 
in value added as a proportion of GOP. However, this was due 
to a fall in value added by insurance, while the banking 
sector expanded rapidly between 1978 and 1983. 
TABLE 3.18: VALUE ADDED IN CREDIT AND INSURANCE IN FRANCE 
1978 - 1983 
Category 1978 1983 1985 
Value Value 
Added % GDP Added % GDP % GDP 
(ECU m) (ECU m) 
Services of Credit and 
Insurance Companies 15,568 4.2 28,462 4.9 
: Credit 13,695 3.7 27,046 4.6 
: Insurance 1,873 0.5 1,416 0.2 
Compensation of 
Employees (Credit 
and Insurance) 6,865 1.9 11,761 2.1 2.2 
Source: s.o.E.c. - National Accounts by Sector, 
National Accounts by Branch. 
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In Italy the contribution to GDP by the insurance sector 
remained constant but an increase in banking value added 
raised the overall contribution to GDP from 5.7 per cent in 
1978 to 6.3 per cent in 1983. 
TABLE 3.19: VALUE ADDED IN CREDIT AND INSUR.AHCE IN ITALY 
1978 AND 1983 
Category 1983 1985 
Value 
1978 
Value 
Added 
(ECU m) 
% GDP Added % GDP % GDP 
(ECU m) 
Services of Credit and 
Insurance Companies 11,828 5.7 25,027 
Credit 11' 197 5.4 23,861 
Insurance 631 0.3 1,166 
Compensation of 
Employees (Credit 
and Insurance) 6,100 2.9 12,716 
Source: S.O.E.C - National Accounts by Sector, 
National Accounts by Branch. 
Luxembourg 
6.3 
6.0 
0.3 
3.1 3.0 
In Luxembourg the contribution of credit and insurance 
institutions to GDP fell from 17.1% of GDP to 14.0% in 1982. 
However, in 1982 Luxembourg remained the country with the 
most significant banking and insurance sector relative to the 
size of the economy. 
TABLE 3. 20: VALUE ADDED IN CREDIT AND INSUR.AHCE IN 
LUXEMBOURG 1978 AND 1982 
Category 1978 1982 
Value Value 
Added % GDP Added 
(ECU m) (ECU m) 
Services of Credit and 
Insurance Companies 478 17.1 535 
Compensation of Employees 157 5.7 275 
Source: S.O.E.C. - National Accounts by Sector, 
National Accounts by Branch. 
% GDP 
14.0 
7.2 
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Netherlands 
In the Netherlands the share of GDP accounted for by value 
added in the credit and insurance sectors rose from 4.4 to 
5.5 per cent between 1978 and 1983, with banking accounting 
for all of this increase in share of GDP. The share of the 
insurance sector remained constant at 1.30 per cent of GDP. 
TABLE 3.21: VALUE ADDED CREDIT AND INSURANCE IN 
THE NETHERLANDS 1978 AND 1983 
Category 1983 
Value 
1985 1978 
Value 
Added 
(ECU m) 
% GDP Added % GDP % GDP 
Services of Credit and 
Insurance Companies 
Credit 
Insurance 
Compensation of 
Employees (Credit 
and Insurance) 
4,762 
3,324 
1,438 
2,695 
4.4 
3.1 
1.3 
2.6 
(ECU m) 
8,207 
6,244 
1,963 
4,012 
Source: S.O.E.C.- National Accounts by Sector, 
National Accounts by Branch. 
United Kingdom 
5.5 
4.2 
1.3 
2.8 2.7 
The share of value added by credit and insurance in GDP grew 
significantly in the UK between 1978 and 1983, and the UK was 
second to Luxembourg in having the largest value added as a 
proportion of GDP. As in other countries, growth was mainly 
due to the credit sector. 
TABLE 3. 22: VALUE ADDED IN CREDIT AND INSURANCE IN THE UIC 
1978 AND 1983 
Category 1978 1983 1985 
Services of Credit and 
Insurance Companies 
Credit 
Insurance 
Compensation of 
Employees (Credit 
and Insurance) (1) 
Value 
Added 
(ECU m) 
12,401 
8,551 
3,850 
12,376 
Value 
% GDP Added 
(ECU m) 
4.8 30,004 
3.3 21,666 
1.5 8,338 
5.1 31,903 
Source: S.O.E.C. - National Accounts by Sector, 
National Accounts by Branch. 
% GDP % GDP 
5.9 
4.3 
1.6 
6.6 7.1 
(1) This is branch data whereas the data in the remainder of 
the table is sectoral. Differences in branch and sector 
data for the UK have been referred to above. 
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3.4 OUTPUT/TURNOVER IN FINANCW. SERVICES 
In examining the economic significance of financial services 
it is useful to consider some output/turnover measure of 
financial services as an indication of activity. There are 
of course very significant difficulties in defining output in 
financial services. In this section we utilise a turnover 
type measure of output for the key financial services 
sectors. In particular we use premiums for the insurance 
sector, loans outstanding in the banking sector and market 
capitalisation for the security markets. 
INSURANCE 
Table 3.23 gives details of trends in gross premium income in 
insurance as a proportion of GDP in each of the countries 
between 1978 and 1984. In each of the years, (except 1980), 
the highest proportion of premium income to GDP was 
experienced in the UK. The UK average over the period was 
7.0 per cent compared with Germany and the Netherlands 
averaging 6.2 and 5.9 per cent respectively and Belgium and 
France with middle rankings of 4.0 and 3.9 per cent 
respectively. In the UK, Germany, France and the Netherlands 
there was a clear tendency for insurance gross premium income 
to rise as a proportion of GDP. 
TABLE 3. 23: GROSS INSURANCE PREMIUM INC<Jm AS A PERCENTAGE 
OF GDP 2 1978-84 
Country 7. GDP 
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 Average 
B 4.1 4.0 4.0 4.1 4.0 3.9 3.9 4.0 
D 5.6 5.8 6.6 5.8 6.5 6.6 6.6 6.2 
ES n.a. n.a. 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.5 2.5 2.6 
F 3.6 3.6 3.7 3.8 3.9 4.1 4.3 3.9 
I 2.1 2.0 2.0 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.1 
L 2.9 3.0 3.0 3.1 3.2 3.1 3.1 3.0 
NL 5.5 5.8 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.1 6.1 5.9 
UK 6.2 6.4 6.5 7.0 7.2 7.4 8.1 7.0 
Source: S.O.E.C., Sigma (Swiss Reinsurance Company} 
Premiums per head of population show a similar pattern for 
total insurance, though the highest premium is in Germany. 
Income levels per head of population are likely to have a 
significant influence on these results. Life premiums per 
head in the UK exceed those in Germany and non-life is 
corresponding lower. 
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TABLE 3. 24: PUMilJKS PER BEAD OF POPULATION IN 1984 (ECU) 
Country Total Non-Life Life 
B 352.0 254.5 97.5 
D 675.8 398.7 277.1 
ES 89.8 78.5 11.3 
F 441.6 307.8 133.8 
I 164.4 142.0 22.4 
L 349.7 268.5 81.2 
NL 544.8 299.6 245.2 
UK 596.6 243.7 352.9 
Source: Sigma 
BANKING 
Between 1978 and 1984 there was a marked rise in loans 
outstanding for each of the banking sectors. The most rapid 
rate of growth was in the UK, with loans doubling from 1980 
to 1983 and rising by a further 25 per cent in 1984. By 1984 
Germany had slipped to second place in terms of loans 
outstanding, followed by France, (on the basis of the 1982 
level) Italy and Spain. 
TABLE 3.25: BANnRG LOANS OUTSTAHDING 1 1978-84 
Country ECU billion 
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 
B 63.5 75.1 92.3 116.4 122.7 n.a. n.a. 
D 524.4 n.a. 649.1 713.1 800.9 923.8 968.6 
ES 94.6 118.1 n.a. 135.2 177.3 162.2 201.5 
F 318.3 361.7 411.8 462.8 515.6 n.a. n.a. 
I 199.7 224.6 252.6 244.8 292.2 341.2 429.4 
L 49.5 n.a. n.a. n.a. 103.9 112.5 137.7 
NL 100.1 115.9 130.2 144.1 157.4 171.0 185.4 
UK 256.9 n.a. 392.6 599.7 697.8 786.8 987.8 
Source: OECD Financial Statistics 
Table 3.26 shows that in all of the countries except Italy 
the amount of loans as a proportion of GDP increased. The 
rate of increase was marked in the UK (+81 per cent), Belgium 
(+67 per cent 1978-82), Luxembourg (56 per cent), l~ss rapid 
in Germany (19 per cent) and the Netherlands (27 per cent), 
and slow in Spain, France and Italy. By 1984 the UK had 
loans outstanding of more than twice GDP, compared with about 
140 per cent in Belgium, the Netherlands and Germany, and 
less than 100 per cent in Spain, France and Italy. In 
Luxembourg loans were almost 70 times GDP in 1984. 
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TABLE 3.26: BANKING LOANS OUTSTANDING AS A PERCENTAGE OP GDP 
1978 - 84 
Country 
1978- 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 
B 85.3 94.8 109.1 135.5 142.2 n.a. n.a. 
D 116.8 n.a. 124.5 130.7 133.5 140.9 139.0 
ES 82.5 82.7 n.a. 80.4 96.4 91.1 98.7 
F 85.3 86.2 87.3 89.8 92.9 n.a. n.a. 
I 97.1 94.6 88.7 77.0 82.2 85.3 96.0 
L 4,428 n.a. n.a. n.a. 6,502 6,334 6,916 
NL 102.5 111.3 118.0 125.0 122.4 125.9 130.2 
UK 115.2 n.a. 117.9 152.8 164.9 178.6 208.3 
Source: OECD Financial Statistics 
SECURITIES 
An indication of the importance of securities markets in the 
eight countries can be obtained by examining data on stock 
market capitalisation. In Table 3.27 details of stock market 
capitalisation are presented as a measure of output for 
securities markets. The figures show that the UK and Germany 
had the largest securities markets as measured in this way. 
As a proportion of GDP however the securities market in 
Luxembourg is very large compared to that in other countries. 
Relative to GDP the securities markets in the Netherlands and 
the UK are next largest though considerably smaller than in 
Luxembourg. 
TABLE 3.27: S'l.'OCK IWlDT CAPITALISATION - END 1986 
Country Par Value of Market Value Total % of 
Bonds & of Equity GDP 
Debentures Shares 
ECU bn 
B 68 35 103 92 
D 558 241 799 89 
ES 74 89 163 69 
F 229 143 372 85 
I 256 131 387 75 
L 599 24 623 11' 125 
NL 90 78 168 165 
UK 374 442 816 149 
Source: Federation Internationale Des Bourses des Valeurs 
Annual Report 1986. 
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3.5 PROFITS OF FINANCIAL SERVICES 
In this section we consider the question of the profits of 
financial services. In particular we review profits in the 
banking and insurance sectors. 
BANK PROFITS 
The most profitable banking sectors, when measured in 
relation to loans outstanding and to GDP, were in Italy and 
Spain. German and UK banks also had high profitability while 
the French, Dutch and Belgian banking sectors were less 
profitable. 
TABLE 3. 28: PROFIT BEFORE TAX OF BAHlS, 1982 
Country 
B 
D 
ES 
F 
I 
NL 
UK 
ECUm 
389 
5,024 
2,482 
2,317 
3,658 
365 (1981) 
4,032 
% of GDP 
0.45 
0.84 
1.24 
0.42 
1.03 
0.32 
0.95 
% of Loans 
Outstanding 
0.32 
0.63 
1.4 
0.35 
1.8 
0.35 
0.68 
Source: OECD Costs and Margins in Banking -
Statistical Supplement, Financial Statistics 
Belgi\111 
Belgian banking profitability grew by 22 per cent from 1979 
to 1982. Profits of the savings banks fell from their 1979 
level, while there was an increase in the profits of 
conunercial banks and "big banks". 
TABLE 3.29: BELGIUM BANIING PROFITABILITY, 1978-82 
Profits (ECU m) 
Year Big Banks Conunercial Banks Savings Banks Total 
1982 119 188 82 389 
1981 102 184 68 354 
1980 34 165 52 251 
1979 82 129 109 320 
1978 97 150 n.a. 247 
Source: OECD- Costs and Margins in Banking 
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Germany 
In Germany the savings banks accounted for more than half of 
profits earned by the banking sector between 1978 and 1982 
and had the most rapid growth in profits (Table 3.30). The 
profits of the "big banks" and commercial banks fell from 
1978-81 before recovering in 1982, while there was a large 
fall in the profits of the giro banks. Overall profitability 
of the sector rose by one-third from 1978 to 1982. 
TABLE 3.30: GERMAN BANIDIG PROFITABILITY 1 1978-82 
Profits (ECU m) 
Big CODDilercial Giro Savings 
Year Banks Banks Banks Banks TOTAL 
1982 700 1,429 242 2,653 5,024 
1981 474 1,083 204 1,811 3,572 
1980 486 1,034 246 1,427 3,193 
1979 555 983 405 1,285 3,228 
1978 630 1,213 450 1,507 3,800 
Source: As for table 3.29 
Spain 
Spanish banking profits rose by 71 per cent between 1978 and 
1982, with the most rapid growth rate being 88 per cent by 
the "big banks". The share of total profits accounted for by 
the private banks fell from 48 per cent in 1978 to 39 per 
cent in 1982. 
TABLE 3.31: SPANISH BANXIRG PROJITABILITY2 .1978-82 
Profits (ECU m) 
Year Big Banks Private Banks Savings Banks Total 
1982 864 975 643 2,482 
1981 792 1,043 531 2,366 
1980 615 861 451 1,927 
1979 497 787 373 1,657 
1978 459 699 292 1,450 
Source: As for Table 3.29 
France 
French banking profitabiltiy rose by 45 per cent between 1978 
and 1982. Profits of the "big banks" rose by only 26 per 
cent compared to 51 per cent for other banks. 
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TABLE 3.32: FRENCH BANIING PROFITABILITY, 1978-82 
Year 
1982 
1981 
1980 
1979 
1978 
Big Banks 
483 
662 
663 
432 
382 
Source: As for Table 3.29 
Profits (ECU m) 
Other Banks 
1,834 
1,981 
1,816 
1 '319 
1,213 
Total 
2,317 
2,643 
2,479 
1,751 
1,595 
Italian banking profits rose by 180 per cent from 1978 to 
1982 and each of the major banking sectors more than doubled 
profits. The "big banks"profits grew by 280 per cent, 
compared with 179 per cent and 150 per cent for the 
commercial and savings banks. However, in 1982 the 
commercial banks accounted for 70 per cent of banking sector 
profits. 
TABLE 3.33: ITALIAN BANIING PROFITABILITY 2 1978 - 82 
Profits (ECU m) 
Year Big Banks Commercial Banks Savings Banks Total 
1982 384 2,565 709 3,658 
1981 146 1,934 465 2,545 
1980 168 1,494 343 2,005 
1979 98 1,019 284 1,401 
1978 101 919 283 1,303 
Source: As for Table 3.29 
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Netherlands 
The Netherlands banking sector profits fell between 1978 and 
1981, from ECU 859 m to ECU 365 m. Almost all of this drop 
in profitability was experienced by the commercial banks. 
TABLE 3. 34: NB'1'BERLANDS BANICING PROFITABILITY, 1978-81 
Profits (ECUm) 
Year Commercial Banks Savings Banks TOTAL 
1981 314 51 365 
1980 616 53 669 
1979 911 66 977 
1978 793 66 859 
Source: As for Table 3.29 
United Kingdom 
Profitability of the UK banking sector rose by 37 per cent 
from 1979 to 1982, with the most rapid growth in profits 
being by the building societies (Table 3.35). The clearing 
banks had a poor performance, with profits rising by only 10 
per cent. 
TABLE 3.35: BRITISH BANICING PROFITABILITY, 1978-82 
Profits (EGU m) 
Clearing Building Trustee 
Year Banks Societies Savings Banks TOTAL 
1982 2,670 1,146 216 4,032 
1981 2,488 984 119 3,591 
1980 2,464 599 167 3,230 
1979 2,431 379 142 2,952 
1978 n.a. 533 136 n.a. 
Source: As for Table 3.29. 
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Profits in Insurance 
An aggregate measure of profits in insurance has been derived from the 
national accounts by subtracting from value added in insurance plus 
net transfer income the amount paid to employees. This figure 
represents premiums and other income less intermediate consumption, 
interest paid and employee costs. It is akin to profits before 
depreciation and tax in company accounts but would exclude profits of 
foreign subsidiaries which were not repatriated. Details are 
presented below. 
TABI...E 3.36: PROFITS IN INSURAHCE1 1983 (:SCUm) 
Value Added 
Plus Net Compensation % of 
Transfer Income(l) of Employees Profits Premiums 
B (2) 1,157 576 581 16.7 
D (2) 9,438 5,183 4,255 10.8 
F 5,618 2,660 2,958 12.5 
I 2,041 1,136 905 10.2 
NL 2,554 1,458 1,096 13.2 
UK 9,070 8,032 1,038 3.2 
(1) Net interest receipts plus other income less interest imputed to 
policy holders and critical interest paid. 
(2) 1982 
Source: S.O.E.C. Detailed Sector Accounts Table 2 Various 
Issues; Sigma April 1985. 
The above figures shows that profits, (as defined), as a percentage of 
premiums exceeded 10 per cent in all the countries shown apart from 
the UK. 
Profits in the UK at 3.2 per cent of premiums were the lowest of the 
six countries. 
Profits earned by non-life insurance companies are derived almost 
entirely from investment earnings in the sense that non-life insurance 
makes an underwriting loss in all but one of the five countries shown. 
The underwriting results are mainly determined by the relation of 
earned premiums to claims and operating costs. The table overleaf 
sets out the experience of non-life companies since 1980. 
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TABLE 3. 3 7: NON LIPE INSURANCE - UNDKRWRITING RESULTS 
% OF PREMIUMS 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 Average 
D +0.3 -0.4 -0.2 +0.6 -0.2 0.0 
ES -4.8 -1.7 -3.8 -6.5 -2.3 -3.8 
F -10.5 -ll.9 -14.4 -12.4 -11.2 -12.1 
NL +1.3 -0.5 -3.9 -5.5 -5.7 -2.9 
UK 
home business -1.7 -1.1 -8.0 -7.0 -13.1 -6.2 
foreign business -6.9 -12.2 -13.0 -13.2 -16.6 -12.4 
Source: Sigma. 
In Germany the average over the five years was zero compared to losses 
of over 12 per cent in France and on the foreign business of UK 
companies. The average loss in the Netherlands and Spain was around 
the 3 per cent level. 
Belgium 
TABLE 3.38: PROFITS IN INSURANCE, 1978 - 83 (:ECUm) 
Value Added & Net 
Transfer Income 
Compensation of Employees 
Profits 
Profits % of Premiums 
Source: S.O.E.C.; Sigma 
1978 
879 
465 
414 
13.6 
1979 
1,002 
515 
487 
15.3 
1980 
n.a. 
525 
n.a. 
n.a. 
1981 1982 
n.a. 1,157 
539 576 
n.a. 581 
n.a. 16.7 
1983 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
Profits in insurance in Belgium, as defined earlier, were in excess 
of 13 per cent in 1978 and 1979 and in 1982 reached 16.7 per cent 
of premiums. 
Genaany 
TABLE 3.39: PROFITS IN INSURANCE, 1978 - 83 (ECUm) 
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 
Value Added & Net 
Transfer Income 6,588 6,988 7,194 7,759 9,438 9,621 
Compensation of Employees 3,482 3,820 4,160 4,374 5,183 n.a. 
Profits 3,106 3,168 3,034 3,385 4,255 n.a. 
Profits % of Premiums 12.2 11.1 8.8 10.8 10.8 n.a. 
Source: S.O.E.C.; Sigma 
In Germany, the profits of insurance companies calculated form 
national accounts were in the 9 - 11 per cent range for all years 
shown except 1978. 
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The table below shows profits after tax in the various categories 
of non-life insurance and life insurance in Germany. The 
percentage of total premiums remained steady at around 1.5 per cent 
in the years 1979 - 84, reflecting the degree of control exercised 
over the industry. 
TABLE 3.40: PROFITS AlTER TAX IN GERMANY 
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 
Total (% of Premiums) 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.7 1.8 1.6 
Life Assurance (% of Premiums) 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.7 
Health Insurance (% of Premiums) 0.6 0.7 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.1 
Non-Life Insurance (% of Premiums) 2.4 2.3 2.2 2.7 2.8 2.5 
Source: Statistical Yearbook of German Insurance GDV 1986. 
France 
TABLE 3.41: PROFITS IN INSURANCE, 1978 - 83 (ECUm) 
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 
Value Added & Net 
Transfer Income 3,501 3,384 4,046 4, 772 4, 721 5,618 
Compensation of Employees 1,551 1,750 2,028 2,302 2,520 2,660 
Profits 1,950 1,634 2,018 2,470 2,201 2,958 
Profits % of Premiums 14.5 14.8 11.6 12.5 10.1 12.5 
Source: S.O.E.C.; Sigma 
In France profits as a percentage of premiums fell from about 14.5 
per cent in 1978 and 1979, to 10.1 per cent in 1982 before 
recovering to 12.5 per cent in 1983. 
Italy 
TABLE 3.42: PROFITS IN INSURANCE, 1978 - 83 (ECUID) 
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 
Value Added & Net 
Transfer Income 892 1,076 1,345 1,403 1,743 2,041 
Compensation of Employees 582 646 786 913 995 1,136 
Profits 310 430 559 490 748 905 
Profits % of Premiums 7.1 8.9 10.9 7.3 9.9 10.2 
Source: S.O.E.C.; Sigma 
In Italy profits as a percentage of premiums were between 7.1% and 
10.9 per cent in the period 1978 - 83. 
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The Netherlands 
TABLE 3.43: PROFITS IN INSURAHCR1 1978 - 83 (ECUm) 
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 
Value Added & Net 
Transfer Income 1,748 1,939 2,134 2,295 2,333 2,554 
Compensation of Employees 1,022 1,092 1,159 1,225 1,377 1,458 
Profits 726 847 975 1,070 956 1,096 
Profits % of Premiums 13.5 14.1 14.8 15.5 12.5 13.2 
Source: S.O.E.C.; Sigma 
In the Netherlands profits, derived from national accounts data, as a 
percentage of premiums were at least 12.5 per cent in each year and 
reached a peak of 15.5 per cent in 1981. 
TABLE 3.44: PROFITS IN INSURAHCE 1 1978 - 83 (ECUm) 
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 
Value Added & Net 
Transfer Income 4,213 5,162 7' 115 6,738 8,160 9,070 
Compensation of Employees 3,000 4,646 5,342 6,146 7,317 8,032 
Profits 1,213 516 1 '773 592 843 1,038 
Profits % of Premiums 8.7 3.0 8.1 2.1 2.7 3.2 
Source: S.O.E.C.; Sigma 
In the UK profits (national accounts definition) as a percentage of 
premiums have been around 3 per cent in 1979 and 1981 - 83. The 
level in 1978 and 1980 was considerably higher at about 8%. 
The table below shows non-life profits as a percentage of non-life 
premiums in the UK for 1980 - 83. The data is for both domestic 
and foreign activities of UK companies and shows clearly the 
importance of investment income to viability. 
T.ABI.E 3.45: UK PROFITS HOH-LD'E INSURAHCE 1 1980-83 
% of non life premiums 
198.0 1981 1982 1983 
Underwriting -4.5 -7.2 -11.0 -11.0 
Investment income 13.7 14.7 15.3 15.0 
Long-term business 1.6 1.8 2.1 2.3 
Other 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.7 
Total: 10.9 9.6 6.9 7.0 
Source: The British Insurance Industry RL Carter & AH Godden 
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3 . 6 BREAKDOWN OF AGGREGATE DEMAND FOR THE CREDIT AND INSURANCE 
SECTOR 
In this section the demand for financial services is analysed 
using input - output data, bank lending and other bank 
balance sheet data and data on non-life insurance premiums 
and claims. The analysis shows the demand for these services 
by households, government and the external sector and, where 
possible, by industrial and service category. 
Demand for Credit and Insurance 
The table below shows an analysis of input-output data on 
the total consumption of the credit and insurance services as 
detailed by sector and end use. The analysis can be taken as 
describing the breakdown of output from the domestic 
credit and insurance industries in each country since imports 
are zero or negligible in both intermediate consumption and 
final uses in all countries. 
TABLE 3.46: BREAKlXMi OF OUTPUT OF THE CREDIT AND INSURANCE SECTOR 
1980 (1) 
D ES F I NL 
7. OF TOTAL USES 
Intermediate Consumption from 
all Origins 
1) Agriculture 0.4 1.6 0.6 1.6 1.3 
2) Energy 0.3 2.1 0.3 0.3 0.3 
3) Metals 0.9 6.1 1.6 3.5 0.8 
4) Machinery and Equipment 1.3 4.2 1.6 2.5 0.8 
5) Food, Drink and Tobacco 0.3 2.0 0.7 1.1 0.6 
6) Textiles and Clothing 0.1 2.0 0.4 1.9 0.1 
7) Timber, Paper and Printing 0.8 3.3 0.6 2.7 0.6 
8) Construction 1.4 3.4 3.5 2.4 0.9 
9) Transport and Communications 4.5 8.9 3.6 7.0 5.4 
10) Credit and Insurance 61.0 48.4 69.1 67.3 60.0 
11) Other Services 3.7 3.8 1.4 2.3 1.8 
12) Non-Market Services 1.6 0.0 0.3 1.3 1.0 
13) Total Intermediate 
Consumption (1-12) 76.5 85.8 83.8 94.0 73.6 
Final Uses 
14) Household Consumption 23.0 11.5 14.6 4.1 22.3 
15) Government Consumption 0 0 0 0 0 
16) Total Consumption (14+15) 23.0 11.5 14.6 4.1 22.3 
17) Stock Changes and Capital 
Formation 
18) Exports to EEC countries 0.1 n.a. 0.5 0.3 1.8 
19) Exports to 3rd Countries 0.3 n.a 1.2 1.5 2.3 
20) Total Exports (18+19) 0.4 2.5 1.7 1.8 4.1 
21) Total Final Uses (16+17+20) 23.5 14.2 16.2 6.0 26.4 
22) Total Uses (13+21) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
23) Total Uses ECUm 36,999 11,631 26,955 20,682 8,385 
Source: S.O.E.C. National Accounts - Input Output Tales 1980 
Tables on Intermediate Output and Final Use 
(1) No data is available for Belgium and Luxembourg 
UK 
0.6 
0.8 
3.8 
5.0 
2.1 
0.7 
1.7 
0.7 
15.1 
44.8 
3.4 
7.2 
85.9 
22.9 
0 
22.9 
-26.7 
3.8 
14.2 
18.0 
14.1 
100.0 
27,464 
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The analysis shows that consumption of credit and insurance in the 
process of producing other goods absorbed about 75 per cent or more 
of the output of the sector in all the countries shown. In Italy 
94 per cent of output was absorbed by intermediate consumption. 
The two most important other users of the intermediate output of 
the sector were transport and communications, the other services 
sector and, in the UK, the general public sector under the 
non-market services category. In several countries construction 
was the next most important purchasing sector. 
The most important final user of credit and insurance services was 
the household sector. In Germany, the UK and the Netherlands the 
household sector purchased about 23 per cent of total credit and 
insurance services used. In France and Spain the percentages were 
14.6 and 11.5 respectively while in Italy it was only 4.1 per cent. 
Total exports were in the range of 0.4 per cent to 4.1 per cent of 
total uses for all the countries shown, except the UK, for which 
the figure was 18 per cent. 
The table below shows the percentage of total inputs represented by 
credit and insurance, in each of the 12 sectors in 6 countries. 
TABLE 3.47: INTERMEDIATE CONSUMPTION OF CREDIT AND INSURANCE FROM 
ALL ORIGINS AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL INPUTS 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
D 1.0 0.3 0.3 0.6 0.3 0.4 0.7 1.4 2.8 71.0 3.8 1.4 5.1 
ES 1.9 1.8 3.2 4.0 1.3 4.1 4.9 3.4 5.0 71.2 6.9 0.2 7.1 
F 0.9 0.2 0.9 1.1 0.5 1.0 0.8 3.3 1.871.9 1.4 0.4 6.1 
I 2.4 0.3 1.6 1.6 0.8 1.8 2.5 2.6 3.4 78.2 5.5 2.2 6.7 
NL 1.9 0.2 0.4 0.7 0.3 0.6 0.7 0.6 3.2 74.7 2.9 1.2 5.6 
UK 1.4 0.8 2.2 3.3 1.8 1.6 2.1 0.8 7.4 60.6 13.6 8.3 7.2 
(1) Agriculture (8) Construction 
(2) Engineering (9) Transport and Communications 
(3) Metals (10) Credit and Insurance 
(4) Maintenance (11) Other Services 
(5) Food, Drink and Tobacco (12) Non-Market Services 
(6) Textiles and Clothing (13) Total 
(7) Timber, Paper and Printing 
Source: S.O.B.C. Rational Accounts - Input Output Tales 1980 
Tables on Inter.ediate Output 
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The table shows that the intermediate output of the credit and 
insurance sector is a very large proportion of inputs to the sector 
itself. The transport, other services and construction sectors 
show the next largest proportion of inputs from credit and 
insurance. Among the countries shown, credit and insurance as a 
percentage of total inputs is highest in the UK and Spain at 7.2 
and 7.1 per cent respectively and lowest in Germany at 5.1 per 
cent. 
The table below shows the proportions in total household 
consumption and in total consumption and exports of credit and 
insurance services which were consumed directly by end-users. 
Consumption of credit and insurance services represented over 3 per 
cent of total household consumption in the UK in 1980, 2.69 per 
cent in Germany and 2.51 per cent in the Netherlands. Consumption 
was lowest in Italy at 0.45 per cent of household consumption. 
The percentages of total final consumption are smaller only because 
total final consumption includes government services as well as 
household consumption. 
TABLE 3. 48: CREDIT AND INSURANCE rnw. USBS IN 1980 (ALL ORIGINS) 
AS PERCENTAGES OJ TOTAL lOR ALL SIC'l'OIS 
Exports 3rd 
Household Total Jinal to the Country 
Consumption Consumption EBC Exports 
D 2.69 2.05 0.07 0.15 
ES 1.27 1.07 n.a. n.a. 
F 1.31 1.06 0.27 0.61 
I 0.45 0.36 0.26 0.84 
NL 2.51 1.94 0.35 0.91 
UK 3.25 2.41 3.10 7.15 
Source: S.O.B.C. National Accounts - Input Output Tables 1980 
Tables on Intemediate Output 
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Demand for Bank Lending 
The table below shows an analysis of bank lending to all industries 
and services excluding financial institutions in 1986. The table 
shows that manufacturing accounted for the largest percentage of 
loans ranging from 35% in Germany to 65% in Belgium. The exception 
to this was the Netherlands, where the biggest percentage of 
banking lending goes to the distributive sector accounting for 30% 
of loans while manufacturing accounted for 28%. Within the 
manufacturing sector itself the engineering industry in all 
countries obtained the biggest proportion of loans. 
Loans which to "other services", accounted for the next largest 
proportion of bank loans. The next largest preportions were 
accounted for by transport and communication in France and Belgium 
obtaining 13% and 9% of total loans respectively. In Spain energy 
accounted for 14% while in Germany and the UK the distributive 
sector received 30% and 33% respectively of total loans. 
TABLE 3. 49: BANK LENDING BY SEC'l'Oi OF ECONOaC ACTIVITY 
B D ES F I NL 
% of Total 
Agriculture 3.6 7.9 4.3 5.4 8.1 1.8 
Manufacturing 65.4 35.3 38.8 40.0 38.7 27.5 
- Metal Manufacturing 4.8 5.1 4.5 0 2.2 1.3 
- Chemicals 11.6 2.0 3.5 0 3.4 3.9 
- Engineering 23.9 14.4 25.6 0 16.0 9.1 
- Food, Drink and 
Tobacco 9.0 5.1 5.2 6.3 4.8 6.2 
- Textiles, Leather 
and Clothing 4.6 2.8 0 0 5.8 1.4 
- Other Manufacturing 11.4 5.8 0 33.7 6.5 5.6 
Energy 7.4 7.4 13.8 4.2 1.9 4.2 
Construction 4.9 8.7 9.7 2.7 9.9 5.5 
Distribution Trade 0 29.4 12.8 0 0 29.8 
Transport and 
Communication 8.8 11.3 4.1 13.1 6.6 11.4 
Other Services 9.9 0 16.7 34.9 34.9 19.8 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: Central Bank Reports 
UK 
9.2 
36.9 
1.4 
2.6 
13.2 
7.0 
2.3 
10.4 
6.3 
8.4 
33.3 
5.8 
0 
100 
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Demand for Bank Assets and Liabilities 
Demand for basic banking services may be regarded both as a demand 
for loans and a demand for deposit taking services. On the assets 
side the service provided meets demand for borrowing from 
Government, the rest of the domestic sector and the rest of the 
world (1). On the liabilities side the demand for deposit services 
may similarly be broken down between these sectors. 
The table below shows a summary of the assets of banking 
institutions, excluding the Central Banks, for seven of the 
countries in the survey. 
For the total of the seven, 34 per cent of the claims of banks were 
on the "other domestic sector", and 28 per cent on the "rest of the 
world" at end 1985. The UK accounts for 16 percentage points of 
the rest of the world figure. Claims on General Government 
accounted for 12 per cent of the total. The claims of the UK and 
German banking sectors accounted for 65 per cent of the claims of 
the banking sectors of the seven countries. 
TARLE 3.50: FIRAHCIAL ASSETS OJ BAMnNG INSTI'l.Vri<XtS - End 1985 
B(l) D ES I(2) L NL UK Total % of 
ECU BN End 
of 
1985 
Total Claims on: 167 1475 291 621 163 252 1299 4267 
Institutions of the 
Group (*) 11 364 23 76 18 13 290 
Other Financial 
Institutions 5 39 49 114 0.1 8 56 
General Government 32 209 54 129 0.1 43 30 
Other Domestic Sectors 32 695 149 248 5 99 230 
Rest of the World 86 129 15 52 140 80 674 
Not Allocable 39 2 7 22 
(*) The group refers to institutions in the banking sector. 
(1) End 1983 
(2) End 1984 
Source OECD financial Statistics 
(1) Rest of the world refers to claims and liabilities outside 
794 
271 
498 
1458 
1176 
70 
each of the countries. Intra-EEC claims and liabilities are not 
netted out. 
Total 
100 
19 
6 
12 
34 
28 
1 
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On the liabilities side, it can be seen from the table below that the 
other domestic sector held 40 per cent of claims on banking 
institutions and the rest of the world 28 per cent. General Goverment 
accounted for only 3 per cent. 
TABLE 3. 51: FINANCW.. LIABILITIES OF BANKING INSTITUTIONS 
- End 1985 
B(l) D ES I(2) L NL UK Total 
End of 1985 
Total Claims of: 159 1474 280 589 169 251 1326 4249 
Institutions of 
the Group 10 379 23 72 14 290 788 
Other Financial 
Institutions 2 47 30 67 23 11 57 237 
General Government 1 93 24 25 .02 2 1 146 
Other Domestic Sectors 47 815 177 335 10 127 185 1696 
Rest of the World 97 83 25 81 136 73 703 1198 
Not Allocable 56 6 24 87 173 
(1) End 1983 
(2) End 1984 
Source: OICD Financial Statistics 
% of 
Total 
100 
18 
6 
3 
40 
28 
4 
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BELGIUM 
The assets of the banking institutions in Belgium accounted for 4 per 
cent of the total for the seven countries. 
ASSETS 
Total Claims 
of which: 
Short term loans: 
TABLE 3.52: BELGIUM 
Some important components of the 
Assets and Liabilities of Banking 
Institutions 
End 1983 
LIABILITIES 
ECU i. OF 
BN TOTAL 
167 100 Total Liabilities 
of which deposits 
39 23 other than cash & 
General Government 3 transferable 
Other Domestic deposits 
Sectors 18 General Govt. 
Rest of World 17 Other Dom. Sec. 
Rest of World 
Bonds issued by 24 14 
General Government 16 
Other domestic 2 
Rest of World 3 
Source: OBCD Financial Statistics 
ECU i. OF 
BN TOTAL 
159 100 
114 71 
1 
11 
101 63 
Short term loans accounted for 23 per cent of total assets and bonds 
14 per cent. Interestingly in Belgium cash and transferable deposits 
of the rest of the world accounted for 36 per cent of assets (not 
shown in above table). On the liabilities side 63 per cent were 
represented by time deposits from the rest of the world. 
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The assets of the German banking system amount to 34 per cent of those 
in the seven countries. About 60 per cent of the assets are long term 
loans, the majority of which are to the other domestic sector. 
Liabilities are more evenly spread between deposits other than cash 
and transferable deposits and other instruments. 
ASSETS 
Total Claims 
of which 
Long Term Loans 
General Government 
Other Domestic 
Sectors 
Rest of World 
TABLE 3. 53: GERMANY 
Some important components of the 
Assets and Liabilities of Banking 
Institutions 
End 1985 
LIABILITIES 
ECU % OF 
BN TOTAL 
1475 100 Total Liabilities 
of which 
889 60 Deposits other 
173 12 than cash and 
transferable 
529 36 Deposits 
66 5 Other deposits 
Short Term 
Loans 
General Government 
Other Domestic 
Source: OICD Financial Statistics 
ECU % OF 
BN TOTAL 
1474 100 
355 24 
339 23 
275 19 
16 1 
95 6 
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SPAIN 
The total assets of banking institutions in Spain accounted for 7 per 
cent of the total in the 7 countries surveyed in 1985. As may be seen 
from the table below demand for short and long term loans accounted 
for 48% of claims of which the majority were to the other domestic 
sector. 
TABLE 3.54: SPAIN 
Some important components of the 
Assets and Liabilities of Banking 
Institutions 
ASSETS LIABILITIES 
ECU % OF ECU % OF 
BN TOTAL BN TOTAL 
Total claims 291 100 Total Liabilitie 280 100 
of which short & of which deposits 
long term loans 140 48 other than cash & 
transferable 
of which: deposits 183 65 
General Government 7 General Govt. 3 
Other Domestic Sectors 120 41 Other Dom. Sec. 122 43 
Rest of World 7 Rest of World 22 
Source: OECD Financial Statistics 
On the liabilities side 65 per cent of the total were deposits, other 
than sight and transferable deposits. The largest proportion of these 
were from the other domestic sector. 
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ITALY 
In Italy the assets of the banking institutions are over 14 per cent 
of that in the seven countries surveyed. Short term loans accounted 
for 307. of assets at the end of 1984, bonds 207. and long term loans 
187.. Most of the short and long term loans were to the other domestic 
sector and most of the bonds were Government issued. 
TABLE 3. 55: ITALY 
Some important components of the 
Assets and Liabilities of Banking 
Institutions 
End 1984 
ASSETS LIABILITIES 
Total Claims 
Short term loans 
of which 
General Government 
Other Domestic 
Sectors 
Rest of World 
Bonds 
General Government 
Long Term Loans 
Other Domestic 
Sectors 
ECU 7. OF 
BN TOTAL 
621 
185 
5 
134 
46 
123 
67 
111 
86 
100 
30 
22 
20 
11 
18 
14 
Source: OECD Financial Statistics 
Total Liabilities 
Cash & other 
transferable deposits 
General Government 
Other Domestic 
Sectors 
Rest of World 
ECU % OF 
BN TOTAL 
589 100 
241 41 
14 
151 25 
6 
Cash and other transferable deposits accounted for 41 per cent of 
liabilities, the majority being to the other domestic sector. A 
further 29 per cent of liabilities were represented by time deposits 
of the other domestic sector, not shown ·above. 
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LUXEMBOURG 
Assets of the banking institutions in Luxembourg accounted for 4 per 
cent of the total assets in the seven countries' banking institutions 
ASSETS 
TABLE 3. 56: LUDMBOURG 
Some important components of the 
Assets and Liabilities of Banking 
Institutions 
End 1985 
LIABILITIES 
ECU i. OF 
BN TOTAL 
ECU i. OF 
BN TOTAL 
Total Claims 163 100 Total Liabilities 169 100 
of which 
cash & transferable cash & transferable 
deposits 39 24 deposits 82 49 
General Government Other domestic 7 4 
Rest of World 30 18 Rest of World 66 39 
Other Deposits so 31 Other Deposits 69 41 
Rest of World 42 25 Rest of World 60 35 
Long Term Loans 36 22 
Rest of World 33 20 
Source: OECD Financial Statistics 
Both the assets and the liabilities of the banking institutions are 
dominated by the importance of the rest of the world sector as can be 
seen from the above table. On the assets side 63 per cent is 
represented by cash, deposits and long term loans to the rest of the 
world. Deposit liabilities are 74 per cent from the rest of the 
world. 
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In the Netherlands the assets of the banking institutions amounted to 
6 per cent of the total in the 7 countries surveyed. 
TABLE 3. 57: RE'l'IIKRLAHDS 
Some important components of the 
Assets and Liabilities of Banking 
Institutions 
End 1985 
ASSETS LIABILITIES 
ECU % OF 
BN TOTAL 
Total Claims 252 100 Total Liabilities 
of which of which 
Deposits other 
than cash and 
Short & Long Term Loans 64 25 transferable 
deposits 
General Government 1 0.5 General 
Other Domestic Sectors 32 13 Government 
Rest of World 23 9 Other Dom.Sec. 
Rest of World 
Debt Certificates 84 33 
General Government 3 1 
Other Domestic Sector 12 5 
Rest of World 70 28 
Source: OBCD Financial Statistics 
ECU % OF 
BN TOTAL 
251 100 
164 65 
1 0.3 
88 35 
61 24 
The table above shows that 25 per cent of assets were in the form of 
short term loans, most of the demand for which came from other 
domestic sectors (13%), and the rest of the world. The other 
important component was debt certificates issued in the main by the 
rest of the world. Deposits other than cash and transferable deposits 
were the main liabilities of the banks at the end 1985. The main 
users of these deposit facilities were the other domestic and rest of 
the world sectors. 
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UNITED KINGJXIt 
In terms of total assets the UK has the second largest banking sector 
of the seven countries, accounting for 31 per cent of total assets. 
The table below shows an aggregate analysis of the users of the main 
components of the UK's banking services. 
TABLE 3.58: UK 
Some important components of the 
Assets and Liabilities 
of Banking Institute 
ASSETS LIABILITIES 
ECU i. OF 
BN TOTAL 
Total claims 1299 100 Total Liabilities 
of which: of which: 
Deposits other than Deposits other than 
cash & transferable cash & transferable 
deposits 709 55 deposits 
General Government 7 Other Domestic 
Rest of World 458 35 Rest of World 
General Government 
Short Term Loans 410 32 
Other Domestic Sectors 224 17 
Rest of World 136 10 
Source: OBCD Financial Statistics 
ECU i. OF 
BN TOTAL 
1326 100 
873 66 
97 7 
529 40 
On the assets side, deposits other than cash and transferable deposits 
account for 55 per cent in the UK. Most of these are with the rest of 
the world. Short term loans, accounting for 32 per cent of assets is 
the next largest component. Most of the loans are to the other 
domestic sector, but a significant proportion is to the rest of the 
world. 
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DEMAND lOR NON-Lin INSURANCE 
In this section and subsequently in this study we present data on the 
insurance sector. It shou~d be noted that there are particular 
weaknesses in insurance statistics. For example in the case of 
premium income recent work carried out by a sub-group of the OECD 
Insurance Committee shows, premium income figures compiled on a 
national basis can mean all sorts of different things. Premium income 
may include reinsurance income as a receipt but be subject to a 
deduction for outgoing reinsurance. Or incoming reinsurance may not 
be included and outgoing reinsurance may not be deducted. In both 
cases, the figures may or may not include those for specialist 
reinsurance companies. The figures for any given country may 
represent the total premium income arising on risks located in that 
country, regardless of the ownership or location of the receiving 
insurers; While every attempt has been made to ensure comparability 
great caution is required. 
Inc011e 
Total net accident insurance premiums (1) in 1983 are shown in the 
table below for Germany, France, Italy, Belgium and the 
Netherlands. Germany had the largest premium income at ECU 
18,344 million, followed by France with ECU 14,880 million and 
Italy with ECU 6,087 million. However, between 1980 and 1983 
premium income grew most rapidly in Italy and France, with 
much less rapid rates of growth (in current prices) in the 
other countries. 
TABLE 3. 59: TOTAL NBT ACCIDIHT IRSUIAIICB PDMIUMS, 1983 
Country Premium Income 
(ECU m) 
1983 % change 
1980 - 83 
B 2,038 (1982) + 7.1 
D 18,344 + 26.1 
F 14,880 + 63.8 
I 6,087 + 67.1 
NL 3,741 + 18.2 
(1980-82) 
Note (1) Premiums are net of Premiums ceded to countries abroad. 
Source: S.O.E.C. Detailed Sector Accounts 
In each of the countries the bulk of premium income is 
derived from domestic residents and comparatively little from 
other countries. Table 3.60 shows that in 1983 the Netherlands had 
the largest premium income from abroad in value terms followed by 
France. The Netherlands also had the largest proportion of premium 
income from abroad. Between 1978 and 1983 Germany and Belgium had an 
increase in the proportion of income from abroad. 
(1) Accident insurance covers all non life business. 
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TABLE 3. 60: NET ACCIDENT INSURANCE PRBMIUM INCCitl lRCII 
ABROAD, 1980 AND 1983 
Country Income from abroad % of income from 
(ECUm) 
1980 1983 1980 
B 77 86 3.9 
D 99 242 1.1 
F 138 190 1.3 
I 0 0 0 
NL 188 244 6.5 
Source: S.O.E.C. Detailed Sector Accounts 
Table 2 Various Issues 
abroad 
1983 
4.2 
1.3 
1.3 
0 
6.5 
A breakdown of domestic premium income in 1983 is shown in 
Table 3.61 for households, government and other types of 
payment unit. Householders account for the majority of the 
premium income in each country, ranging from 53 per cent of 
the total in Belgium to 81 per cent in Germany. Similarly, in 
each country the second most important sector was the 
corporate sector which accounted for almost all of the 
remainder of the income. 
TABLE 3. 61: MET ACCIDIRT IRSlDW(CI PDimll IRCCIII BY 
CATEGORY1 
1983 
Category % of total domestic 
B (1) D F I 
Households 53 81 66 58 
Non-financial 
corporate & 
quasi-
corporate 36 17 32 25 
Insurance 
enterprises 7 1 1 14 
General 
Government 4 1 1 1 
Credit 
Institutions 0 0 0 1 
(1) 1982 
Columns may not total to 100 due to rounding. 
Source: S.O.E.C. Detailed Sector Accounts 
Table 2 Various Issues 
income: 
NL 
63 
31 
4 
2 
0 
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Claims 
The amount paid in claims in 1983 is shown in Table 3.56, 
together with the proportion paid outside of each country. 
Payments for claims are highest in the largest market -
Germany - and follow market size. However, Table 3.56 also 
shows that the proportion of claims paid by resident insurance 
companies to foreigners varied from 10 per cent in Belgium to 
zero in Italy. 
TABLE 3.62: NET ACCIDENT INSURANCE CLAIMS PAm AND 
PROPORTION PAm ABROAD, 1983 
Country 
B 
D 
F 
I 
NL 
Claims paid 
(ECUm) 
2,179 (1982) 
18,357 
15' 132 
6,088 
3,741 
Source: S.O.E.C. Detailed Sector Accounts 
Table 2 Various Issues 
7. paid abroad 
10.1 
1.9 
0.3 
0 
7.0 
As with Table 3.61 the most important sectors for claims are 
households and the corporate sector. Table 3.63 shows that the 
proportion of total claims accounted for by households varied from 49 
per cent in Belgium to 80 per cent in Germany and from 15 to 32 per 
cent for corporations in Germany and Belgium. 
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TABLE 3. 63: NET ACCIDENT INSURANCE CLAIMS PAID BY CATEGORY, 
1983 
Category i. of total domestic income: 
B D F I NL 
Households 49 80 77 61 63 
Non-financial 
corporate & 
quasi-corporate 32 15 23 24 31 
Insurnace 
enterprises 16 0 0 14 4 
General Government 3 4 0 0 1 
Credit 
institutions 0 1 0 1 0 
Private non-profit 
institutions 
serving households 0 0 0 0 0 
(1) 1982 
* Columns may not total to 100 due to rounding 
Source: s.o.E.c. Detailed Sector Accounts 
Table 2 Various Issues 
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3. 7 EXTERNAL TRANSACTIONS IN FINANCW. SERVICES ( 1) 
In this section we consider the economic significance of 
financial services in terms of external transactions. The 
data in this section is based on Eurostat and IMF figures 
supplemented by national estimates and some confidential data 
from the statistical office of the EEC. 
The table below is based on input-output data in Eurostat national 
accounts. It shows that total imports of credit and insurance 
services ranged between 0.3 per cent of total resources in the 
Netherlands and 6.6 per cent in Italy. Imports from EEC countries 
were much less in four of the six than imports from third countries. 
The picture for exports was similar. Exports ranged from 1.9 per cent 
of output in Germany to 12.1 per cent of output in the UK and exports 
outside the EEC were much larger in four of the six countries than 
exports to EEC countries. 
TABLE 3. 64: CREDIT AND INSURANCE RESOURCES AND USES 1980 
Proportion of Total Resources 
RESOURCES EUR- 8 D ES F I NL UK 
Total Intermediate Input 516 481 459 493 603 490 542 
Value Added - Market Prices 408 388 481 416 326 451 410 
Actual output 
Imports from the EC 
Countries 
Imports From Third 
Countries 
Total Imports 
Total Resources 
USIS 
Total Intermediate Output 
Consumption of Households 
Gross Fixed Capital 
Formation 
933 
28 
28 
1000 
878 940 921 934 951 965 
12 11 24 23 2 7 
27 37 27 42 2 27 
39 49 51 66 3 35 
1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 
786 811 760 781 885 690 630 
115 128 81 95 54 150 161 
57 42 126 51 111 88 
Exports to EC Countries 
Exports to Third Countries 42 
6 
13 
15 
18 
22 
51 
12 
49 
29 
21 
25 
96 
Total Exports 
TOTAL USES 
42 19 33 
1000 1000 1000 
74 61 49 121 
1000 1000 1000 1000 
Source: S.O.E.C. National Accouts Input Output Tables 1980. 
(Branch Data) 
(1) No data available for Luxembourg or Belgium. 
(2) Data on the resources side do not add to 100 in most cases. 
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Table 3.65 summarises balance of payments data on trade in 
financial services for the eight countries. Insofar as could 
be identified this data relates to payment for services and 
excludes investment income and interest from 
lending/borrowing. Brokerage fees and commissions have been 
included where data was available but it should be noted that 
these may include earnings by other activities such as 
advertising and other agencies. This item is particularly 
large for Belgium. The data for trade with the EEClO is not 
available for all the services and the data shown in this 
column thus understates the extent of intra-community trade. 
The table shows, as expected, that export earnings of the UK 
financial sector at ECU 5.8bn are by far the largest of the 
eight countries. Export earnings in Belgium/Luxembourg, 
Germany and France are about half of the UK figure. Italy 
and the Netherlands are roughly half the German and France 
level. 
Imports of financial services to Germany are very large at 
ECU 6.7bn compared to less than one third of that level for 
the other countries with the exception of Belgium and France. 
The data on the geographical breakdown of trade in financial 
services is not sufficiently comprehensive at this level of 
aggregation to bear comment. 
The table also shows that as a percentage of total credits(1) 
the UK was 2.2 per cent compared to most other countries 
which ranged between 1.1 and 1.5 per cent. The percentage 
for Belgium is 3.2 per cent if all the brokerage and 
Commission items refers to payment for financial services. 
Spain's credits for financial services were 0.6 per cent of 
total credits. On the debit side the UK percentage of total 
debits was lowest at 0.7 per cent while Germany's was highest 
at 2.6 per cent. Again the Belgium/Luxembourg figure would 
be highest if all the brokerage and commission items were 
relevant to financial services. 
(1) Credits in trade data are payments received for exported 
services. Debits are payments made for imported services. 
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TABLE 3.65: INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN FINANCIAL SERVICES 1985(*) 
Credits % of Total Debits % of Total 
World EEClO Credits World EEC10 Debits 
ECUm ECUm 
B & L 3,467 3.2 3,750 3.5 
D 3,118 n.a 1.1 6, 774 n.a. 2.6 
ES 291 25 0.6 849(1) 237 1.7 
F 3,291 1,109 1.5 3,115 1,314 1.4 
I 1,635 n.a. 1.2 2,052 n.a. 1.4 
NL 1,524 n.a. 1.3 2,145 n.a. 2.0 
UK 5,803 n.a. 2.2 1,907 n.a. 0.7 
(1) Commissions data from 1984 
Belgium 
Table 3.66 shows that the largest item in Belgian trade was 
brokerage and commission fees at more than ECU 2bn for both debits 
and credits, not all of which relates to financial services. 
Export earnings from this source have grown at a much slower pace 
than earnings from insurance and banking. Non-merchandise 
insurance credits doubled between 1979 and 1985 while banking 
credits rose even faster in the same period. On the debit side the 
growth rates were similar to that on the credit side and in 
absolute terms trade was about balanced for these items. 
The geographical breakdown shown for Banking and Insurance on 
Transport indicates that almost one half of earnings abroad are 
from the EEC10 on these items. More than half of payments abroad 
on these two items were to the EEC10. 
(*) Some of the data in the tables which follow were obtained 
from the Statistical Office of the EEC in Luxembourg on the 
basis that it would not be published. 
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TABLE 3.66: TRADE IN FINANCIAL SERVICES BY 
BELGIUM/LUXEMBOURG2 1979-85 
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
ECUm 
Credits 
Brokerage Fees and 
Commissions 2,029 2,177 1, 977 2,310 2,130 2,198 
Banking 174 222 291 335 374 462 
- of which EEC10 50 74 73 89 132 132 
Nonmerchandise 
Insurance 373 419 484 514 550 616 741 
-·of which EEC10 224 246 266 271 308 352 n.a. 
Transport Insurance 50 49 73 67 66 66 
- of which EEC10 25 25 24 22 22 22 
Debits 
Brokerage Fees and 
Commissions 2,103 2,057 1,974 2,164 2,371 2,633 
Banking 100 123 170 224 242 286 
- of which EEC10 25 49 73 89 110 132 
Nonmerchandise 
Insurance 373 419 509 514 550 660 743 
- of which EEC10 224 240 291 313 330 396 n.a. 
Transport Insurance 50 74 73 89 88 88 
- of which EEC10 50 49 48 45 44 66 
Source: IMF: S.O.E.C. 
Germanl 
Earnings abroad on commission fees were almost ECU 1bn in 1985 
compared to less than half that level in 1979. Non-merchandise 
insurance earnings were ECU 1.9bn in the same year and the growth 
since 1979 was about the same as for commissions. Transport 
insurance earnings were much smaller at ECU 224m and have not grown 
so rapidly. 
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On the debit side, however, commission fees were ECU 3.9bn in 1985, 
though the growth has not been as rapid since 1979 as the credit 
side. Non-merchandise insurance payments were more than ECU 2.2 bn 
and have grown almost 2! times since 1979. Transport insurance 
debits, as for the credits have grown less rapidly since 1979 than 
commissions and non-merchandise insurance. 
Overall debits have been larger than credits for these items in 
Germany's balance of payments. 
The geographical breakdown which is available for insurance shows 
that, in broad terms, about half Germany's trade in insurance is 
with the EEC10. 
TABLE 3.67: TRADE IN FINANCIAL SERVICES BY WEST GERMANY 1 1979-85 
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
ECUm 
Credits 
Brokerage Fees and 
Commission 440 494 536 658 786 898 994 
Non-Merchandise 
Insurance 893 923 1,634 1,689 1,586 1,932 1,900 
- of which EEC10 432 442 585 697 747 876 860 
Transport Insurance 149 156 182 212 211 215 224 
- of which EEC10 21 21 25 26 29 33 32 
Debits 
Brokerage Fees and 
Commissions 2,322 2,458 2,934 3,400 3,234 3,448 3,900 
Non-merchandise 
Insurance 914 1,060 1,738 1,782 1,848 2,235 2,279 
- of which EEC10 426 542 678 840 919 1,056 1,099 
Transport Insurance 350 424 446 479 478 565 595 
- of which EEC10 118 126 131 156 144 200 206 
Source: IMF:, S.O.E.C., Bundesbank, Statistical Supplement Services. 
- 93 -
- 53 -
Earnings overseas from banking amounted to ECU 69m. No data is 
available from the EEC statistical office for prior years. 
Insurance earnings at just over ECU 200m in total in 1985, have 
risen by about 50 per cent since 1979, not a particularly large 
increase compared with some of the other countries. 
Payments abroad for financial services considerably exceeded 
receipts in 1985 mainly because of commission payments; no 
disaggregation is available between commissions for financial and 
other services. 
The data available on the geographical breakdown shows that almost 
half of receipts from abroad for insurance on transport and banking 
services were from the EEC10. More than half of payments abroad 
for total insurance and banking were to the EEC10. 
TABLE 3.68: TRADE IN FINANCIAL SERVICE BY THE SPAIN 1979-85 
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
ECUm 
Credits 
Banking n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 69 
- of which EEC10 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 25 
Non-merchandise 
Insurance 116 180 167 215 299 148 145 
- of which EEC10 101 
Transport Insurance 30 23 41 45 54 71 77 
- of which EEC10 38 
Debits 
Commissions, 
Brokerage etc. 165 196 316 417 403 450 
Banking n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 39 
- of which EEC10 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 14 
Non-merchandise 
Insurance 119 128 182 214 140 177 215 
- of which EEC10 147 
Transport Insurance 73 94 112 134 142 170 145 
- of which EEC10 76 
Source: IMP, S.O.E.C. 
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France 
Receipts from banking services accounted to ECU 711m in 1985 
compared to less than ECU 200m in 1979. Non-merchandise insurance 
receipts were less than ECU 500m in 1985 and had not grown very 
rapidly since 1979. By contrast insurance on transport grew very 
rapidly over the same period from ECU 650m to ECU 2.1bn. 
Payments abroad for banking services reached ECU 700m in 1985 from 
a level below ECU 200m in 1979. Non-merchandise insurance payments 
at ECU £400m had not shown such rapid growth since 1979. Transport 
insurance payments, however, roughly trebled between 1979 and 1985 
to reach ECU 1980m. 
About one third of receipts from foreign earnings in banking and 
insurance came from the EEC10 in 1985. About 407. of payments 
abroad for these services was to the EEC 10. 
No data on commission receipts or payments has been identified for 
France. 
TABI..E 3.69: TRADE IN FINANCIAL SERVICES BY FRANCE 1979-85 
ECUm 
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
Credits 
Banking ECUm 183 258 394 428 445 500 711 
- of which EEC10 28 46 54 59 59 71 185 
Non-merchandise 
Insurance 308 340 422 469 513 590 469 
- of which EEC10 142 151 175 188 180 182 168 
Insurance on Transport 652 722 910 1,052 1,223 1,464 2,111 
- of which EEC10 253 286 335 365 '•73 501 756 
Debits 
Banking 174 240 433 560 540 556 701 
- of which EEC10 47 73 96 164 166 168 236 
Non-merchandise 
Insurance 279 348 417 473 528 620 434 
- of which EEC10 143 174 203 223 198 232 193 
Insurance on Transport 
ECUm 629 764 953 1,106 1,329 1,593 1,980 
- of which EEC10 319 385 467 490 600 678 885 
Source: IMF, S.O.E.C. 
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Earnings abroad from banking in 1985 were in excess of ECU 1bn 
compared to only half that level in 1979. Non-merchandise 
insurance earnings at ECU 345m were also much larger in 1985 than 
1979. While earnings from insurance in transport doubled, the 
absolute figure was ECU 97 m in 1985. 
Payments abroad by Italy for these services have tended to exceed 
receipts. The largest element of these payments relating to the 
banking and non-merchandise insurance sectors. 
The geographical breakdown which is available shows that Italian 
trade in insurance and banking is mostly conducted with countries 
outside the EEC10. 
T.A:BLE 3.70: TRADE IN FINANCIAL SERVICES BY ITALY, 1979-85 
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
ECUm 
Credits 
Banking 618 690 820 943 815 895 1,193 
- of which EEClO 155 185 211 235 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Non-merchandise 
Insurance 136 151 196 229 255 387 345 
- of which EEClO 7 10 9 14 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Transport Insurance 43 51 55 56 66 83 97 
Debits 
Banking 1,083 1,245 1,598 2,050 1,170 1,188 1,388 
- of which EEC10 295 348 385 462 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Non-merchandise 
Insurance 185 224 241 288 362 491 544 
- of which EEC10 16 19 25 32 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Transport Insurance 58 63 71 72 82 105 120 
Source: IMF, S.O.E.C. 
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Netherlands 
Throughout the 1978 to 1985 periods the Netherlands was in deficit 
on commissions/brokerage fees and transport insurance. 
Earnings from abroad on commissions/brokerage fees and other fees 
were almost ECU 1.3 bn in 1985 compared to ECU 0.7 bn in 1979. It 
is not clear how much of this relates to financial services. 
Earnings abroad from banking were just over ECU 200m in 1985 
compared to ECU 80m in 1979. 
On the debit side commissions and other fees exceeded ECU 1.6bn in 
1985 compared to less than ECU 900m in 1979. Payments for banking 
and non-merchandise insurance were both just less than ECU 200m in 
1985. Payments abroad for transport insurance rose very quickly 
from ECU 17m in 1979 to ECU 113m in 1985. 
No geographical breakdown is available for the data on commissions. 
About one third of earnings abroad from banking were from the EEC10 
and about half of payments abroad on banking services. The data 
from the EEC statistical office indicate that payments to the EEC10 
exceeded those to the World and this is being queried. 
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TABLE 3. 71: TRADE IN FINANCIAL SERVICES BY THE NETHERLANDS 1978-85 
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
ECUm 
Credits 
Commissions, 
brokerage fees etc. 717 824 826 972 1,004 1,107 1,289 
Banking 80 75 101 136 138 192 229 
- of which EEC10 31 30 33 47 48 70 87 
Transport Insurance 8 9 7 6 6 6 6 
- of which EEC10 3 4 2 2 3 3 . 3 
Debits 
Commissions, 
brokerage fees etc. 877 1,090 1,289 1,390 1,397 1,557 1,647 
Banking so 51 76 85 96 134 199 
- of which EEC10 28 29 37 44 45 67 91 
Non-merchandise 
Insurance 17 51 0 56 20 111 113 
- of which EEC10 37 57 40 51 0 103 130 
Transport Insurance 135 143 152 153 150 184 186 
- of which EEC10 32 30 28 29 29 35 36 
Sources: IHF, S.O.E.C. 
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United Kingdom 
The table below shows that overseas earnings by the UK banking 
sector were almost ECU 2.7 bn in 1985 compared to ECU 661m in 1979. 
Earnings from insurance at ECU 1.1bn also showed a considerable 
increase from the 1979 level of ECU 353m. Receipts both from 
commodity trading and stock exchange other braking also doubled 
during this period. 
Payments for financial services received from abroad are identified 
gross only for banks and this includes an element of investment 
income due to overseas affiliates. This debit item reached almost 
ECU 2bn in 1985 compared to less than ECU 0.5bn in 1979. Overall 
the UK has maintained a large surplus on trade in financial 
services. 
No geographical breakdown of this data was available. 
TABLE 3. 72: TRADE IN FINANCIAL SERVICE BY TB1 UK 1979-85 
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
ECUm 
Credits 
Banking 661 801 1,036 1,283 1,305 1,925 2,676 
Insurance 353 405 567 685 717 906 1,127 
Net Commodity Trading 440 568 650 801 991 1,131 1,049 
Stock Exchange and 
Other Brokerage 513 559 808 778 779 959 951 
Debits 
Banking - Investment 
Income and Services 
Charges 464 581 855 1,351 1,166 1,455 1,907 
Source: UK Balance of Payments - CSO Pink Book 1986 
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Integration of the Insurance Markets in the KEC 
The table overleaf shows the number of establishments abroad for 
the insurance industry in 7 of the 8 countries in 1984. The UK 
industry has the largest number of establishments abroad, (608), 
and the smallest percentage (44%) of its foreign establishments in 
the EEC. UK establishments in the EEC were about the same in 
number in France, Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands. 
France and Germany had 166 and 116 foreign establishments 
respectively of which 75 and 90 respectively were in the EEC. 
These establishments were mainly in Belgium, Italy and the 
Netherlands and in the case of France, Germany. 
Out of 6 total of 79 foreign establishments from the Belgian 
industry 73 were in the EEC. For Italy, 46 of the 70 foreign 
establishments were in the EEC and 40 of the 63 from the 
Netherlands. 
TABLE 3. 73: IN'l'IGRATION OJ' EC INSURARCR MARDTS 
Country of Origin Country of Activity 
Total of EC Share 
B D F I L NL UK EC World as % 
B 7 24(1) 1 14 22 1 73 79 92 
D 21 21 lO 3 21 5 90 116 78 
F 21 16 5 6 11 8 75 166 45 
I 8 8 11 6 5 46 70 66 
L 1 1 2 so 
NL 11 6 9 1 3 40 63 63 
UK 39 42 47 18 36 276 608 44 
(1) Incl. Luxembourg. 
Source: Sigma 
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SECTION 4: ANALYSIS OF PRESENT STRUC'l'UD Ol FINANCIAL SKRVICES 
MARDTS 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
The focus of this section is on regulatory barriers and how they 
are implemented. In particular attention is given to those 
regulations: 
affecting the establishment of financial service 
institutions in overseas markets; 
affecting cross border trade directly. 
This section represents the first part of Section lC of the work 
programme. The second part of Section lC which considers the 
scope for a quantitative assessment of the effects of completing 
the internal market in financial services is presented in 
Section 5 of this report. 
As indicated above a useful dichotomy for assessing the 
question of regulatory barriers to international integration 
in services generally, and in financial services in 
particular, is that between barriers to trade and barriers to 
investment. Although financial services (such as insurance or 
stockbrokerage) could be provided across international 
frontiers by entities which were not established in the member 
state where the customer is resident, such transactions are 
often inhibited by exchange controls and other barriers. 
These are the barriers to trade narrowly defined. 
Alternatively, foreign financial institutions could establish 
a branch or subsidiary in a member state from which to provide 
the service. The inhibition of such establishment is a 
barrier to investment. 
This section has the objective of reviewing the current 
situation regarding both barriers to trade and barriers to 
investment in financial services in eight member states of the 
Community. Following guidanc~ by the Commission on the 
priority which should be given to this topic, this review 
represents a summary of available information. 
The organisation of this section is explained on the one hand 
by the pervasive impact of exchange controls across all 
financial sectors, and on the other hand by the very different 
treatment of investment (or establishment) issues as between 
banking, securities and insurance markets. Thus the analysis 
begins with an account of the situation regarding establishment 
in banking, where it is found that comparatively few overt 
barriers to investment exist. There follows a parallel 
discussion of establishment in the securities sector, banks are 
very important in this sector, and that alleviates the 
restrictions on foreign concerns becoming securities brokers in 
certain member states. The next part of this section reviews 
the insurance sector, where there are barriers to trade 
independent of exchange controls, and where licensing practices 
often inhibit entry. Finally, we present some notes 
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on the current situation with regard to exchange controls; in 
the member states which retain strict exchange ~ontrols, 
these have the effect of severely restricting the freedom of 
trade in all financial services. 
It is useful firstly however to categorise the barriers to 
trade in summary form for banking, securities and insurance. 
In the table overleaf the barriers to trade in banking, 
securities and insurance sectors are categorised in relation 
to barriers to establishment, to operating conditions and to 
competing for business. In the subsequent analysis details of 
the barriers or impediments to the integration of financial 
markets in each of these main sectors are examined. 
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TABLE 4 .1 BARRIERS TO IHTRGRATION Ilf FINANCIAL MARDTS 
BARRIERS TO ESTABLISHMENT IN BANKING 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
Restrictions on the legal form banks may adopt. 
Limitations on the number of brances that may be established. 
Restrictions on the takeover of domestic banks. 
Restrictions of equity or other control of domestic banks. 
BARRIERS TO OPERATING CONDITIONS IN BANKING 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
The need to maintain separate capital funds. 
Differences in the definition of "own capital" funds. 
The need to maintain certain capital-asset ratios. 
Exchange controls. 
BARRIERS TO COMPETING FOR BUSINESS IN BANKING 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
Limitations on services offered. 
Restrictions on local retail banking. 
Restrictions on acquisition of securities and other assets. 
BARRIERS TO ESTABLISHMENT IN INSURANCE 
(1) Lack of harmonisation of licensing procedures. 
(2) Lack of harmonisation in the constitution of technical reserves. 
BARRIERS TO OPERATING CONDITIONS AND C<»>PETTNG FOR BUSINESS Ilf INSURANCE 
(1) 
(2) 
Direct insurance: restrictions on the placement of contracts with 
non-established insurers. 
Co-insurance: establishment of a permanent presence imposed on 
lead-insurers. 
(3) Custom and practice in government procurement policies. 
(4) Lack of harmonisation in the supervision of insurance concerns. 
(5) Re-insurance: compulsory or voluntary cessation of a percentage of 
contracts to a central pool or prescribed establishment. 
(6) Lack of harmonisation in the fiscal treatment of insurance contracts 
and premiums. 
BARRIERS TO ESTABLISHMENT IN SECURITIES 
(1) 
(2) 
Membership of some stock exchanges limited to national citizens. 
Constraints on the establishment of offices of solicit and carry out 
business in secondary markets. 
(3) Restrictions on the takeover of or equity participation in domestic 
institutions. 
(4) Limitations on the establishment of securities firms in a universal 
banking system. 
BARRIERS TO OPERATING CONDITIONS IN SECURITIES 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
Exchange controls and other equivalent measures which prevent or limit 
the purchase of foreign securities. 
Conflicting national prudential requirements for investors protection. 
Discriminatory taxes on the purchase of foregin securities. 
BARRIERS TO COMPETING FOR BUSINESS IN SECURITIES 
(1) Limited access to primary markets in terms of lead management of 
domestic issues. 
(2) Restricted access to secondary markets because of national stockbroker 
monopolies on some stock exchanges. 
(3) Restrictions on dealing with investing public. 
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4.2 REGULATORY BARRIERS TO TRADE AND ESTABLISHMENT IN BANKING 
Our analysis of regulatory barriers in banking examines the 
conditions under which a foreign banking organisation can set up 
operations in each of the eight member states covered by the study 
with a view to determining what special barriers exist. Such 
barriers might derive from legislative and regulatory provisions, 
the conduct of monetary and credit policy, institutional customs 
and conventions. 
Our focus here has been on the regulations in force in each of the 
eight member states. It is important to note that a general synopsis 
such as this cannot hope to uncover concealed barriers which lie in 
the fine-detail of the regulations and which have not yet revealed 
themselves in practice. Furthermore the true impact of regulations 
will usually depend on the margin of discretion with which they are 
applied. 
In reviewing the legal and regulatory barriers to a non-domestic bank 
setting up in an EC member state, the general position is that there is 
little by way of overt discrimination against non-domestic entities in the 
countries under examination. Within the EEC, credit institutions which 
have their head office in a member state have right of entry and 
establishment following the First Council Direction of December 
1977. In principle, with some exceptions which will be noted, 
non-national entities must go through the same sort of procedure as 
domestic entities in order to set up a banking operation. But that 
does not necessarily mean that successful and profitable entry to 
banking is always easy. Obtaining authorization for other than a 
representative office can be time consuming and costly in 
administrative terms. If the member state employs a regime of 
credit ceilings for monetary policy purposes, then even after entry 
there may be practical difficulties in achieving growth, particularly as 
the acquisition by foreign entities of a domestic bank is subject to 
control in all member states. The capitalisation requirements which are 
imposed even for branches of foreign entities may also impose a 
differential cost on foreign entrants. 
For each member state the report begins by identifying the regulatory 
authorities. There follows an account of the requirements for establishing 
a banking operation, regulations restricting foreign (1) acquisitions or 
participation in indigenous banks, and restrictions on the type and range 
of services and activities. 
(1) Unless otherwise indicated foreign refers both to countries within and 
outside the EEC. 
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GERMANY 
Supervisory Authority 
All banks within Germany are subject to the German Federal Banking 
Supervisory Authority which, in turn, reports to the Federal Minister 
of Finance. 
The Supervisory Authority supervises banks and acts to prevent adverse 
developments in the banking system or the economy at large. It is the 
licensing agent for all banks, and to a certain extent can make 
banking policy by determining the regulations regarding equity and 
liquidity requirements. It also has detailed rights of information, 
investigation and intervention. 
Establishment of Banking Operations 
In terms of entry and establishment, the same general principles apply 
to both foreign and domestic banks: 
(1) Representative offices: no licence required but their 
establishment, relocation and closing must be reported to the 
Federal Banking Supervisory Office and the Deutsche Bundesbank. 
Without a licence, activities are restricted to providing 
investment information and recommendations, and acting as a 
conduit between customers and the parent company. They may 
not fill investment orders; and any correspondence from a 
non-licensed office to a client within Germany must be mailed 
from outside the country to meet the proscriptions against 
representative offices conducting banking business within the 
national boundaries. 
(2) Branches: deemed to be banks in their right although branches 
of the same bank will be considered as one credit institution. 
(3) Wholly-owned subsidiaries and majority-owned subsidiaries: 
regarded in law as German banks. There are no entry barriers 
and licensing requirements are the same as for domestic banks. 
The licensing procedure is quite exacting in its requirements, 
although there is no indication that foreign applicants face any 
special disadvantages relative to domestic applicants. The following 
conditions need to be satisfied in order to acquire a licence: 
(1) The resources necessary for conducting a business - in 
particular adequate capital in the Federal Republic of Germany -
must be available. 
(2) The managers must be trustworthy and have the necessary 
professional qualifications. 
(3) The bank must have at least two managers who work for it not 
merely in an honorary capacity. 
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The bank must send a plan about the intended business and its 
organisation to the Federal Banking Supervisory Office. 
There are no provisions on nationality of personnel and 
management. Managers of branches of foreign banks or of 
foreign-owned subsidiaries are required to demonstrate 
sufficient command of the German language as is necessary to 
direct a banking institution in Germany. In terms of 
qualifications and experience, the regulations apply equally to 
domestic and foreign bank managers. 
Regulations Restricting Foreign Acquisitions of Participation in 
Indigenous Banks 
There are no restrictions under this head. 
Restrictions on Type and Range of Services and Activities 
Branches of foreign banks may not act as banks of deposit for mutual 
funds of German investment companies but this is not seen to be of 
practical relevance to their activities in Germany. 
Since May 1, 1985, German subsidiaries (but not branches) of foreign 
financial institutions have been permitted to lead-manage foreign DM 
bond issues (those of non-resident borrowers, issued in Germany). 
Whilst relaxing its objection to foreign lead management of foreign DM 
bonds, the Bundesbank has reserved the right to apply a reciprocity 
guideline to financial institutions whose home country is not in the EEC 
and does not permit similar possibilities. In practice this reservation, 
which is not specified in either statue or regulation, has only been 
applied to Japanese firms. 
Supervisory Authority 
The Bank of England has responsibility for the overall control of the 
monetary and banking system. It exercises its powers in an informal 
way but the 1987 Banking Act, when it reaches the statue books, will 
provide the Bank with greater statutory authority, should it need to 
act in a more formal manner. 
Establishment of Banking Operations 
Domestic and foreign institutions are required to comply with the same 
set of conditions, should they wish to develop a banking presence in 
the UK. 
The opening of a representative office by a foreign bank is subject to 
notification to the Bank of England; documentation may be required 
from the parent institution. 
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Branches of foreign banks are perceived very much as being an integral 
part of the total operation of the bank worldwide and not as separate 
entities in their own right. Accordingly, it is seen as inappropriate 
to expect branches to maintain their own capital, although they have 
to maintain adequate liquidity and keep within agreed foreign currency 
exposure guidelines. Assurances are sought from the relevant 
supervisory authority that it will assume full responsibility for its 
foreign offshoot, and that the management and finances of the 
institution are sound. Whilst regular contact between the Bank and 
foreign branches is maintained, reporting requirements are less 
extensive and prudential meetings normally less frequent than for UK 
incorporated institutions. 
There are no specific restrictions on ownership of a bank but, under 
Schedule 2 of the Banking Act, the Bank of England must be satisfied 
that at least two individuals effectively direct the business of an 
authorised institution. 
Whilst there are no provisions relating to nationality, it may be 
required, under certain circumstances, to have at least one member of 
senior management who has appropriate experience in the London market; 
this would be a pre-requiste for any individual appointed as senior 
foreign currency dealer. 
Regulations Restricting Foreign Acquisitions of Participation in 
Indigenous Banks 
There are no formal restrictions on the acquisition of less than 15% 
of the share capital of a recognised bank or licensed deposit-taker. 
Where the acquisition is over 15%, both domestic and foreign 
institutions fall within the ambit of a Bank of England notice. The 
Bank must be consulted on all such proposals as early as possible and 
before any formal negotiations are undertaken. A flexible approach is 
maintained but, in general, approval for the acquisition will be 
subject to agreement between the parties concerned and to the 
satisfaction of tests relating to capital, management, reputation and 
future intentions. 
Restrictions on Type and Range of Services and Activities 
The Bank of England's notice of 11th November, 1980, states that 
all capital issues in sterling should be led by a UK-based 
institution with the capacity of act as an issuing house in the UK. 
Non-EEC owned institutions with such a capacity will be eligible to 
lead sterling issues if in the Bank's view there are reciprocal 
opportunities in their domestic capital markets for equivalent 
UK-owned institutions. It is expected, however that such issues 
will be co-led by a UK-owned institution that can act as an issuing 
house in the UK. Where the reciprocity requirement is n't met, 
foreign-owned institutions may only participate in a co-management 
position. 
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The Financial Services Act 1986, Section 183 (1), gives the 
Treasury or Secretary of State for the Department of Trade and 
Industry 'carte blanche' to take action against countries that do 
not have reciprocity arrangements. This applies not only to 
banking but also to investments and insurance. Whilst it is highly 
unlikely that the UK would take action against any EC member as 
this would contravene EC rules and guidelines, it should be noted 
that the statutory authority is there for use. Any action taken 
should be through the formal channels of the European courts. 
ITALY 
Supervisory Authority 
The Interministerial Committee for Credit and Savings (CICR) is the 
highest authority for credit and monetary policy and supervision of 
financial institutions. The CICR formulates policies and issues 
guidelines that are implemented by the executive agencies of the 
Bank of Italy. 
The Bank of Italy is empowered to monitor deposit-taking and 
loan-granting activities so as to maintain the stability of the 
banking system. Its supervisory powers cover both the structural 
aspects of the system (opening of new institutions and branches, 
mergers and acquisitions) and the operative aspects (participations, 
territorial competence, loan limits). It may request periodic reports 
from the banks and conduct inspections. 
Establishment of Banking Operations 
In practice, as from 1966, there is a ban on the authorisation of all 
new foreign or domestic banks. Exceptions to this rule have been some 
banks set up with mixed (Italian and foreign) capital. There are no 
restrictions on the opening of a representative office by a foreign 
bank, but both domestic and foreign banks have to seek prior approval 
for the establishment of new branches. 
Other conditions which may be seen as restrictions on foreign bank 
entry are as follows: 
(1) There is a minimum capital requirement for the opening of the 
first branch of a foreign bank which is determined on a 
case-by-case basis. The Bank of Italy has never enacted its 
power to establish formally a uniform minimum capital 
requirement for all banks. 
(2) Branches of foreign banks are required to provide "comfort 
letters" from their parent institutions. Such a letter is not 
compulsory in the case of EEC banks, though failure to produce 
'-'llP. results i.n ,'}branch's operational limits be-in,; seve-r-ely 
curtailed. 
(3) In some regions with special statues, local legislation gives 
the region autonomous powers in credit matters with regard to 
the establishment of new banks and the opening of branches. 
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No specific qualifications have been prescribed for bank managers, 
although they must be resident in Italy and of proven respectability. 
"Respectability" has not been precisely defined and, in practice, 
reliance is placed on the bank's judgement. 
Restrictions on Foreign Acquisitions or Participations in 
Indigenous Banks 
In view of the legal constraints in force and the fact that the 
majority of banks are in public ownership, the question of 
acquisition or participation in indigenous banks only really 
concerns the banks set up as joint-stock companies (i.e. the 
ordinary credit banks). In their case the sale of all or part of 
the capital to foreigners is not subject to authorization by the 
supervisory authorities (except as regards compliance with the 
foreign currency regulations), the decision falling within the 
sphere of banks' autonomous powers. With regard to the "banks of 
national interest11 (those established in the form of a joint stock 
company which have branches in at least 30 provinces), their shares 
can only be held by Italian citizens and residents of EC countries. 
Restrictions on the Type and Range of Services and Activities 
There are limitations on individual lending by branches of foreign 
banks, with the amount related to a percentage of a branch's own 
funds. Loans in excess of this amount must be authorised by the Bank 
of Italy, although there is no limit on the amount that may be 
borrowed. 
Lending by the branches of foreign banks is restricted territorially 
as follows: 
(i) To the regions in whose provincial capitals the branches are 
established (without any restriction on the nationality of the 
borrower). 
(ii) To the whole country in the case of lending to firms of foreign 
origin on subsidiaries of foreign companies. 
Foreign branches, like domestic banks, can only operate in the 
short-term area - up to eighteen months. Nevertheless, they may 
extend credit beyond the short-term with ceilings that vary for each 
branch from 10 to 15% of their borrowed funds. In the absence of a 
11 comfort letter", deposits - rather than borrowed funds - are taken as 
the reference parameter for lending operations beyond the short term. 
BELGIUM 
Supervisory Authority 
The Central Bank is responsible for issuing bank notes and for 
regulating currency and exchange. 
The commercial banks operating in Belgium are under the control of the 
Bank Commission which issues a consolidated report on the financial 
position of the banks concerned annually. 
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Establishment of Banking Operations 
The opening of representative offices is subject to authorisation by 
the Banking Commission which is usually granted, provided the office 
is not used for carrying on banking business or for soliciting 
business to be channelled through offices outside Belgium. 
The provisions governing the entry and establishment of branches and 
subsidiaries apply to both Belgium and foreign banks. 
The parent institutions of branches of foreign banks must conform to 
the pre-conditions for banks incorporated in Belgium; namely: 
(1) The parent institution must carry on banking business. 
(2) The parent institution must be a "societe commerciale" (a 
commercial company) with legal personality. 
The same licensing procedures apply to both domestic and foreign 
institutions. However, the authorisation to extend mortgage credits 
required from the Ministry of Economic Affairs may be refused if 
reciprocity is not granted in the parent bank's country of origin. 
Each branch of a foreign or domestic bank has to maintain its minimum 
"own capital" which must not be used to undertake operations outside 
Belgium and the Banking Commission requires proof that the endowment 
capital in no way corresponds to a liability of the parent bank to a 
third partner. 
A statement is also required by the Banking Commission to the effect 
that the opening of the branch or subsidiary has been notified to the 
competent authorities of the home country and that the transfer of the 
required funds has been authorised. In the case of branches, the 
applicant must provide a certified copy of the decision by the parent 
bank's management to earmark a portion of the bank's capital to the 
branch set up in Belgium. 
Restrictions on Foreign Acquisitions or Participations in 
Indigenous Banks 
There are two general provisions that apply to a foreign investment in 
Belgium companies: 
(1) Authorisation by the Minister of Finance is required for any 
takeover bid on public companies by residents of countries 
outside the EC. 
(2) The Minister of Economic Affairs, the Minister of Finance and 
the State Secretary to the Regional Economy must receive prior 
notification of any operations leading to the acquisition of at 
least one third of the capital of enterprises operating in 
Belgium and where capital is of at least BF 100 million. 
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Any merger of majority interest acquisition must be authorised by the 
Banking Commission. Also, any significant change in the relative 
share, the ownership or control of shareholders' participations is 
subject to prior consultation with the Banking Commission. These 
provisions, however, apply equally to both Belgium and foreign 
shareholders. 
Restrictions on Type and Range of Services and Activities 
There are no restrictions under this head. 
Supervisory Authority 
The Central Bank has extensive powers to supervise the banking 
industry, although certain actions need the approval of the 
Minister of Finance. It consults extensively with the banking 
industry's representative bodies in drafting directives concerning 
ratios, reporting etc. 
Establishment of Banking Operations 
Use of the word 'bank' is reserved for a limited group of institutions 
registered under the Act on Supervision of the Credit System (1978). 
Exemption status may be granted by the Minister. 
The prohibition does not apply to institutions from other EEC Member 
States which operate in the Netherlands and are entitled to use the 
word 'bank' in their home country; but an explanation of status, 
activities and financial position may be required. 
No regulatory prov1s1ons apply to the entry and establishment by 
foreign banks of representative office. 
A licence is required to engage in the business of a credit 
institution but the requirements are the same as for a domestic 
institution, namely: 
(1) A prescribed minimum in terms of own resources. 
(2) Confirmation of the competence of the person in charge of 
day-to-day management. 
(3) Certification of annual accounts. 
There are also controls on individuals that hold over a certain 
percentage of voting rights in a credit institution, or are otherwise 
able to exercise (or have exercised) a comparable degree of direct or 
indirect control. A declaration of no-objection has to be obtained 
from the Central Bank which is normally granted unless the Bank is 
of the opinion that it would lead to undesirable developments 
within the credit system or runs contrary to sound banking policy. 
No distinction is made between foreign and domestic institutions. 
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An important element of this policy is the countering of the 
intermingling of banking and insurance activities which could lead to 
"undue'' concentrations of economic power in the Netherlands. 
Recently, new measures have been introduced to encourage competition 
between banks and insurance companies. 
There are no regulatory and administrative provisions on nationality 
and language requirements of personnel and management. 
Regulations Restricting Foreign Acquisitions or Participations in 
Indigenous Banks 
The approval of the Ministry of Finance is 
required for acquisitjon of a banking institution either by a 
Dutch or foreign purchaser. 
Restrictions on Type and Range of Services and Activities 
Foreign firms with branches or subsidiaries in the Netherlands may 
engage in securities-related activities under the same regulations 
that apply to Dutch banks, subject to a reciprocity requirement that 
prohibits foreign banks from acting as lead manager of 
guilder-denominated bond issues in the Netherlands unless Dutch banks 
are afforded comparable treatment in the parent country of the foreign 
bank. 
FRANCE 
Supervisory Authority 
French banking is supervised by a number of different regulatory 
bodies: 
(1) The National Credit Council - determines policy on banking and 
financing activity and issues general banking regulations. 
(2) The Banking Commission - monitors compliance with legislation 
and regulations. 
(3) Bank of France - issues bank notes and has supervisory powers 
over credit distribution and control. 
(4) Commissaries of the Government - represent the State on each 
central agency established for each sector of credit 
establishments. It ensures that each central agency and its 
members respect the applicable banking legislation and 
regulations. 
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Establishment of Banking Operations 
The opening of representative offices of foreign banks does not 
require prior authorisation. 
Any institution, either French or foreign, carrying on the general 
business of banking must obtain a licence from the National Credit 
Council. As with domestic banks there are specific requirements 
concerning: 
(1) The legal form of the institution. 
(2) Minimum capital holdings. 
(3) General economic needs. 
(4) Reputability of the managers. 
(5) General exchange control provisions applying to foreign direct 
investment. 
There is no general requirement concerning guarantees and "comfort 
letters" from parent institutions. The Banking Commission may require 
that a blocked account in French francs be opened by the parent bank 
with a view to guaranteeing the branch's liabilities. This 
requirement has, however, been applied very rarely. 
Regulations Restricting Foreign Acquisitions or Participations in 
Indigenous Banks 
As with all foreign investments in France, the acquisition of more 
than 20 per cent of a company's capital requires the authorisation of 
the Ministry of Economy and the Bank of France. This is currently 
an issue of considerable contention because of a denationalisation 
programme being undertaken which includes several banks and 
bank-holding companies. The French Minister of Economy has the right 
to reduce the 20 per cent threshold in the "national interest", and a 
right to reserve a special preferential share, giving the government 
authority to block any undesired investment (domestic or foreign) 
which represents over 10 per cent of that company's capital. 
Restrictions on Type and Range of Services and Activities 
There is no discrimination but it is an established practice that 
the lead manager of bond issues denominated in French francs should 
be a member of the "Comite des Emissions" which is restricted to a 
small number of banks. 
Credit ceilings, in practice, may bear more heavily on recently 
established banks and on those which deal significantly in French 
francs with residents. This problem applies to both domestic and 
foreign-controlled banks; the latter may however be granted a 
temporary derogation to credit ceilings provisions with a view to 
facilitating establishment in France. 
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LUXEMBOURG 
Supervisory Authority 
The 'Institut Monetare Luxembourgeois' has responsibility for 
supervising the banking and financial sectors, and the power to 
regulate the money supply and credit and lending facilities. The 
'Institut Belgo-Luxembourgeois de Change' exercises control over 
foreign exchange operations. 
Establishment of Banking Operations 
A bank wishing to operate in Luxembourg may incorporate a company as a 
separate legal entity or establish a branch or representative office. 
Banks incorporated in Luxembourg have not taken the form of a 'societe 
a responsibility limitee' because credit institutions are prohibited 
by law from taking this form of incorporation. 
Branches of foreign banks are allowed to operate in Luxembourg under 
the same banking and supervisory regulations as incorporated banks. 
The branch must maintain its assets clearly separated from those of 
its parent company and other entities within the group. 
Regulations Restricting Foreign Acquisitions or Participations in 
Indigenous Banks 
There are no restrictions under this head. 
Restrictions on Type and Range of Services and Activities 
There are no restrictions under this head. 
SPAIN 
Supervisory Authority 
The Bank of Spain has overall responsibility for the administration, 
inspection and professional supervision of banks, saving banks and 
credit institutions. 
Establishment of Banking Operations 
Spain, as a recently-joined member of the EC, is in a seven-year 
transition period. Spanish authorities began to admit foreign 
banks in 1979 in a deliberate effort to increase the 
competitiveness and efficiency of the domestic banking sector. The 
Royal Decree 1388 of June 23, 1978, still regulates the presence of 
foreign banks within Spain. 
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Foreign banks may establish subsidiaries, branches or 
representative offices. Subsidiaries must take the form of a 
"sociedad anonima" (corporation). Subsidiaries are restricted to 
three branch offices, including the head office, which effectively 
excludes them from the Spanish retail banking market. Branches 
must operate under the full responsibility and name of the parent 
company. Their authorisation to operate is not transferable. 
Representative offices cannot conduct credit deposit or 
intermediary operations. 
The capital of a foreign bank subsidiary must be entirely subscribed 
by the foreign bank and may not be less than Ptas 2,000 million plus a 
100 per cent issue premium; shares may not be transferred without 
authorisation. 
In the case of a branch, the capital allocation of the parent company 
may not be less than Ptas 2,000 million. 
There are no specific regulations governing management qualifications, 
but there are limits on the number of positions that one person can 
hold simultaneously in banks and companies. 
At the request of the Bank of Spain and after a report from the Higher 
Banking Council, the Ministry of Finance authorises a licence for a 
banking entity. This requirement is applicable to both corporations 
and branches. There are no formal guidelines for the granting of this 
authorisation, and it depends on multiple factors and circumstances, 
both external and internal. The principle of reciprocity is firmly 
applied in relation to non-EC countries to ease the competitive 
pressure on Spanish banks. 
All restrictions on entry for other EC members should be removed by 
1993. 
Regulations Restricting Foreign Acquisitions or Participations in 
Indigenous Banks 
Foreign banks may purchase up to 50 per cent of a Spanish bank with 
any percentage above this requiring the approval of the Ministry of 
Economy and Finance. Such approval is only granted exceptionally and 
usually for the acquisition of a distressed bank. 
Domestic banks acquired by foreign interests are accorded full 
national treatment and they enjoy all the rights and obligations of 
domestic banks. 
Restrictions on Type and Range of Services and Activities 
The three major restrictions of the Royal Decree 1388 remain. 
Firstly, the amount of deposits which a foreign bank can obtain from 
Spanish customers is limited to 40 per cent of its portfolio of 
investments and loans to public and private Spanish entities. Foreign 
banks are allowed free access to the interbank market. 
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This regulation encourages foreign banks to fund themselves from their 
parent banks or from the Euromarkets, thus limiting competition for 
domestic deposits. Combined with the branching restriction, foreign 
banks are effectively prevented from competing in Spain's retail 
banking market. 
The second restriction limits each foreign bank to a maximum of three 
branches, as mentioned earlier. In practice, few foreign banks have 
more than two offices. In contrast, domestic banks now operate over 
15,000 branches in Spain. 
The third limitation prohibits foreign bank equity participation in 
Spanish non-financial businesses, even though Spanish banks control a 
significant portion of private industry. Foreign banks may, however, 
own equity in credit card companies, data processing service companies 
for banking operations, and other enterprises related to banking. 
CAPITAL AND SOLVENCY REQUIUKENTS: GENERAL NOTE 
It would seem that a major restriction on EC states wishing to operate 
in the internal market is the need for branches to maintain their own 
minimum endowment capital, so that a parent bank's overall resources 
may not be drawn upon. The only exception to this rule is the UK 
where there is no minimum capital requirement. 
The definition of "endowment capital" appears to vary from state to 
state, and it is argued that this can give a competitive advantage to 
banks established within some countries. Particular sources of 
contention, according to a report produced by the Economists 
Advisory Group for the European Commission, are the treatment of 
subordinated debt within the definition of capital and the degree 
of consolidation of accounts. 
Following on from this, some member states specify m1n1mmn solvency 
requirements in the form of prescribed gearing ratios. It is claimed 
that these also bring about distortions in competition, not only 
between banks but with other financial institutions such as unit trust 
and building sections that do not have to comply with the same rules 
on solvency. 
Research indicates that there is a consensus of opinion within the 
banking world that lack of harmonization of solvency requirements 
amongst the EC states constitutes a barrier to trade. 
CONCLUSIONS 
In conclusion, the following points may be made in regard to banking 
within the EC member states specified: 
(1) All banking establishments must conform to the prescribed legal 
forms of the country in which business is established. These 
may vary from state to state. 
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(2) With the temporary exception of Spain, the entry and 
establishment rules for foreign banks are essentially the same 
as for domestic institutions. 
(3) There are few problems in establishing representative offices; 
prior authorisation is only required in some countries. 
(4) There are licensing or prior authorisation requirements for all 
EC banking countries wishing to establish branches within other 
member states. 
(5) With the exception of the UK, all branches have to maintain 
their own minimum endowment capital; the definition of which 
will vary from state to state. This would seem to provide one 
of the major obstacles to trade. 
(6) Some countries require "comfort" letters. Such letters are 
essentially guarantees of support from the appropriate 
supervisory authority or parent institution and are not 
generally seen to be an onerous obligation. In Italy, however, 
a branch's operational activities are curtailed if such a letter 
is not provided. 
(7) There are no specific restrictions on the employment of foreign, 
EC nationals or special discriminatory rules in terms of 
professional qualifications or degree of competence and 
management experience. 
(8) Once certain conditions are met in relation to m1n1mum capital 
requirements, the competence of personnel etc, there would 
appear to be no other obstacles to setting up subsidiaries other 
than in Spain and Italy. 
(9) In Italy, France and Spain there are restrictions on foreign 
acquisitions or participations in indigenous banks; and in all 
EC states some prior authorisation is required from the 
appropriate supervisory authority. 
(10) With the exception of Spain and Italy, it would seem there is 
little in the way of significant, openly discriminatory rules on 
the extent and range of services that may be provided. It 
appears to be the custom, however, that domestic banks 
lead-manage domestic bond issues in most of these countries. 
The general conclusion to be drawn from this overview of banking 
practices is that the barriers to trade lie not so much in overt, 
discriminatory rules and regulations, but rather in national practices 
that apply equally to both domestic and foreign-controlled banks. 
Differences in licensing, minimum capital and solvency requirements, 
territorial restrictions may make some EC countries less attractive 
than other for foreign bankers. 
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4.3 REGULATORY BARRIERS TO TRADE AND ESTABLISHMENT IN SECURITIES 
European stock exchanges are changing at a rapid rate in an effort to 
maintain and improve their standing in a competitive international 
environment. The so-called 'Big Bang' in the UK has happened at the 
same time as there has been rationalisation measures in other EC 
countries, such as the proposed integration of regional exchanges in 
Germany and a new computerised dealing system in France. 
Nevertheless, there still appears to be considerable obstacles to the 
free trading of securities within Europe. 
Our analysis identifies those barriers to establishment and operation by 
foreign entities in securities markets. As banks dominate these markets, 
many of the problems of establishment have already been covered in the 
appropriate section on banking and are only touched upon here. Exchange 
controls, which are a particularly material factor in relation to 
securities, are referred to, but dealt with more fully in a separate 
section. The tax treatment of purchasers of foreign securities in a small 
number of countries may introduce distortions in these markets. 
BELGIUM 
Establishment of Securities Operation 
Any financial institution, foreign or Belgian, wishing to carry out 
securities operations must obtain a licence from the Banking 
Commission. Those wishing to operate in the primary market - the 
issuing of securities - must also obtain a licence from the Minister 
of Finance. This requirement does not apply to banks registered under 
Belgian law; i.e. domestic banks and subsidiaries of foreign banks. 
A non-bank securities firm would have an ambiguous status under 
existing arrangements. A banking licence is necessary in order to 
engage in underwriting, distribution and other primary market 
activities, but it is unlikely to be issued to an organisation that 
does not offer a relatively wide range of banking-related services to 
the public. In the event, most foreign securities firms choose to be 
established in the form of representative offices. 
The secondary securities market in Belgium is organised in such a way 
that: 
(a) Instructions to buy or sell securities on the market must be 
carried out by a stockbroker. 
(b) Instructions to buy or sell listed or unlisted securities on the 
market may be accepted only by banks (whether Belgian or 
foreign) or stockbrokers. 
A distinction is thus made between the acceptance and execution of 
orders. 
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Stockbrokers must be nationals of Belgium or of another EC country and 
must carry on their business in their own name or that of a company in 
which their liability is unlimited and joint and several. Sponsorship 
and training requirements are very specifically geared to Belgian 
nationals. 
Restrictions on Type and Range of Services and Activities 
Authorisation to operate in Belgium gives foreign banks exactly the 
same rights as Belgian ones with regard to providing services to 
customers, whether on the primary or the secondary market. Nor is 
there any difference in treatment with regard to access to money 
market activities or participation in public sector issues. 
There are some restraints on the operations of representative offices 
of foreign securities dealers. Non-bank commercial enterprises (for 
example, foreign stockbroking firms) are entitled to establish 
themselves as representative offices in Belgium but, in these 
circumstances, may not receive market orders from the public. It is 
forbidden by law to solicit the savings of the public other than 
within the framework of one of the systems for the protection of 
savings. Their activities are thus limited to administering 
portfolios, investment counselling and the receipt of orders from 
Belgian intermediaries (banks and brokers) to be executed on foreign 
markets. 
Mutual funds (collective investments) are subject to a special system 
of control. Belgian funds must be administered by companies duly 
accredited by the Banking Commission; whilst shares in foreign mutual 
funds may not be made available in Belgium without prior authorisation 
from the Banking Commission and the Minister of Finance. 
FRANCE 
Establishment of Securities Operations 
Banks occupy a prominent position in the securities markets, but 
brokers, who are independent of banks, also play an important role. 
In dealing in the secondary markets the public may place orders with 
banks or brokers, but the former have a national advantage through 
their large branch networks. Brokers have the exclusive legal right 
to trade on the exchanges where all domestic bonds and shares must be 
traded (money market instruments and Eurobonds may be traded off the 
exchanges). 
A licence is required from the Finance Ministry to act as a broker and 
the number of licences is fixed; thus, a licence can be obtained only 
by acquiring one from an existing broker. Only nationals of EC 
countries may apply to be licensed as brokers, but election to the 
governing body of the stockbrokers' association is restricted to 
French nationals and at present only they have succeeded in joining 
the exchange. 
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Both foreign banks and foreign securities firms may apply for banking 
licences and be established as branches or subsidiaries. Foreign 
branches must maintain an endowment capital of at least the minimum 
level of companies incorporated under French Law. 
Should foreign-owned firms wish to expand their securities activities 
in France through the purchase of a French institution, there are 
restrictions. As detailed before, all acquisitions that constitute 
more than a 20 per cent share require prior approval. 
Restrictions on Type and Range of Services and Activities 
Because of a recent change in government underwriting practices 
foreign institutions may actively participate in the primary markets 
for Government securities which, prior to 1985, were issued exclusively 
through a syndicate of French banks. Increasingly, short-term 
Treasury bills and long-term bonds are being issued through public 
auction which allows foreign-controlled firms with experience in other 
markets to become major market-makers in French government issues. 
Other primary market activities are, in theory, fully open to foreign 
firms but, as stated previously, custom dictates that French 
institutions lead manage bond issues on the domestic French franc or 
Eurofranc markets. 
Involvement in the secondary markets is complicated by the fact that 
practically all transactions take place on recognised security 
exchanges and thus pass through a Government-licensed stockbroker. 
For the most part, foreign institutions are subject to the same 
regulations as domestic firms in the sale of securities to resident 
investors. In order to solicit orders for securities from clients at 
their homes or places of business, securities firms must have a 
licence and only solicit for stocks listed on a French securities 
exchange regulatory body. Because of exchange controls foreign 
securities purchased by French clients must be held by stockbrokers of 
credit institutions authorised under the French banking law, which 
includes foreign banks. 
The major practical handicaps which foreign firms face in doing retail 
securities business in France result from the fact that their business 
is normally geared to the sale of foreign securities, which is limited 
by the existence of exchange controls. This problem should diminish 
as exchange controls are phased out. 
The management of investment trusts is open to foreign firms. In 
order to sell shares in an investment trust to French investors, the 
fund must be registered on a recognised securities exchange, although 
not necessarily on a French exchange. 
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GERMANY 
Establishment of Securities Operations 
In Germany, which has adopted the universal banking system, most 
securities-retailed activities are considered to be banking. 
Therefore, institutions undertaking one or more of these operations 
are normally designated banks and are required to obtain a banking 
licence. Holders of a banking licence may engage in the full range of 
securities market activities open to domestic financial institutions: 
new securities issues, secondary market activities, collective 
investment operations, and portfolio management and counselling. 
Foreign institutions have complete freedom as to whether to choose to 
be established as a branch or as a subsidiary. Foreign security firms 
may also apply for less comprehensive licences limiting them to 
securities, as opposed to banking activities. 
Banks are members of the stock exchanges as are the free and official 
stock exchange brokers. The role of the official stock exchange 
brokers is to equilibrate the supply and demand of the other stock 
exchange members to fix the official quotation. Besides the official 
market compartment of the stock exchanges, securities trading is 
carried out in privately organised "semi-official" markets and in 
"free trade" which is an informal telephone market for quoted 
securities outside the opening hours of the "official" stock exchange. 
Foreign firms seeking membership on one or more of Germany's eight 
independent regional stock exchanges are free to initiate an 
application process that is very similar to the banking licence 
procedure and identical to the practice for domestic applicants. 
Restrictions on Type and Range of Services and Activities 
As stated within the section on Banking, foreign bank branches or 
subsidiaries may participate in and lead manage domestic bond issues; 
but, as far as issues of foreign DM mark bonds are concerned, only 
subsidiaries may act as lead manager. Moreover, the issues (if 
public) must be listed on a German stock exchange. 
The German Central Bank has also dropped its opposition to the 
introduction of various non-traditional debt instruments and 
practices such as DM floating rate notes, multiple currency issues, 
zero coupon bonds and swap-linked issues. Because non-German firms 
have relatively more expertise in these non-traditional 
instruments, the German Central Bank's decision could be 
advantageous to foreign firms, at least in the near-term. 
Nevertheless, the preponderance of "new style" issues so far 
continues to be done by the major German banks. 
A tax which ranges from 0.1 to 0.25 per cent is imposed on secondary 
market purchases and sales of bearer securities by fund investors. 
(Professional intermediaries are exempt). Bond issues as registered 
claims, mainly government bonds, are not subject to the tax. 
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Some observers believe that the marketing of foreign collective 
investment shares is rather difficult. To protect domestic 
purchasers, domestic legislation stipulates certain obligations: 
(1) The designation of a resident representative who must be 
trustworthy and have the necessary professional qualifications. 
(2) The issue of a sales prospectus. 
(3) Specific reporting and disclosure requirements. 
Whilst the preconditions themselves may present a problem, it would 
seem that there are also market-related factors which discriminate 
against the introduction of foreign collective investments. 
For example, the collapse of a major foreign investment funds, which led to 
substantial losses by many German households foreign funds would still 
appear to face resistance among German investors. Market penetration 
difficulties also arise from the fact that as a result of their extensive 
retail networks, German financial institutions enjoy much greater access to 
small investors than foreign firms (particularly new entrants) could ever 
hope to obtain. 
It is alleged by some foreign securities dealers that the means of 
exercising prudential control over securities operations unnecessarily 
add to the costs of business. Specifically, the Banking Authority 
requires not only bank books, but also the computer equipment for the 
bookkeeping, to be physically located in Germany. 
ITALY 
Establishment of Securities Operations 
Commercial banks and their affiliated finance companies dominate the 
securities business in Italy. However, execution of trades on 
securities exchanges is restricted to brokers. 
Foreign firms, security companies as well as banks, are able to 
participate in the Italian securities market through branches or 
subsidiaries and by acquisitions of existing institutions. 
Brokers must exercise their profession as individuals. They do not 
have corporate status or limited liability. In order to be licensed 
as a broker, candidates must have Italian nationality, possess an 
Italian degree and have at least two years experience as s 
representative of an Italian broker. 
Restrictions on Type and Range of Services and Activities 
Banks have the leading position in dealing in primary and secondary 
markets for government bonds, in placing private sector securities and 
in collecting orders from investors for trading in secondary markets. 
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Foreign securities companies could, in principle, participate in bond 
issues as a financial company. They may engage in underwriting of 
securities issues and are eligible to request lead manager status. 
Custom and practice, however, means that Italian bond and share issues 
are led by domestic institutions. Foreign banks may participate in 
the secondary market by trading bonds or accepting orders for bonds or 
equities from final investors. However, foreign insti'tutions face 
some limitations operating in the secondary market as brokers have to 
be Italian citizens. Foreign banks can purchase and have in the past 
acquired commission dealers who enable them to compete with Italian 
banks in this respect. Nevertheless, a commission dealer may only 
solicit orders from the public, so that a stockbroker must still be 
used to execute actual trades on the exchange floor. 
Foreign securities dealers may establish offices to collect orders for 
execution overseas, but any foreign s€curities actually purchased must 
be deposited with an authorised resident bank. 
In order to offer collective investments a special company must be 
formed known as an Investment Fund Management Company; such companies 
are usually controlled by the banks or insurance companies. 
LUXEMBOURG 
Luxembourg has adopted the universal banking system, with banks 
engaged in all securities-related activities. Brokers and securities 
firms are also active in the securities market, but dealing with the 
general public is limited to banks and brokers; securities firms which 
are not admitted as a broker on the floor of the Exchange may only 
deal with professionals of the financial sector. 
The Luxembourg Stock Exchange is an important international financial 
centre, with many firms seeking to be listed there as a means of 
improving their financial standing. In practice, any firm or 
institution admitted to another recognised exchange may be admitted to 
the Luxembourg Stock Exchange. 
Foreign institutions may establish offices to collect and transmit 
orders for securities to be executed in the country or abroad or to 
disseminate information and advice. To do so requires a trading 
authorisation. 
Restrictions on Type and range of Services and Activities 
There are no restrictions under this head. 
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Establishment of Securities Operations 
Banks in the Netherlands are licensed to engage in essentially all 
forms of securities-related activities. The primary securities market 
is dominated by banks, but brokers and other institutions compete with 
the banks in offering securities, trading and investment services. 
Both banks and specialised investment companies organise and market 
collective investment funds. 
Foreign banks may establish branches or subsidiaries after being 
granted a licence by the Netherlands Central bank. As a means of 
ga1n1ng access to securities-related business, a foreign firm may also 
purchase a domestic establishment, subject to approval by the Ministry 
of Finance. This is a precondition for domestic firms as well. 
Foreign securities companies may also apply for and be granted a 
banking licence in the Netherlands, subject to fulfilling prudential 
requirements. 
Foreign corporations or persons may become members of the Amsterdam 
Stock Exchange. In order to do so, it is necessary to have a 
representative office, branch or subsidiary in Amsterdam and to be 
incorporated within the EC. 
Restrictions on Type and Range of Services and Activities 
There are ample opportunities for foreign financial institutions to 
participate in the Netherlands securities markets. Foreign banks, 
however, do not act as lead manager of guilder-denominated bond issues 
in the Netherlands unless Dutch banks are afforded comparable 
treatment in the bank's parent country. Foreign co-managers of such 
issues who are not established in the Netherlands are limited to 
underwriting no more than one third of an issue (this ceiling was 
recently raised from 20 per cent.) 
Government securities are auctioned to members of the Amsterdam Stock 
Exchange so that the role of foreign financial institutions is largely 
dependent on their membership of the Exchange. 
A stamp tax is imposed upon transactions in securities between 
authorised resident intermediaries and the investment public. This 
measure would appear to place non-resident intermediaries at an 
advantage over residents. 
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SPAIN 
Establishment of Securities Operations 
Banks play a dominant role in the securities market in Spain, but 
actual dealing on the Stock Exchange may only be done by registered 
stockbrokers who must be of Spanish nationality. Shares or bonds may 
be traded off the exchange as well but all trades, except those of 
Treasury bills and mortgage bonds, must be intermediated by an 
authorised stockbroker. Stockbrokers are, however, highly dependent 
on banks through whom clients' orders are largely channelled. Because 
of high fixed commissions and the rising volume of transactions, 
stockbrokers make substantial sums of money. A government plan to 
turn them into market-makers and ease entry to their entrenched 
profession was scrapped in 1986, after it met tough opposition from 
the brokers themselves. 
Foreign banks may acquire an interest in a Spanish bank or establish 
branches, subsidiaries or representative offices, subject to approval 
and with certain qualifications (see Banking Section). 
There are two kinds of collective investment which are usually, but 
not always, controlled by banks. Investment funds must have an 
initial amount of at least one billion pesetas, and be governed by 
management companies which are subject to special regulations, 
including a provision that at least one half of th company and one 
director are Spanish. Securities must be deposited in either a 
domestic or foreign-owned resident bank or savings bank. Group 
Investment Companies are regulated like group investment institutions, 
and have to have a board of directors with a majority of Spaniards. 
Restrictions on the Type and Range of Service and Activities 
With restrictions on the number of branches which foreign banks may 
establish a fairly tight set of exchange controls, international 
securities dealing are severely limited. Foreign issues may not be 
introduced in the domestic market and sales or purchases of foreign 
securities are not normally permitted. 
Establishment of Securities Operations 
Conceptually, a distinction is drawn between banking and investment 
within the UK. This is reflected in the existence of separate 
statutory (and other) regulatory regimes for "banking" and "investment 
business" and also in different supervisory authorities for each 
category. Banks, however, may engage in both activities and are thus 
covered by both regulatory regimes. 
At the end of 1986 the London Stock Exchange introduced sweeping 
reforms designed to strengthen the competitiveness of London as a 
financial centre. One of the major effects of these changes is the 
creation of broadly-based financial groups offering a full range of 
services and encompassing secur~ties-related activities on a large 
scale. 
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The new measures should facilitate the establishment of foreign 
security firms or the acquisition of existing ones. In fact, the Bank 
of England may consider applications from foreign securities firms 
for deposit-taking licences if certain prudential concerns are 
satisfied. All institutions are eligible, in principle, for 
membership in the London Stock Exchange, and to deal in other 
securities and related markets. 
In March 1986, the London Stock Exchange allowed corporate membership 
in the exchanges, abolished the ceiling of 29.9 per cent on 
non-members' equity holdings in member firms, and lifted the 
moratorium on admitting to membership firms in which non-members held 
any capital. 
Although these stock exchange restrictions had not been 
discriminatory, applying to UK and foreign institutions alike, 
applications by foreigners for membership in the exchange were 
discouraged. The unfamiliar divided dealing system, which prohibited 
firms from acting as both broker and market makers - abolished on 
October 27, 1986 -and the ban on corporate membership may have also 
discouraged foreign firms. Since March 1986, however, a number of 
foreign firms have increased their minority shareholdings in domestic 
members firms to 100 per cent and some have been accepted as members 
of the exchange. 
Restrictions on Type and Range of Securities Activities 
Once established in the United Kingdom, foreign financial institutions 
engaged in the securities business do, with limited exceptions, 
receive the same treatment as domestic ones. As mentioned previously, 
the lead management of sterling denominated securities may only be 
conducted by an institution resident in the UK where there are 
reciprocal arrangements in the parent country. Moreover, it is 
expected that such issues will be co-led by a UK owned institution. 
This requirement was originally imposed by the Bank of England to 
regulate international access to the sterling market within the 
context of the Control of Borrowing Act. There has been some 
relaxation in this area in the sense that indigenous UK firms which 
have recently become owned or controlled by foreign firms have 
subsequently served as co-lead managers. 
The stamp duty imposed by the UK authorities on the issues of 
depository receipts in the UK may weigh particularly heavily on 
foreign financial institutions. The 1.5 per cent levy was necessary 
to avoid circumvention of the 0.5 per cent stamp tax on the purchase 
and sale of securities in the UK, since an interest in such securities 
could effectively be obtained by purchase of depository receipts. 
A mention should be made again of the considerable powers introduced 
by the Financial Services Act 1986 in cases where UK institutions are 
deemed not to have received equally favourable treatment in the 
conduct of investment, insurance and banking business in other 
countries. Because of the liberalisation of the securities markets, 
it was felt that some means of redress was necessary against countries 
where there was an imbalance of treatment. Its use may be reserved, 
however, for non-EC countries like Japan. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
The main conclusions to be drawn are as follows: 
(1) The major obstacle to establishing a presence in a foreign 
securities market would appear to be regulations banning 
foreigners from being licensed as brokers. The importance of 
exchange membership must be assessed, however, in relation to 
the entire institutional structure of the securities markets. 
In Italy, for instance, securities may be traded directly 
between banks off the exchange, i.e. without a broker as 
intermediary. 
(2) Difficulties are encountered by non-banking firms which wish to 
establish themselves in a universal banking environment - as 
exists, for example, in Germany or Belgium - where a full 
banking licence will not be granted to an institution that does 
not offer a full range of banking services. Countries are, 
however, now adapting and beginning to offer more limited 
licences for trading in securities only. 
(3) There are restrictions on the establishment of offices either to 
solicit secondary market business from individual or 
institutional investors, or to disseminate information about 
possible investments. Also barriers are placed in the way of 
dealing directly with the public in executing such orders. 
(4) Regarding primary operations, discriminatory restrictions on the 
lead management of domestic issues exist in some states. 
(5) In addition to exchange controls, there are other measures 
which, while not directly prohibiting operations in foreign 
securities, are designed to prevent or limit their purchase. In 
Spain, for example, banks, insurance companies and collective 
investment companies are limited in the amount of foreign 
securities that may be held in their portfolios. 
(6) A small number of countries levy discriminatory taxes on the 
purchases of foreign securities. Whilst these taxes do not in 
most cases discriminate against foreign entities, the increased 
cost of doing business may act as a disincentive for trading 
securities in a particular market. 
(7) National prudential requirements are deemed to be a problem in 
relation to collective investments. Thus, in Germany, many 
foreign applicants report difficulty in meeting local 
requirements. This is not seen to be discriminatory, but lack 
of harmonisation of rules on collective investments may make 
some European markets less attractive than others. 
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4. 4 REGULATORY BARRIERS TO TRADE AND ESTABLISHMENT IN INSURANCE 
Insurance is a highly technical, multifaceted service hidebound by 
many rules and regulations. As with the banking sector, it may be 
that margin of discretion with which detailed regulations are applied 
that determines the competitive standing of a foreign insurer in a 
member state, rather than the regulations per se. 
With insurance the question of barriers to establishment is 
supplemented by the question of freedom of trade. Over and above 
the barriers imposed by exchange controls a number of legal 
barriers to trade in insurance have resulted in a situation where, 
except for major risks, insurance is fragmented into isolated 
national markets. In contrast, major risks are laid off in what is 
a truly international reinsurance market. 
Recent court cases have altered the position somewhat in Europe, and 
it should be noted that whilst attempt has been made to update the 
source material available, it is possible that recent measures adopted 
by member states have been overlooked. 
In line with the distinction between minor and major risks, this 
section deals first with direct insurance, before looking at 
co-insurance and reinsurance. The country-by-country approach is 
accordingly not followed in this section. 
DIDCT INSURANCE 
Establishment of Insurance Operations 
Licensing 
Licensing is the most common means of restricting the access of 
foreign insurers. Licences may be withheld completely or restricted 
to certain parts of the business. Almost without exception some 
permanent presence has been required in the importing country, 
although this may now change in the light of the recent decision of 
the European Court of Justice in the case of the Commission versus the 
Federal Republic of Germany, France, Ireland and Denmark - Freedom to 
Provide Insurance Services. 
While it is not necessary for branches to maintain separate 
solvency margins, EC directives require undertakings to establish 
at the head office a solvency margin, calculated according to 
co-ordinated rules, that is sufficient for their entire business, 
i.e. both the head office and the agencies and branches. One-third 
of the solvency margin constitutes the guarantee fund which, 
depending on the various classes of insurance, cannot be less than 
a certain fixed amount. 
Out of the eight countries specified within this report, most 
countries fully enforce these EC directives. Foreign insurers must 
satisfy these criteria in addition to domestic requirements 
governing technical reserves, which are applied uniformly to both 
domestic and foreign insurers. Each of the member states has its 
own separate set of rules governing technical reserves and the 
assets which represent such reserves. 
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Recruitment of Local Managerial Staff 
None of the eight countries requires a foreign insurance company to 
recruit local staff for managerial work. The General Agent must be a 
resident in Luxembourg, France, Germany, the Netherlands and the UK, 
but not in Belgium, Italy or Spain. 
Transfer of Funds 
Foreign insurance companies have to comply with the general 
requirements concerning the transfer of funds which are applied in 
each country; but there is no specific restriction concerning the 
insurance sector. 
Obstacles to Insurance Transactions 
Placing of Contracts 
The ruling of December 4, 1986, in the European Court means that 
those countries which prevent or severely limit the placement of 
insurance contracts outside their territories with non-established 
insurers must reconsider their rules and regulations. The Court's 
decision, however, does not remove all restrictions as national 
authorisation requirements must, in most cases, be adhered to in the 
interest of consumer protection. 
At present, there are numerous obstacles to placing business 
outside a country with unlicensed insurers that range from 
restrictions on the use of resident intermediaries to the volume of 
business that may be conducted. The full ramifications of the EC 
ruling in terms of relaxing barriers to trade are unlikely to 
become evident for some time. 
Government Procurement Policies 
Government purchases of goods and services may not only be 
substantial, but can often be connected with other parallel economic 
activities. The insurance associated with these activities forms a 
broad range of insurance possibilities for which foreign insurers may 
have restricted chances to compete if there are preferential 
procurement policies. 
None of the eight member states dealt with in the context of this 
report have legislation limiting the placement of government insurance 
contracts to domestic insurers. It may, however, be the case that 
both custom and practice prevent foreign insurers from offering their 
services in this area on a competitive basis. 
- 129 -
- 89 -
Contract Law 
Some countries allow the parties to an insurance contract to choose 
the law which shall apply. This is however, subject to certain 
limitations with regard to the compulsory provisions of the contract 
law relating to the whole contract. In Spain, national law must 
always be adhered to, whilst both France and Luxembourg enforced 
national law in certain situations; e.g. in France, when the risk 
covered is in the country itself. 
All the eight states specified allow the parties to insurance 
contracts to take their differences to their courts, even if the 
contracts have been made under the law of another country. 
Restrictions only apply in Luxembourg, where it is only allowed in the 
case of life assurance of persons, and in France, where it is subject 
to the rider that the contract does not relate to risks situated in 
France. 
Taxation 
None of the eight countries have discriminatory tax measures against 
foreign insurers although some member states have a more favourable 
fiscal environment than others. The OECD publication on barriers to 
trade in insurance, published in 1983, identified the following 
points: 
(1) Taxes levied are no higher for contracts placed with 
non-established insurers. 
(2) Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg and the United Kingdom grant tax 
relief to the proposer for certain types of insurance contracts 
when the contract is placed in the domestic market. 
CO- INSUBAMCE 
Co-insurance is the practice whereby insurance groups form syndicates 
to share big industrial risks. In most countries, international 
co-insurance is subject to regulations identical of very similar to 
those applying to other forms of direct insurance. Most of those 
countries which allow international co-insurance set high 
thresholds, below which they do not allow international 
co-insurance in accordance with the 1987 Coinsurance Directive. 
To come within the EC directive on co-insurance, the following 
conditions in particular must be satisfied: 
(1) The risk must be located within the Community and must be 
covered, without joint liability between them, by several 
insurance undertakings (the co-insurers), one of which is the 
leading insurer, by a single contract at an overall premium 
and for the same period. 
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(2) The leading insurer must fully assume the leader's role in 
co-insurance practice and must determine the terms and 
conditions of insurance and rating. Moreover, it must 
determine, according to the rules or practice of the State where 
it is established, the minimum amount of the reserves for 
outstanding claims to be established by each co-insurer. 
The latest development in the field of co-insurance has been brought 
about once again by the case recently before the European Court of 
Justice. In addition to the particular case against Germany 
relating to direct insurance, the EC also brought action against 
Germany, Denmark, Ireland and France on the grounds of 
non-compliance with its directive on co-insurance. The general 
ruling to emerge was that the leading insurer of a co-insurance 
syndicate does not have to be established in a country in which the 
risks are situated, nor does it require authorisation from the 
appropriate supervisory authority. The latter point is in direct 
contrast to that made in the case of direct insurance brought 
against Germany, where it was emphasised that national 
authorisation procedures must still be complied with, even though 
the insurer may not have a permanent presence in the country. 
RE-INSURANCE 
General Freedom from Regulation 
In general it may be said that re-insurance stands out within the 
insurance sector as being an unregulated business. Whilst the direct 
sector in almost all countries is subject to a battery of regulations 
aimed at ensuring solvency and stability in insurance services in 
general, the same level of concern is not shown for the re-insurance 
sector, to which, of course, much of the risk covered by the direct 
insurance sector is passed on, although this situation varies from 
class to class and country to country. 
Under an EC directive, all member states were required to remove 
all restrictions upon freedom of establishment and freedom to 
provide services in respect of insurance firms' activities relating 
to re-insurance. 
State Operation 
In no country is re-insurance provided as a state monopoly. In Italy, 
concerns writing life assurance are required to cede from 10 to 40 per 
cent, depending on the case, of their risks to the National Insurance 
Institute. In some of the member states, the State may re-insure 
certain risks in competition with private companies; this does not 
happen in either the Netherlands or the UK or in many other 
countries. 
Licensing and Supervision of Established Concerns 
In Italy and the UK, re-insurance companies are required to obtain a 
licence when re-insurance is undertaken with direct business; in 
Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands and Spain it is also the 
case through the licence is not specific to re-insurance but covers 
direct insurance as well. 
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When re-insurance is carried out by specialised concerns (pure 
re-insurance), these concerns may establish without a licence in 
Belgium, France (provided the head office is in an EC country), 
Germany and the Netherlands. The other countries require pure 
re-insurance enterprises to be licensed. Countries are consistent in 
their approach to supervision - either not bothering at all or 
supervising both foreign and domestic concerns. Germany provides the 
only exception in that it supervises domestic undertakings to an 
extent but not foreign re-insurers. 
Deposit Requirements 
The supervisory regulations in some member states prevent insurers 
from covering any part of the technical reserves by claims against 
reinsurers. This means that they are in practice compelled to 
require very substantial deposits from reinsurers. As a 
consequence reinsurance is much less used in those countries (for 
example France) which have such rules than in those countries (for 
example Germany) which do not. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Insurance appears to be similar to the banking sector in that 
established foreign and domestic insurers are treated in a homogeneous 
manner, with there being little in the way of open discrimination. 
Lack of harmonisation of national laws and regulations seem to present 
the major barrier to free trade, as it results in some member states 
being inherently less financially attractive than others in terms of 
open competition. 
The case recently before the European Court of Justice, concerning the 
freedom to provide insurance services, highlights the discrimination 
exercised by some member states against non-established direct and 
co-insurers. The full ramifications of the Court's judgements will 
only become evident once countries have amended their own legislation 
and adjusted their domestic practices accordingly. 
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4.5 EXCHANGE CONTROLS RESTRICTIONS ON TRADE IN FIRANCIAL SERVICES 
EXCHANGE CONTROLS 
EC Proposals for Removal of Ezcbange Controls 
Exchange controls, particularly on the free movement of capital, 
constitute a significant barrier to cross-border trading in 
financial services, as was outlined in Section 2 of this report. 
The European Commission has introduced a two-stage process to 
liberalise all community exchange controls by 1992. The first 
stage came into effect in February of this year for seven of the 
member states, including the UK, France, West Germany, Italy and 
the Benelux countries. Those measures formally liberalise 
cross-border transactions in unlisted securities, unit trusts and 
national securities issued on foreign stock exchanges, as well as 
long-term trade credits and admission of foreign securities to a 
domestic market if quoted on a stock exchange. Spain, as a 
recently joined member of the EC, is allowed until 1990 to 
introduce these measures. 
A proposal has now been made to liberalise all EC capital flows. 
This will allow individuals to have bank accounts, financial loans 
and money market instruments in any Community Country. 
Introduction 
The free movement of capital is assured in the UK, West Germany, the 
Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg, France and Italy; there are, 
however, reporting and authorisation procedures in force for 
certain transactions. France and Italy are in the process of 
liberalising its exchange controls, whilst Spain still retain them 
on an extensive basis. 
The following paragraphs highlight some noteworthy features of the 
exchange regime in various member states. 
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Belgium/Luxembourg 
These countries have a joint two-tier exchange. Operations related to 
the purchase or sale of securities are normally done on the 
financial market like all financial transactions in the 
Belgian-Luxembourg Economic Union. Some relevant operations may, 
however, at the choice of the investor, be carried out on either 
the free or official market, the latter being limited to current 
account transactions. Such operations include repayment of listed 
bonds denominated in Belgian or Luxembourg currency and belonging 
to foreign residents for at least 18 months, as well as the 
liquidation of participation in enterprises in the Economic Union 
for which a transfer guarantee was obtained at the time the 
investment was made. All transactions on the free or the official 
market involving more than BF 25 million require prior presentation 
of appropriate documentation to the Exchange Control Board. 
France 
Restrictions are imposed in a number of areas such as lending to 
non-residents, and the opening of foreign bank accounts. 
Loans made to French companies by foreign lenders, in French francs 
up to 50 Million have no restrictions; but no prior authorisation 
is required in the case of foreign currency loans. 
Germany 
In Germany, there appears to be little in the way of exchange 
restrictions and of reporting requirements. Two points to note are as 
follows: 
(i) The purchase of certain fixed interest-bearing securities 
(Treasury Bonds) by non-residents is subject to approval by the 
federal government. 
(ii) Whilst there are no restrictions currently in force on deposits 
of non-residents, the Central Bank is in a position to 
Italy 
regulate indirectly the inflow of such deposits by requiring 
banks to maintain minimum reserves at various rates. 
Italy has a number of capital controls and similar measures designed 
to prevent capital outflow that restrict international securities 
dealing. 
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There are restrictions on both borrowings from abroad and loans by 
residents to non-residents. Authorisation by the Treasury is 
required unless specific criteria are met in terms of the type of 
loan, the amount and its duration. Also financial loans in lire 
are forbidden. 
Capital invested in Italy either by foreigners or Italian citizens 
resident abroad, for the creation of new productive enterprises may be 
transferred abroad without any restrictions. Dividends and profits 
earned from the investment, as well as the proceeds of liquidation, 
may also be transferred abroad without any restriction. If the 
investment is not made for the purpose of setting up new productive 
enterprises, the transfer of dividends or profits abroad may not 
normally exceed 8% per annum of the capital invested, (although it is 
currently overriden by an administrative regulation), and the capital 
invested may not be transferred until two years have elapsed from the 
date of investment. 
Under certain conditions, non-residents can have accounts in 
foreign currencies while residents are only allowed to keep 
"authorised accounts" or "special accounts" to deal with 
international transactions in lire. Any transfer from a foreign 
account to an internal account is subject to exchange control 
clearance. 
The Netherlands 
From October 1, 1986 onward, all regulations dealing with the import 
and export of capital were abolished in the Netherlands. 
In general, Dutch residents are obliged to use authorised banks or 
institutions, or persons designated by the central bank, when paying 
or receiving money from non-residents, regardless of the currency 
employed. Certain transactions between residents and non-residents 
need to be notified to the central bank for the compiliation of the 
balance of payments. 
Spain 
Spain is in the process of relaxing exchange controls. 
Liberalisation measures are expected in the area of securities' 
dealings but as at the end of 1986, the following type of restriction 
was still in force: 
(1) Foreign issues in general could not be introduced on the 
domestic market but some limited issues have been allowed 
with authorisation. 
(2) Sales or purchases of foreign securities were very limited. 
(3) Purchases abroad of collective investment securities were 
very limited. 
(4) The purchase abroad by residents of unquoted securities was 
prohibited unless in the nature of an authorised direct 
investment. 
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There are restrictions on borrowing abroad, with loans over 750 
million pesetas requiring the prior approval of the Bank of Spain. 
Branches of foreign entities may not obtain loans from their home 
office, unless loans takes form of direct investment or is of a 
participating nature. 
In general, operations between residents and non-residents which 
result in foreign receipts or payments are subject to exchange 
control. Some transactions are prohibited and others require prior 
authorisation, verification or communication. Infringements of the 
law are regarded seriously by the authorities. 
United Kingdom 
The UK has no exchange controls and there are no points to be 
particularly noted under this head. 
Conclusions 
The removal of exchange controls is seen as 
creating a completely free internal market. 
controls and trade in services was outlined 
note in Appendix 3. 
an important factor in 
The link between exchange 
in our methodological 
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SECTION 5. QUANTIFICATION OF THE EFlECTS OF REGULATIONS 
5 .1 INTRODUCTION AND REVIEW OF APPROACHES 
The objective of this section is to determine the scope for a quantitative 
assessment of the effects of completing the internal market in financial 
services. In particular, the purpose of this section is to provide 
quantitative measures of the effects of regulations, and of the lack of 
Community wide competition, or market segmentation. It was envisaged in 
the work programmes that these quantitative measures would be based on a 
set of financial products or services, considered to be representative of 
the output of the financial services sector as a whole, and found in each 
of the separate Community markets included in the study. In particular, it 
was envisaged that prices of this set of products would be established for 
each market. 
In this section we present a quantification of the impact of regulation on 
the basis of a set of prices of financial services and products. We 
believe, however that such an approach on its own is not sufficient and we 
have, therefore, in addition considered other measures of the effects of 
regulation. It is, therefore, useful to review .a number of potential 
approaches to estimating the effects of regulations or market segmentation 
and to consider their rationale and their limitations. 
In attempting the quantify the effects of regulation we considered 
a wide range of approaches including the following: 
(1) Comparative prices of specific products services; 
(2) Value added/output ratios; 
(3) Survey data on net margins; 
(4) Evidence from other countries on economies of scale or on external 
economies of financial integration; 
(5) Indirect measures of impact of specific regulations; and 
(6) Case Study of Impact of Deregulation. 
The rationale and the limitations of each of the above approaches 
are discussed below. 
(1) Comparative Prices of Specific Products/Services 
The work programme envisaged the compilation of comparative 
prices as the measure of the effects of quantification. The rationale 
for this approach was indirectly referred to in our analysis of the 
link between liberalising the market for financial services and 
liberalisaticn of capital movements as outlined in Appendix 3 of this 
report. In that analysis, we 
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noted that the fragmentation of the European market for 
financial services means that the consumer does not obtain the 
services for the lowest possible price. The deviations from 
the lowest possible price can arise from a variety of 
conceptually distinct sources. These can include: 
( i) 
(ii) 
(iii) 
(iv) 
(v) 
differences in comparative advantage; 
unexploited economies of scale; and 
monopoly rents resulting in higher costs or profits; 
differences in the regulatory, fiscal and judicial systems; 
differences in market structure and practices. 
The above analysis highlights the importance of reviewing 
comparative prices as a measure of the effects of regulation 
or market segmentation. There are, however, both conceptual 
and technical difficulties with this approach which implies that while 
it represents one of the best approaches available, it would be a 
mistake not to consider other complementary approaches. 
A conceptual difficulty with using price differences as a 
measure of the effect of regulation is indicated by the fact 
that there are significant price differences within national 
markets although suppliers in these markets are faced with the 
same regulations. It is, therefore, not certain that the 
removal of regulatory barriers to trade would result in a 
single price. It is important to realise that there are market as 
well as regulatory barriers to trade. An example of a market barrier 
is information required to gain entry. Price divergence within 
countries may be due to information barriers. For example, in the 
Padoa-Schioppa report, it was noted that "when financial resources are 
traded, since nothing material is being shipped, the cost of 
information rather than physical costs represents the main national 
barrier to trade. Often, however, information will flow more easily 
between geographically separate but economically linked parties than 
between physical neighbours." 
In addition to this conceptual difficulty there are a number 
of technical difficulties in measuring prices. Firstly, there 
is the question of comparability of products. For example the 
price of motor insurance for the same class of insurance etc 
may differ as a reflection of differences in the underlying 
risk. A second problem arises due to the problem of cross 
subsidisation of financial services products. In our 
analysis, we have selected a range of products/services in 
such a way as to attempt to minimise these problems. There is 
also severe practical difficulties in obtaining price comparisons as 
relative prices often change rapidly and given significant price 
variations within countries there is a danger that price divergences 
between countries may reflect sampling errors. 
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The issue of comparability of price data is particularly important and 
while every effort has been used to attempt to obtain comparability, price 
comparisons are very difficult to make in financial services. For example 
in the case of term life insurance a report(l) which examines the question 
in detail, concluded that one is practically never comparing like with 
like. One factor of considerable significance, is that the basis of the 
application of direct taxation to life insurance companies differs in the 
United Kingdom from that in the other Member States reviewed, and usually 
has the effect that no tax is paid upon the profits of term insurance, 
which may even benefit from a form of tax credit. Such a tax credit can be 
taken into account in the fixing of tariffs (this is a consequence of the 
application of the so-called "income less expenditure" method, which pushes 
the taxation burden on to those classes of life insurance which gives rise 
to substantial investment income). As to motor insurance, it must be noted 
that the scope of the so-called comprehensive cover is not the same in all 
Member States or for all companies. Also of relevance is the fact that the 
cost of premiums is to a large extent (although of course not totally) 
related to the costs of claims. This varies between different Member 
States for reasons which are not related to the efficiency of the insurance 
companies. The frequency of accidents varies substantially from one 
country to another. So does the cost of repairing vehicles. Differences 
in insurance contracts law make it easier for insurers to avoid payment of 
claims in some countries than in others. Differences in the legal systems 
mean that claims can be settled with much less legal expenditure in some 
countries than in others. Where personal injuries are concerned hospital 
bills which have to be borne by insurers in some countries, and are 
supported by the social security system in others. Awards made by courts 
for physical injury, especially permanent disability, vary enormously. 
In comparing insurance prices it is important to take note of the 
differences between the so-called "pure premium" which is the amount of 
premium theoretically required to cover claims payments without taking any 
account of expenses of any kind whatever and without taking account either 
of investment income, on the one hand, and the loading on the pure premium 
which is necessary to take account of expenses of all kinds which are 
largely within the control of the insurance company. Pure premium may be 
determined for certain classes of insurance (e.g. motor) very largely by 
national conditions (many of which will remain different even in the 
internal market), while for others (e.g. damage to high-tech factories) the 
pure premium will depend on standards of engineering and risk prevention of 
an international character, and therefore much on national standards. 
Similar difficulties arise in relation to other financial services. 
Despite the difficulties estimates of existing price differences are an 
important guide to future potential price developments. Therefore while 
the price comparisons presented in this report are used as a guide in 
estimating inputs for our economic modelling exercise it would be a mistake 
to consider the price comparisons as representing a comprehensive 
comparison of the cost to the consumer of financial services. In many 
cases as will be outlined later the "price" estimates presented do not 
represent the cost to the consumer. 
(1) Carter R.L, Morgan E.V; "Freedom to Offer Life Insurance Across EEC 
State Boundaries", E.A.G Report, 1986. 
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Value Added/Output Ratios 
In considering value added to output ratios we are attempting to 
quantify the effects of market segmentation by measuring the resources 
used in producing a unit output. Value added represents the sum of 
compensation of employees and profits accruing to the resources 
employed. In many service industries the ambiguity of the concept of 
output and the difficulty of measuring it have often led statisticians 
to use resource inputs themselves as a measure of output. For the 
purpose of this analysis such an approach would not be appropriate. 
The measure of output which we use must be conceptually independent of 
inputs. 
In order to explain the rationale and the limitations of such measures 
it is useful to take the example of the banking sector. The most 
commonly used measure of banking output is the value of loans 
outstanding. This has been used particularly in studies of bank 
concentration and of economies of scale in banking. Though 
conceptually independent of inputs, this is, however, an imperfect 
measure. Its deficiencies can be summarised as follows: 
(a) there is no discrimination between loans of differing intrinsic 
riskiness or of differing maturities. 
(b) the measure does not discriminate between different degrees of 
maturity transformation. Thus in one bank, loans may be financed 
primarily by fixed-term deposits with matched maturity while in 
another bank long term loans are financed mainly by demand 
deposits. Abstracting from default risk, the first type of bank 
is acting as little more than a broker, with no deposit 
withdrawal risk. 
(c) no allowance is made for deposit-related and money transmission 
services. Implicitly these are assumed to be proportionate to 
the size of the balance sheet as measured by loans. 
(d) no allowance is made for other services generated fee income 
including off-balance sheet transactions, merchant banking 
activities and so on. 
These deficiencies are likely to be particularly severe in making 
comparisons between individual banks, such as is done in measures of 
concentration and scale economies. Aggregation over banks, and using the 
figures in a time series of cross country comparison will tend to reduce 
the importance of problems (c) and (d), in that the share of non-loan 
service in the aggregate is likely to be less variable than that in 
individual banks. Nevertheless problems do remain, but we believe they 
provide a useful aggregate check on the micro data. 
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In paying for the services provided by banks, the consumer will cover: 
( i) 
(ii) 
(iii) 
interest paid by the bank to its depositors; 
the cost of materials used by the bank, i.e. intermediate consumption 
and consumption of fixed capital. 
value added by the bank, i.e. compensation of employees and gross 
operating surplus. 
If we make the assumption that the cost of the first two items is largely 
beyond the control of each bank, then item (iii) measures the contribution 
of the banking sector to the aggregate costs of bank services. 
If the value added of the banking system is not the minimum possible, this 
may be due, for example, to taxes and regulations, to inefficiencies, for 
example those arising from scale dis-economies, or to imperfect competition 
I (in banking or in factor markets).; 
It is also possible to take the view that to an important extent items (i) 
and (ii) are not beyond the control of individual banks, and that looking 
at (iii) alone may result in an understatement of cost differentials. 
However, with regard to interest on deposits, the level of interest rates 
is strongly affected by inflation and other conjunctural factors. In a 
cross-country study, the differences in interest attributable to such 
factors could swamp the elements of cost differential with which we are 
concerned. 
For insurance the same principles apply. In seeking a suitable output 
measure the difficulties are perhaps greater than for banks. There is no 
directly comparable stock measure for insurance like bank loans. The main 
simple candidate for measuring output is premium income. For accident 
insurance, claims is also a possible measure. The main conceptual 
drawbacks of premium are: 
(a) there is a timing problem, the risk insured and paid for in the 
measured premium may cover a shorter or a longer period than one year. 
(b) the premium may partly represent a pure investment sum to be 
risklessly managed by the insurer. Just using premium income 
simplicitly assumes that the true risk pooling or insurance element is 
the same for all policies. 
(3) Survey Data on Net Margins 
An alternative approach to exam1n1ng prices is to look at differences 
in the costs or profits obtained by different financial institutions 
in the different countries. In particular, an examination of margins 
in the banking sector and in cost to output ratios in such sectors as 
insurance can be of use in evaluating the effects of regulations. 
This represents a micro version of the value added to output ratios 
considered above. 
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Evidence from other Countries on Economies of Scale or on External 
Economies of Financial Integration 
The existence of economies of scale and their measurement would 
provide a very useful basis for quantifying effects of market 
segmentation. As noted in Appendix 3 of this report, there is 
considerable controversy regarding economies of scale in financial 
services and existing evidence on both economies of scale and of 
external economies of financial integration is very limited. 
(5) Indirect Measures of Impact of Specific Regulations 
The impact of selected specific regulations could provide an input 
into a quantification of the effects of regulations. This, however, 
would only measure static effects. In addition, it would only measure 
the impact on institutions who decided to "pay the cost" of meeting 
the regulations. Our judgement is, therefore, that such an approach 
is very unlikely to prove worthwhile. We have however later in this 
section for illustrative purposes reported on the results of selective 
research on the impact of specific regulations in the banking and 
insurance sectors. 
(6) Case Studies of Impact of Deregulation within a National Boundary 
An additional potential approach to quantify the effects of regulation 
is to consider on a case study basis the impact of deregulation within 
a national boundary and to evaluate what impact it has on prices. 
This could be a useful additional source of input into an evaluation 
of the effects of removing or reducing regulations in Europe. We 
have, therefore, taken as a case study the example of deregulation of 
the UK securities business. 
Other Measures 
In addition to the six measures which are reviewed above, we considered a 
number of other measures such as measures of credit rationing and macro 
measures such as a share of value added (less trade) in GNP. Due to data 
or methodological problems with these approaches we decided not to pursue 
them further. 
It is also essential that the indirect macroeconomic implications of 
regulations are evaluated. 
,In the remainder of this section the quantified data for comparative 
'prices, value added/output ratios, survey data on net margins, indirect 
measures of impact of specific regulations, and the case study of impact of 
deregulation, are presented. 
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QUANTIFICATION OF COMPARATIVE PRICES 
In the following paragraphs we present a quantification of 
comparative prices for a range of financial services products 
eight countries. We present details of prices in banking and 
sectors, in insurance and in securities and brokerage sectors. 
particular, we analyse details of prices for the following 
services/products: 
cost of commercial loans; 
cost of consumer credit; 
cost of mortgages; 
cost of credit cards; 
cost of purchasing foreign exchange drafts and travellers 
cheques; 
cost of letters of credit; 
cost of current bank accounts; 
cost of term insurance; 
cost of home and contents insurance; 
cost of motor insurance; 
cost of fire and theft insurance; 
cost of public liability insurance; 
and cost of stock exchange transactions. 
Our selection of products was designed and agreed with the 
Commission to overcome some of the difficulties referred to 
earlier in Section 5.1. 
in the 
credit 
In 
Many of the prices have been obtained directly via a sample of 
financial providers. Others have been obtained from published 
sources and from producer associations. It is important to treat 
comparative price data with care. Prices of financial services 
change frequently and the data presented represents "a snap shot" at 
a given point in time. Also of critical importance is that for a 
wide range of financial services there are a wide range of possible 
prices on offer and in many cases there is cross-subsidisation 
between different financial services. 
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Another important issue relates to how representative are the chosen 
products of the output of the financial services sector as a whole. 
This is a difficult issue to judge but given the large number of 
different services chosen which cover both private consumer and 
commercial services in banking, insurance and securities sectors 
these services are believed to be as representative as feasible. 
These services do not include advisory services. The reason for this 
is a methodological one in that it was not felt possible to obtain 
prices for standardised advisory services. The sources of the data 
presented are indicated in this section. 
We have attempted to present in a standard manner the same financial 
services products in different countries. In certain cases 
regulatory or market practices have made this difficult to achieve. 
We have also attempted to standardise the presentation for different 
types of financial services products. In certain cases however we 
have not presented the material in this manner where we believe it 
may be misleading. 
A key issue in interpreting the price data is that we have attempted 
to focus on the cost of the service provided by the financial 
institutional and have adjusted the figures to remove the influence 
of interest rate differentials. We have however considered the 
impact of interest rate differentials separately in Section 6. As 
many of the products represent the margin over wholesale money market 
rates the prices do not represent the cost to the consumer. This is 
consistent with our economic modelling requirements. The data 
therefore would not be suitable as a measure of consumer prices in 
different countries. The figures also exclude consumer taxes. 
In table 5.2.1 overleaf we define the financial services or products 
examined in our price comparison. 
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TA.BLE 5.21 
Name of Standard Service Description of Standard Service 
Banking Services 
Conunercial Loan 
Consumer Credit 
Credit Cards 
Mortgage 
Commercial Draft 
Travellers 
Cheques 
Current Cheque 
Account 
Letter of Credit 
Insurance Services 
Term Insurance 
Home Insurance 
Motor Insurance 
Commercial Fire 
and Theft 
Public Liability 
Cover 
Brokerage Services 
Private Equity 
Transactions 
Private Gilts 
Transactions 
Institutional 
Equity 
Transactions 
Annual cost to a medium size firm of a commercial 
loan of 250,000 ECUs. Measured as excess over 
inter-bank rates. 
Annual cost of consumer loan of 500 ECUs. Excess 
interest rate over money market rates. 
Annual cost assuming 500 ECU debit. Excess 
interest rate over money market rates. 
Annual cost of Home loan ot 25,000 ECU. Excess 
interest rate over money market rates. 
Total cost for a large commercial client of 
purchasing a commercial draft for 30,000 ECUs. 
Total cost for a private consumer of purchasing 
100 ECU's worth of Travellers Cheques. 
Annual cost assuming 200 cheques P.A., 20 standing 
orders, 50 cash withdrawals, 20 credit. 
Cost of letter of credit of 50,000 ECUs for 
three months. 
Average annual cost of term insurance. 
Annual cost of fire and theft cover for house 
valued at 70,000 ECUs with 28,000 ECUs contents. 
Annual cost of comprehensive insurance, 1.6 litre 
car, Driver 10 years experience, no claims bonus. 
Annual cover for premises valued at 387,240 
ECUs with stock and contents at 232,344 ECUs. 
Annual premium for Engineering company with 20 
employees and annual turnover of 1.29 million 
ECUs. Includes employer liability cover. 
Commission costs of cash bargain of 
1,440 ECUs. 
Commission costs of cash bargain of 
14,000 ECUs. 
Commission costs of cash bargain of 288,000 ECUs 
Institutional Gilt 
Transactions Commission Costs of cash bargains of 7.2m ECUs. 
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INTERPRETING I PRICE I COMPARISONS 
Extreme caution must be exercised in interpreting the price 
comparisons' in this section and the analysis in previous 
sections concerning the problems of comparability and cross 
subsidisation must be noted. Also as adjustments in many cases 
have been made for the interest rate the prices do not represent 
the cost to the consumer. Prices are also exclusive of consumer 
taxes. It is also important to note that in section 6 of this 
report some additional points are raised which are relevant to 
interpreting the 'price' comparisons. 
COSTS OF MORTGAGES 
Tables 5.2.2 show the cost of mortgages as measured by the 
amount by which interest rates on mortgages exceed money market 
rates. The data in the table was derived by subtracting market 
rates money from estimates of the costs of mortgages. The 
latter data was obtained from the European Community Mortgage 
Federation. The results represent the average costs for each 
quarter. It is likely that prices will have changed since this 
data was collected. 
TABLE 5.2.2: EXCESS OF AVERAGE MORTGAGE LOAN INTEREST RATES 
OVER MOREY MARD'l' RATES 
per cent per annum 
1982 1983 1984 1985 
B 3.36 4.69 3.41 3.23 
D 1.43 3.09 2.75 2.61 
ES 2.31 1.59 4.69 6.35 
F 0.11 1.83 1.94 2.09 
I 2.12 2.06 1.68 2.0 
NL 2.97 3.85 2.57 1.50 
UK 1.60 1.53 4.17 2.61 
Sources: European Community Mortgage Federation 
1986 
1.92 
2.30 
3.20 
2.61 
1.40 
1. 37 
1.16 
International Monetary Fund "Financial Statistical 
Yearbook". 
The excess of average mortgage interest rates over money 
market rates is shown in Table 5.2.2. In 1986 the 
differential ranged from just over 1 per cent in the UK to 3.2 
per cent in Spain. Between 1982 and 1986 the excess fell in 
each of the countries except Germany and France. It should also 
be noted that financial institutions providing mortgage may 
obtain funds at rates which differ from money market rates. 
This factor has not been taken into account in the estimates. 
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COSTS OF CONSUMER CREDIT 
Average rates of interest for bank loans to personal customers 
are shown in Table 5.2.3 in excess of money market rates .• The 
excess over prevailing money market rates varies considerably 
from 2-3 per cent in, Belgium and Luxembourg to 8 per cent or 
over in the UK, France, and Germany. The precise definition 
used here relates to the annual cost of a loan for a private 
consumer purchasing a motor vehicle. The costs examined are the 
excess over money market rates. The high cost in some countries 
such as Germany reflect the low level of money market rates. 
Quotes were obtained directly from two of the major banking 
groups in each of the countries. Very little differences within 
countries were evident for the particular consumer credit 
identified within the institutions contacted. There are of 
course a wide range of institutions offering different types of 
consumer credit at significantly differnt rates within 
countries. This would have to be taken into account in any 
comprehensive review of consumer credit. 
TABLE 5.2.3 AVERAGE COSTS OF CONSUMER CREDIT 
Country Per Cent Per Annum 
excess over 
money market 
rate 
B 2.3 
D 9.2 
ES 5.4 
F 8.0 
L 2.8 
NL 5.1 
UK 8.6 
Source: Sample survey of banks plus Morgan Guaranty; "World 
Financial Markets" 
COST OF CREDIT CAimS 
The table below shows the average cost for three credit cards. 
One of the cards examined is a charge card rather than a credit 
card and this influences the estimates. The costs are made up of 
a joining fee or annual charge together with the interest charge 
which has been "normalised" by using the excess of the nominal 
interest rate charged over the representative money market rate. 
The table shows credit cards to be most expensive in Italy, 
Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands. France and Luxembourg 
were the cheapest on the basis of this measure of costs. 
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TABLE: 5.2.4 
COST OF CREDIT CARDS 
ECU Range 
B 94 83 - 100 
D 84 63 - 122 
ES 66 63 - 68 
F 37 20 - 55 
I 99 79 - 117 
L 46 43 - 49 
NL 75 38 - 104 
UK 61 53 - 65 
Source: Sample Survey of Credit Card Charges 
(1) The data represent the average annual cost (in excess of 
money market rates) in the first year of acquiring a credit 
card and availing of ECU500 credit, if available, for the 
full year. The credit cards used in the example are Visa. 
Eurocard and American Express. The results were obtained 
directly fromthe credit card companies. 
COSTS OF PURCHASING FOREIGN EXCHANGE: 
The percentage difference between the exchange rate at which banks 
buy and sell foreign exchange varies depending on the type of 
instrument (notes, cheques, drafts), involved. For a given 
currency this reflects differences in handling and administration 
costs associated with each instrument. Differences in percentages 
between banks may also reflect differences in perceptions of risk 
of exchange rate fluctuations and the degree of competition for new 
business. We have not considered this issue in this report. We 
have however examined the cost to the consumer in terms of 
commissions, charges etc. A survey was carried out of the costs to 
the consumer of purchasing a commercial draft and travellers 
cheques in the eight countries. The results were obtained from a 
major bank with branches in different countries. (The results are 
shown in tables 5.2.5 and 5.2.6). 
COMHDCIAL DRAFTS 
Information on the total costs of purchasing a commercial draft for 
30,000 ECU's for a large commercial client is presented overleaf. 
These costs are inclusive of commission and bank charges. The cost 
of a commercial draft was the lowest in the Netherlands while in 
Spain the cost was the highest. 
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TABLE 5.2.5 
COST OF PURCHASING A COMMERCIAL DRAFT 
Country 
B 
D 
ES 
F 
I 
L 
NL 
UK 
Source: Sample Survey of Banks 
ECU 
43 
53 
120 
63 
50 
54 
22 
47 
The total cost for a private consumer of purchasing 100 ECUs worth 
of travellers cheques is given in Table 5.2.6 The results show 
that Germany, Luxembourg and the United Kingdom were the cheapest 
countries to purchase travellers cheques in, while France was the 
most expensive country. 
TABLE 5.2.6 
COST OF PURCHASING TRAVEJJ.QS CHEQUES 
Country ECU 
B 7.3 
D 5.0 
ES 7.0 
F 7.5 
I 6.6 
L 5.0 
NL 7.2 
UK 5.0 
Source: Sample Survey of Banks 
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COST OF LETTERS OF CREDIT 
In the table below data on the costs of letters of credit is 
presented. The figures show that costs were highest in Spain 
and lowest in France and Germany. The results are based on 
quotes provided by the major banks in each country reviewed. 
Very little differences within the countries were observed. 
TABLE 5. 2. 7 COSTS OF LETTERS OF CREDIT 
The costs compared on those for: 
Opening 
Confirming 
Accepting 
Carrying out 3 transactions 
The credit is for 3 months (1) 
Per Cent of Value 
B 1.15 
D 0.85 
ES 1.5 
F 0.875 
I 1.03 
L 1.2 
NL 1.10 
UK 1.02 
(1) The transactions are large enough not to incur any flat rate 
minimum charges. 
Source: S&Biple Survey of Banks 
COSTS OF CBEQUING ACCOUNTS 
The table overleaf sets out the costs of maintaining a current account 
and carrying out the transactions specified. For the example chosen 
the charges appeared highest in Italy, Germany and the UK. In the 
other countries minimal or zero charges were levied. Other factors 
bear on this comparison since banks are competing for deposits in some 
countries by offering extra services and in some cases a nominal 
interest payment on current accounts if certain maximum balances are 
maintained. The costs are based on a survey of the major banks in 
each country. In view of the above factors we believe data on these 
costs could be misleading and we do not use them in our subsequent 
analysis. 
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B 
D 
ES(2) 
F 
I 
L 
NL(3) 
UK 
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TABLE 5. 2. 8 BANK CHARGES 
The costs compared on those for: 
200 Cheques p.a. 
20 standing orders 
50 Automatic Cash Withdrawals 
20 Credits 
Account does not qualify for free banking 
ECU per annum 
0 
117 
2 
10 
240 
8 
0 
112 
(1) Assumed that the standing orders are all opened in the year in 
question. 
(2) Fixed charge only. No charge on cheques or automatic 
withdrawals. 
(3) Automatic Cash Withdrawal system introduced recently. Some banks 
charge DG1.50 per transaction. 
(4) The above charges refer to cheques written within the country in 
question. In Belgium there are no charges for such cheques but a 
charge of BF 150 is levied on a euro cheque of BF 7,000 written 
outside Belgium. Postage is also charged on letters to 
customers. 
Source: Sample Survey of Banks 
COST OF COMMERCIAL LOANS 
The annual cost to a medium sized firm of a commercial loan of 250,000 
ECUs (as measured by the margin over inter bank rates) are shown in 
table 5.2.9. The table shows commercial loans to be the most 
expensive in the UK and the Netherlands while France and Belgium were 
the cheapest. The cost of commercial loans depend on the risk 
associated with the loan. The data presented overleaf does not 
represent the cost to the firm as it is measured in terms of the 
margin over inter bank rates. These rates fluctuate significantly and 
this factor should be noted. Other reservations regarding these 
figures are considered in Section 6 of this report. 
- 151 -
- 111 -
TABLE 5. 2. 9: ANNUAL COST OF A C<I'IMKRCIAL LOAN 
B 
D 
ES 
F 
I 
L 
NL 
UK 
Source: Sample Survey of Banks 
COST OF TERM INSURANCE 
ECU 
4,500 
5,000 
5,625 
4,375 
5,125 
5,000 
6,750 
6,875 
A comparison was made of a sample of costs of term insurance in 
the eight countries. In examining all of the data on insurance 
prices in this section the difficulties in making insurance 
comparisons which was stressed earlier must be noted. Pure term 
insurance represents only a small proportion of the market in the 
countries surveyed. However, comparisons of savings linked 
premiums would not prove very easy to make because of the 
importance of differing levels of interest rates. The tables 
below set out the results. The cost of term insurance for a sum 
of 72,500 ECU was obtained for different classes indicated. The 
results represent quotes from between six and twelve companies in 
each of the countries. The results were obtained in 1987. 
TABLE 5.2.10: TERM INSURANCE PBEMIA 1 5 YEARS (Sum Assured = ECU 72,500) 
Country ECU Per Annum 
Male Female 
Age 25 35 45 25 35 45 
B 193 288 564 193 288 564 
D 161 187 307 153 174 274 
ES 174 232 508 168 188 338 
F 109 210 463 109 210 463 
I 209 290 536 209 290 536 
LU 162 258 543 162 258 543 
NL 126 144 360 108 126 216 
UK 83 101 261 83 87 175 
Source: Sample Survey 
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TABLE 5. 2. 11 : TERM INSURANCE 1 10 YEARS (Sum Assured = ECU 72,500) 
Country ECU Per Annum 
Male Female 
Age 25 35 45 25 35 45 
B 208 333 694 208 333 694 
D 172 210 375 156 195 336 
ES 184 285 640 174 213 418 
F 133 242 553 133 242 553 
1 220 342 697 220 342 697 
LU 178 306 682 178 306 682 
NL 124 172 454 107 136 264 
UK 91 130 362 87 103 242 
Source: Sample Survey 
The data on term insurance indicates that premia are lowest in 
the UK. Insurance in Germany appears considerably higher 
although the percentage gap narrows as the age group 
increases. The position with regard to German insurance is 
interesting and is considered below. 
The premiums quoted for France, Italy, Belgium and Luxembourg 
were the same for males and females. In France and Italy 
premiums are generally higher than in Germany for both five 
and ten year terms. The Italian premiums quoted were higher 
than in France, Germany and the UK in all categories. The 
Spanish quotes are, broadly speaking, similar to France for 
males aged 35 and 45. They are higher for 25 year old males 
and females. The rates for 35 and 45 year old females in 
Spain are lower than for France. 
The premiums in the Netherlands are lower than for many other 
countries. Premiums in Belgium and Luxembourg are in most 
cases higher than in Spain, France, Germany and the UK. 
As indicated above the German comparisons are interesting as 
they in part reflect a particular regulatory issue. 
Specifically contracts are standardised and conservative 
mortality rates must be used. 
It is however mandated that at least 90% of any surplus must 
be returned to policy holders through dividends/bonuses. This 
may obscure the true cost of purchasing insurance since the 
outcome on the bonus/dividend may not be clear for many years. 
The premiums shown for Germany in the above tables were an 
average of premiums quoted by companies some of which have 
deducted instant rebates and some which may have offered 
increased benefits in other ways such as including a profit 
share or special bonus payments in cases of accidental death. 
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The average figures shown above suggest that term insurance in 
Germany is considerably more expensive than in the UK. The 
gap narrows as the age group increases. It is possible that 
the disparity is less than shown, taking both cost and 
benefits since the Germany firms which quoted rates without 
immediate rebates offered other benefits not matched by the UK 
quotes. 
The table below shows the lowest rates quoted in the Germany 
sample, and the range found in the UK. 
TABLE 5. 2.12: TERM INSURANCE PREMIA 
Lowest in Germany Sample compared to the UK range 
Females 
25 
Males 
35 45 25 35 45 
Germany 
UK 
UK 
UK 
Germany 
UK 
UK 
UK 
Lowest 
Highest 
Average 
Lowest 
Lowest 
Highest 
Average 
Lowest 
143 
95 
83 
69 
147 
117 
91 
65 
172 
120 
101 
69 
5 Year Term 
249 
292 
261 
168 
118 
95 
83 
69 
10 Year Term 
200 
196 
130 
85 
284 
419 
362 
244 
121 
107 
87 
65 
140 
95 
87 
69 
156 
138 
103 
65 
174 
202 
175 
113 
253 
281 
242 
161 
The highest quotes in the UK sample were lower than the lowest 
in Germany with the exception of 45 year old males and females 
for both five and ten year terms. Finsinger (1) also found in 
the sample carried out in 1981, that the highest UK rates were 
lower than the cheapest in Germany but that the gap narrowed 
with increased age. However, that sample was carried out 
before rebates were widespread in Germany. The lowest 
quotations in the present sample in Germany are in all cases 
more than fifty per cent above the lowest in the UK except for 
the ten year term for 45 year old males . 
(1) The French Automobile and Life Insurance Markets 
J Finsinger & R Waldmann 1986 
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HOUSE AND CONTENTS INSURANCE 
The comparison of prices for these policies is particularly 
difficult because of the importance of location, type of 
construction, level of security and range of cover options 
available. The premiums for Italy came out highest from the 
sample and somewhat surprisingly those of the UK second 
highest. The results represents quotes obtained from between 
five and twelve companies in each of the countries reviewed. 
Again the differences in the inherent risk associated with 
insurance premium is a key factor. This is one of the reasons 
why in our economic modelling we have assumed that only a 
proportion of price differences would be removed in an 
integrated market. 
TABI..E 5. 2 .13: INSURANCE PREMIUMS HOUSE AND CONTENTS 
B 
D 
ES 
F 
I 
LU 
NL 
UK 
House valued at ECU 70,000 
Contents ECU 28,000 
Fire and Theft Cover 
House located in a medium sized city 
ECU per Annum 
118 
144 
135 
195 
253 
220 
164 
266 
Source: Sample Survey of Insurance Companies 
COSTS 01' HO'l'OR INSURANCE 
115 - 132 
93 - 159 
112 - 160 
163 - 211 
240 - 270 
217 - 238 
142 - 185 
225 - 300 
A survey was carried out on the costs of obtaining 
comprehensive insurance cover for a new 1.6 litre car. The 
main driver was specified as a 35 year old male with 10 years 
experience, full no claims bonus and who lived in an average 
sized city. Open driving was cited as a requirement. The 
results are set out in the table overleaf: The range 
estimates provided are also indicated and represent quotes 
from between six and twenty insurance companies in each 
country. 
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LU 
NL 
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TABLE 5.2.14: COST OF INSURANCE PREMIUMS - MOTOR 
Opel Ascona 1.6L 
Male aged 35 
10 years experience 
Lives in average sized city 
Full no claims bonus 
Open driving 
ECU per Annum 
494 
436 
758 
413 
942 
671 
354 
316 
Range 
468 - 526 
394 - 505 
701 - 812 
401 - 427 
716 - 1015 
652 - 727 
294 - 471 
261 - 411 
Source: Sample Survey of Insurance Companies 
COST OF COMMERCIAL FIRE AND THEFT INSURANCE 
A comparison was made of the cost of obtaining commercial fire 
and theft insurance for an engineering company assembling 
computer components. As in the case of house and contents 
insurance, the comparison of prices for these policies is 
extremely difficult because of the importance of differences 
in location, construction etc. The premiums for Italy and 
France came out the highest, while those in Belgium and 
Luxembourg were the lowest. The result represents quotes from 
four and six companies in each country. The very large range 
of prices quoted in France is noteworthy. 
B 
D 
ES 
F 
I 
LU 
NL 
UK 
TABLE 5. 2 .15 COST OF COMMERCIAL FIRE AND THEFT 
INSURANCE PUMIUMS 
Premises Valued at ECU 387,240 
Stock and Contents ECU 232,344 
Fire and Theft Cover 
Premises Located in a Medium Sized Town 
ECU per Annum 
1296 
2023 
1765 
3587 
4896 
1204 
1412 
1797 
1109 - 1486 
1926 - 2119 
1465 - 1986 
1930 - 5834 
3459 - 5907 
899 - 1755 
1265 - 1695 
1755 - 1839 
Source: Sample Survey of Insurance Companies 
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PUBLIC LIABILITY 
A survey was also carried out on the cost of obtaining public 
liability for the same example of an engineering company. The 
company was assumed to have 20 employees with a wage bill of ECU 
193,620 and a turnover of ECU 1.2 million per annum. The 
results are presented in Table 5.2.16. The results represent 
quotes from between four and six companies in each country. 
Again the very large range indicated for France and Italy is 
noteworthy. Particular caution should be exercised in 
interpreting the figures on public liability insurance cover. 
Many of the companies contacted indicated that a detailed 
inspection of premiums etc. would be required before authorative 
quotations could be supplied. In some countries the practice 
concerning the precise tripartite maximum limit also varied 
between companies and in some countries companies were legally 
obliged to bear responsibility for legal defense expenses. In 
view of the difference in judicial and technical factors great 
caution should be exercised in evaluating the public liability 
cover. These costs however are given only a very small 
weighting in our estimates of consumer surplus and therefore do 
not materially affect our estimates. 
TABLE 5.2.16: PUBLIC LIABILITY 
No. of employees 20 
Wage Bill ECU 193,620 Clerical 45,178 
Manual 148,442 
Turnover ECU 1.29 million per annum 
Range 
B 968 926 - 1010 
D 1257 1084 - 1430 
ES 1364 1210 - 1464 
F 1852 476 - 3227 
I 1508 798 - 2662 
L 934 618 - 1249 
NL 714 614 - 800 
UK 798 725 - 870 
Source: Sample Survey of Insurance C0111panies 
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COST OF STOCK EXCHANGE TRANSACTIONS 
Stock exchange commission rates on trading in Government stocks are 
shown in Table 5.2.17. The results on stock exchanges are 
primarily based on the findings of the International Federation 
(FIBV).In the UK large bargains of more than ECU 7.2m are net of 
commission, while commission costs elsewhere range from ECU 
2,590 in the official market in the Netherlands to ECU 21,500 in 
Belgium. Luxembourg and the Netherlands (official market) have 
commission costs of less than ECU 4,000 on a bargain of this 
size; France (maturities of less than 10 years) and the 
Netherlands parallel market had costs in the range of ECU 5,000 
- ECU 5,400 and, Spain, Italy and France (securities) had costs 
in excess of ECU 8,900. 
The rapidly changing position in European stock exchanges 
implies that quoted rates for stock exchange transactions are 
out of date very soon after publication. In the UK the 
commission cost of institutional gilts is no longer available 
and we have assumed the same price differential as applies to 
institutional equities. In Germany bank commissions on 
institutional equities are now negotiable and we have assumed an 
average of previously quoted rates and some estimates provided 
by a major bank. 
Commission costs on bargains of ECU 14,400 ranged from ECU 14 in 
the UK and ECU 21 in Italy, to ECU 65-72 in Belgium, France and 
Luxembourg and to ECU 108-180 in Germany, in the Netherlands and 
Spain. 
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TABLE 5. 2.17: STOCK EXCHANGE COMMISSIONS ON TRADING IN 
GOVERNHEN'l' STOCKS 
B 
D 
- Fixed Interest 
Securities 
ES 
F 
- Indexed 
- Non-Indexed - less than 
10 yr to maturity 
I 
L 
NL 
- Official Mkt. 
less than 
- Parallel Mkt. 
- ASAS less than 
UK 
Cash Bargains 
Bargain Size 
ECU 7 .2m 
Equivalent 
Commission 
Costs 
21,583 
5,395 
8,993 
12,365 
5,323 
10,791 
3,597 
2,590 
(Negotiable) 
6,295 
5,035 
(Negotiable) 
ECU 
Mostly net of 
Commission 
(3,600 approx 
pre-big bang 
Bargain Size 
ECU 14,400 
Equivalent 
Commission 
Costs 
180 
65 
108 
72 
65 
21 
72 
137 
171 
137 
14 - 140 
(56 pre-big 
bang) 
Source: Federation Internationale Des Bourses (FIBV); Survey Results 
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Stock exchange commissions on equity trades are shown in 
Table 5.2.18. For a bargain of ECU 288,000 the average 
commission costs range from ECU 719 in the UK to ECU 3,453 in 
Spain. France was found to be the second least expensive with 
costs of ECU 1,292, followed by Belgium and the Netherlands with 
costs of ECU 1,726, and Italy with costs of ECU 2,014, Germany 
and Luxembourg were next with average commission costs of ECU 
2,302. For small bargains of ECU 1,440 the cheapest country is 
France (ECU 9.00) and the UK is the most expensive (ECU 23). 
TABLE 5. 2.18: STOCK EXCHANGE COMMISSIONS ON TRADING IN 
EQUITIES 
Cash Bargains 
Commission Costs, 
Bargain Size Bargain Size 
ECU 288,000 ECU 1,440 
B l, 727 14 
D 2,302 11 
ES 3,453 17 
F 1,292 9 
I 2,014 10 
L 2,302 11 
NL 1, 727 
(Negotiable) 22 
UK 719 23 
Source: FIBV; Survey Results. 
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5.3 VALUE ADDED/OUTPUT RATIOS 
In this section we review aggregate value added/output ratios 
for the insurance sector and for banking. For insurance we 
examine value added as a percentage of premiums and for 
banking we review value added as a percentage of loans 
outstanding. 
INSURANCE 
Table 5.3.1 shows the value of premiums and value added in 
each of the countries in 1983 and expresses value added as a 
percentage of premiums. In 1983 value added in the Netherlands 
and the UK were in the 23-26 per cent range while Spain, 
Belgium, Germany and Italy were in the 13-19 per cent range. 
This calculation is on a national accounts basis which excludes 
interest receipts and payments which are deemed to be transfers. 
A significant proportion of profits in insurance is derived from 
dividend and interest earnings, part of which are imputed to 
policy holders. Without interest earnings higher premiums would 
have to be charged. Thus interest and dividend receipts less 
imputed interest to policy holders has been added to value added 
to derive a measure of the resources required to provide 
insurance services. (When reliance on interest is taken into 
account it is clear that the UK percentage of premiums is lowest 
at 1.1 per cent.) The percentage ranges from 21 - 32 per cent 
for the other countries. 
TABLE 5. 3.1: VALUE ADDED AND PREMIUMS, 1983 (1) 
Country Aggregate 
value added 
(ECU m) 
Gross premiums 
(ECU m) 
Value Added 
as % of 
gross 
Premium 
Value Value 
B 
D 
ES 
F 
I 
NL 
UK 
605 
7, 972 
493 
1,416 
1,166 
1,963 
8,338 
3,545 
42,951 
3,607 
23,696 
8,899 
8,252 
32,744 
17.1 
18.6 
13.7 
6.0 
13.1 
23.8 
25.5 
Added + Added + 
Net 
Interest 
as % 
Premium 
32.2 
22.6 
n.a. 
21.3 
24.0 
24.2 
1.1 
Net 
Interest 
+ 
Dividends 
as % 
Premiums 
34.2 
22.4 
n.a. 
23.8 
24.2 
30.6 
23.4 
Source: Eurostat; Sigma 
(1) Data for Luxembourg on value added in insurance is not 
available 
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BANXING 
A measure of the costs of the banking service is provided by the 
value added/loans outstanding ratio. Data on value added as a 
percentage of loans outstanding is presented in table 5.3.2. Value 
added in banking as a percentage of loans averaged 6.3 per cent in 
Italy from 1978-84, with an increase up to 7 per cent in 1983. In 
France and Spain average value added exceeded 4 per cent and both 
countries had an increase in value added as a proportion of loans 
from the late 1970's up to 1982 (France) and 1984 (Spain). German 
value added as proportion of loans averaged 3.6 per cent 1978-82 
and fell between 1978-79 and 1981-82. Belgian value added averaged 
3.4 per cent compared to 3.2 per cent in 1978-82. The Netherlands 
and the UK averaged 3 per cent for value added as a proportion of 
loans, with UK value added falling as a proportion of loans from 
1980 to 1984 and Dutch value added increasing from 1981-82. 
TABLE 5.3.2: VALUE ADDED IN BANXING AS PERCENTAGE OF LOANS 
OUTSTANDING, 1978-84 
Country % of loans 
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 Average 
B 3.2 n.a. 3.2 3.4 3.8 n.a. n.a. 3.4 
D 4.1 3.9 3.4 3.3 3.4 n.a. n.a. 3.6 
ES 3.0 2.8 n.a. 5.0 4.1 4.3 5.4 4.1 
F 4.3 4.4 4.9 5.1 4.9 n.a. n.a. 4.7 
I 5.6 5.6 6.6 6.6 6.7 7.0 6.3 6.3 
NL 3.3 3.2 3.0 3.0 3.3 3.7 3.5 3.0 
UK 3.3 n.a. 3.7 2.9 2.6 2.8 2.8 3.0 
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5. 4 SURVEY DATA ON NET MARGINS/COSTS 
In this section we present data on net margins and on ratio of 
various costs to output. The margins data for the banking 
sector are based on a major survey completed by Revell and on 
research by OECD. The data on insurance sector was obtained 
directly from a sample of accounts of insurance companies in 
the different countries. 
BANKING MARGINS 
Table 5.4.1 gives details of average margins in banking in the 
different types of banks in the countries surveyed. Gross 
earnings margins vary considerably between and within 
countries. Large banks had higher gross margins than the 
other types of banks in Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands, 
in France commercial banks had the highest margins, and in 
Italy and the UK the savings banks and trustee banks 
respectively had the highest gross margins. Net earnings 
margins also show considerable variation: in five of the 
countries net margins were highest in the savings or trustee 
banks, while in France and the Netherlands the commercial 
banks had the highest margins. 
(1) Revell, J.R.S., COSTS AND MARGINS IN BANKING, AN INTERNATIONAL 
SURVEY O.E.C.D. 1980. 
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TABLE 5.4.1: GROSS AND NET MARGINS IN BANIS, 1982 
Country/bank i. of average total assets 
Gross earnings Net earnings 
margin margin 
B 
Large banks 3.36 0.78 
Commercial banks 3.01 0.77 
Savings bank 2.70 1.06 
D 
Large banks 4.35 1. 23 
Commercial banks 3.30 1.07 
Giro banks 0.86 0.38 
Savings banks 3.79 1. 59 
F 
Large banks 2.94 0.93 
Commercial banks 2.98 1.01 
I 
Large banks 2.92 0.86 
Commercial banks 3.23 1.36 
Savings banks 4.52 1.98 
NL (1981) 
Commercial banks 2.91 1.00 
Savings banks 2.75 0.79 
UK 
Large banks 4. 72 1.1.~,4 
Trustee savings banks 5.83 1. 75 
Building societies 1. 78 0.50 
Source: O.E.C.D. Costs and Margins in Banking, Statistical 
Supplement 
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Belgium 
Table 5.4.2 gives details of gross and net margins in the 
Belgian banking sector between 1978 and 1982. Gross margins 
in large banks were very stable while net margins changed 
considerably. Gross margins in commercial and savings banks 
were lower than in the large banks, but average gross margins 
were higher. 
TABLE 5.4.2: GROSS AND NET MARGINS IN BELGIAN BARIS, 1978-82 
% of average total assets 
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 Average 
Large banks 
gross 3.26 3.37 3.06 3.30 3.36 3.27 
net 0.54 0.52 0.49 0.63 0.78 0.59 
Commercial banks 
gross 3.33 3.36 3.10 3.00 3.01 3.16 
net 0.61 0.61 0.70 0.68 o. 77 0.68 
Savings banks 
gross n.a. 2.96 2.31 2.56 2.70 2.63 
net n.a. 1.43 0.71 0.90 1.06 1.00 
Source: OECD 
Germany 
Table 5.4.3 shows that in Germany the average gross margin in 
large banks and in savings banks was over one-fifth higher 
than in the commercial banks and more than four times the 
margin of the giro banks. Net margins were also the lowest on 
average in the giro banks and fell over the 1978-82 period -
in contrast to net margins in the other banking sectors. 
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TABLE 5.4.3. GROSS AND NRT MARGINS IN GERMAN BANKS, 1978-82 
% of average total assets 
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 Average 
Large banks 
gross 3.34 3.19 3.26 3.82 4.35 3.59 
net 0.60 0.49 0.46 0.85 1. 23 0.73 
Conunercial banks 
gross 2. 72 2.55 2.58 2.88 3.30 2.81 
net 0.62 0.49 0.45 0.70 1.07 0.67 
Savings banks 
gross 3.42 3.25 3.19 3.56 3.79 3.44 
net 1.17 1.05 1.00 1.36 1.59 1. 23 
Giro banks 
gross 0.99 0.83 0.73 0.62 0.86 0.81 
net 0.45 0.30 0.20 0.13 0.38 0.29 
Source: OECD 
France 
Average gross margins were similar in French large banks and 
savings banks and were fairly stable in both types of banks over 
the 1978-82 period. Net margins in conunercial banks were 
considerably higher than in large banks, but rose less rapidly. 
TABLE 5.4.4: GROSS AND NRT MARGINS IN J'BRNCH BANKS, 1978-82 
% of average total assets 
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 Average 
Large banks 
gross 2.99 2.92 3.12 3.04 2.94 3.00 
net 0.55 0.57 0.93 0.94 0.93 0.78 
Commercial banks 
gross 2.93 2.90 3.09 3.06 2.98 2.99 
net 0.75 0.75 1.02 1.03 1.01 0.91 
Source: OECD 
Italy 
Italian gross and net margins were on average highest in the 
savings banks, followed by the commercial banks and the "large 
banks". For each of types of banks there was a rise in margins 
over the 1978-82 period. 
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TABLE 5.4.5: GROSS AND NET MARGINS IN ITALIAN BANKS 1 1978-82 
% of average total assets 
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 Average 
Large banks 
gross 2.64 2.58 3.04 3.29 2.92 2.89 
net 0.67 0.56 0.87 1.13 0.86 0.82 
Commercial banks 
gross 3.02 2.81 3.33 3.55 3.23 3.19 
net 1. 07 0.94 1. 31 1.57 1.36 1.25 
Savings banks 
gross 3.89 3.69 4.30 4.65 4.52 4.21 
net 1. 37 1.39 1. 75 2.05 1.98 1. 71 
Netherlands 
Gross margins in the Netherlands were on average higher in 
commercial banks between 1978 and 1981 than in the savings banks. 
However, there was only a small difference in net margins between 
the two types of bank. 
TABLE 5. 4. 6: GROSS AND NET MARGINS IN BANIS IN THE NETHERLANDS 
1978-82 
Commercial banks 
gross 
net 
Savings banks 
gross 
net 
Source: OECD 
UK 
% 
1978 1979 
3.28 3.17 
1.01 1.02 
2. 77 2.82 
1.13 0.96 
of average total assets 
1980 1981 1982 Average 
3.05 2.91 n.a. 3.10 
1.02 1.00 n.a. 1.01 
2.64 2.75 n.a. 2.74 
0.78 0.79 n.a. 0.92 
In the UK gross margins in the "large banks" averaged 5.06 per cent 
from 1980 to 1982, compared with 4.72 and 1.69 per cent 
respectively for the trustee banks and the building societies. 
However, net margins in the "large banks" and the trustee banks 
were similar. 
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TABLE 5.4.7: GROSS AND NET MARGINS IN UK BANKS 2 1978-82 
% of average total assets 
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 Average 
Large banks 
gross n.a. n.a. 5.45 5.02 4. 72 5.06 
net n.a. n.a. 1. 83 1.59 1.44 1.62 
Trustee Savings 
gross 3.94 4.13 4.92 4.80 5.83 4. 72 
net 1.77 1.64 1.64 1.01 1. 75 1.56 
Building Societies 
gross 1.40 1.54 1. 76 1.99 1. 78 1.69 
net 0.59 0.49 0.60 0. 72 0.50 0.58 
Comparative Administration Costs in Insurance 
In this section we consider comparative administration costs in 
insurance for non life and life activities. 
Non-Life 
The table below shows management costs and commissions for a sample of 
companies in each country. The percentages showed wide variations. 
The averages show that these costs were lowest relative to premiums 
in the UK and highest in Belgium and the Netherlands. 
TABLE 5. 4. 8: COfPARATIVB ADMINISTRATION COSTS IN 
NON LilE INSURANCE 
Country Management and Other Expenses and 
B 
D 
ES 
F 
I 
NL 
UK 
Commissions as % Net Premiums 
Range 
18.0% - 71% 
23.1% - 44.2% 
7.1%- 66.7% 
20.3% - 62.8% 
19.8% - 42% 
16.0% - 43.1% 
6.1% - 30.4% 
Average 
39.6% 
28.2% 
36.1% 
24.5% 
31.2% 
34.5% 
21.2% 
Source: Sample Survey of Accounts of Insurance Companies 
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Management and other expenses, excluding commissions, are shown in the 
table below. 
TABLE 5. 4. 9: COMPARATIVE AllfiNISTRATION COSTS IN NON LDE INSURANCE 
Country Management and Other Expenses 
as 7. Net Premiums 
Range Average 
Belgium 10.87.- 57.37. 32.4% 
ES 7.17.- 56 .17. 32.47. 
F 7.57. - 33.57. 17.27. 
NL 5.97. - 267. 16.27. 
UK 5.67. - 17.37. 11. 57. 
Source: Sample of Accounts of Insurance Companies 
- In the German and Italian accounts in the sample, only 
the total of management, other expenses and commissions 
were shown. 
In this case also the UK sample exhibits the lowest percentage at 11.5 
per cent of premiums. In France and the Netherlands the percentages 
were 16 - 177. and in Belgium and Spain 327.. 
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Life Insurance 
Management expenses and commissions were 20% of premiums in life 
companies sampled in the UK compared to 24% in France and Italy and 
28.7% in Spain. Life expenses associated with life insurers were not 
separately identified for the accounts examined in the remaining 
countries. 
TABLE 5. 4 .10: C<JtPARATIVE ADMINISTRATION COSTS IN LIFE INSURANCE 
Country Management and Other Expenses 
and Commissions as % Net Premiums 
Range Average 
ES 20.2% - 39.2% 28.7% 
F 8.9% - 31.6% 24.5% 
I 15.7%- 27.0% 24.1% 
UK 9.6% - 32.2% 20.1% 
Source: Sample of Accounts of Insurance Companies 
Management and other expenses excluding commissions averaged almost 
13% in UK Life companies compared to almost 14% in France and over 15% 
in Spain. 
TABLE 5. 4.11: C<JtPARATIVE ADMINISTRATION COSTS IN LIFE INSURANCE 
Country Management and Other Expenses 
as % of Net Premiums 
Range Average 
ES 7.1%- 34.0% 15.2% 
F 7.2%- 18.3% 13.6% 
UK 7/9% - 19.1% 12.8% 
Source: Sample of Accounts of Insurance Companies 
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5. 5 INDIRECT MEASURES OF IMPACT OF SPECIFIC REGULATIONS 
It is useful to consider some indirect measures of the impact 
of specific regulations. For illustrative purposes we 
consider the impact of prudential regulations in the banking 
sector and some measures of impact of regulations in the 
insurance sector. The analysis represents a summary of 
research undertaken by EAG in the banking sector(!) and by 
Carter and Morgan(2) for insurance. 
BANKING 
A study was carried out in 1986 for the Commission on the 
consequences of different prudential ratios for competition 
between credit institutions. The study was partly based on 
interviews with banks in a number of EEC countries. This 
section summarises the main points of the report. 
Banks in different countries may be required to observe some 
combination of: 
(i) 
( ii) 
(iii) 
(iv) 
(v) 
minimum absolute capital requirements 
gearing ratios 
own funds/risk assets ratios 
fixed asset ratios 
large loan ratios 
A range of views were expressed about the extent of distortion 
caused by these different ratio requirements and it was 
stressed that variations in definitions of own funds was an 
important source of distortion. All but one of the 
interviewees believed that differences in solvency 
requirements were an important source of distortion. A 
substantial number also said that the requirements in their 
own countries were not very different from what would be 
expected if banks were unconstrained. This apparent paradox, 
the study states, may be partly due to the importance placed 
on not only the ratios but also the definition of such matters 
as own funds. It may also have been reflection of a desire 
by the bankers to appear prudent in their business dealings. 
However, the view that the imposed ratios were not very 
different from what they would be if banks were unconstrained 
may reflect the fact that, given a certain capital base, banks 
will adjust the riskiness of their portfolio accordingly. Thus 
in countries with relatively high capital base requirements 
banks may tend to invest in more risky (higher return) 
investments than would be the case if the capital base 
requirements were lower. 
(1) An Evaluation of the Consequences of the Existence of Different 
Prudential Ratios for Competition Between Credit Institutions in 
the European Community, EAG Report 1986, Report Prepared for 
European Commission. 
(2) Carter R.L., Morgan E.V. Freedom to Offer Life Insurance Across 
EEC State Boundaries, EAG Report 1986. 
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The EAG study indicates that it may not be possible to provide 
accurate quantitative comparisons of the effects on competition 
of different solvency requirements. On the basis of the 
opinions of those interviewed it was, however, stated that: 
rumong the three major banking countries the UK, France and 
Germany, French banks have a significant advantage over 
banks in both the other countries. 
Banks in the UK probably enjoy a slight competitive 
advantage over those in Germany. 
rumong the smaller members of the Community, banks in 
Denmark were severely disadvantaged. 
The Impact of Regulation in Insurance 
The impact of regulations in insurance was considered in the 1986 
Carter and Morgan study op cited. 
This study referred to research which showed significant variations in 
the prices of term insurance between EEC countries. The survey 
carried out for the present study confirms those findings. Significant 
variations in prices within countries were also evident as was also 
the case in our analysis. 
The degree of price variations within countries was said to depend on 
the degree of regulation but significant variations were still present 
in highly regulated markets such as Germany. The study listed a 
number of important variations in term insurance products which could 
account for price differences between countries. The mortality base 
used in most countries is set down by the supervisory authorities. 
The tables used are derived from general population mortality and 
only in the UK, of the countries covered in this report, is 
mortality based on experience of insured lives. 
The report showed that ultimate mortality rates for insured lives in 
the UK were only about 65 per cent of that shown for the male 
population for ages 30, 40, SO, and 60. 
The use of population mortality tables builds a safety loading into 
premiums and this yields increased revenue to companies. In Germany 
the regulatory authority requires that most of this excess profit is 
returned to policy holders by way of dividends and bonuses. The 
extent of the safety margin is indicated by the degree to which 
mortality rates used in continental countries exceed those based on 
insured lives in the UK. The table below shows that for most ages of 
males and females the rates in continental countries were 2-4 times 
the UK rate. 
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TABLE 5.5.1 
MORTALITY RATES USED IN THE CALCULATION OF TERM INSURANCE PREMIUM 
RATES IN 1978 AS A PERCENTAGE OF THE RATES USED IN THE UX 
United 
Belgium France Germani I tali Netherland Kingdom 
Mortality Table 
Men aged 25 316 320 450 352 352 100 
35 513 471 471 356 327 100 
45 376 368 314 282 270 100 
Women 25 239 242 341 212 111 100 
35 641 588 588 445 325 100 
45 578 566 483 434 319 100 
Source: Carter and Morgan, Op Cited. 
In Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands the same 
mortality tables are used for the calculation of term insurance 
premium for both males and females. In the UK further refinement has 
been introduced since premiums are quoted for smokers and non-smokers, 
male and female. 
The EAG study also refers to interest rates as a source of price 
differences for term insurance. In France, Germany and Italy the 
choice of interest rate to be used in calculating premiums is 
controlled by the authority. 
The study calculated the pure premiums for a 20 year term using UK and 
Belgian mortality tables and 6 and 4 per cent interest rates. The 
difference in pure premiums was 227 per cent of which one 25th was 
accounted for by the resulting interest differential. 
The method used to load expenses between different types of policy is 
a further factor which can affect the price of policies. UK loadings, 
according to the EAG study, were lower than other countries possibly 
because of allowance for tax relief on expenses but also because 
expenses appeared to be calculated on a marginal cost basis. 
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5. 6 CASE STUDY EXAMPLE OF IMPACT OF DEREGULATION 
We examine below the impact on costs and margins in the 
securities market following the recent deregulations in the 
UK. The impact of deregulation on the London stock market can 
be assessed by considering commission rates, the number of 
market makers, equity dealing spreads and the depth of markets 
for the different types of shares. 
Commission Rates 
Commission rates pre-and post October 27, 1986 are shown in 
Tables 5.6.1 and 5.6.2 For equity bargains of St£1,000 -
£20,000 commission rates rose after deregulation. For 
bargains of £1,000 and £20,000 there were small rises in 
actual commissions quoted between July 1986 and the average 
rates in December 1986. Bargains of £5,000 and £10,000 showed 
a more marked increase in commissions. On bargains of £50,000 
and above there was a fall in actual commission rates, ranging 
from 32 per cent for £50,000 bargains to about 20 per cent for 
£0.5m bargains. For £1m bargains, the cost remained the same 
between July and December 1986. 
TABLE 5. 6.1 IMPACT OF DEREGULATION OH THE LONDON MARKET 
Commission Rates - Equities 
Bargain Value £ 
Private Clients 
1,000 
5,000 
10,000 
20,000 
Institutions 
50,000 
100,000 
500,000 
1,000,000 
Minimum 
Scale 
1.65 
1.65 
1. 32 
0.67 
.67 
.58 
.40 
.34 
Pre Deregulation 
% 
Actual Rate 
July 1986 
1.53 
1. 26 
1.02 
0.60 
.53 
.39 
.31 
.22 
Post Deregulation 
% 
Average Scale 
December 1986 
1. 63 
l. 60 
1.25 
0.63 
.34 
.28 
.25 
.22 
Source: The Stock Exchange, Quality of Markets - Second Report 
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Details of commission rates for gilts are shown in Table 5.6.2 
For institutional clients dealing with a bargain of £0.25m +, 
almost all commissions post October 1986 are net. Before 
deregulation commissions were 0.04 per cent for medium/long 
gilts and 0.0006 per cent for short gilts. For private 
clients there was a slight fall for £1,000 bargains from 
slightly more than 1 per cent to an average of 1.0 per cent 
and a slight fall to an average of 0.1 per cent for bargains 
of £10,000 - £50,000. 
TABLE 5.6.2: IMPACT OF THE DEREGULATION IN LONDON MARXET 
Bargain 
Size 
Institutions 
250,000+ 
250,000 
Private Clients 
1,000 
10,000 - 50,000 
Commission Rates - Gilts 
Pre Deregulation 
7. 
Medium and Long Gilts 
0.04 
Short Gilts 
0.006 
Slightly more than 1% 
Slightly more than 
post October 1986 
Source: As for Table 5.6.1 
Number of Market Makers 
Post Deregulation 
7. 
Almost all net 
Almost all net 
1.0 
0.1 
The number of equities by SEAQ classification and number of 
market makers are shown in Table 5.6.3. Between the Spring of 
1986 and December 1986 the number of alpha stocks(!) increased 
from 62 to 90, beta stocks increased from 417 to 722, gamma from 
1,121 to 1,430 and there was a fall in the number of delta 
stocks from 144 to 91. Overall, there was a rise from 1,744 to 
2,133 in the number of stocks. 
Alpha stocks are defined as those with more than 10 market 
makers, turnover of £100m per qtr and market value of £625m 
Beta stocks are those with six or more market makers (or 4 who 
will quote firm prices). Gamma stocks are those with two or 
more market makers willing to quote indicative prices. 
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The average number of market makers increased strongly for alpha and 
beta stocks and also rose, to a lesser extent, for gamma stocks. The 
number of market makers in delta stocks fell. 
TABLE 5. 6. 3: NUMBER OF EQUITIES BY SEAQ CLASSIFICATION AND NUMBER 
OF MARKET MAIERS 
Spring 1986 December 1986 
Number Alpha Beta Gamma Delta Total Alpha Beta Gamma Delta Total 
of 
Market 
Makers 
18+ 13 2 15 
16-17 24 4 28 
14-15 24 11 35 
12-13 12 2 14 18 39 57 
10-11 23 8 31 9 65 74 
8-9 24 61 85 1 108 109 
6-7 2 lOS 27 1 135 1 227 228 
4-5 1 170 361 19 551 66 582 648 
2-3 71 720 115 906 3 831 834 
0-1 13 9 22 17 91 108 
62 417 1,121 144 1,744 90 722 1,430 91 2,133 
Source: As for Table 5.6.1. 
Table 5.6.4 shows that the amount of total turnover accounted 
for by alpha stocks increased from 40 to 56 per cent. There 
was a marked fall in the proportion of total turnover 
accounted for by gamma and delta stocks, from 20 per cent to 9 
per cent and the share of turnover of beta stocks fell from 40 
to 34 per cent. 
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TARLE 5.6.4: DISTRIBUTION OF UK EQUITY SECtlRITIES AND '1'URNOVER BY 
CATEGORIES 
Pre October 1986 Post October 1986 
Number i. of Turnover Number io of Turnover. 
Value Value 
Alpha 62 40 90 56 
Beta 427 40 522 34 
Ganuna 1,240 12 1,430 7 
Delta 244 8 91 2 
1,973 100 2,133 100 
Source: As for Table 5.6.1 
Equity Dealing Spreads 
Table 5.6.5 shows that the average dealing spread has narrowed post 
October 1986 for alphas and betas, as well as for the less actively 
traded gammas. In the case of alpha stocks there was a fall of 
one-fifth in spreads for both minimum quotations of 1,000 shares 
and for maximum quotes of 99,000 shares. For beta stocks spreads 
increased slightly for minimum quotes, but fell 13 per cent for 
maximum quotes - with the result that spreads for maximum quotes 
fell as a proportion of spreads for minimum quotes from 153 per 
cent to 128 per cent. There was no change for spreads in minimum 
quotes for gamma shares but a fall of 9 per cent in spreads for 
maximum quotes. 
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TABLE 5. 6. 5: EQUITY DEALING SPREADS 
AVERAGE OF DIPPERENCE BETWEEN BEST BID AND BEST OPPER PRICES 
Alphas 
1,000 Shares 
Maximum quote size 
Maximum as 7. of 1,000 
shares spread 
Beta 
-- 1, 000 shares 
- Maximum quote size 
Maximum as 7. of 1,000 
Gamma 
- 1,000 shares 
Maximum quote size 
Maximum as 7. of 1,000 
shares spread 
End Oct 1986 
.66 
.92 
139 
1.25 
1. 91 
153 
2.55 
3.2 
125 
Source: As for Table 5.6.1, pages 19 and 20 
End Jan 1987 
.53 
.73 
138 
1.30 
1.66 
128 
2.55 
2.91 
114 
Additional information on spreads is shown in Table 5.6.6. 
The average difference between best bid and offer price did 
not fall for normal market size bargains in alpha quotes and 
there were increases in spreads for beta and gamma shares. 
However, there was a very large fall in spreads for large 
deals - defined as being four times the normal market size 
indicating an improvement in the depth of the market. 
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TABLE 5.6.6: DBPl'B OF HARDT 
% 
Pre Big Bang Post Big Bang 
Alpha Beta Gamma Alpha Beta Gamma 
Average difference 
between best bid and 
offer price at NMS (1) 0.7 1.9 3.1 0.7 1.95 3.5 
Average Difference 
between best bid and 
offer price at 
LMS (2) 1.5 5 7.5 0.6 1.8 2.7 
(1) NMS is normal market size (i.e. the usual size in which 
dealers quote). 
(2) LMS is large market size (i.e. defined as four times 
NMS). 
Source: As for Table 5.6.1, page 21 
Conclusion on Case Study of Impact of Deregulation 
The evidence collected by the London Stock Exchange on the 
impact of deregulation showed that dealing costs for small 
bargains rose slightly and those for medium to large bargains, 
which form the largest part of the market, fell. Evidence on 
the number of market makers and on the depth of the market 
suggests that the quality of the market improved significantly 
following deregulation. It is however important to note that 
there is uncertainty regarding whether these price reductions 
will remain given the level of capacity in the market. 
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SECTION 6: ESTIMATING THE GAINS FRat EUROPEAN ECON<ItiC INTEGRATION 
6. 1 INTRODUCTION AND REVIEW OF METHODOLOGY 
In this section we present our estimates of the gains from European 
economic integration. In particular we consider two aspects of 
this important issue. Firstly, we examine our estimates of the 
microeconomic economic gains from integration of European financial 
services markets. Secondly we review the macroeconomic welfare 
gains from integration of European capital markets. In particular 
we consider the gains from risk pooling, and equalisation of 
interest rates. 
There are two approaches available in exam1n1ng the microeconomic 
economic gains from integration of European financial services 
markets. The first approach involves the examination of the 
costs incurred by firms in meeting the regulatory barriers to 
trade and establishment and the costs incurred by the public 
sector in operating these regulations. The second approach which 
we have used in this study involves using more indirect measures of 
the cost of regulation. It is however worth considering the first 
approach in some more detail, even though we have not relied on 
this method in this study. 
An important limitation of the first approach is that estimates of 
the costs of regulations would not be of use unless assumptions 
were made regarding what would be the cost of regulation in an 
integrated market. Such assumptions would be exceptionally 
difficult to make (as unlike the customs area), it is certain that 
some level of regulation will continue in an integrated Europe. Of 
greater importance is the fact that such estimates would very 
significantly underestimate the economic cost of the present 
obstacles to trade as they would not capture the benefits of 
increased competition or economies of scale. In terms of the cost 
of regulation to the public sector similar difficulties arise. For 
example in Table 6.1 below details of the numbers employed in the 
insurance supervisory agencies is presented for selected countries. 
The data indicates that while there are considerable differences it 
is not possible to estimate the levels which would be required in 
an integrated market. 
TABLE 6.1: NUMBERS EMPLOYED IN THE INSURANCE SUPERVISORY 
AGENCIES IN SELECTED COUNTRIES 
UK 
Italy 
Netherlands 
Belgium 
France 
Germany 
Spain 
83 
173 
120 
105 
300 
300 
350 
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Our estimates of the costs of "Non Europe" are based primarily on 
making assumptions on the likely movement of prices in an 
integrated financial market. These price movements in the banking 
sector do not refer to changes in the price/costs to the consumer 
as such costs are comprised of two elements as follows: One, the 
underlying cost of finance and secondly the cost element incurred 
in providing the service. As these price reductions will be 
applied to estimates of value added it is only the latter costs 
which are relevant. In most cases therefore the "prices" which are 
relate to the element of the price to the consumer which is in 
excess of money market rates. Earlier in this study data on the 
existing prices of financial products were presented. The data 
indicated a wide range of prices both within and between countries 
and it is clear that while prices for certain financial services 
were cheaper in one country, the prices of other services were 
higher than in the other countries examined. Later in this section 
we consider our assumptions for the likely prices of financial 
services in an integrated market. 
At present in the non-integrated Europe the various barriers to the 
completion of the internal market in financial services result in 
different prices being charged in the different countries. The 
prices are also related to the size and structure of the different 
markets, corporate taxation and judicial and regulatory barriers. 
It is as if there were a set of tariffs on financial services in 
the high price countries. 
From this perspective the evaluation of welfare gains (i.e. net 
economic benefits) from the completion of the internal market 
involves an exercise similar to the calculation of the gains (in 
terms of consumer surplus, etc.) from a move to free trade, or the 
establishment of a customs union. 
Until very recently, economists making such calculations typically 
employed the assumptions of perfect competition and (usually) 
constant or diminishing returns to scale (1). All of these studies 
have computed very small gains from reductions in trade barriers 
(2). But work by Krugman (3) and others suggests that a main cause 
of trade - and probably the main sources of gains from trade -
between industrial countries is the exploitation of economies of 
scale (or of scope) in the presence of imperfect competition. 
Taking account of these considerations can dramatically increase 
the estimated gains from reducing the barriers to trade (4). 
(1) An example of such work would be Miller and Spencer,"The 
Static Economic Effects of the UK Joining the EEC: A General 
Equilibrium Approach. Review of Economic Studies 1977, 
(2) For example, Miller and Spencer obtained gains for the 
United Kingdom from trade creation resulting from the 1973 
enlargement of the EEC of only one-sixth of one per cent of 
GNP (and that was before taking account of the losses from 
trade diversion, or the net transfer to the Common 
Agricultural Policy). 
(3) Krugman, "Increasing Returns, Molopolistic Competition, and 
International Trade, Journal of International Economics, 1979. 
(4) For instance, Harris "Applied General Equilibrium Analysis of 
Small Open Economies with Scale Economies and Imperfect 
Competition", American Economic Review 1984 found that the 
estimated gains for Canada from the establishment of a 
free-trade area with the United States rose from 2.4 per cent 
of GNP to 8.6 per cent when account was taken of the impact of 
returns to scale and imperfect competition. 
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Other important work by Smith and Venables(l) indicates that 
producers may experience internal economies of scale which lead 
both to inefficiently small scale production when the market is 
confined within national boundaries, and to an oligopolistic market 
structure. Accordingly, average costs of production are 
unnecessarily high in a fragmented Europe and in addition the 
mark-up of prices over marginal costs is higher than it need be to 
cover fixed costs. 
The consequences of opening up trade in these circumstances is both 
to lower unit costs, by allowing more use of the economies of 
scale, and also (probably) lowering the mark-up of prices over 
marginal costs to the extent that the oligopoly is weakened. 
While the consumer will gain, there will be reductions in excess 
profits. 
The above analysis suggests that having estimated the likely 
differentials by which the prices of financial services in the 
various member states will change, it remains to determine the 
potential welfare gains from providing sufficient integration in 
the financial market in Europe. In order to do this it is 
necessary to decide how much of the assumed price changes will be 
due to reduced profits and how much to changes in costs. 
It is worth setting out how the welfare losses work out in each of 
these polar cases. For simplicity, we take it that the cost 
function for the production of financial services is linear, with 
a fixed cost of K and a per unit variable (marginal) cost of c. 
We also assume a simple constant elasticity demand function: 
_, 
X = p 
where x is the quantity of financial services demanded and p is 
the price. The price elasticity of demand is, of course, 
Consider a country where the price differential vis a vis the 
lowest cost country is ~. i.e. 
(1 - )...)p = c*' 
where c* is the per unit cost in the lowest price country. (Here 
we are assuming that the lowest price country has access to a 
sufficiently large market to make the contribution of fixed costs 
negligible, or in other words that it has been able to exploit all 
available economies of scale). 
In general, the welfare change resulting from completion of the 
market will equal the sum of the change in consumer surplus and 
aggregate profits. To the extent that the result is a 
competitive market (as we assume), then these two will tend to 
move in the opposite direction, with existing profits being 
eroded. 
(1) Smith A, Venables A. 11Trade and Industrial Policy Under Imperfect 
Competition11 , Economic Policy, 1986. 
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The demand function which we have assumed leads to a simple 
expression for consumer surplus: 
S = px (p) I (~ - 1) 
The change in consumer surplus resulting from a fall in price 
from p to (1 - )p can be calculated as: 
S = px (p) (1- (1-:>--) 1-e I (1- Z:). (1) 
Case 1: Pure cost differential. Suppose first that the source of 
price differentials is purely the fact that some countries can 
produce financial services at lower cost at all levels of output. 
Then, taking the fixed cost K to be zero in order to abstract 
from economies of scale, and taking the market to be always 
competitive, the marginal cost in the country under consideration 
is clearly: 
c = c* (1- /'-). 
Completion of the market in this situation will result in all of 
the output being produced by more efficient producers. However 
there will be no loss of producer surplus because of the 
pre-existing competitive situation. The total welfare change 
will therefore equal the gain in consumer surplus given by (1). 
Case 2: Price differential reflects oligopoly. It may be that, 
despite the absence of economies of scale or of cost differentials, 
non-competitive behaviour is maintaining a higher price. In this 
polar case, price is a pure mark-up over marginal cost with 
(1-,>-)p =c. 
Pre-existing profits are 
px - ex = /'px. 
These will, under our supposition, be wiped out by completion of 
the European market. The loss of profits must be set against the 
increase in consumer surplus C to obtain a net welfare change. 
In the approach outlined above it is clear that the percentage 
price differential may understate the loss of consumer surplus 
particularly if the elasticity of demand is high. This is because 
the higher price discourages consumption of financial services as 
well as imposing a penalty on the consumption which does occur. 
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It is clearly of some importance to decide which of these polar 
cases is nearer to the actual source of the price differentials. 
Knowledge of the concentration (number of firms or Herfindahl 
index) can provide an estimate of the pure oligopolistic profits 
actually prevailing (in contrast to (2) above.) For example, 
under the assumption of Cournot-Nash non-competitive behaviour it 
is well known that: 
7/+ K = (H/e) px 
where~ is pure profits, and His the Herfindahl index (which 
might be approximated by the reciprocal of the number of leading 
firms). 
Equation (3) implies that Cournot-Nash oligopoly could not generate 
profits in excess of a given percentage of total expenditure. This 
enables one to place an upper limit on the contribution of 
imperfect competition to the price differential. Use of this 
framework would allow us to infer a likely range for this welfare 
gain from eliminating a given price differential. 
The above approach represents a methodology for moving from 
assumptions of likely range of future price changes to economic 
welfare gains. It should be stressed that it would be possible 
to make different assumptions than those assumed in the framework 
presented. For example some results of economies of scale studies 
are considered in terms of constant scale elasticities. This would 
require some reinterpretation of the above material. It would also 
be possible to make alternative assumptions regarding the impact of 
market structure on profits. An examination of such alternative 
assumptions may provide a useful area for future research. In view 
of the fact that concentration may not be the best indicator of 
competition (as it is plausible that one could have a highly 
concentrated and competitive market) we do not present our 
estimates of any potential loss in producer surplus in this report. 
For illustrative purposes however we indicate in an appendix the 
estimated loss in producer surplus derived from this methodology. 
In terms of calculating estimates of the economic impact of 
integration using the above approach it is necessary to make 
assumptions regarding the following issues: (i) likely level of 
price changes; (ii) value added in financial services; and 
(iii) elasticity of demand for financial services. It is useful to 
consider each of these issues in turn. 
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6.2 Potential Future Price Changes 
The level by which prices of financial services will change in an 
integrated European market is by definition speculative and 
difficult to predict. Our analysis in this report provides a 
basis for producing defensible estimates on this issue. In 
particular our estimates are guided by a number of factors 
including data on existing price differentials, value 
added/output ratios, net margins/cost data and the extent of 
specific regulations. Our future price scenarios are also guided 
by case study examples of the impact of deregulation within 
national boundaries. 
The study of price reductions resulting from deregulation within 
a national market summarised earlier, referred to the UK 
securities market. This case study indicated that while there 
were small increases in commission for small transactions for 
institutional transactions commission rates fell by between 
twenty and thirty six per cent. In this study we have utilised 
scenarios where prices are assumed to decline by between ten and 
twenty six per cent in different countries. These assumed 
"price" reductions do not represent reductions in consumer prices 
as in the banking sector they are based on prices or costs in 
excess of money market rates. The implied reduction in consumer 
prices in these cases would be a fraction of the assumed price 
reductions used in this study. In view of the difficulties 
inherent in estimating likely price movements we have also 
considered the sensitivity of our findings to alternative price 
assumptions. 
It is possible to construct a wide range of possible price 
scenarios which could emerge in an integrated market. For 
example one could assume that prices would fall to the level of 
the lowest existing price observation. Indeed there would be 
some grounds for assuming that the larger market opportunities 
presented by an integrated European financial services market 
would enable prices to fall below existing lowest prices, as 
economies of scale are exploited. In this study we have taken a 
more conservative estimation of the potential gains which could 
be secured. 
In order to highlight the reasoning behind our future price 
scenarios it is useful to consider for each country some of the 
factors referred to above. This analysis is undertaken on a 
country by country basis in subsequent paragraphs overleaf. In 
this analysis we pay particular attention to existing price 
differentials. The points raised regarding relative prices in 
Section 5 of the report should be noted in interpreting the 
analysis in this section. The price comparisons are based on 
assuming for each category of financial services a weighting for 
each of the financial services prices presented. While precise 
data on the percentage of value added incurred in producing the 
particular services is not available the weights have been 
derived on the basis of estimates of the relative importance of 
the particular products/services. The basis for the weighting 
system is presented as an appendix. 
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Price Scenario for Belgium 
In the table below the data on the price of selected banking 
services in Belgium compared with other countries is presented. 
In particular we present calculations on the percentage 
differences in the prices of banking services in Belgium compared 
with the average of the four lowest price observations. The 
costs of current accounts are not presented due to the widespread 
belief that these are very significantly affected by cross 
subsidisation. The cost of credit cards and letters of credit 
used represent the particular examples referred to in Section 5. 
The results for consumer credit and mortgages are not sensitive 
to the particular examples chosen. 
TABLE 6. 2: COMPARATIVE PRICES OF BANKING SERVICES IN BELGIUK 
Cost of 
Cost of 
Cost of 
Cost of 
Cost of 
Cost of 
Cost of 
Implied 
Assumed 
Consumer Credit 
Credit Cards 
Mortgages 
Letters of Credit 
Foreign Exchange Drafts 
Foreign Exchange Travellers 
Commercial Credit 
Potential Price Fall 
Potential Price Fall 
Cheques 
% Difference 
from the 4 
Lowest 
Observations 
-41.0 
79.0 
31.3 
21.8 
6.2 
35.2 
-4.6 
16.0 
8.0 
The implied price fall estimate represents the level by which 
prices of banking services would fall if the weighted average of 
the bankin& financial services examined declined to the average 
of the four lowest observations. It should be noted that the 
implied price fall assumes that where prices are currently below 
the average of the four lowest that no increase would incur in 
the integrated market. This important assumption is made for all 
countries. In this case the data would suggest a price decline 
of 16.0 per cent. However as indicated previously this would 
imply a much lower price decrease in terms of the cost to the 
consumer. While the price of most of the banking services in 
Belgium reviewed were above the average of the four lowest, the 
costs of consumer and commercial credit were lower. The prices 
of banking services in Belgium may reflect the relatively small 
size of the Belgium market while the cost of credit may in part 
be related to the relatively large presence of foreign banks in 
the Belgium market. Foreign banks account for approximately one 
third of the aggregate assets of banking institutions in Belgium. 
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We believe however that it would not be prudent to assume that 
in Belgium banking prices as defined would fall by 16.0 per 
cent. This is in part due to the fact that in our calculations 
for consumer surplus we use total figures on value added. This 
would overestimate the gain in consumer surplus by the extent to 
which value added was incurred on the supply of services outside 
of the Community. In addition the banking prices in Belgium 
probably in part reflect some market characteristics which would 
not alter in an integrated market. Also given the complexity and 
rapidly changing nature of the banking market it is likely that 
our price comparisons may overestimate potential price 
differences. To take account of the above factors we assume that 
only fifty per cent of the implied price would incur in an 
integrated market. 
It is also useful to present the results for insurance products 
in Belgium. Data on the percentage differences from the four 
lowest observations are outlined in the table below. The 
particular examples for insurance products used were presented in 
Section 5. The average prices obtained were used in the 
calculations below. 
TABLE 6. 3: caotPARATIVE PRICES OF INSURANCE SERVICES IN BELGIUM 
Cost of Contents and House Insurance 
Cost of Motor Insurance 
Cost of Commercial Fire and Theft 
Insurance 
Cost of Public Liability Insurance 
Cost of Term Insurance 
Implied Potential Price Fall 
Assumed Potential Price Fall 
% Difference 
from the 4 
Lowest 
Observations 
-15.9 
30.0 
-8.7 
13.4 
77.6 
31.0 
16.0 
In the case of insurance products the data indicates that prices 
of house and contents insurance and commercial fire and theft 
were below the average of the four lowest while prices of other 
insurance products were higher, particularly for term insurance 
and motor insurance. 
This price configuration probably reflects local conditions such 
as high vehicle accident rate and the cost of motor vehicle 
repairs as well as regulatory factors. The implied price fall 
also reflects the importance given in our weighting system to 
life insurance as measured by the term estimates. 
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In view of the problems inherent in insurance price comparisons 
referred to earlier in this report we have assumed that only 
fifty per cent of the implied price fall represent potential 
price declines. 
The final category of products for Belgium presented relate to 
stock exchange transactions and data on this is presented in the 
table below. The prices relate to the examples used in Section 
5 of this study. 
TABLE 6.4: COMPARATIVE PRICES OF STOCK: EXCHANGE TRANSACTIONS 
IN BELGIUM 
Cost of Private Equity Transactions 
Cost of Private Gilts Transactions 
Cost of Institutional Equity 
Transactions 
Cost of Institutional Gilts 
Transactions 
Implied Potential Price Fall 
Assumed Potential Price Fall 
% Difference 
from the 4 
Lowest 
Observations 
35.9 
14.4 
26.4 
284.1 
53.0 
26.0 
With regard to security transactions the figures show a 
particularly high cost of institutional gilt transactions 
compared with the average of the four lowest observations in 
other countries. This may in part reflect the very low 
commission on institutional transactions in certain other 
countries and may also reflect the particular arrangements for 
financing the public sector in Belgium, although an examination 
of this latter issue is outside the scope of this study. In 
view of the rapidly changing nature of security transactions in 
Europe and the other factors referred to in relation to banking 
and insurance services we believe it would not be appropriate to 
assume that any more than fifty per cent of the implied price 
fall would incur in an integrated market. 
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Price Scenario for Germany 
In the table below the data on the price of selected banking 
services in Germany compared with other countries is presented. 
The results show the percentage differences in the prices of 
banking services in Germany compared with the average of the 
four lowest observations. 
TABI...E 6. 5: COMPARATIVE PRICES OF BANnlfG SERVICES IN GERMANY 
Cost of Consumer Credit 
Cost of Credit Cards 
Cost of Mortgages 
Cost of Letters of Credit 
Cost of Foreign Exchange Drafts 
Cost of Foreign Exchange 
Travellers Cheques 
Cost of Commercial Credit 
Implied Potential Price Fall 
Assumed Potential Price Fall 
% Difference 
from the 4 
Lowest 
Observations 
135.9 
60.0 
57.3 
-10.0 
30.9 
-7.4 
6.0 
33.0 
13.0 
The above price comparisons indicate that if banking prices were 
to fall to the average of the four lowest observations this 
would result in a decline of 33.0 per cent. It must be noted 
however that the way the estimate of consumer credit, commercial 
credit, credit cards and mortgages were calculated represented 
the cost in excess of selected money market rates. In many 
cases the absolute levels of these costs were comparatively low 
in Germany but because of the low level of wholesale money 
market rates the costs appear high when defined as above. Also 
the relatively high cost of consumer credit reflects the feature 
of the domestic financial services market where the main banking 
institutions prefer the use of straightforward overdraft 
facilities. Thus the particular type of consumer credit is not 
common in the main financial institutions and this is reflected 
in the data presented above. Also of relevance is the fact that 
in Germany the use of credit cards is very limited and as a 
result there is a much smaller market for these cards with 
resultant consequences for economies of scale. The analysis of 
value added as a percentage of loans outstanding in the German 
banking sector indicated a lower percentage than was evident in 
a number of other countries. In view of the above features and 
the other factors referred to in the analysis of Belgium banking 
data we believe that it would be misleading to assume that even 
fifty per cent of the implied price fall represents the 
potential price decline. In our analysis we have therefore 
assumed only forty per cent of the implied price fall in our 
calculations of consumer surplus and even this may overestimate 
the position. As stressed previously the assumed price fall to 
the consumer would be only a fraction of 13 per cent. 
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In table 6.6 below data on the price of insurance products in 
Germany is presented. 
TABLE 6. 6: COMPARATIVE PRICES Oil INSURANCE SERVICES IN GERMANY 
Cost of Contents and House 
Insurance 
Cost of Motor Insurance 
Cost of Commercial Fire and Theft 
Insurance 
Cost of Public Liability Insurance 
Cost of Term Insurance 
Implied Potential Price Fall 
Assumed Potential Price Fall 
% Difference 
from the 4 
Lowest 
Observations 
2.7 
14.7 
42.5 
47.3 
5.1 
10.0 
5.0 
With regard to insurance prices the particular features of the 
German insurance market referred to in Section 5 should be 
noted. Also of relevance is the regulatory position whereby for 
the larger commercial risks the law requires such risk to be 
insured with an authorised German insurer. In our analysis of 
administration costs in non life insurance companies in Germany 
these appeared to be below the average in other countries but 
there are severe difficulties in drawing any conclusions from 
such comparisons. 
In view of the fact that insurance price comparisons are 
particularly sensitive to differences in regulatory and other 
differences including the critical issue of underlying risk we 
believe it would not be prudent to assume that any more than 
fifty per cent of the implied price fall represents potential 
price reductions. We have therefore used an assumption of fifty 
per cent of the implied price fall in our estimates of consumer 
surplus. 
The final category of financial services examined for Germany 
relates to the costs of private and institutional stock exchange 
transactions. We present overleaf estimates of the percentage 
differences of security prices in Germany compared with the four 
lowest observations. 
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TABLE 6. 7: COMPARATIVE PRICES OF STOCIC EXCHANGE TRANSACTIONS 
IN GERMANY 
Cost of Private Equity Transactions 
Cost of Private Gilts Transactions 
Cost of Institutional Equity 
Transactions 
Cost of Institutional Gilts 
Transactions 
Implied Potential Price Fall 
Assumed Potential Price Fall 
% Difference 
from the 4 
Lowest 
Observations 
6.8 
90.1 
68.5 
-4.0 
11.0 
6.0 
The data on the costs of stock exchange transactions implies a 
price fall of 11.0 per cent in Germany in the event of an 
integrated financial services market. This is significantly 
less than the price reductions which emerged in the UK following 
deregulation. However as indicated earlier the position in the 
German stock exchange has changed since the figures were 
published and institutional transactions are now a matter for 
negotiation. In the light of these developments we believe it 
is appropriate to assume that fifty per cent of even the 
relatively modest price fall should be used in our calculations. 
Price Scenario for Spain 
In table 6.8 the calculations for the percentage difference 
between Spain's banking prices compared with prices in the eight 
countries, is presented. 
TABLE 6. 8: catPARATIVE PRICES OF BANIDtG SERVICES IN SPAIN 
Cost of Consumer Credit 
Cost of Credit Cards 
Cost of Mortgages 
Cost of Letters of Credit 
Cost of Foreign Exchange Drafts 
Cost of Foreign Exchange Travellers 
Cheques 
Cost of Commercial Credit 
Implied Potential Price Fall 
Assumed Potential Price Fall 
% Difference 
from the 4 
Lowest 
Observations 
38.5 
25.7 
118.8 
58.9 
196.3 
29.6 
19.2 
34.0 
20.0 
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The data presented in table 6.8 indicates an implied price fall 
in Spanish banking services of thirty four per cent. It should 
of course be noted that the implied price fall in terms of the 
price to the consumer would be significantly less than this 
amount, for the reasons referred to earlier. The two products 
which appear particularly high compared with the four lowest 
countries are mortgages and foreign exchange drafts. Foreign 
exchange drafts are not that significant in our overall 
weighting system and the mortgage figures represent the costs in 
excess of money market rates. The mortgage figure relates to 
1986 costs and it is likely that with the recent opening of the 
banking market these costs would have been moved more in line 
with the lower priced countries. The latest data on value added 
in banking as a percentage of loans outstanding in Spain 
indicated a high percentage compared with other countries 
although the question of comparability is again relevant. 
In our analysis of the economic gains from European integration 
we believe for the reasons referred to earlier in this chapter 
it would be a mistake to assume that all of the implied price 
fall could be realised. In the case of Spain we have therefore 
assumed that only 60% of the implied price fall represents 
potential price falls in our modelling assumptions. This price 
fall represents the position after integration compared with the 
situation which existed to which the data relates. This figure 
is therefore likely to be an overestimation of the potential 
gains compared with the current position. While our results for 
certain countries may overestimate the gains it is the overall 
benefit to the community which is the key focus of this study. 
Overall we believe any overestimate in certain countries is 
likely to be counteracted by some of the conservative 
assumptions made in our calculations. 
In the table below data on comparative prices of insurance 
services compared with the average of the four lowest is 
presented. 
TABLE 6. 9: C<»>PARATIVE PRICES OF INSURANCE SERVICES IN SPAIN 
Cost of Contents and House Insurance 
Cost of Motor Insurance 
Cost of Commercial Fire and Theft 
Insurance 
Cost of Public Liability Insurance 
Cost of Term Insurance 
Implied Potential Price Fall 
Assumed Potential Price Fall 
% Difference 
from the 4 
Lowest 
Observations 
-3.7 
99.5 
24.4 
59.9 
37.4 
32.0 
19.0 
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While the figures show that the cost of motor insurance and 
public liability insurance were particularly high the particular 
concerns indicated previously regarding public liability 
insurance should be noted. The cost of motor insurance may be 
related to the underlying risks and costs associated with motor 
insurance in Spain. The cost of contents and house insurance 
was lower than the average of the four lowest. The above figures 
would indicate an implied price fall of thirty two per cent. In 
view of the difficulties with insurance comparisons we believe 
however that it would be prudent to assume that only 60% of this 
price fall represents the potential price reductions. 
As for other countries we also examined comparative prices for 
stock exchange transactions in Spain. The relevant calculations 
are outlined in table 6.10 below. 
TA.BI...K 6 .1 0: COMPARATIVE PRICES OF S'J.'OCK EXCHANGE TRANSACTIONS 
IN SPAIN 
Cost of Private Equity Transactions 
Cost of Private Gilts Transactions 
Cost of Institutional Equity 
Transactions 
Cost of Institutional Gilts 
Transactions 
Implied Potential Price Fall 
Assumed Potential Price Fall 
% Difference 
from the 4 
Lowest 
Observations 
65.0 
216.9 
152.7 
60.0 
44.0 
26.0 
The above price comparisons for stock exchange transactions 
would indicate a potential price fall of 44 per cent. Such a 
price reduction would be very high by the experience of other 
countries and we therefore believe it overstates the potential 
price reduction. In our assumptions we have therefore taken 60% 
of this price fall. While this is less than the price reduction 
which occurred on large transactions in the UK we believe it 
represents the maximum potential price fall which is appropriate 
for our modelling requirements. Given the rapidly changing 
nature of European stock exchange this position is likely to 
have been reduced further since the data was collected. 
Price Scenarios for France 
In the table overleaf data on the comparative prices of banking 
services is presented for France. The figures show the 
percentage differences in prices from the average of the four 
lowest price observations. 
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TABLE 6.11: C<JtPARATIVE PRICES OF BANKING SERVICES IN FRANCE 
Cost of Consumer Credit 
Cost of Credit Cards 
Cost of Mortgages 
Cost of Letters of Credit 
Cost of Foreign Exchange Drafts 
Cost of Foreign Exchange 
Travellers Cheques 
Cost of Commercial Credit 
Implied Potential Price Fall 
Assumed Potential Price Fall 
% Difference 
from the 4 
Lowest 
Observations 
105.1 
-29.5 
78.5 
-7.2 
55.6 
38.9 
-7.3 
25.0 
13.0 
The above figures indicate a very high cost for consumer credit 
and for mortgages in France compared with the average of the 
four lowest observations. It is important to note that as for 
other countries these do not represent the price to the consumer 
but rather the excess of over money market rates. It is 
interesting to note that the figures indicate that the cost of 
commercial credit over inter bank rates are less than the 
average in the four lowest countries. It is also interesting to 
note that public ownership is very important in the French 
banking sector although this is changing due to privatisation. 
In view of these factors and the fact that our potential price 
reductions are applied to total value added we believe that 
assuming all of the implied price fall would overstate the 
economic benefits arising from economic integration. We have 
therefore used an assumption in our estimates of fifty per cent 
of the implied price fall. 
Comparative prices of insurance services in France are outlined 
in table 6.12. The data compares five insurance products which 
include both private and institutional areas. The very wide 
variance in insurance quotes indicated in Section 5 should be 
noted. 
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TABLB 6. 12: COMPARATIVE PRICES OF INSURANCE SERVICES IN FRANCE 
Cost of Contents and House Insurance 
Cost of Motor Insurance 
Cost of Commercial Fire and Theft 
Insurance 
Cost of Public Liability Insurance 
Cost of Term Insurance 
Implied Potential Price Fall 
Assumed Potential Price Fall 
% Difference 
from the 4 
Lowest 
Observations 
39.0 
8.7 
152.8 
117.0 
33.2 
24.0 
12.0 
The data on insurance products presented above would indicate an 
implied price fall of 24 per cent if prices declined to the 
weighted average of the four lowest observations. The data on 
value added as a percentage of premium in the insurance sector 
in France was less than the average of other countries reviewed. 
In view of the differences in riskiness of insurance between 
countries and the variance in the quotes referred to above, we 
believe it would be prudent to only assume that fifty per cent 
of the implied price fall represents potential price fall in our 
estimates of consumer surplus. 
The figures on comparative prices of equity and gilt 
transactions are presented below. 
TABLE 6.13: COMPARATIVE PRICES OF S'l.'OCK EXCHANGE TRANSACTIONS 
IN FRANCE 
Cost of Private Equity Transactions 
Cost of Private Gilts Transactions 
Cost of Institutional Equity 
Transactions 
Cost of Institutional Gilts 
Transactions 
Implied Potential Price Fall 
Assumed Potential Price Fall 
% Difference 
from the 4 
Lowest 
Observations 
-12.6 
21.5 
-5.4 
57.4 
23.0 
12.0 
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The data on French security prices indicate that prices of 
private equity transactions and institutional equity 
transactions were below the average of the four lowest 
observations while gilt transactions were more expensive. The 
implied price fall of 23 per cent is based on the assumption 
underlying all of the price comparisons that prices which are 
below the average of the four lowest would not increase in an 
integrated market. This, because of the issue of cross 
subsidisation may be unrealistic and is likely to overestimate 
the potential gains. We have therefore assumed that only SO% of 
the implied price fall represents potential price reductions in 
our economic modelling. 
Price Scenarios for Italy 
Table 6.14 presents estimated prices of banking services in Italy 
compared with other countries. 
TABLE 6 .14: COMPARATIVE PRICES OF BANIING SERVICES IN ITALY 
Cost of Consumer Credit 
Cost of Credit Cards 
Cost of Mortgages 
Cost of Letters of Credit 
Cost of Foreign Exchange Drafts 
Cost of Foreign Exchange 
Travellers Cheques 
Cost of Commercial Credit 
Implied Potential Price Fall 
Assumed Potential Price Fall 
% Difference 
from the 4 
Lowest 
Observations 
121.0 
88.6 
-4.3 
9.1 
23.5 
22.2 
8.6 
18.0 
9.0 
The above price data indicate that with the exception of 
mortgages the prices of all of the banking services examined 
were more expensive in Italy compared with the average of the 
four lowest countries. The data on value added in banking as a 
percentage of loans outstanding for Italy was the highest of the 
countries examined. The margins data reviewed earlier in this 
report also indicated relatively higher margins for Italian 
commercial banks and for savings banks, although such 
comparisons are influenced primarily by the nature of the 
institutions. 
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The price data overleaf would indicate an implied price fall of 
18 per cent. It should however be noted that the figures on 
consumer credit represent an assumed average of selected other 
countries and because of this and the reasons discussed earlier 
in this section we believe it would be prudent to use a more 
conservative figure and in our calculations we assume a price 
decline of only 9 per cent. 
Data on the estimated prices of insurance products in Italy are 
presented below. The figures show that for the insurance 
products examined estimated prices were significantly above the 
average of the four lowest observations. 
TABLE 6.15: COMPARATIVE PRICES OF INSURANCE SERVICES IN ITALY 
Cost of Contents and House Insurance 
Cost of Motor Insurance 
Cost of Commercial Fire and Theft 
Insurance 
Cost of Public Liability Insurance 
Cost of Term Insurance 
Implied Potential Price Fall 
Assumed Potential Price Fall 
% Difference 
from the 4 Lowest 
Observations 
80.4 
147.9 
245.0 
76.8 
83.2 
51.0 
26.0 
There are a number of important technical, judicial and market 
practices which are evident in the Italian insurance market and 
which are likely to influence the price figures presented above. 
The figures as for all countries are very sensitive to the risks 
covered and there are very marked regional and other differences 
in the levels of risks in the Italian insurance market. For 
example the cost of contents and house insurance in certain 
cities are a multiple of those in other regions. It is also 
common for rebates to be offered on insurance services in the 
Italian market. In view of the above factors and the 
reservations noted previously concerning public liability and 
other insurance prices we believe it would be a mistake to use 
the implied price fall in our estimates. We have therefore 
decided to take fifty per cent of the implied price fall as the 
potential gain in our economic modelling calculations. 
In the table overleaf comparative prices of stock exchange 
transactions in Italy are presented. The figures show that 
while the prices of private stock exchange transactions are 
lower than the average for the four lowest, the cost of 
institutional transactions are above the average in the eight 
countries. If prices of securities fall to the average of the 
four lowest observations this would imply a price fall of 33.0 
per cent. We believe however that it would be prudent to assume 
that the potential price fall represents only fifty per cent of 
this estimate. 
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TABI..E 6 .16: COMPARATIVE PRICES OF STOCI EXCHANGE TRANSACTIONS 
IN ITALY 
Cost of Private Equity Transactions 
Cost of Private Gilts Transactions 
Cost of Institutional Equity 
Transactions 
Cost of Institutional Gilts 
Transactions 
Implied Potential Price Fall 
Assumed Potential Price Fall 
Price Scenarios for Luxembourg 
% Difference 
from the 4 
Lowest 
Observations 
-2.9 
-63.0 
47.4 
92.0 
33.0 
17.0 
In the table below comparative prices for banking services in 
Luxembourg are presented. Reliable comparative data on the cost 
of mortgages in Luxembourg was not obtainable during our study. 
We have however assumed that the cost of mortgages in Luxembourg 
is equal to the average costs in the other countries examined. 
TABI..E 6.17: COMPARATIVE PRICES OF BANDNG SKRVICES IN LUXEMBOURG 
Cost of Consumer Credit 
Cost of Credit Cards 
Cost of Mortgages 
Cost of Letters of Credit 
Cost of Foreign Exchange Drafts 
Cost of Foreign Exchange 
Travellers Cheques 
Cost of Commercial Credit 
Implied Potential Price Fall 
Assumed Potential Price Fall 
% Difference 
from the 4 
Lowest 
Observations 
-26.9 
-12.4 
36.5 
27.1 
33.3 
-7.4 
6.0 
16.0 
8.0 
The above figures indicate that a number of banking services in 
Luxembourg are lower than the average of the four lowest 
countries. Overall the implied price fall was lower than for 
most of the countries examined. Our analysis of regulations in 
the banking sector indicated that Luxembourg was one of the most 
- 198 -
- 158 -
international markets in Europe and the sector was more 
significant in relation to the size of the economy than for any 
of the other countries reviewed. In veiw of this factor and the 
comments on the 'price' comparisons referred to earlier, we 
believe it is prudent to only assume a price fall of 8.0 per 
cent for Luxembourg. 
The data on the comparative prices of insurance services in 
Luxembourg are presented below. The results show the price 
comparison for commercial insurance and for private contents and 
house insurance and motor insurance. 
TABLE 6.18: ca1PARATIVE PRICES OF INSURANCE SERVICES 
IN LUXEKBOURG 
Cost of Contents and House Insurance 
Cost of Motor Insurance 
Cost of Commercial Fire and Theft 
Insurance 
Cost of Public Liability Insurance 
Cost of Term Insurance 
Implied Potential Price Fall 
Assumed Potential Price Fall 
% Difference 
from the 4 
Lowest 
Observations 
56.9 
76.6 
-15.2 
9.5 
65.9 
37.0 
19.0 
The data on insurance prices in Luxembourg presented above are 
higher than the average of the four lowest observations with the 
exception of commercial fire and theft insurance. The figures 
indicate an implied price fall of 37.0 per cent. However in 
view of the difficulties in obtaining comparative insurance 
figures we have used an assumed price fall of only ninteen per 
cent. The reservations regarding differences in risk etc. must 
be noted. 
The cost of both private and institutional stock exchange 
transactions are presented in the table overleaf. The data 
represents a comparison with the four lowest observations. 
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TABLE 6 .19: catPARATIVE PRICES OF S'l.'OCX EXCHANGE TRANSACTIONS 
IN LUXEMBOURG 
Cost of Private Equity Transactions 
Cost of Private Gilts Transactions 
Cost of Institutional Equity 
Transactions 
Cost of Institutional Gilts 
Transactions 
Implied Potential Price Fall 
Assumed Potential Price Fall 
% Difference 
from the 4 
Lowest 
Observations 
6.8 
26.8 
68.5 
- 36.0 
9.0 
5.0 
The above figures indicate that the cost of institutional gilt 
transactions was lower in Luxembourg than the average of the 
four lowest observations. The prices would indicate an implied 
price fall of 9.0 per cent. In our economic estimates we 
however assume a price fall of only 5 per cent. 
Price Scenario for the Netherlands 
In table 6.20 comparative prices of banking services in the 
Netherlands are outlined. 
TABLE 6. 20: catPARATIVE PRICES OF BANliNG SERVICES IN 
THE NE'1'BERLANDS 
Cost of Consumer Credit 
Cost of Credit Cards 
Cost of Mortgages 
Cost of Letters of Credit 
Cost of Foreign Exchange Drafts 
Cost of Foreign Exchange 
Travellers Cheques 
Cost of Commercial Credit 
Implied Potential Price Fall 
Assumed Potential Price Fall 
% Difference 
from the 4 
Lowest 
Observations 
30.8 
42.9 
-6.3 
16.5 
-45.7 
33.3 
43.0 
10.0 
5.0 
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The data on the price of banking services in the Netherlands 
presented overleaf show that for most of the banking services 
examined prices were higher than the average in the four lowest 
countries. The price of the important product of mortgages as 
defined in terms of the excess over money market rates and the 
price of foreign exchange drafts were lower than the average of 
the four lowest observations. This significantly influences the 
overall implied price fall. The data on 'prices' presented 
above would indicate a 'price' fall of ten per cent. In view of 
the points raised previously regarding the price comparisons and 
the international element in banking we have however taken the 
more cautious assumption that 'prices' would decline by only 
five per cent although this may underestimate the potential 
price fall. 
The estimated prices of insurance services in the Netherlands 
indicate that in general prices for insurance services chosen 
were less than the average of the four lowest observations. 
TABLE 6.21: COMPARATIVE PRICES OP' INSURANCE SKilVICES IN 
THE NE'l'HERLANDS 
Cost of Contents and House Insurance 
Cost of Motor Insurance 
Cost of Commercial Fire and Theft 
Insurance 
Cost of Public Liability Insurance 
Cost of Term Insurance 
Implied Potential Price Fall 
Assumed Potential Price Fall 
Unweighted 
% Difference 
from the 4 
Lowest 
Observations 
16.9 
-6.8 
-0.5 
-16.3 
-8.9 
1.0 
0.5 
The above figures would indicate an implied price fall of 
one per cent. While extreme caution must be exercised in 
interpreting our analysis of costs in the insurance sector 
considered previously, it is interesting to note that management 
and other expenses as a percentage of net premiums in non life 
insurance companies in the Netherlands were very low compared 
with other countries reviewed. It is unlikely that in an 
integrated market that the potential price fall would be limited 
to such a small decrease, however we have used the above 
assumption in our economic estimates of potential consumer 
gains. We have also considered for the Netherlands as for other 
countries the impact of a price range on our base case estimate 
of plus and minus five per cent. 
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The estimates of the price of stock exchange transactions in the 
Netherlands are presented in the table below. The data 
indicates that differences in comparative prices between private 
equity and gilt transactions and institutional transactions. 
TABLE 6. 22 ~ CCJn>ARATIVR PRICES 0!' STOCX EXCHANGE TRANSACTIONS 
IN THE NETHERLANDS 
Cost of Private Equity Transactions 
Cost of Private Gilts Transactions 
Cost of Institutional Equity 
Transactions 
Cost of Institutional Gilts 
Transactions 
Implied Potential Price Fall 
Assumed Potential Price Fall 
% Difference 
from the 4 
Lowest 
Observations 
113.6 
160.6 
26.3 
-17.4 
18.0 
9.0 
The above data indicates a potential price fall of approximately 
eighteen per cent. In our estimates of economic welfare gains 
we have used an assumption of 9.0 per cent. 
Price Scenarios for UK 
In table 6.23 estimates of comparative prices for banking 
services in the UK are presented. The figures show that with 
the exception of consumer and commercial credit the prices of 
all the financial services examined are similar to the average 
of the four lowest observations. In the case of consumer and 
commercial credit this is measured as the cost in excess over 
money market rates. This may be affected by the high interest 
rates in the UK. The figures also show that the costs of 
mortgages and foreign exchange travellers cheques are lower than 
the average of the four lowest. 
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TABLE 6.23: COMPARATIVE PRICES OP BANXING SERVICES IN THE UX 
Cost of Consumer Credit 
Cost of Credit Cards 
Cost of Mortgages 
Cost of Letters of Credit 
Cost of Foreign Exchange Drafts 
Cost of Foreign Exchange 
Travellers Cheques 
Cost of Commercial Credit 
Implied Potential Price Fall 
Assumed Potential Price Fall 
% Difference 
from the 4 
Lowest 
Observations 
121.5 
16.2 
-20.7 
8.1 
16.1 
-7.4 
45.7 
18.0 
9.0 
Overall therefore the prices of banking services in the United 
Kingdom appears competitive except for loans which may be 
influenced by money market and inter bank rates. The data 
indicates an implied price of 18 per cent. We believe however 
that due to the fact that many of the services examined were 
competitive as well as the international nature of UK banking 
sector, this is likely to overestimate the potential price 
falls. In view of the points discussed above we have assumed 
that the potential price fall is only 9. per cent. It is 
important to note that this would indicate a reduction in actual 
prices to the consumer of much less than this amount for the 
reasons referred to earlier in this report. 
Data on comparative prices of insurances services in the UK is 
presented below compared with the average of the four lowest 
observations. 
TABLE 6. 24: COtPARATIVE PRICES OP INSURANCE SERVICES IN THE UX 
Cost of Contents and House Insurance 
Cost of Motor Insurance 
Cost of Commercial Fire and Theft 
Insurance 
Cost of Public Liability Insurance 
Cost of Term Insurance 
Implied Potential Price Fall 
Assumed Potential Price Fall 
% Difference 
from the 4 
Lowest 
Observations 
89.7 
-16.8 
26.6 
-6.5 
-29.9 
4.0 
2.0 
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The figures on insurance prices in the UK indicate that three of 
the five products examined were less expensive than the average 
of the four lowest price observations. The two products which 
are above the lowest prices are home and commercial fire and 
theft. The premiums for these products reflect local conditions 
concerning risk and it has been reported that these have 
increased significantly in recent years to take account of 
increases in risks. It is also noteworthy that the limited data 
reviewed on administration costs in the UK insurance sector as a 
percentage of premiums were among the lowest observed. In our 
economic modelling we have assumed a price fall of two per cent. 
In table 6.25 below information on comparative prices of stock 
exchange transactions in the UK are presented. The results show 
differences in comparative price levels between private and 
institutional transactions. Due to the nature of UK 
institutional gilt market it was not possible to obtain cost of 
such transactions. We have however assumed that the relatively 
cost compared with other countries of these transactions are the 
same as for institutional equity transactions. 
TABLE 6. 25: COMPARATIVE PRICES OF STOCK EXCHANGE TRANSACTIONS 
IN THE UK 
Cost of Private Equity Transactions 
Cost of Private Gilts Transactions 
Cost of Institutional Equity 
Transactions 
Cost of Institutional Gilts 
Transactions 
Implied Potential Price Fall 
Assumed Potential Price Fall 
% Difference 
from the 4 
Lowest 
Observations 
123.3 
35.6 
-47.4 
-47.4 
12.0 
6.0 
The above figures indicate the relatively high cost of personal 
transactions and the low cost of institutional business, which 
confirms the documented post big-bang development. The above 
figures would indicate an implied price fall of 12.0 per cent. 
In view of the current situation in the UK Stock Exchange and 
the reductions in prices which have occurred to date we believe 
this may overestimate the potential gain and we have assumed a 
potential price fall of six per cent. 
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6 . 3 KEY NON PRICE ASSUMPTIONS 
In addition to estimates of potential price changes it is 
necessary to estimate value added, and the elasticity of demand 
in order to calculate gains in consumer surplus. These 
assumptions are reviewed below. In the appendices we also 
consider assumptions on the Herfindahl index and consider some 
estimates of gains in economic welfare using this index as an 
indicator of changes in producer surplus. 
Value Added in Financial Services 
In order to calculate consumer surplus and welfare gains it is 
necessary to estimate value added in financial services. 
Detailed data on value added is available as indicated earlier in 
our report for the credit and insurance sector. A disaggregation 
for credit and for insurance is also available for most 
countries. No data on value added for securities is available 
but some aspects of securities will be included in the value 
added figures for credit institutions. Where we use a 
disaggregated analysis and consider credit and insurance sectors 
separately we have assumed that the potential price fall for each 
of these sectors would be the potential price fall assumed for 
overall financial services sector. 
Elasticity of Demand for Financial Services 
In order to decide on the appropriate assumptions to make 
regarding the price elasticity of demand for financial services 
we reviewed existing literature. There were however very few 
estimates of the elasticity of demand for financial services 
available. Some estimates were available however for the 
interest elasticities of the demand for money (1) but these are 
unlikely to be representative of the price elasticity for 
financial services in general. Some research (2) has however 
been recently completed on the price elasticity of the demand for 
whole life insurance and the results of this research indicated 
price elasticities for policies without participation in profits, 
in the range 0.71-0.92. In our base case assumptions we have 
used a price elasticity of demand assumption of 0.75. 
(1) See Hein E.S. and Hafer R.W, "Financial Innovations and the 
Interest Elasticity of Money Demand: Historical Evidence", 
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Vol. 16 No. 2 May 1984. 
(2) See Babbel, D.F, Price Elasticity of Demand for Whole Life 
Insurance, Journal of Finance, Vol X1 No. 1, March 1985. 
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BASE CASE ESTIMATES AND RESULTS OF INTEGRATION 
In the table below a summary of our base case estimates used in 
the calculation of consumer surplus for each of the countries 
reviewed is presented. In subsequent paragraphs we examine the 
resultant estimates for gains in consumer surplus of integration 
of European financial services markets. We also examine the 
sensitivity of the results to changes in some of the main 
assumptions used. It should be stressed that consumer surplus 
represents the net gain to all consumers and does not refer to 
private consumers versus institutional or commercial consumers. 
The assumed price reductions represent the weighted average of 
the assumed price reductions for banking, insurance and 
securities referred to earlier. In view of the uncertainty 
inherent in any such price scenarios we have taken a price range 
of five per cent above and below the assumed price estimate. As 
indicated earlier these price reductions do not refer to the 
price to the consumer which would be significantly less than 
these estimates. 
TABLE 6.26 
Assumptions Used in Base Case Estimate of Economic Integration 
Country Value Added Value Added Value Added Elasticity Assumed 
In Credit & in Credit in of Percentage 
Insurance Institutions Insurance Demand Price 
(1) (2) Institutions Reductions 
(2) 
ECU BN ECUs BN ECUs BN 
B 5.966 3.979 .605 0.75 6 16 
D 44.417 33.902 7.972 0.75 5 15 
ES 13.929 8.638 .493 0.75 16 26 
F 29.277 27.046 1. 416 0.75 -7 17 
I 26.998 23.861 1.166 0.75 g 19 
LU .535 0.75 3 13 
N 8.537 6.244 1.963 0.75 1 9 
UK 70.240 21.666 8.338 0.75 2 12 
(1) 1985 data except Luxembourg which is 1982. 
(2) 1983 data except Luxembourg which is 1982. 
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Results of Impact of European Integration 
In the table below estimates of the economic impact of European 
integration of financial services as measured by the change in 
consumer surplus is presented for each of the countries examined. 
The estimates indicate that the gain in consumer surplus would be 
of the order of 11,144m -32,710m ECUs. The lower estimate is 
based on a lower assumed price reductions while the higher 
estimate is based on scenario of greater price reductions. 
It is important to stress the nature of the results. In 
particular they represent a snap shot of the position before and 
after integration. The figures also assume a competitive market 
structure after integration. The realism of this assumption is 
open to question but is necessary for the analysis. The figures 
indicate the net gains in consumer surplus on a country by 
country basis but do not make any assumption about the 
redistributive effects between producers and different countries. 
Thus the results indicate the benefits to the consumers in each 
country and the overall gain in consumer surplus to the 
Community. They do not indicate the impact on economic activity 
in the different countries. The results therefore do not 
represent the change in economic welfare for individual 
countries. In an integrated competitive market it is likely that 
there will be new entrants and firms unable to compete. The 
distribution of the gain in demand between producers in different 
countries will depend on how the national producers respond to 
the new trading environment. An examination of this issue which 
includes the regional policy implications is outside the scope of 
the analysis in this study. 
TABLE 6.27: ESTIMATED GAIN IN CONSUMER SURPLUS RESULTING FRCJt 
INTEGRATION OF EUROPEAN CREDIT AND INSURANCE HARDTS 
B 
D 
ES 
F 
I 
LU 
N 
UK 
ECUsM 
366 - 1,018 
2,264- 7,074 
2,376 - 4,040 
2,105 - 5,330 
2,516 - 5,542 
16 - 73 
86 - 796 
1,415 - 8,837 
11,144 -32,710 
The extent to which the above estimates represent a gain in 
economic welfare depends on the assumptions made regarding the 
extent to which the price reductions used result in a loss in 
producer surplus. The particular framework which we have adopted 
would indicate that it would be necessary to subtract from this 
gain in consumer surplus some estimates of the likely decline in 
producer surplus. In doing so we recognise that it could be 
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argued that this results in an underestimation of the gains from 
European economic integration but consider that a conservative 
approach is more likely to represent;the real situation as 
barriers are removed. In an appendix we present a methodology 
using the Herfindahl index as a meas~re of concentration which we 
use to estimate potential economic w~lfare gains. In the event 
I 
of the consumer surplus gains being ~sed as a measure of economic 
welfare gains we believe it would be/prudent to use the mid point 
in the price range as the upper esti~ate of economic welfare 
gains. 
It is also useful to consider the consumer surplus gains for the 
credit and insurance sector separately. Due to limitations of 
available data a more detailed sub-s~ctoral breakdown is not 
feasible. It is likely however that there may be differences in 
the determinants of consumer surpluses (such as elasticity 
differences) for different sub sectors. The sensitivity analysis 
undertaken later in this section may be of use in considering the 
impact of changes in different assumptions. 
In examining the individual results for credit and insurance 
sectors separately it should be noted that due to definitional 
differences these do not equate with aggregate results for 
'credit and insurance' sector. For most countries the results 
are similar but for the UK the aggr~gate credit and insurance 
sector include significantly more aqtivities than the sum of the 
two sub sectors. In presenting the disaggregate results the 
credit sub sector will be referred to as banking and securities. 
Consumer Surplus in Banking Securit!es Sectors 
In the table below the estimates of;the impact of integration of 
European banking sector in terms of gains in consumer surplus is 
presented. 
The table indicates the estimated g~ins in consumer surplus 
resulting from integration of the European banking markets. The 
size of the gain is primarily determined by the size of value 
added in the sector and the assumed reduction in prices. The 
figures do not represent a gain in economic welfare in each 
country. It is important to also n'ote that the figures do not 
represent the gain or loss to producers in each country. 
TABLE 6. 28: ESTIMATED GAIN IN CONSUMER SURPLUS RESULTING FR<J4 
INTEGRATION OF EUROPJWi BANKING MARD'l'S 
I 
ECU's M 
B i 203 - 634 
D 2,438 - 6,172 
ES 1,474 - 2,505 
F 1,945 - 4, 924 
I 1,216 - 3,800 
N 63 - 649 
UK 880 - 3,207 
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Consumer Surplus in Insurance Sector 
In the table below the estimates of the impact of integration of 
European insurance sector in terms of gains in consumer surplus 
are presented. The very large gains in consumer surplus 
resulting from integration of European insurance markets 
accounted for by Germany and the UK reflects the size of the 
markets in these two countries and not a higher percentage gain. 
Indeed the percentage gains for the UK and Germany are lower than 
for number of the other countries reviewed. 
TABLE 6. 29: ESTIMATED GAIN IN CONSUMER SURPLUS RESULTING PRCJt: 
INTEGRATION OF EUROPEAN INSURANCE MAiDTS 
ECU's M 
B 69 138 
D 80 829 
ES 73 131 
F 102 258 
I 253 398 
N 20 100 
UK 84 600 
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Sensitivity of Results 
It is important to stress that there is considerable uncertainty 
regarding what will be the economic outcome of European 
integration. Our calculations are designed to attempt to 
estimate in a quantified manner the likely impact based on 
certain assumptions regarding future developments. The results 
therefore represent an estimate based on a set of reasonable 
assumptions. In view of the uncertainty regarding a number of 
the key assumptions it is important to examine the sensitivity of 
the results to changes in the assumptions made. In the following 
paragraphs we consider the impact on our estimates of consumer 
surplus for alternative assumptions regarding price changes and 
elasticity of demand. 
For the banking sector the 'prices' in general represent the 
value added element in prices. It is important to stress that 
these price assumptions do not represent the price to the 
consumer. The price reductions to the consumer would be much 
less than the 'price' assumptions used in our analysis.It was not 
possible to obtain a similar measure for other sectors but due to 
the importance of banking in overall financial services this is 
of key importance. 
Sensitivity of Estimates to Alternative Price Assumptions 
In the table below we present estimates of the gain in consumer 
surplus resulting from integration of European credit and 
insurance markets on the basis of a range of price assumptions. 
Our estimates presented earlier were also based on a range of 
price reductions. 
TARLE 6. 30: ESTIMATED GAIN IN CONSUMER SURPLUS ON THE BASIS OF 
ALTERNATIVE PRICE ASSUMPTIONS 
ECU's M 
Assumed Percentage 
Price Changes 10 20 30 40 
B 620 1,290 2,040 2,868 
D 4,620 9,640 15,160 21,300 
ES 1,450 3,020 4,750 6,680 
F 3,040 6,350 9,990 14,040 
I 2,810 5,860 9,210 12,950 
LU 60 120 180 260 
N 890 1,850 2,910 4,090 
UK 7,300 15,240 23,970 33,680 
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The results indicate that the estimates of consumer surplus are, 
not surprisingly, sensitive to alternative price assumptions. 
Sensitivity of Estimates to Alternative Elasticity of Demand 
Assumptions 
In the table below we present estimates of consumer surplus gains 
using alternative assumptions of price elasticity of demand. The 
figures indicate that the estimates are not very sensitive to 
changes in the price elasticity of demand. 
TABLE 6. 31: ESTIMATED GAIN IN CONSlJMKR SURPLUS ON THE BASIS OF 
ALTERNATIVE ESTIMATES OF PRICE KLASTICITY OF DEMAND 
ECU's m 
Assumed Price Elasticity 
of Demand 0.2 0.5 0.75 1.5 
B 971 996 1,018 1,087 
D 6,759 6,933 7,074 7,502 
ES 3, 727 3,894 4,040 4,526 
F 5,068 5,209 5,330 5,717 
I 5,235 5,400 5,542 6,000 
LU 71 72 73 77 
N 776 786 796 824 
UK 8,535 8,698 8,837 9,272 
6. 5 MACROECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS 
In addition to our estimates of the microeconomic impact of 
integration of European financial services sector it is also 
necessary to consider the macroeconomic welfare gains from 
integration of European Capital markets. In particular it is 
important to consider the gains from risk pooling, and 
equalisation of interest rates. These issues are considered in 
subsequent paragraphs. 
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Risk Pooling by Capital Markets 
It is well known that holding a diversified portfolio of stocks 
can result in lower risk for any given return than would be 
obtainable from any single stock. In effect the risk specific to 
individual stocks becomes negligible in the average return on the 
portfolio, with remaining risk attributable only to correlations 
between the variability of individual stock returns. If an 
investor is confined to investing in the securities of a 
particular country, he may bg unable to achieve the maximum 
diversification. Accordingly, an investor restricted in this 
manner may have to put up either with more risk than necessary 
for a given (expected) return, or with a lower (expected) return 
for a given level or risk. 
These considerations are more important if the returns obtainable 
in the stock markets of different countries are not very highly 
correlated with each other, as lack of correlation between assets 
points to a potential for gains from diversification. 
From the borrower's point of view too there can be benefits from 
the integration of capital markets, even if the rate of interest 
on risk-free assets were the same in all countries, to the extent 
that integration increases the potential for diversifying risk. 
This is because the typical borrower offers a risky asset to the 
lender; but the integrated market will require no compensation by 
way of additional mean return for those parts of the risk that is 
diversifable in an international portfolio. This borrower's gain 
can be described as the gain from integration, as opposed to the 
gains which lenders can make by diversifying their portfolios as 
described in the previous paragraph, since the latter gains may 
exist even if the markets are integrated. 
Assessment of the empirical significance of these points requires 
the answer to two questions. First: are the European capital 
markets integrated (with each other and with the rest of the 
world) in the sense that rates of return fully reflect all 
diversification possibilities? Second: can an investor 
restricted to the assets of one country achieve as good a 
trade-off between risk and return as if he was free to choose 
from foreign assets also in forming his portfolio? These 
questions are logically separate, as it is possible that 
integration of capital markets exists in the sense of the first 
question above while ~ investors are restricted in their 
portfolio choice by exchange controls. 
Both questions have been addressed by an extensive literature, 
though a conclusive quantification of the magnitudes involved is 
not yet available. One of the main reasons for the rema1n1ng 
uncertainty lies in the fact that so much hinges on the degree of 
correlation between assets in different countries. These 
correlations can only be estimated from historical patterns, but 
there is no guarantee that past correlations will provide a 
reliable guide to the future. A comprehensive review of the 
conceptual issues involved is presented in a paper by Michael 
Adler and Bernard Dumas(1). 
(1) Adler M. Dumas B. "International Portfolio Choice and Corporation 
Finance", Journal of Finance 1983. 
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On the second question, which is the more clearcut of the two, the 
general conclusion from many studies may be summarised by the view of 
Adler and Dumas that because of the "fairly small correlations" which 
exist between stock market values in different countries, "it is 
possible to reap important gains from international portfolio 
diversification". 
For instance the widely quoted early study by Levy and Sarnat (1) 
observed that while the mean return from a portfolio of EEC-6 country 
stocks based on experience in the 1950's and 1960's was about 15.5%, 
this was achieved at the cost of a risk (standard deviation) of 25.0%. 
An "all-country" stocks portfolio would yield a mean return of 12.0%, 
but with much reduced risk at 8.0%. The lowest risk that could be 
obtained for a mean return of 12.0% using government bonds and only 
EEC-6 stocks was 16.7%. 
In like vein, Solnik (2), calculated that an US investor confined to 
US securities would suffer a two-thirds increase in risk for the same 
mean return. 
Attempts to answer the question, whether the international capital 
markets are in fact integrated (so that the gains to borrowers 
discussed above are already available), have required subtle 
statistical techniques. Many of these tests, such as those used by 
Solnik and by Stehle(3), have been inconclusive. However, a recent 
paper by Cho, Eun and Senbet(4), presents more conclusive results from 
the analysis of an extensive 11-country data set with over 300 
individual stocks. Four EEC countries (UK, Germany, Belgium and 
Netherlands) are included in the study. As with previous data sets, 
correlations between stock returns in different countries tend to be 
low (the mean intra-country correlation is only 0.23, compared with a 
mean intra-country correlation of 0.52). The authors' strategy is to 
consider each pair of countries, identifying the factors which explain 
most of the variation between the returns in the stocks of those 
countries, and having controlled for those factors, examining whether 
the required rate of return on individual stocks depends on which 
country that stock comes from. In the case of most country pairs, 
there is a dependence on the country, a conclusion which allows the 
author to reject the hypothesis of full international capital market 
integration. It should be noted that this rejection comes from the 
risk-premium component of the required return, rather than any 
estimated difference in the risk-free return between countries. So 
far as the EEC countries are concerned, Cho, Eun and Senbet reject 
full integration for them also; even within the EEC, it seems that 
(1) Levy, Sarnat. "International Diversification of Investment 
Portfolios" American Economic Review 1970" 
(2) Solnik BH, "The International Pricing of Risk: An Empirical 
Investigation of the World Capital Market Structure" Journal of 
Finance 1974. 
(3) Stehle RE, "An Empirical Test of the Alternative Hypothesis of 
National International Pricing of Risky Assets", Journal of 
Finance 1977. 
(4) Cho Eun & Senbet, "International Arbitrage Pricing Theory: An 
Empirical Investigation11 , Journal of Finance 1986. 
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full capital market integration does not hold. Only in the case of 
two out of the six country pairs: Germany-Netherlands, and France-UK, 
is it possible (with more than 1% probability) to entertain the 
hypothesis that any two of the four EEC countries are integrated in 
this sense. 
Conclusions Regarding Risk Pooling by Capital Markets 
The above analysis indicates that the European capital markets are not 
integrated in the sense that rates of return do not fully reflect all 
diversification possibilities. Furthermore investors who are 
restricted to the assets can not achieve as good a trade-off between 
risk and return as if there was freedom to choose from foreign assets. 
In terms of the quantified importance of potential greater portfolio 
diversification possibilities some estimates of this can be obtained 
by computing the expected rate of return on an internationally 
diversified portfolio with the same risk as the actual risk of the 
market portfolio in the particular country. The difference between 
this and the actual market return represents the annual gain in rate 
of return which could result from integration. For example, using the 
data of Levy and Sarnat (op. cit.), an appropriately levered 
international portfolio could generate mean returns almost 
three-quarters as high as the mean return on the EEC-6 market 
portfolio, for the same risk. In fact their figures yield a mean 
levered return, for the same risk of over 11% per annum higher. The 
more recent Grauer and Hakansson figures, referring to the US rather 
than EEC-6, also suggests very substantial gains from international 
diversification. 
"Implications of Completing the Internal Market for Certain Capital 
Movements?" 
At present the persistence of exchange control prevents the free flow 
of capital from moving to the countries with the highest rates of 
return. Even if there were no differences between the efficiency of 
the financial services industry in the various members states, the 
removal of exchange controls could be expected to have beneficial 
effects through the convergence of real interest rates. 
It is useful to attempt to estimate the likely implications of 
completing the internal market for certain capital movements. It is 
however important to note the limitations of such an analysis. 
The analysis and the estimates pres.ented below are based on a study of 
the changes in demand for physical investment, by country, as a result 
of changes in the real cost of capital (largely, though not entirely, 
determined by changes in real interest rates). Clearly the completion 
of the internal market, by removing exchange controls, technical 
barriers, and by liberalising trade in financial services, will almost 
certainly alter the interest rate configuration from what it would 
otherwise have been, and stimulate all kinds of capital flows, both 
short term and long term. However, as noted above, the estimates of 
welfare gains given relate to certain longer term capital items only, 
and these do not cover all of the internal market implications for 
capital flows. 
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Moreover, given the limited coverage of the analysis it is necessary 
to keep in mind that, as far as direct investment is concerned, this 
has been largely liberalised for some time, and so it is possible that 
the impact of completing the internal market on this item will be very 
modest indeed. This will be the case if, for example, the marginal 
efficiency of physical capital has already been largely equalised, as 
a result of existing arrangements, in most of the countries covered by 
the report. 
Given information on the marginal efficiency of capital and the real 
interest rates prevailing in the different countries, it is possible 
to quantify the gains from the move to a comma~ interest rates. A 
caveat should be recognised in respect of the assumption that the 
removal of exchange controls would necessarily equalise the real rates 
of interest across Europe. Until there is a much tighter exchange 
rate mechanism in the EMS, and one covering all of the countries, 
convergence of real interest rates will remain imperfect. In order to 
consider the potential benefits it is however useful to consider the 
economic impact of an equalisation of interest rates, resulting from 
the integration of European capital markets. 
Where financial markets are segmented by controls which inhibit the 
free movement of capital, real interest rates may differ between 
countries. In the extreme case where there is total segmentation and 
no balance of payments imbalance, each country's 
investment would be financed from domestic savings. Real interest 
rates, assuming no other internal distortions, would equal the 
marginal product of capital in each country. Removal of restrictions 
on capital flows may not of itself be a sufficient condition for 
equalisation of real interest rates if there exist other factors which 
affect differentially the profitability of investment between 
countries. Differences in the structure and impact of taxation 
systems between countries are a potentially significant distortion (1) 
Liberalisation of controls on financial markets would give rise to a 
capital outflow from a country with low real interest rates to a 
country with higher real rates. This will tend over time to equalise 
real interest rates between countries. Investment in projects with 
the highest returns, irrespective of the country-in which they are 
located, will enable net gains to be achieved. Thus the country 
experiencing the capital outflow can achieve a larger net national 
product through receipt of interest on foreign assets in excess of the 
return which could have been achieved by investing domestically. The 
country in receipt of the capital inflow can increase its domestic 
produce by a sufficient amount to pay interest abroad and still 
achieve a larger net national product. 
(1) See 11 Internationalisation of Financial Markets: Some Implications 
for Macroeconomic Policy and for the Allocation of Capital 11 , 
Furao, M. Hanozaki, M; OECD Working Paper, November 1986. 
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In order to clarify the impact of gains from equalisation of interest 
rates it is useful to consider the diagram below. The diagram and 
the exposition which follows draws heavily on the OECD paper by Fukao 
and Hanozaki referred to earlier. 
INTEGRATED FINANCIAL MARKET 
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In the diagram on integrated financial markets the marginal 
product of capital schedules is presented for two countries A and 
B in a simplified analysis of how welfare is increased on foot of 
integration of their capital markets. Before integration real 
interest rates in A are lower than in B. 
After integration, the real interest rates of the two countries 
will tend to be equalised. The capital stock of country A 
declines from Ka to Ka 1 by the amount of its net foreign asset. NFA . Corresponging tobthis, the capital stock of country B 
inc~eases from K to K 1. The real interest rate of country A iBcreaseE from Rao to Ra1 while that of country B decreases from R toR 1 . The get domestic product of country A declines from th~ area of ABCO to the area of AFGO . The net national product 
of this country fs larger than the ne~ domestic product in the 
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new equilibrium by the amount of investment income from abroad, 
which is equal to the area of FHCG. Therefore, the net national 
product of country A increases by the triangle area of FHB. On 
the ot~er hand, the net domestic product of country B increases 
from the area of DObCE to the area of DObGF, increasing by the 
area of ECGF. The 1ncrease in the net national product is equal 
to the triangle area of EHF due to interest payments abroad (the 
area of FHCG). The total increases in the world net national 
product is equal to the shaded area of EBF, which may be regarded 
as a welfare gain by the two countries. This welfare gain is 
created by the improved allocation of capital through the 
international equalisation of the marginal product of capital. 
The calculations underlying the estimates presented in this 
section on the gains from equalisation of interest rates involve 
two main steps as follows: 
(i) estimation of the equilibrium interest rate after 
integration; 
(ii) calculation for the eight countries of the equivalent area 
of the triangle shown in the diagram earlier. 
The calculations are based on classical analysis and the 
traditional assumptions regarding market flexibility etc. 
applies. 
In the first of these steps the average retail interest rate, r 0 
is calculated. The equilibrium rate r* is estimated as ro plus 
any adjustment to this unweighted average which would be brought 
about by the existence of differences in the interest 
elasticities of demand for capital between countries. T~e 
calculations for this first step is as follows: (where X 
represents the US$ billion change in the demand for capital which 
would result from a one percentage point reduction in the real 
cost of capital.) 
The inverted marginal efficiency of capital function for country 
i is Xi (ri), with the mean interest rate as r 0 and the 
equilibrium interest rate in the integrated market as r*. Then 
if 
then, approximately, 
r* = r 0 + <e.. 
The second step in the calculations is accomplished by 
calculating differences between the estimated equilibrium rate 
and the actual real interest rate. The precise calculation is as 
follows: 
Writing~i =[ri - r*], an approximation to the loss is given 
by: 
0.5~Ed 2 x'i (r 0 ). 
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The framework indicates that the size of the welfare gains to be 
achieved from equalisation of real interest rates depends both on 
the size of the differences and on the responsiveness of the 
demand for capital to interest rate changes in different 
countries. 
Estimates of the increase in the demand for capital as a result 
of a one percentage point decrease in the real cost of capital 
were obtained from the OECD working paper referred to above. 
These estimates were available for Germany, France, the UK and 
Italy. These are the four largest economies of the eight in this 
study and we have assumed that the demand for capital in the 
remaining four countries, in response to a one percentage point 
decline in the real cost of capital, is equal to the average of 
that in the larger four. 
The table below shows estimates for real interest rates, the 
responsiveness of the demand for capital to a one percentage 
point decline in the real cost of capital and deviations from the 
equilibrium real interest rate. It is important to stress that 
real interest rate deductions will also affect consumer's income 
and welfare. 
TABLE 6.32: WEI..PABE GAINS FR<J4 THE EQUALISATION OF REAL INTERRST 
RATES 
Real Real Changes Deviations Deviations 
Interest Interest from from 
Rates Rates in Demand Equilibrium Equilibrium 
Short Long for Short Term Long Term 
Term Term Capital Interest Interest 
1986 1986 * ECU BN Rate Rate 
Percentage Points 
1 2 3 4 5 
B 9.4 6.9 16 1.3 0.8 
D 7.6 6.4 135 -0.4 0.3 
ES 5.7 3.6 33 -2.3 -2.5 
F 8.6 6.3 80 0.6 0.2 
I 8.8 6.2 104 0.7 0.8 
L 9.4 6.9 0.6 1.3 0.8 
NL 8.2 7.4 28 0.2 1.3 
UK 7.9 5.9 96 -0.1 -0.2 
* 
As a result of a 1 percentage point decline in interest rates. 
Sources: Real Interest Rates - Central Banks 
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The potential welfare gains from completing the internal market 
for certain capital movements can be calculated using the 
deviations of real interest rates from equilibrium (columns 4 + 5 
overleaf) and the estimates of the change in the demand for 
capital shown (column 3) and using the formula outlined 
previously for the approximation of the loss of non integration. 
The results indicate a gain of between 1.4 - 1.6bn ECUs depending 
on whether long or short term rates are used. The size of these 
gains reflects the coverage and nature of the analysis and 
developments to data in liberalising capital movements. 
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Conclusions 
Our research indicates that there is significant potential gains 
to be secured in terms of increases in consumer surplus and 
economic welfare, resulting from integration of European 
financial services markets. 
Extreme caution must be exercised in interpreting any 
quantification of the potential gains as the results will of 
necessity be speculative. However on the basis of our base case 
assumptions, we estimate that the gain in consumer surplus would 
be of the order of llb - 33b ECUs. The net economic welfare 
gains using the higher price assumptions are estimated to be of 
the order of 22bn ECUs. These gains represent the potential 
microeconomic benefits of integration of main European Community 
financial services markets. The results for individual countries 
presented in this study do not represent the potential economic 
welfare gains for each country as this would involve an 
examination of the distribution of the potential aggregate gains 
which is outside the scope of this study. 
In addition to the above gains it is also likely that there will 
be macroeconomic welfare gains from integration of European 
capital markets. The gains from risk pooling by capital markets 
could generate mean returns almost three-quarters as high as the 
return on existing market portfolios. Also of importance is the 
potential gains from equalisation of interest rates. 
The gains from integration will result from the dynamic effect of 
economic integration and not simply as a result of removing the 
costs of meeting some of the existing regulations. In all 
countries consumers will benefit from European integration but 
some producers will come under pressure to survive in the single 
market. 
In this study the importance of financial services in terms of 
output and employment was indicated. The critical macroeconomic 
importance of capital markets was also highlighted. In view of 
the potential benefits of European integration of financial and 
capital markets it is essential that steps are taken to rapidly 
complete the internal market in financial services. 
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Summary Work Programme 
Geographical coverage of the study: F.R. of Germany, France, Italy, 
the United Kingdom, the Benelux countries and Spain. 
The study is divided into two parts: 
The objectives of the first part (Part 1) of the study are: 
to assess the importance of financial services to the Community 
economy, from the point of v;iew of the producer and from the 
point of view of the ~ of, financial services; 
to analyse the present organisation of the market for financial 
services; 
to determine the scope for ~ quantitative assessment of the 
effects of completing the i~ternal market, both as a whole and in 
parts. 
i 
This information will then be us~d, in the second part (Part II) of 
the study; 
to evaluate the cost of the present obstacles to trade in 
financial services: 
to provide estimates of the benefits of completing the internal 
market. 
The first part of the study is divided into three sections. 
Section IA Methodological Issues 
The purpose of this section is to resolve three methodological 
problems. In particular it is; 
to provide a comprehensive but operational definition of 
financial services; 
to identify the producer and users of financial services; 
to clarify the link between liberalising the market for financial 
services and liberalisation of capital movements. 
The definition of financial services will be based on an analysis of 
the range of services or products available. It will cover the 
following: 
international, commercial, and private banking, corporate 
financial services and offshore banking; 
money market activities, braking, funds management; 
consumer credit; 
assurance, insurance and re-insurance; 
commodities exchange and futures exchange. 
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The identification of the producers of financial services will proceed 
country by country because it is unlikely that, in each of the member 
states of the community, a given service will be provided by the same 
kind of institution. The identification of users will concentrate on 
direct users of financial services. Users will include companies, 
households and General Government. 
In examining the link between financial services and capital movements 
it should be noted that 
the liberalisation of certain financial services can proceed 
independently of the liberalisation of capital movements 
particularly if the principal of "home country control", as set 
out in the White Paper, is accepted. On the other hand the 
liberalisation of other financial services will not be effective 
without free capital movements. The study must identify those 
cases where the liberalisation of the relevant financial 
services, and those cases where separate action is required. 
the need for, and the right of financial institutions to 
establish themselves in member states other than those in which 
they are already based (particularly as regards insurance 
services) depends upon the outcome of certain cases now before 
the European Court of Justice. 
Section lB Macro-economic and sectoral Analysis 
The purpose of this section is to provide a body of data for financial 
services, covering, for each of the countries included in the study; 
a) turnover, output, value added, employment and profitability; 
b) the demand for financial services by households, companies and 
General Government; 
c) external transactions 
together with the additional material required to enable comparisons 
with other sectors and the total economy to be made. 
These data will include both detailed cross-sectional analysis as well 
as time series with greater emphasis being given to more recent years. 
Some of the data will reflect the institutional structure of the 
financial service sector (employment etc.) some of the product 
structure (demand etc.) The body of data must therefore include any 
appropriate correspondence or transition tables, required to match 
these two approaches. The definitions and concepts used in assembling 
the data must be those of the European System of Accounts (ESA). 
This body of data will be based upon national or international 
macro-economic data as well as data of a more micro-economic kind from 
the following sources: 
data from associations of producers of financial services; 
specialised publications; 
samples of data from individual producers; 
other miscellaneous sources. 
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Tn assembling the data the following problems should be considered: 
The difficulty of measuring the output of services. 
The variation of data coverage as between countries. 
Section lC: Analysis of the present structure of the financial 
service market and quantifications of the effects of 
regulation 
The focus of this section will be on regulatory barriers and how they 
are implemented. 
In particular attention will be given to those regulations: 
affecting the establishment of financial service institutions in 
overseas markets; 
affecting cross border trade directly. 
The purpose of this section will also be to provide quantitative 
measures of the effects of regulations, and so of the lack of 
Community wide competition, or market segmentation. These 
quantitative measures will be based on a set of financial products or 
services, considered to be the representative of the output of the 
financial services sector as a whole, and found in each of the 
separate community markets included in the study. Prices of this set 
of products will be established for each market. 
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WORK: PROGRAMME FOR PART II OP' THE STUDY 
Part II of the study will be divided into three sections, the first 
will be concerned with the cost of the present obstacles to free trade 
in financial services. 
Section llA Evaluating the Cost of t-.be Present Obstacles to P'ree 
Trade in :Financial Services and Background Research and Analysis 
The purpose of this section is to provide figures for the cost of the 
obstacles to free trade in financial services and also with the 
compilation and analysis of background research which will be used in 
Section IIC. 
Most emphasis in Part II of the study will be focused on indirect 
estimates of costs of non Europe. These estimates will be obtained 
indirectly from an analysis of price data and from an analysis of the 
data on the other approaches to the quantification of the effects of 
regulations. 
Section IIB Analysis of Macroeconomic Welfare Gains 
In this section data on the real interest rates prevailing in 
different countries will be compiled. Assumptions regarding the 
marginal efficiency of capital will also be made. 
An analysis of other external benefits relating to international 
pooling of capital market risks and credit rationing will also be 
provided. 
Section IIC Estimating the Gains from Completins the Internal Market 
for :Financial Services 
The purpose of this section will be to provide figures for the 
benefits to be made from completing the internal market for financial 
services. The work of this section must firstly be directed towards 
measuring the effect of completing the internal market on the net 
welfare gain for each country. This will be expressed in millions of 
ECUs or as a percentage of other economic variables. 
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WORK PROGRAMME FOR PART II OF THE STUDY 
Part II of the study will be divided into three sections, the first 
will be concerned with the cost of the present obstacles to free trade 
in financial services and with background research and analysis for 
sections IIC of the study. The second section will be concerned with 
analysis of macroeconomic welfare gains. The third with the benefits 
to be gained from completing the market. 
Section llA Evaluating the Cost of the Present Obstacles to Free 
Trade in Financial Services and Background Research and Analysis 
The purpose of this section is to provide figures for the cost of the 
obstacles to free trade in financial services and also with the 
compilation and analysis of background research which will be used in 
Section IIC. 
Most emphasis in Part II of the study will be focused on indirect 
estimates of costs of non Europe. These estimates will be obtained 
indirectly from an analysis of price data and from an analysis of the 
data on the other approaches to the quantification of the effects of 
regulations. 
Section IIB Analysis of Macroeconomic Welfare Gains 
In this section data on the real interest rates prevailing in 
different countries will be compiled. Assumptions regarding the 
marginal efficiency of capital will also be made. Illustrative 
estimates will be calculated of macroeconomic implications of the 
impact of equalisation of interest rates on the basis of these 
assumptions. 
An analysis of other external benefits relating to international 
pooling of capital market risks and credit rationing will also be 
provided. 
Section IIC Estimating the Gains from Completing the Internal Market 
for Financial Services 
The purpose of this section will be to provide figures for the 
benefits to be made from completing the internal market for financial 
services. The work of this section must firstly be directed towards 
measuring the effect of completing the internal market on the net 
welfare gain for each country. This will be expressed in millions of 
ECUs or as a percentage of other economic variables. 
The estimation of the gains will be obtained by using an adapted model 
which takes account of the new imperfect competition approach. 
In effect, what the model will provide (together with assumptions 
regarding the price elasticity of demand) is a formula which, when 
applied to the price differential for each country (relative to the 
price in the completed market) and the size of each country's market, 
will yield estimate for each country of the net welfare gain of 
completion of the internal market for financial services in Europe. 
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Link Between Trade in Financial Services and Capital Movements 
In this appendix we consider the important and complex issue 
of the link between trade in financial services and capital 
movements. 
The main issues which need to be addressed in this connection 
are analysed and discussed in the following paragraphs. 
(1) The extent to which trade in financial services necessarily 
involves capital movements. 
Generally speaking an international capital movement occurs 
when a resident of one country acquires a financial claim on a 
resident of another country. As intermediaries, financial 
institutions often act as principals with respect both to the 
ultimate creditors and the ultimate debtors. Thus a deposit 
placed by a German resident in an United Kingdom bank 
represents an international capital movement as does a loan 
made by the UK bank to a German company. The position is less 
clearcut in the case of the issue of a note of indebtedness by 
the German company to the German investor, guaranteed by the 
UK bank; even in this case, for some purposes, the 
transaction may be treated as involving an international 
capital movement. If the bank merely places the note, without 
guarantee then we would not normally say that an international 
capital movement has happened. Nevertheless a financial 
service has been performed by the bank in packaging and 
marketing the note. Another example of an international 
service transaction without a capital movement could arise 
with an insurance company. It is clear that for both 
long-term and accident ins~rance the sale of a policy 
establishes a financial claim. But a French insurance company 
might sell a claim on its Spanish branch to a resident of 
Spain. In so far as the administration, marketing and other 
costs were incurred by the French parent, with the Spanish 
branch being merely a front company, we would regard this 
transaction as an international sale of services; but there 
would have been no international capital movement. 
Therefore it is possible for some international trade in 
financial services to take place without capital flows. 
Nevertheless exchange controls inhibit the ability of 
residents to obtain financial services from foreign financial 
institutions not specifically geared up for such indirect 
arrangements. Furthermore, setting up arrangements for 
delivering financial services across international borders 
without effecting capital flows will often be costly for the 
providers. 
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(2) A schematic approach. 
As discussed in Section 4 of this report exchange controls of 
varying degrees of severity inhibit the international movement 
of capital between member states of the Community. (The most 
severe controls involve Greece, Ireland, Spain and Portugal). 
The circumstances under which different financial services can 
legally be provided, or financial products sold, across 
international frontiers, varies widely both in theory and in 
practice. The same applies to the degree to which financial 
institutions can set up branches, or establish subsidiaries, 
in other member states. Finally a wide variety of different 
regulations and fiscal regimes applies to financial services 
in the different member states (and in some cases these 
discriminate against foreign financial institutions). 
In the face of this degree of institutional complexity, and in 
order to grasp the main issues, we have adopted a schematic 
approach. Thus we rule out certain configurations and focus 
only on a small set of archetypical regulations. In particular, 
we ignore the possibility (which is of practical relevance, 
for example in insurance) that foreign institutions granted 
the freedom to trade or to establish will be actively 
discriminated against in the fiscal or regulatory regime. 
(3) Whether partial completion of the internal market can achieve 
theoretical efficiency? 
The fragmentation of the European market for financial 
services means that the consumer does not obtain the services 
for the lowest possible price. The deviations from the lowest 
possible price can arise from a variety of conceptually 
distinct sources. In the first case there is the question of 
comparative advantage: a combination of intrinsic 
characteristics such as factor endowments and access to the 
appropriate production technology may make some member states 
relatively more suitable for the production of financial 
services. A second reason for deviations from the minimum 
possible price in a fragmented Europe is the possibility of 
unexploited economies of scale. Even more important is the 
potential for external competition to eliminate uncompetitive 
practices and monopoly rents which can persist in protected 
markets. In what follows, the likely success of various 
stages of partial liberalisation in achieving these potential 
gains will be reviewed one by one. 
(4) The role of regulations. 
Each member state regulates the operation within its 
jurisdiction of resident financial institutions. The purpose 
of this regulation is partly prudential, partly macroeconomic, 
and it may also have other objectives such as channeling of 
credit to economic sectors which are considered strategic, or 
protection of the interests of weaker economic agents. As is 
well known and indeed explicitly recognised by the 
Commission's White Paper, if foreign financial institutions 
are allowed to trade without being subject to strict local 
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regulations, they may gain such a competitive advantage over 
domestic institutions as to render the regulations 
unsustainable. It is important to know whether, or to what 
extent, liberalisation of trade in financial services, or 
liberalisation of capital movements, can be undertaken without 
weakening the independence of regulatory authorities. The 
fact that these regulations may have the effect of raising the 
price of financial services above the minimum provides an 
independent reason for inquiring as to their sustainability in 
the face of liberalisation of trade and capital movements. 
(5) Failures of competition. 
In a fully unified market, the welfare losses which can be 
attributed to the present fragmentation would presumably be 
eliminated. However we must be cautious in concluding that 
competitive efficiency will prevail with services being 
provided to the consumer at minimum cost. But there is 
evidence of non-competitive behaviour in financial markets. 
Financial services of both the credit and the insurance 
variety derive their very nature from economies of large 
numbers; this effectively impels the uncontrolled financial 
markets to some degree of concentration. Although the 
practical importance of these economies beyond a certain size 
may be disputed, there can be no certainty that an unified 
European financial market will not be a concentrated one, 
unless a pro-competitive regulatory regime is enforced. 
Indeed, while it is true that not all of the member states 
have competitive financial markets at present, it may 
nevertheless be remarked that there might on balance be 
welfare losses in moving from a competitive, but fragmented, 
market to an unified, but oligopolistic one. 
The remainder of the analysis of the above methodological 
question is organised as follows: firstly we propose a 
classification of different degrees of freedom of trade in 
financial services. These classes are then explored with 
reference to their likely effect on costs of production, on 
market structure and on the sustainability of a number of 
types of national regulation in a regime of tight exchange 
controls. We then examine the effect of liberalising exchange 
controls while retaining restrictions on trade or 
establishment. Finally, some conclusions are presented. 
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Degrees of trade freedom 
(1) Freedom to trade or to establish. 
Concentrating on the situation where there may be restrictions 
on capital movements, the degree to which financial 
institutions can penetrate foreign markets depends firstly on 
whether they are allowed to 
sell products across international frontiers 
open a branch in the foreign market 
establish a subsidiary in the foreign market. 
The present situation in regard to the degree of freedom of 
sale or establishment is outlined in Section 4 of this report. 
Where there is the freedom to sell financial products, but 
branching or establishment of subsidiaries is restricted, and 
where binding exchange controls exist, the freedom to sell 
many financial products will typically be nugatory. The sale 
of a financial service without being able to issue or accept a 
claim effectively confines the financial institution to pure 
brokerage or advisory role. Even if the institution could get 
around this by means of off-balance sheet arrangements, that 
would reflect a loophole in the exchange controls. 
The distinction between branching and the establishment of a 
subsidiary is not as clear from the perspective of the 
economic analysis of competitive behaviour, as it is from the 
point of view of taxation or legal obligations. The 
establishment of a subsidiary, i.e. a legal entity under the 
laws of the host country, appears to weaken the integration 
and control of the parent by comparison with entry on the 
basis of a branch. But the distinction may be more apparent 
than real, for example because the directors of the subsidiary 
may be employees of the parent company. A particular point 
which is relevant is that branches are generally considered as 
non-resident for the purpose of exchange controls, and this 
may offer some advantages to that form of presence over the 
establishment of a subsidiary where exchange control 
restrictions are severe. Certainly the differing tax and 
company law treatment of branches and subsidiaries may result 
in significant competitive advantages of one form of operation 
over another, and over domestic institutions, raising the same 
type of question as arise where foreign financial institutions 
are permitted to operate abroad under home country financial 
regulations and supervision, as discussed below. 
(2) Home or host country regulations. 
For a branch or subsidiary, the degree to which the newcomer 
is subject to host country regulations and supervision, as 
opposed to the regulatory and supervisory regime of its home 
country, will be a decisive factor so far as the competitive 
position is concerned. In each of the member states of the 
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Community financial institutions are subject to an important 
range of regulatory and supervisory controls going beyond the 
company law requirements imposed on non-financial companies. 
Differences between the regulatory and tax environment in 
different member states are also significant. 
Though the "concept of mutual recognition and equivalence" 
proposed by the Commission applies more to prudential than to 
other aspects of the regulatory and fiscal environment, and 
the acceptability of local regulations under certain 
circumstances has been established by the European Court of 
Justice, it is convenient here to draw the dichotomy between 
home and host country regulation. The process of 
harmonization of regulations, which will be accelerated by the 
process of completing the internal market, will in time make 
this distinction less important. But for the immediate future 
it will in many instances be decisive. As we will see, it may 
be necessary to extend the application of mutual recognition 
and home country regulation to a wider sphere, including 
matters often regarded as part of monetary policy if full 
microeconomic efficiency is to be obtained. 
Generally speaking one may expect the role of host Governments 
to be comparatively less prominent in at least some aspects of 
the regulation and supervision of branches by comparison with 
subsidiaries. 
(3) Types of regulation. 
Schematically, and with inevitable oversimplification, we can 
assign regulations to one of the three boxes: prudential, 
consumer protection, and general monetary and credit policy. 
The archetypical prudential requirement is a capital adequacy 
or maximum gearing requirement; interest rate ceilings, rules 
on loadings for accident insurance and premium calculation 
rules for life insurance exemplify requirements imposed for 
consumer protection; while liquidity ratios for banks are 
typical of monetary policy instruments. Of course any such 
classification will be subject to objections. Many 
regulations have multiple purposes, and some may have 
consequences which are not in line with their stated 
objectives. Our interest here is not so much in what 
objectives the regulations achieve as in their cost and 
competitiveness implications. 
(3) Are the strictest regulations really necessary? 
Nevertheless there is a fundamental difficulty for policy 
analysis in this area: if one assumes the regulations to be 
well-targetted to their objectives, different regulatory 
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regimes will tend to result in a different product mix. For 
instance a regime of tight prudential requirements and 
detailed consumer protection rules will tend to support a 
financial sector which is less prone to failures and where the 
consumer is better served in the dimensions to which 
regulatory attention has been addressed. The price of 
financial services may be higher, but it could be argued that 
the product is, according to the revealed preferences of the 
regulatory authorities, better. The simplest approach to this 
difficulty is to accept the objectives of the least regulated 
country, and to treat, for the purpose of analysis, tighter 
regulations as being superfluous or distortionary. In the 
achievement of the unified market in Europe something like 
this approach will probably have to be adopted in the end, 
perhaps combined with the adoption of a minimum set of 
regulatory standards. 
(5) The role of exchange controls 
tt is also necessary to look more closely at the effect of 
exchange controls on the operation of branches or subsidiaries 
of foreign financial institutions. To anticipate, a major 
conclusion of our discussion is that the role of exchange 
controls is an important one. As noted above, a distinction 
can usually be drawn between those aspects of an international 
financial service transaction that involve international 
capital movements and those that do not. The existence of a 
local branch can allow a foreign institution to provide a 
financial service even in the presence of exchange controls 
that would inhibit the flow of capital which might otherwise 
be associated with the transaction. However one can imagine 
that where permission to branch or establish a subsidiary was 
granted to a foreign financial institution, this might well be 
accompanied by specific and limited exemptions from exchange 
controls which could be sufficient to make an appreciable 
difference to its ability to compete in the host country. 
A foreign financial institution may need only the freedom to 
diversify internationally a small part of the balance sheet of 
its branch or subsidiary to achieve an optimal diversification 
of its global portfolio. Therefore even small exemptions from 
the exchange control rules may be sufficient to make the 
difference between a segmented and an unified financial market 
in Europe so far as that institution is concerned. That is 
one reason why it is interesting to focus on the possibility 
of special and partial exemptions from exchange controls for 
financial institutions. 
Selected scenarios. 
Even confining ourselves to these three aspects leads to an 
unmanageably complex combination of scenarious. So instead of 
trying to analyse each possible case, we focus on a small 
subset of cases which will bring out the main features. 
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The first cases, denoted A1 and A2 in Table 2.1 below, are 
intended to represent the goal of the European Commission. 
There is freedom to trade in financial services across 
international frontiers, and also freedom to establish 
subsidiaries and branches. Exchange controls have essentially 
been eliminated ·under A1 and A2. The difference between these 
two scenarios is the degree to which the provision of 
financial services is subject to home (A1) or host (A2) 
country regulations. As already mentioned, while the 
Commission has espoused the principle of mutual recognition 
with home country licensing and supervision, it is assumed in 
the Commission's view of the completed internal market that 
certain matters, such as monetary policy regulations, will 
remain a matter for the host country. This effectively leaves 
the Commission's scenario in a half-way house between A1 and 
A2. 
Other rows in Table 2.1 represent, in differing ways and to 
differing extents, limitations on a free international 
financial market. Each of the scenarios chosen involve some 
degree of exchange controls, with a distinction drawn between 
very tight controls which apply also to financial 
institutions, and more liberal regimes which have limited 
specific exemptions allowing financial institutions some 
leeway to balance their portfolio internationally. 
Scenario B is at one artificial pole, where there are many 
barriers to the establishment of a presence internationally, 
but where exchange control restrictions are fairly light and 
there is freedom to trade financial services (for example by 
telephone) across frontiers. The most restrictive scenario 
considered is C, where, although trade is permitted, strict 
exchange controls severely limit the degree to which it can be 
availed of. 
Moving to the opposite pole, where establishment of a 
commercial presence is permitted, but trade is impeded, we 
consider four scenarios differing in the severity of exchange 
controls and between home and host country regulations: D1 
and D2 are where there are no exemptions from a severe 
exchange control regime, and where branch operation, as 
opposed to the establishment of a subsidiary, is not 
permitted; scenarios E1 and E2 are more liberal in that 
subsidiaries of foreign financial institutions are allowed 
some exemptions from an otherwise strict regime of exchange 
controls, and where foreign institutions are allowed to 
operate through branches. D1 and E1 relate to home country 
regulations, D2 and E2 to host country regulations, a 
distinction which, as already mentioned will become 
progressively less important as harmonization of the 
regulatory and supervisory regime proceeds. 
Although the scenarios considered do not exhaust the possible 
combinations, they are sufficiently representative to 
illustrate the main considerations involved. 
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(1) The Situation in the Presence of Exchange Controls 
In order to throw light on the degree to which maximum 
efficiency can be achieved in the presence of fairly strict 
exchange controls, some of the likely consequences of a 
liberalisation of establishment rules and practices are 
explored below. Some of the arguments obviously apply to more 
than one situation, but undue repetition is avoided. 
(i) Home country regulations and supervision apply. 
(In terms of the scenarios which we have selected, the 
following paragraphs relate chiefly to Dl and El.) 
In this situation, the general presumption is that tightly 
regulated financial sectors will not be able to compete 
abroad, and furthermore domestic institutions could be under 
threat from foreign competition. Assuming first of all that a 
good degree of competition prevails in the home market before 
trade or entry is permitted, we may review the likely impact 
of the different types of regulation selected earlier. For 
convenience, we refer more to banks than to other types of 
intermediary, many of the arguments hold for all types of 
intermediary with appropriate modifications. To anticipate, 
we will conclude that, while the differing regulations involve 
a distortion of competition, this need not in all cases be 
fatal for domestic institutions. Just as for trade in goods, 
comparative advantage will generally preserve segments of the 
market in which domestic institutions remain competitive, 
though this may result in the emergence of anti-competitive 
pressures. 
To begin with there is the capital adequacy or maximum gearing 
type of prudential requirement. For a bank this means that 
lending must be backed partly by issues of equity. A higher 
capital adequacy requirement for domestic banks does not 
necessarily mean that they will be placed under a competitive 
disadvantage, as the cost of equity capital at home may be 
lower than that abroad because of the existence of exchange 
controls. In general, capital adequacy requirements are 
likely to impose only modest burdens; even the most 
sophisticated of such regulations cannot hope to take full 
account of the risk structure of the bank's balance sheet, so 
that in equilibrium a bank which faces a competitive 
disadvantage because of a higher capital requirement can 
adjust the riskiness of its balance sheet until its own choice 
of leverage would correspond to that imposed. In this way the 
coexistence of banks with different compulsory capital 
requirements may result in a segmentation of the market by 
risk rather than in an outright competitive disadvantage. 
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Turning to interest rate ceilings, imposed at least partially 
for consumer protection against usurious charges (though the 
fear of ruinous competition is also a justification), a 
similar type of argument may apply. Basically the argument 
would be that, provided the interest rate ceiling was not too 
far below market clearing levels, the domestic bank, 
restricted by having to keep low deposit rates, might be able 
to offer safer deposits by a more rigorous vetting of loan 
applicants (which they could afford to undertake because of 
the low cost of deposits). That would leave the foreign 
competitor with a riskier loan portfolio, but higher deposit 
rates to justify it. However the resulting riskiness of the 
liabilities of the foreign bank (or near-bank) would be an 
unattractive feature of this regime, from the authorities' 
point of view: in effect the imposition of interest rate 
ceiling would have increased the riskiness of a sector of the 
banking system. Note that it is the existence of exchange 
controls that preserve this distortion. 
Maximum loading requirements for insurance premia would also 
segment the market. Domestic insurers, no longer able to 
cross-subsidise lines with unduly low maximum loadings would 
presumably ration their availability if unregulated foreign 
insurers entered. Likewise the imposition of burdensome 
calculation rules for life insurance premiums on domestic 
insurers would be highly visible, and while the failure of the 
maximum loading rules to achieve their objective might result 
in a withdrawal of the rules, until that was done 
inefficiencies would result. 
Liquidity ratios for banks imposed for reasons of monetary 
policy fall into a third category. On the one hand, if the 
required balances are not remunerated at a market rate then 
this imposes a cost penalty on the domestic bank which may be 
hard for it to absorb. Bank deposits are already such a 
liquid asset that it is hard to see how a bank could offset 
the imposition by adjusting its business (for example by 
offering liberal overdraft permissions) to the point where it 
would call for a substantial voluntary increase in the bank's 
holdings of non-remunerating liquid assets, especially when 
one considers the normally ready availability of liquidity at 
market rates through interbank market. On the other hand, the 
monetary policy objectives underlying the liquidity ratios are 
likely to be frustrated by the entry of unregulated foreign 
banks. So the potentially severe cost penalties suffered by 
domestic banks would not achieve any policy objective. This 
anomalous situation would probably induce the authorities to 
relax the requirements. 
This review of the impact of certain regulations reveals that 
some might tend to segment the market: giving the domestic 
institutions a comparative advantage in some sectors, while 
others could impose an outright competitive disadvantage on 
them. Some of these consequences might be acceptable to home 
regulatory authorities, but in other cases the tighter 
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regulations would have ceased to perform any constructive 
function and would presumably be withdrawn. There would thus 
be a momentum in the direction of international harmonization 
of many regulations. To the extent that harmonization was 
achieved, then greater efficiency could be expected to result; 
but the fact that authorities might be prepared to live with 
the sorts of market segmentation and distortion which have 
been illustrated suggests that this particular half-way house 
might persist for some time. 
To the extent that the regulations remained unharmonized, 
market segmentation might result in non-competitive practices. 
For the home institutions, being driven into a small segment 
would put pressure on profitability and the existence of a 
common external cause would make cartelisation to preserve 
revenue a plausible reaction, and one in which the authorities 
might well find it easy to acquiesce. For the foreign 
entrant, the absence of competition from the home institutions 
might make it relatively easy for the first few newcomers to 
establish a limit price regime that would discourage further 
competition from abroad. 
It should be noted that fiscal preferences, or procurement-
type preferences given to domestic institutions, as well as 
the potential market power of state-owned financial 
institutions might inhibit the ability of foreign institutions 
to enter even under a "home regulations" regime. This 
consideration would be less important, though not entirely 
without weight, in the absence of exchange controls. 
In summary, we may conclude that, because of the effects noted 
above, the acceptance of home country regulations and 
supervision will not, in the absence of exchange control 
liberalisation (as in scenarios Dl and El), be adequate to 
ensure full efficiency. 
(ii) Host country regulations and supervision apply. 
In this case (applying for instance to scenarios D2 and E2) 
the focus of attention shifts from the distorting effects of 
differential regulations to the competitive environment. The 
new entrants, if they have lower costs arising for example out 
of economies of scale or scope, may scoop the market; driving 
out inefficient home institutions. On the other hand, 
especially if the home market is imperfectly competitive to 
begin with, new entrants may find it advantageous to benefit 
from the non-competitive environment with larger profits from 
a smaller share of the market. 
The likelihood of foreign entrants quickly sweeping up a large 
share of financial markets is questionable. The ability of an 
institution to trade effectively in financial markets depends 
on its creditworthiness. Even a major international bank or 
insurance company, though easily established in the money 
markets, will have to make an investment of time and resources 
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in establishing the requisite degree of confidence among 
non-financial corporate and household customers. This barrier 
to entry may not deter foreign competition if the newcomer's 
other costs are low, but the process will be a prolonged one 
and the benefits of trade will be slow in coming. 
Furthermore, especially if the market is already imperfectly 
competitive, the barriers may prevent the price of financial 
services from falling as much as they might in a fully 
integrated competitive equilibrium. For when the first 
newcomers are established they may be able to inhibit further 
foreign entrants by pricing just too low to make further entry 
across the barrier worthwhile. 
It should be borne in mind that the application of host 
regulations already involves a barrier to entry, as foreign 
institutions will generally find it costly to effect the 
establishment of a subsidiary which complies with the 
regulations, quite apart from the risk of covert 
discriminatory administration of the regulations. 
Are financial markets prone to imperfect competition? 
One reason for expecting some financial markets to exhibit 
imperfect competition is the possible existence of economies of 
scale and scope. Another is the very impact of certain 
regulations. In particular, quantitative restrictions on 
credit expansion, however desirable their objectives may be, 
are often thought to inhibit competition. Limitations on 
opening new branch offices can have a similar effect. Under 
such arrangements it could be the case that even the most 
inefficient institution preserves its market share, thereby 
allowing the others to make excess profits. If freedom of 
establishment simply admits a new member to such a comfortable 
arrangement, it is clear that little consumer gain may result. 
While there may be some non-competitive pricing by financial 
institutions, little research has been done on the nature of 
this imperfect competition. Should we think of them as 
behaving cooperatively, as a cartel, or non-cooperatively with 
strategic but uncoordinated interactions? In short we are 
left with the ambiguity of a variety of possible results 
without knowing which one is empirically applicable. 
The recent revisionist theory of contestable markets invites 
us to consider closely whether supposed barriers to entry 
ar1s1ng from sunk costs of entry are real. It has been argued 
that in many non-financial cases investments are reversible; 
capital can be sold. However in the case of investments 
designed to build creditworthiness as discussed here, it seems 
clear that this critique is not applicable. The existence or 
importance of economies of scale or scope is hotly disputed. 
For many years researchers failed to find economies in banks 
except for very small firms; now these findings are being 
disputed on technical grounds and it seems likely that further 
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research using refined methodology will be better equipped to 
detect economies. Here we maintain the working assumption 
that such economies are potentially important. A detailed 
review of existing evidence on economies of scale will be 
undertaken in Part II of this study. 
Our tentative conclusion is that freedom of establishment 
under host country regulations will not guarantee a fully 
competitive outcome with prices of financial services falling 
to the lowest possible. Bound by exchange controls the home 
customer cannot bypass the domestic market and seek the lowest 
price worldwide. Persistence of, or conceivably the 
introduction of, imperfectly competitive financial markets at 
home may well limit the welfare gains from freedom of 
establishment. 
While quantification is difficult, we would deduce that the 
outcome of scenario D2 is likely to be less satisfactory than 
with the corresponding home country regime Dl, and likewise E2 
would prove preferable to El. 
Specific exemptions from exchange controls for financial 
institutions. 
If rigid exchange controls are in effect and fully applicable 
to establishing financial institutions, the potential for 
these institutions to diversify their portfolio 
internationally is compromised. The result is that the 
institutions cannot fully achieve economies of 
diversification, of scale and of scope. The potential losses 
are not only the financial losses of having a less than 
optimally diversified portfolio, but also result from the 
additional resource costs of managing a separate portfolio, 
and indeed what will probably have to be substantially a 
separate operation altogether, as considerable 
decentralisation of decision making and control to the foreign 
branch or subsidiary under these circumstances is likely to 
occur. This cost penalty incurred by new entrants will 
obviously mean fewer threats to home institutions from low 
cost foreign operations, and correspondingly smaller consumer 
gains. 
But exchange controls are often imposed to protect the 
official foreign exchange reserves from speculative>raids, and 
the monetary authorities might be willing, without 
compromising this objective, to allow a foreign financial 
institution enough by way of exemptions from the controls to 
allow the institution to manage its portfolio on a global 
basis. For example, provided the aggregate net inflow or 
outflow of funds attributable to the institution was not a 
large fraction of its balance sheet, the official reserves 
would be secure, but the financial institution would not be 
constrained in its portfolio decisions (except, of course if 
it wished to undertake exchange rate speculation). 
Quite apart from the efficiencies imparted to a bank or 
insurance company from being able to diversify its portfolio 
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sufficiently is the potential for stock-market related 
intermediaries to function in such a way as to provide, even 
in the presence of exchange controls, the international 
pooling of stock-market risks that is sought from an unified 
European stock-market. Already stocks are held across 
international borders through the medium of depository 
receipts which effectively give the stocks some of the 
characteristics of home securities. It is conceivable that de 
facto freedom of establishment of unit-trust type 
intermediaries with limited exchange control exemptions could 
generate, through somewhat analogous instruments, a major 
widening of investing opportunities for wealth holders, and 
cheaper sources of finance for corporate borrowers in several 
member countries even while the general regime of exchange 
controls persisted. 
This discussion clearly favours the scenarios which are more 
liberal on the exchange control front, such as the E 
scenarios. 
Ranking the possibilities 
In terms of which set of circumstances, among the four 
scenarios permitting establishment, but hampered by exchange 
controls, is likely to yield the greatest consumer benefits, 
we may infer from the above discussion, tentative though it 
is, that a "host regulations" environment is less favourable 
than "home regulations", largely because it seems more likely 
to preserve non-competitive markets. The "home regulations" 
regime could also encourage non-competitive practices, but, as 
it would put pressure on many of the most distorting 
regulations, the outcome would probably be better. 
Specific exemptions from exchange controls could offer cost 
savings to intermediaries, as well as widening the market, and 
are likely to offer advantages to the domestic consumer. 
The proposed ranking of the four combinations is therefore: 
El > Dl > E2 > D2. 
Free Movement of Capital 
To contrast the situation of exchange controls with freedom of 
establishment, this section briefly reviews some aspects of 
trade in financial services with freedom of capital movements, 
but restrictions on establishment, as in Scenarios B and C. 
The Commission's goal, as represented by scenarios Al and A2 
are also placed in context. 
Sustainability of regulations. 
It has already been argued that freedom of trade without 
freedom of establishment and in the presence of exchange 
controls (Scenario C) is unlikely to lead to any significant 
inroads being made by foreign producers of financial products. 
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On the other hand, with a regime of free movement of capital 
as in B, the presumption must be that business will flow to 
the lowest cost producer. 
By definition of such freedom, it will no longer be possible 
to, maintain a "host country regulations" regime, as the 
producers of financial services will not have any particular 
dealings with the authorities of the countries in which they 
are not established. Accordingly the pressure on the 
authorities to dismantle controls which segment the market or 
impose cost penalties on home banks will be severe. Some 
regulations which might survive under exchange controls even 
with 11home country regulations 11 will have more serious 
consequences if maintained under freedom of capital movements. 
For instance, it has been pointed out above that the existence 
of exchange controls can result in the required rate of return 
on equity capital differing from colmtry to country, so that 
higher capital requirements might place a burden on 
shareholders without necessarily preventing the home financial 
institution from competing with a foreign institution. But 
with freedom of capital movements, equity will migrate to 
where it is better rewarded, and a home bank faced with high 
capital adequacy requirements might find it impossible to 
raise capital on terms which allow it to compete, even if the 
remainder of its cost structure is as low as the foreign bank. 
This perspective suggests that scenario A2 will place 
considerable pressure on regulations that are more severe than 
the international norm, leading to a fairly rapid convergence 
of regulation and ultimately to the equivalence of Al and A2. 
However, it must be borne in mind that certain types of fiscal 
preference may be used very effectively to inhibit trade. For 
example, the·import demand for life assurance is at present 
very weak in countries where only those premiums that are paid 
to an established domestic insurer are tax-deductible. 
Cost reductions 
Returning to Scenario B, the question to be asked is whether 
limitations on establishment might restrict the degree to 
which cost savings might be expected from a liberalisation of 
exchange controls. Basically, the costs imposed derive from 
the need to operate at a distance. Undoubtedly, this would 
compound the problem of establishing creditworthiness which, 
as already discussed, would grace a new entrant. Mail order 
financial services may not be attractive for many customers, 
corporate and household alike. On the other side of the 
confidence and creditworthiness equation, financial 
institutions themselves will be somewhat reluctant to extend 
credit or undertake insurance for customers about which they 
can know comparatively little, as will be the case if it is 
difficult for firms to a physical presence in a country in 
which they are neither established with a subsidiary nor have 
a branch. In practice therefore, cost savings might be 
- 250 -
restricted to wholesale type business, or to standard 
products, where individual verification is not required, or is 
very easy. The practical relevance of this proposition is 
illustrated by the situation with what may be called the 
retail insurance market, in which there is practically no 
international trade in the community, with twelve separate 
national markets instead. 
Impact on competitive structure 
With the important exception of retail and face to face types 
of financial services, one would expect a general move towards 
competitive conditions in the financial marketplace following 
a move to freedom of capital flows. Indeed this is probably 
an accurate description of much of international banking and 
reinsurance today. It is not easy to see what forces could 
allow local pockets of financial market imperfection to exist. 
Nor is it likely that an extension of the market in Europe 
would create a concentration of market power that might 
ultimately work against the consumer. The large size of the 
existing global free financial markets is so large as to 
reduce fears that the addition of the parts of the European 
financial market which are now protected could have such a 
result. 
Conclusion 
The discussion in this section has necessarily been 
qualitative and somewhat speculative, reflecting the scarcity 
of relevant research findings. Furthermore, to avoid undue 
pedantry, only a selection of issues has been touched upon. 
The general conclusion however seems clear. Maintenance of 
strict exchange controls may well inhibit the full consumer 
benefits from freedom of trade and freedom of establishment 
for financial services in Europe. This is partly because 
financial institutions will not be able to avail of the 
economies of a wider market. Although an attempt to maintain 
a regime of strict regulations will run into difficulties 
under home country regulations, it is not certain that all of 
these regulations will create impossible competitive 
disadvantages for home financial institutions. Market 
segmentation rather than global loss of competitiveness may 
often be the consequence. 
Under host country regulations, the result of freedom of 
establishment may be very little improvement where 
uncompetitive market structures exist or may result. In 
contrast, the prospect for welfare gains from a liberalisation 
of exchange controls does not seem to depend so heavily on 
freedom of establishment, at least for financial services of a 
wholesale or standard type. In terms of the scenarios 
outlined in the analysis, the three with freedom of capital 
movements, Al, A2 and B, dominate the rest in welfare terms. 
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COMPARATIVE OVERVIEW OF AREAS OF COMPETITION BETWEEN FINANCIAL 
H~STITUTIOHS IN 1986 
The key below applies to the colu:nns (institutions) in all the following 
taules: 
1 Clearing/co~mercial banks 
2 Merchant ~anks 
3 Savings banks 
4 Postal and giro banks 
5 Credit unions 
o Mortgage credit institutions/building societies 
7 HP finance co;npanies 
3 Leasing co~panies 
9 
'' 
12 
- '"\ 
_.:, 
~4 
.:.J 
1 ~ 
_o 
~7 
13 
Fac-cors 
Life assurance companies 
General assurance companies 
Reinsurance companies 
Investment funds 
Unit trusts 
Pension fu:~ds 
Stocktlro~ers 
Commodities brokers 
t•1oney brokers 
In the follovling Table 1 series, the follm>Jing key applies to the cell 
=::~:ries: 
a very significant 
b sign~ficant 
c minor significance 
In the follov:ing Table 2 series, t:,e follovling key applies to the cell 
er::ries: 
a 1 ar ge 
b medium 
c sma 11 
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Country: West Germany 
Table 1 Extent to which different institutions are significant in different 
service areas 
Institutions 
Services 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 . " 1.0 
1 Current (checking) account b a b a c 
2 Ret a i 1 deposits b a b a b c 
3 :·ioney market deposits/loans a c 
4 E~rocurrency de~osits c. c 
5 Offshore banking a 
6 Foreign exchange ~ c 
"' 
7 Trc.vellers cheques a a c c 
8 w· ,,, re purchc.se/consumer 
finance a a a c b b b 
9 Credit cards b a c a c 
10 House mortgages b a b a c b c 
ll Fac'cories, export credit a c c c a 
12 Leasing a a 
13 Venture capital a a 
14 Business loans a c c c c c c 
15 International lending c. c 
15 Investment in stock market c. c. c c c c b b b 
c.ssets 
1 ~ 
_/ Loan guarantees a c c 
13 Investment and corporate c. c c c c c 
finance advice 
19 Life assurance c c a 
20 Accident insurance (direct) 
- motor c c a 
21 - employer•s liability c c b 
22 - other c 
23 Reinsurance a 
24 Investment fund management a b b a 
?~ 
_;:) Unit trust management a a 
26 Pension services c c a 
27 Securities: underwriting, 
ne1·1 issues and p 1 acement a c 
23 Securities broking a a a a 
29 ~1oney brok i ng a a 
30 Bullion and other commodities 
trading a a 
tJote: Germany operates a universal banking system 
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Country: West Germany 
Table 2 Proportion of total business of financial institutions accounte for 
by different service areas 
Institutions 
Services 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
l Current (c:,ec:king) account a a a a c 
? Retail de~os its a a a a a c 
3 >1oney marke: deposits/loans a c 
4 :::.Jrocurrency deposits c c 
J Offshore banking c 
Cl ~oreign exchange c c 
7 Travellers cheques c c c c 
s Hire purchcse/consumer 
finance b b b c a c c 
0 Credit ca:-cs c c c c 
. .., 
:-1ouse c a a a ' ' mort ;ages c c c 
-" 
ll Factories, export credit a 
1? Leasing c 
1., 
-" 
Venture capital c c 
, 1 5usiness 1 oans a c c c c c a .!.-r 
1 -
_J Internatior.al lending b c 
lS Investmen: in stock market b c c c c c a a a 
assets 
~7 :..oan guarantees ,.. c c '-
~3 Investmen: and corporate c c c 
finance advice 
1 'J Life ass:..Jrance c c a 
--' 
20 Accident insurance (direct) 
- motor c c a 
21 
- employer 1 s liability c c 
22 - other 
23 Reinsurance a 
24 Investment fund management c c c a 
?-~J Unit trust management c a 
r 
_o Pension services c a 
27 Securities: underwriting, c c 
new issues and placement 
23 Securities broking c b c a 
29 r~oney broking c a 
30 Bu 11 ion and other commodities 
trading c a 
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Country: France 
Table 1 Extent to which different institutions are significant in different 
service areas 
Institutions 
Services 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 ll 12 13 14 15 15 17 13 
1 
2 
3 
4 
::> 
6 
7 
8 
Current (checking) account 
Reta.n deposits 
Money market deposits/loans 
Eurocurrer.cy deposits 
Offshore banking 
Foreign exchange 
Travellers cheques 
Hire purchase/consumer 
;;~ance 
a b c 
a b b 
a a c 
a a 
a 
a c 
a c 
b 
9 Cred~~ cares a c 
a c 
a 
10 H::Juse mor~gages 
11 Factories, export credit 
12 Leas~ng a 
13 VentJre capital 
14 Business loans 
a 
a c 
a c 
b a 
15 International lending 
15 Invest~ent in stock market 
17 
13 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
:v 
_o 
27 
28 
29 
30 
ass~ts 
Loan guarantees a c 
Invest~ent and corporate a a 
finance advice 
Life assurance c 
Accident insurance (direct) 
- mo:or 
- employer•s liability 
- other c 
Reinsurance 
Investment fund management b b 
Unit trust management b 
Pension services 
Securities: underwriting, a a 
new issu~s and placement 
Securities braking 
Money braking 
Bullion and other commodities 
trading a 
a c 
a c c 
c 
c 
b c a 
a 
a c 
c 
c 
b 
c 
c 
a 
a 
a 
a 
b 
a 
a 
a 
Note: Most large banks undertake merchant banking activities 
a b 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
- 257 -
Country: France 
Table 2 Proportion of total business of financial institutions accounte for 
by different service areas 
Institutions 
Services 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 13 
1 Curr'2nt (checking) account a a c a 
2 Ret,: i 1 deposits a. a a a c c 
3 ~·1oney market deposits/loans a a c c 
4 :::.JrJcurrency deposits c a 
J Of~sho;e bc.nking c 
0 Fore~gn ex::hange c c 
7 lra·;eliers cheques c c c 
8 Hire purchase/consumer c b b c a 
fi rl3.nc:e 
9 r,•::;r'-.,_.,_._I\.. cards c c c 
lO House mortgages a b a 
11 F::c::;ries, export credit c c a 
12 L::c.s~ng c a 
13 V::nture capital c c 
14 Business 1 oans a c b 
15 Inter:~a:ional lending b c 
1 ,.. 
-0 Investment in stock market b c c a a a 
assets 
17 Loan guarantees c c c 
18 Investiilent and corporate c a 
finance advice 
19 Life assurance c a 
20 Accident insurance (direct) 
- rr:::r:or a 
21 - em;:Jloyer•s liability b 
22 - otner 
23 Reinsurance a 
24 l:~vestment fund management c a a 
25 Unit trust management b a 
26 Pension services a 
27 Securities: underwriting, c a 
new issues and placement 
28 Securities braking a 
29 r·1oney braking a 
30 Su 11 ion and other commodities a 
trading 
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Country: Italy 
Table 1 Extent to which different institutions are significant in different 
service areas 
Institutions 
Servi:es 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 13 
1 Current (checking) account ~ a b a c 
2 Ret a i 1 deposits b b b b b c 
3 :.:oney market deposits/loans e. a c c 
4 :~rocurrency deposits c a 
5 Offshore banking ~ 
r Foreign exchange c 0 ~ 
7 7ravellers cheques a c c 
8 Hire purchase/consumer ~ a b a a b b b 
finance 
9 Credit cards ~ c 
10 House mortgages c a 
11 Factories, export credit a c a 
12 ~easing ~ a 
13 Venture capital 
-
c 
14 Business 1 oans ~ c a 
1'"" 
_:::J International lending a c c 
15 Investment in stock market a a a a a 
assets 
17 Loan guarantees , c '-' 
1 Q 
-'-' Investment and corporate ~ 3. c 
finance advice 
19 Life assurance a 
20 Accident insurance (direct) 
- motor a 
21 - employer's liability a 
22 - other 
23 Reinsurance a 
24 Investment fund management a a 
25 Unit trust management a a 
26 Pension services a 
27 Securities: underwriting, b c. 
new issues and placement 
28 Securities broking a 
29 :·ioney broking a 
30 Bullion and other commod it i es 
trading ~ a 
- 259 -
Country: Italy 
Table 2 Proportion of total business of financial institutions accounte for 
by different service areas 
Institutions 
Services l 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 13 
1 Current (checking) account c b a b c 
2 Retail deposits a a a a a c 
3 i>loney market deposits/loans b a c c 
4 Eurocurrency deposits a 
5 Offshore ban~ing c 
6 Foreign excha.nge " c '-
7 Travellers cheques c c c 
3 Hire purchase/consumer c a a a a b b b 
finance 
9 Credit cards c c 
1 ..... 
-U :-iO'JSe mortgages c b 
ll Factories, ex;;.Jrt credit \.. c a 
12 Leasing " a '-
l3 Venture capi~al c c 
14 Business loc.ns a c b 
15 internationc.l lending c c c 
16 Investment in stock market a c a a a 
assets 
17 loan guarantees " c '-
18 Investment and corporate c c. c 
finance advice 
19 life assurance a 
20 Accident insurance (direct) 
- motor a 
21 - e:nployer•s liability b 
22 - other 
23 Reinsurance a 
24 Investment fund management b a 
25 Unit trust management ) a 
26 Pension services a 
27 Securities: underwriting, a 
new issues and placement 
28 Securities braking a 
?0 
---
~laney braking a 
30 Bu 11 ion and other commodities a 
trading 
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Country: United Kingdom 
Table 1 Extent to which different institutions are significant in different 
service areas 
Institutions 
Services 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 13 
1 Current (checking) account a b c c 
2 Retail deposits a b b a 
3 ~·1oney mar~et depos its/1 oans a a c c c 
. ~urocurrency deposits '+ a a 
j Offshore b:.n king a 
6 Foreign exc:hange a c c c 
7 lravelle:-s cheques a c c 
3 r:ire purcr.ase/consumer a b c c a 
finance 
9 Credit c:.rcs a c c c 
lO :-iouse morc;:.;es b c c 2. c 
ll ~actor i es, export credit a c c a 
12 Leasing a c c a 
, ~ 
""j ':e:nure capital a 
l4 Business 1 oans a c c 
15 Intern at i one.l lending a 
16 Investment in stock market b c c a a a 
assets 
, -
:..I Loan guarantees a 
:3 Investment and corporate a a a 
finance acvice 
19 Life assurance c c a 
20 A:cident insurance (direct) 
- motor c c a 
21 - employer's liability 
22 - other c c 
23 Reinsurance c a 
24 Investment fund management b b a 
/-
_:; 'Jnit trust management b b a 
26 Pension services a 
27 Securities: underwriting, a a 
new issues and placement 
23 Securities braking b a 
29 t~oney braking a 
30 3u 11 ion and other commodities 
trading a 
Note: Most 1 arge banks undertake merchant banking activities 
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Country: United Kingdom 
Table 2 Proportion of total business of financial institutions accounte for 
by different service areas 
Institutions 
Se:vices 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
1 Current (checking) account 
2 Retail deposits 
3 Money m~r~et deposits/loans 
4 E~roc~rrency deposits 
J OffshJre banking 
0 rJrei;n exchange 
7 Travellers cheques 
3 H~re purchase/consumer 
finance 
9 Cresit cares 
lJ House ~crt;ages 
ll Factories, export credit 
l2 Lee.si1g 
13 Ven~Jre capital 
l~ Bus~ness leans 
13 In~ernational lending 
16 !nves!~ent in stock market 
as sets 
~~ ~oan guaran:ees 
13 Invest:nent and corporate 
fir.ance advice 
13 Life assurance 
2J Accident insurance (direct) 
21 
"? L~ 
23 
24 
?-
_J 
25 
27 
28 
29 
30 
- ;;:o::Jr 
- em~loyer•s liability 
- other 
~einsurance 
Investment fund management 
Unit trust management 
Pension services 
Securities: underwriting, 
new issues and placement 
Securities braking 
:'•1oney brok i ng 
Bullion and other commodities 
trading 
a a a c 
a a a a 
a a c b c 
a a 
c 
c c c c 
c c c 
c a b c a 
c c c c 
b b c c a 
c c c c a 
c c c a 
a c c 
a 
b c c a a a 
c 
c ~ 
c c a 
c c a 
c c b 
a 
c a a 
c b a 
a 
a a 
b a 
a 
a 
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Country: Belgium 
Table 1 Extent to which different institutions are significant in different 
service areas 
Institutions 
Services 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 13 
1 
2 
3 
4 
-
::l 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
15 
17 
13 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
?~ 
_::;. 
25 
27 
28 
29 
30 
Note: 
Current (checking) account 
Retail deposits 
Money market deposits/loans 
Eurocurrency deposits 
Offshore banking 
Foreign exchange 
Travellers cheques 
Hire purchase/consumer 
finance 
Credit cards 
a b c c c 
a a c a c 
a a c c 
a 
a 
a 
a c c a 
House mortgages 
Factories, export credit 
Leasing 
a 
b c b c 
Venture capital 
Business 1 oans 
International lending 
Investment in stock market 
assets 
Loan gu ar an tees 
Investment and corporate 
finance advice 
Life assurance 
Accident insurance (direct) 
- motor 
- employer•s liability 
- other 
Reinsurance 
a 
a 
a c 
a c 
a a c 
a 
a a : 
c 
Investment fund management a b 
Unit trust management a b 
Pension services 
Securities: underwriting, 
new issues and placement a a 
Securities braking a 
Money braking 
Bullion and other commodities 
trading a 
c 
c 
a 
b 
c 
c 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
b 
a 
a 
Most large banks undertake merchant banking activities 
a a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
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Country: Belgium 
Table 2 Proportion of total business of financial institutions accounte for 
by different service areas 
Institutions 
Services 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 15 17 18 
1 Current (cr.ecking) account a b c c c 
2 Ret a i 1 deposits a a a a a 
3 ~ioney market deposi~s/loans a a a c 
.a. Eurocurrency deposits c 
5 Offshore bc'l~ing c 
0 Fore i 9n exc;-;ange c c 
7 Trave11ers cheques c 
" Hire purchase/consumer h a a a ;::, L.l 
finance 
0 Credi-c ca.r::s c c 
lJ House mor-cs::ges c a c a b 
ll Factories, export credit ,. c c a I.. 
12 Leasing c c a 
13 Venture cac:~:al c c 
. ~ 1~ Business 1 o ans a c c 
15 International lending a c 
1 r 
_;:> Investment in stock market a a c c a a a 
assets 
17 Loan g~aran:ees ,. '-
1..., 
.!.0 Inves t:ile:Jt a.nd corporate c a c c a 
finance ajvice 
19 Life assur::1ce c a 
20 Accident ir.s:.1rance (direct) 
- motor a 
21 
-
employer's liability b 
22 - other 
23 Reinsurance a 
24 Investme:1t fund management c b a 
?-
-=> Unit trust iiianagement c b a 
?r 
-0 Pension services 
27 Securities: underwriting, c a 
new issues and placement 
23 Securities braking c a 
29 ~~oney braking a 
30 Bu 11 ion and other com:nodities 
-trading a a 
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Country: Luxembourg 
Table 1 Extent to which different institutions are significant in different 
service areas 
Services 
, 
... 
2 
3 
4 
5 
0 
7 
3 
Current (checking) account 
Retail deposits 
Money market deposits/loans 
~~rocurrency deposits 
Of7shore ban~ing 
Forei9n exchange 
Travellers cheques 
~ire purchase/consumer 
finance 
9 Credit cards 
10 House mortgages 
11 Factories, ex~ort credit 
12 Leasing 
13 Venture capital 
14 Business loans 
15 International lending 
15 Investment in stock market 
assets 
!7 Lean guarantees 
l3 Investment and corporate 
finance advice 
!9 Life assurance 
20 Ascident insurance (direct) 
motor 
21 - e~ployer•s liability 
22 - other 
23 Reinsurance 
24 Investment fund management 
25 Unit trust management 
26 Pension services 
27 Securities: underwriting, 
new issues and placement 
23 Securities braking 
29 Money braking 
30 3ullion and other commodities 
trading 
Institutions 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
a a 
a a 
a a 
a b 
a 
a c 
a b 
c. c 
a c 
c 
c c c 
c 
c 
c 
a a 
c a c c 
a a c 
a a 
a a c 
a 
a a 
a c c 
a c 
c 
c 
'v 
a c 
a c 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
Note: Luxembourg operates a universal banking system 
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Country: Luxembourg 
Table 2 Proportion of total business of financial institutions accounte for 
by different service areas 
Institutions 
Services 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 13 
1 Current (checking) account a a c 
2 Retail deposits b a a c a 
3 :.~oney market deposits/loans a b c 
~ ~:Jrocurrency deposits a c "T 
- Offshore banking a J 
6 roreign exchange c c c 
7 7raveilers cheques c c c 
0 Hi:e purchase/consumer c c a a u 
finance 
9 Credit cards c c 
~0 ;-:oJse mortgages c a c c 
11 Factories, export credit c c c a 
12 Leasing c c a 
~3 ':enture capita 1 c 
i ,, 
-"t 3usiness 1 oans a c c 
1 -
_J International lending a c c 
1 ~ 
-0 investment in stock market a c 
assets 
~~ ~can guarantees c c c 
l3 I r. ·;es tment and corporate c c c 
finance advice 
19 Life assurance c a 
20 Accident insurance (direct) 
- ;no tor c a 
?i 
- employer•s liability a ~ .. 
22 - other c 
23 ?.ei nsurance 
?~ 
_ ... Investment fund manage: .. ent c c a 
r 
_J Unit trust management c c a 
?~ 
_o Pension services c a 
27 Securities: underwriting, a 
new issues and placement 
23 Securities braking a a 
29 i·1oney braking c a 
30 3u li ion and other commodities 
trading c a 
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Country: Netherland 
Table 1 Extent to which different institutions are significant in different 
service areas 
Institutions 
Services 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 l7 13 
1 Current (checking) account 
2 Retail deposits 
3 Money market deposits/loans 
4 Eurocurrency deposits 
3 Offshore banking 
o Foreign ex:nange 
7 Travellers cheques 
8 Hire purchase/consumer 
finance 
9 Credit cares 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
13 
1 -
-D 
House mortgages 
Factories, export credit 
Leasing 
Venture capital 
Business loans 
Internationc.l lending 
Investment in stock market 
assets 
17 Loan guarantees 
13 Investment and corporate 
finance advice 
19 Life assurance 
20 Accident insurance (direct) 
21 
22 
23 
24 
?"" 
_::J 
?-~0 
27 
zg 
29 
30 
- motor 
- employer 1 S liability 
- other 
Reinsurance 
Investment fund management 
Unit trust management 
Pension services 
Securities: underwriting, 
new issues and placement 
Securities braking 
i·1oney braking 
Bullion and other commodities 
b b a 
b b b 
a c 
a c 
c. 
a c 
a c 
b b 
a c 
a b b 
a 
a 
b 
a c 
a c 
a a b 
a c 
a a b 
b c 
b c 
c c 
a a 
a 
c c 
a a b b 
a 
trading a 
b c 
a c c 
c 
b c a 
c 
a c 
c c a 
a a 
b c c c c 
b c c c 
c 
b c c 
b 
b 
b 
a 
a 
a 
c 
Note: Netherlands operates a universal banking system 
c c 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
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Country: Netherlands 
Table 2 Proportion of total business of financial institutions accounte for 
by different service areas 
Institutio:1s 
se~vices 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 13 
1 
2 
3 
4 
0 
7 
3 
Current (checking) account b 
Retail deposits a 
~oney market deposits/loans b 
~urocurrency deposits c 
Offshore ban~ing b 
Foreign excnange c 
Travellers cheques c 
Hire purchase/consumer b 
finance 
b a a c 
a b a c c 
c 
c 
c 
c c 
b b c a 
9 Credit cards a c c 
:J House mort;a~es 
~~ Factories, ex;Jort credit 
:2 Lec.s i ng 
13 Venture capital 
l~ Business loans 
13 International lending 
:5 Investment in stock market 
c.ssets 
l7 Loan guaran:~es 
~~ Investment and corporate 
finance advice 
:? Life assurance 
20 Accident insurance (direct) 
2l 
?? 
~':< {_._, 
24 
25 
?~ 
_o 
T 
_/ 
23 
29 
30 
- motor 
- employer•s liability 
- other 
Reinsurance 
Investment fund management 
Unit trust management 
Pension services 
Securities: underwriting, 
new issues and placement 
Securities braking 
i·1oney braking 
Bullion and other commodities 
trading 
b a a 
c c c a 
c a a 
c 
c a c c c c 
b c 
a a b c c c c 
c c c 
a a c c c c 
c c 
c c 
c c 
a a 
c c 
a a 
c c 
a 
a 
b 
c 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
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Country: Spain 
Table 1 Extent to which different institutions are significant in different 
service areas 
Institutions 
Services 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 13 
1 Cu:-rent (checking) account a c 
2 Ret a i 1 de;:JOs its a a a a c c 
3 Money market depos its/1 oans a a 
4 Eurocurrency deposits 3. c 
5 Offshore banking a 
6 Foreign exchange a c 
7 Travellers cheques a c c 
8 H1re purchase/consumer a a b a a 
finance 
9 Credit cares .:l c c 
10 House mortgages a c c 
11 Factories, export credit 3. a c 
12 Leasing a a 
13 Venture capital b c 
l4 Business 1 oans a c b 
1 -
.::J Internat ion a 1 lending a 
1 -
.o Investment in stock market a a a a a 
assets 
17 Loan guarantees a c c 
. " I • 
. ..- Investment and corporate a c c c c 
finance advice 
19 Life assurance a c a 
20 Accident insurance (direct) 
- motor a c a 
?1 
....... 
- employer's liability b 
22 - other a c 
23 ?.ei nsurance a 
24 Investment fund management a a a 
;;-
_:) Unit trust management a a 
25 Pension services c a 
27 Securities: underwriting, a 
new issues and placement 
28 Securities braking a 
29 Money braking a 
30 Su ll ion and other commodities a 
trading 
Note: Most 1 arge banks undertake merchant banking activities 
- 269 -
Country: Spain 
Table 2 Proportion of total business of financial institutions accounte for 
by different service areas 
Ins ti tuti ons 
Services 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 13 
l Current ( chec:<i ng) account a c 
2 Ret a i 1 deposits a a a a c c 
3 i•loney market deposits/loans a a 
4 Eurocurrency deposits c c 
j Offshore banking c 
5 Foreign exchange c c 
7 Travellers cneques c c c 
3 H~re purchase/consumer a b b a 
finance 
9 Credit cards ,.. c c ... 
~~ House mor:g.:.ges c c a 
. , i="actories, ex;:JOrt credit ,.. c a .!..!. .... 
~2 le.:.sing ,.. a ... 
13 Venture capital c c 
. ~ 1.,. Business 1 oans a b b 
13 Internat ion a 1 1 ending b 
1 ~ 
.:.0 I nves tmen-c in stock market b c a a a 
assets 
• 7 Loan guarantees ,.. c c li 
"" 
-~ Investment and corporate c c c c c 
finance advice 
19 life assurance c c a 
20 Accident insurance (direct) 
- motor c c a 
21 
- employer's liability b 
22 - other c c 
23 Reinsurance a 
24 Investment fund management b a 
25 Unit trust management c a 
?~ 
_o Pension services c a 
27 Securities: underwriting, a 
new issues and placement 
23 Securities braking a 
29 r~oney braking a 
30 Bu 11 ion and other commodities a 
trading 
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APPENDIX 5: BASIS FOR WEIGHTING SYSTEM USED IN PRICE COMPARISONS 

273 -
BELGIUM 
Product Basis 
Commercial loans Weighted by bank loans, discount credits and 
acceptances to manufacturing industry, 
multiplied by the interest charged on 
commercial loans in excess of the interbank 
rate. 
Mortgages Weighted by mortgages outstanding multiplied 
by the excess of the average mortgage rate 
over money market rates in 1986. 
Consumer Credit Weighted by 25% of the claims of Commercial 
Banks on the Private Sector, multiplied by 
the interest charged on consumer credit in 
excess of the money market interest rate. 
Credit Cards Weighted by figures on credit outstanding on 
credit cards multiplied by the margin on 
credit cards. Based on UK data on credit 
outstanding on credit cards adjusted by 
number of credit cards used in Belgium. 
Travellers Cheques Weighted by 25% of tourism receipts and 
expenditures multiplied by the percentage 
cost of purchasing travellers cheques. 
Foreign Exchange Drafts Assumed to have the same weight as letters 
of credit. 
Letters of Credit Weighted by 20% of bank loans to the 
manufacturing sector multiplied by margins 
on letters of credit. 
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GERMANY 
Product Basis 
Commercial Loans Weighted by lending to domestic enterprises 
and self employed in manufacturing 
multiplied by the interest charged on 
commercial borrowing in excess of the 
interbank rate. 
Mortgages Weighted by mortgages outstanding multiplied 
by the excess of the average mortgage rate 
over money market rates in 1986. 
Consumer Credit Weighted by lending to individuals excluding 
housing multiplied by the interest charge on 
consumer credit in excess of the money 
market rate. 
Credit Cards Weighted by figures on credit outstanding 
on credit cards multiplied by the margin on 
credit cards. Based on UK data on credit 
outstanding on credit cards adjusted by 
number of credit cards used in Germany. 
Travellers Cheques Weighted by 25% of tourism receipts and 
expenditures multiplied by the percentage 
cost of purchasing travellers cheques. 
Foreign Exchange Drafts Assumed to have the same weight as letters 
of credit. 
Letters of Credit Weighted by 20% of bank loans to the 
manufacturing sector multiplied by margins 
on letters of credit. 
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SPAIN 
Product Basis 
Commercial Loans Weighted by credit to the private 
manufacturing sector for productive activity 
multiplied by the excess of interest rate 
charges on commercial loans over the 
interbank rate. 
Mortgages Weighted by mortgages outstanding multiplied 
by the excess of the average mortgage rate 
over money market rates in 1986. 
Consumer Credit Weighted by 25% of bank lending to 
enterprises and families multiplied by the 
excess interest charge on consumer credit 
over money market rates. 
Credit Cards Weighted by figures on credit outstanding 
on credit cards multiplied by the margin on 
credit cards. Based on UK data on credit 
outstanding on credit cards adjusted by 
number of credit cards used in Spain. 
Travellers Cheques Weighted by 25% of tourism receipts and 
expenditures multiplied by the percentage 
cost of purchasing travellers cheques. 
Foreign Exchange Drafts Assumed to have the same weight as letters 
of credit. 
Letters of Credit Weighted by 20% of bank loans to the 
manufacturing sector multiplied by margins 
on letters of credit. 
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FRANCE 
Product 
Commercial Loans 
Mortgages 
Consumer Credit 
Basis 
Weighted by credit to manufacturing 
multiplied by excess of commercial interest 
rate charges over the interbank rate. 
Weighted by mortgages outstanding multiplied 
by the excess of the average mortgage rate 
over money market rates in 1986. 
Weighted by 25% of estimated personal credit 
multiplied by the interest charge on 
consumer credit in excess of the money 
market rate. 
Credit Cards Weighted by figures on credit outstanding 
on credit cards multiplied by the margin on 
credit cards. Based on UK data on credit 
outstanding on credit cards adjusted by 
number of credit cards used in France. 
Travellers Cheques Weighted by 25% of tourism receipts and 
expenditures multiplied by the percentage 
cost of purchasing travellers cheques. 
Foreign Exchange Drafts Assumed to have the same weight as letters 
of credit. 
Letters of Credit Weighted by 20% of bank loans to the 
manufacturing sector multiplied by margins 
on letters of credit. 
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ITALY 
Product Basis 
Commercial Loans Weighted by bank loans to manufacturing 
multiplied by the excess of commercial 
interest rate charges over the interbank 
rate. 
Mortgages Weighted by mortgages outstanding multiplied 
by the excess of the average mortgage rate 
over money market rates in 1986. 
Consumer Credit Weighted by 25% of estimated personal credit 
multiplied by the interest charge on 
consumer credit in excess of money market 
rates. 
Credit Cards Weighted by figures on credit outstanding 
on credit cards multiplied by the margin on 
credit cards. Based on UK data on credit 
outstanding on credit cards adjusted by 
number of credit cards used in Italy. 
Travellers Cheques Weighted by 25% of tourism receipts and 
expenditures multiplied by the percentage 
cost of purchasing travellers cheques. 
Foreign Exchange Drafts Assumed to have the same weight as letters 
of credit. 
Letters of Credit Weighted by 20% of bank loans to the 
manufacturing sector multiplied by margins 
on letters of credit. · 
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NETBERLANDS 
Product 
Commercial Loans 
Mortgages 
Basis 
Weighted by universal banks credits and 
loans to manufacturing multiplied by the 
interest charge on commercial loans in 
excess of the interbank rate. 
Weighted by mortgages outstanding 
multiplied by the excess of the average 
mortgage rate over money market rates in 
1986. 
Consumer Credit Weighted by 25% of credit to individuals 
multiplied by the interest charge on 
consumer credit in excess of the money 
market rate. 
Credit Cards Weighted by figures on credit outstanding 
on credit cards multiplied by the margin on 
credit cards. Based on UK data on credit 
outstanding on credit cards adjusted by 
number of credit cards used in the 
Netherlands. 
Travellers Cheques Weighted by 25% of tourism receipts and 
expenditures multiplied by the percentage 
cost of purchasing travellers cheques. 
Foreign Exchange Drafts Assumed to have the same weight as letters 
of credit. 
Letters of Credit Weighted by 20% of bank loans to the 
manufacturing sector multiplied by margins 
on letters of credit. 
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UK 
Product Basis 
Commercial Loans Weighted by loans and advances outstanding 
from the UK monetary sector to resident 
manufacturing companies multiplied by the 
interest charge on commercial loans in 
excess of the interbank rate. 
Mortgages Weighted by mortgages outstanding multiplied 
by the excess of the average mortgage rate 
over money market rates in 1986. 
Consumer Credit Weighted by 25% of consumer credit to 
the private sector multiplied by the 
interest charge on consumer credit in excess 
of money market rates. 
Credit Cards Weighted by figures on credit outstanding 
on credit cards multiplied by the margin on 
credit cards. 
Travellers Cheques Weighted by 25% of tourism receipts and 
expenditures multiplied by the percentage 
cost of purchasing travellers cheques. 
Foreign Exchange Drafts Assumed to have the same weight as letters 
of credit. 
Letters of Credit Weighted by 20% of bank loans to the 
manufacturing sector multiplied by margins 
on letters of credit. 
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LUXEMBOURG 
Product Basis 
Commercial Loans Weighted by estimated bank loans to 
manufactuing multiplied by margin on 
commercial loans. 
Mortgages Weighted by estimated mortgages outstanding 
multiplied by the excess of rates over money 
market rates. Estimates based on Belgiun 
data on the basis of the ratio of 
Luxembourg/Belgium population. 
Consumer Credit Weighted by 25% of estimated consumer credit 
multiplied by interest rate in excess of 
money market rates. Estimated data based on 
Belgium data on the basis of the ratios of 
populations. 
Credit Cards Weighted by figures on credit outstanding 
on credit cards multiplied by the margin on 
credit cards. Based on UK data on credit 
outstanding on credit cards adjusted by 
number of credit cards used in Luxembourg. 
Travellers Cheques Weighted by 25% of estimated tourism 
receipts and expenditures multiplied by the 
percentage cost of purchasing travellers 
cheques. Estimates based on Belgium data on 
the basis of the ratio of bednights spent by 
foreign tourists in Luxembourg in all means 
of accommodation to that in Belgium. 
Foreign Exchange Drafts Assumed to have the same weight as letters 
of credit. 
Letters of Credit Weighted by 20% of estimated bank loans to 
the manufacturing sector multiplied by 
margins on letters of credit. 
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APPENDIX 6: MAPPING OP FINANCIAL SERVICE GROUPINGS USED 
IN DD'FEBENT SECTIONS OP 'l'BI REPORT 
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Appendix 5 lists eighteen institutions and thirty services which they 
provide in various conbinations across different countries. 
Appendix 4 describes ten main service activities in the financial 
sector. The table overleaf lists the eighteen institutions and 
shows how the thirty services in Appendix 5 are linked to the 10 
main service activities of Appendix 4. 
' ! 
I 
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LINKS BETWEEN GROUPS OF FINANCIAL SERVICES 
Eighteen 
Institutions 
Il Clearing Banks 
I2 Merchant Banks 
I3 Savings Banks 
I4 Postal/Giro Banks 
IS Credit Unions 
I6 Mortgage Institutions 
I7 Financial Companies 
I8 Leasing Companies 
I9 Factors 
IlO Life AssureanceCos 
Ill General Assurance Cos 
112 Reinsurance Cos 
113 Investment Funds 
114 Unit Trusts 
115 Pension Funds 
116 Stockbrokers 
117 Commodity Brokers 
118 Money Brokers. 
Thirty 
Services 
Sl Current Checking A/c's 
S2 Retail Deposits 
S3 Money Market Deposits/ 
Loans 
S4 Eurocurrency Deposits 
ss Offshore Banking 
S6 Foreign Exchange 
S7 Travellers Cheques 
S8 Hire Purchase/Consumer 
Finance 
S9 Credit Cards 
SlO House Mortgages 
Sll Factories, export credit 
S12 Leasing 
S13 Venture Capital 
Sl4 Business Loans 
SlS International Lending 
Sl6 Investment in Stock Mkt. 
S17 Loan Guarantees 
S18 Investment and Corporate 
Finance Advice 
S19 Life Assurance 
S20 Accident Insurance 
- Motor 
S21 Employers liability 
S22 Other 
S23 Reinsurance 
S24 Investment 
Fund Management 
S25 Unit Trust Management 
S26 Pension Services 
S27 Securities 
underwriting etc. 
S28 Securities Broking 
S29 Money Broking 
S30 Bullion and Commodity 
Trading. 
Ten Main 
Service Activities 
MSAl International and 
Domestic Commercial 
Banking -S4, S6, Sll 
S14, SlS, Sl7 
MSA2 International and 
Domestic Private 
Banking - Sl, S2, S4 
S7, S12, Sl3, SlS, Sl7 
MSA3 Corporate Finance 
Sl8, S27 
MSA4 Offshore Banking- SS 
MSAS Money Market 
Activities-53, S29 
MSA6 Broking-516, Sl8, S28 
MSA7 Fund Management - S24, 
S25, S26 
MSA8 Consumer Credit - S8, 
S9, SlO 
MSA9 Assurance, Insurance 
& Reinsurance -S19, 
S20, S21, S22, S23 
MSAlO Commodities 
Exchange Business -S30 
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In Section 3 the data on employment are taken from Eurostat for most 
countries. The classifications are: 
Banking and Finance 
Insurance 
81 
82 
81 + 82 Total Banking, Finance and Insurance 
These correspond to NACE categories 81, 82 and 81+82 respectively in 
Eurostat publications. Under the heading "Banking and Finance" is 
included the first nine (I1-I9) of the eighteen institutions listed 
above together with I13, I14, I15 and some parts of I16 to I18 and 
central banks. Those parts of I16 to I18 which are excluded are 
brokers acting only as agents in transactions. Financial Brokers 
acting only as agents would be included in NACE 83, Business Services 
to Enterprises. In practice the degree of adherence to these 
principles varies between countries. 
The data on value added in Section 3 are taken from Eurostat National 
Accounts, branch 69, Credit and Insurance. In the European System of 
Accounts branches are units of homogeneous production and are 
intended to highlight technico-economic relationships in the economy. 
Branch 69 corresponds to NACE 81 + 82 as defined above. 
In Section 5 of the report national accounts data on net interest and 
dividends were drawn from Eurostat sectoral accounts. In contrast to 
the branch analysis, referred to above, the sectoral analysis is based 
on an institutional breakdown of economic activity intended to 
highlight income flows and the behavioural relationships among 
economic agents. Institutions are defined generally as units which 
keep a complete set of accounts. The sectors used in this part of the 
study were: 
Credit Institutions 
Insurance Enterprises 
Credit and Insurance Enterprises 
S40 
S50 
S40 + S50 
The degree of correspondence between S40 and S50 and branch 69 is 
reasonably close for most countries. Brokers not acting in principals 
are not included in these sectors. 
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APPENDIX 7: USE OF BERJ'INDABL INDEX TO ESTIMATE ECON<JfiC 
WEIJ.i' ARE GAINS 
'~ 
- 287 -
As indicated in the report the estimates of consumer surplus may 
overestimate economic welfare gains by the extent to which there is 
any loss in producer surplus. One approach to considering this issue 
is to assume that in a concentrated sector the potential for 
realising oligopoly profits is greater. It is of course plausible 
that intense competition could exist in a concentrated industry. It 
is however useful to consider the impact on net economic welfare gain 
of assuming that a reduction in producer surplus would result in an 
integrated financial services market. In this appendix it is further 
assumed that the Herfindahl index can be used as a measure of 
concentration. 
Before we present the results of this analysis it is useful to 
consider in more detail the possible link from the Herfindahl index 
to industrial concentration to oligopoly profits and the loss of 
producer surplus. The basic concept is that the Herfindahl index is 
a measure of concentration and the more concentrated the sector the 
greater will be its ability to earn oligopoly profits. To the extent 
to which profits in excess of competitive profits exist it is assumed 
that this implies that part of the price reductions in an integrated 
market would result from a reduction in profits. The extent to which 
this incurs represents a loss in producer surplus. 
The Herfindahl index is a measure of concentration that is based on 
the sum of squares of the percentage market shares of the companies 
in a country. For illustrative purposes consider an example of the 
banking sector in two countries A and B. Let us assume that for 
simplicity that there are five banks in each country but in country 
A, each holds 20 per cent of the market while in B three banks each 
have 30 per cent of the market while the remaining two hold five per 
cent. In the example the Herfindahl index would be calculated as: 
Country A [0.2 2 ] x 5 = 0.2 
Country B ([0.3 2 ] x 3) + [(0.5 2 ) x 2] = 0.275 
The higher level of concentration in country B is reflected in the 
higher value of the Herfindahl index. 
High levels of concentration may be taken as an indication of the 
potential degree of monopoly or oligopoly power. In such markets 
firms may be able to affect market prices. 
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Berfindahl Index 
Estimates of the Herfindahl Index for European countries were 
available for 1973 (1) while data was not available to us to directly 
update the Herfindahl Index, information on the concentration ratio 
for the three largest banks was available for 1983. (2) Research by 
Honohan and Kinsella (1) indicated that the three bank concentration 
ratios were highly correlated with estimates for Herfindahl Index. 
Our estimates of the Herfindahl Index used in our base case are based 
on updating the 1973 estimates by the percentage changes in the 
combined concentration ratios for commercial banks and all banking 
institutions, compared with the 1973 estimates. Given the nature of 
these calculations caution should be exercised in comparing these 
estimates and it would be useful to estimate an update of the 
Herfindahl Index when data becomes available. This is however 
unlikely to significantly alter the estimates of economic welfare 
gains. 
In the table below estimates of the Herfindahl Index for different 
countries are presented. 
Country Berfindahl Index 
B 0.119 
D 0.046 
ES 0.086 
F 0.086 
I 0.050 
LU 0.086 
N o:177 
UK 0.036 
(1) Honohan, P. Kinsella R.P., "Company Bank Concentration Ratios 
Across Countries ", Journal of Banking and Finance, (6) 1982. 
(2) Revell, J, "Margins and the Role of Large Banks", Institute of 
European Finance, Research Monograph, No. 2 1982. 
Base Case Estimates 
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In the table below we estimate the impact of subtracting the 
estimates of producer surplus using the methodology outlined above. 
The results indicate that the economic welfare gains would be of the 
order of 18,137m ECUs. 
Estimated Gain in Economic Welfar~ Resulting from Integration of 
European Credit and Insurance Markets 
E~sM 
Total for Eight Countries 18,137 
In view of the methodological difficulties of using the above 
approach to estimate net economic welfare gains we have not presented 
the above results in the text of the report. The results may however 
be useful in providing some guidance on the potential loss in 
producer surplus. Alternative approaches to this important issue may 
be a useful area for further research. 
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STATISTICAL ANNEX 
TO THE "COST OF NON-EUROPE" IN FINANCIAL SERVICES 
Providing a detailed sectoral analysis 
of financial services 
, I 
:i 
1 
j 
'I 
' ,, 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
This statistical annex, was presented by Price Waterhouse as 
background material in connection with a study of the costs of. 
"Non Europe", which was undertaken for the European Commission. 
In this document we present a detailed sectoral analysis of 
financial services in the eight countries examined. While 
every effort has been made tc obtain consistent data for each 
of the countries examined, the absence of consistent detailed 
sectoral data from either international or national sources, 
dictated the need to utilise a wide range of data sources. 
This has enabled a much more comprehensive sectoral analysis to 
be undertaken. We have converted all of the data for each of 
the national countries to ECUs in order to facilitate 
comparisons. 
I 
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2 BANKING AND CREDIT 
2.1 Germany 
Statistical Overview 
Table 1 Balance sheet totals of German banking institutions 
Table 2 Number of monthly reporting banks and their classification by 
size 
Table 3 Asset and liability breakdown of all universal banks as a 
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of banks in Germany 
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Table 1 Balance sheet totals of German banking institutions 
ECU million Number of banks in 
Oct 1986 Jan 1986 Oct 1986 Jan 1986 
A Multi-purpose banks 
1 Commercial Banks 
Big banks 142,803 127,894 6 6 
Regional banks and other 
commercial banks 166,169 151,808 99 98 
Branches of foreign 
banks 34,432 37,345 64 63 
Private banks 21,237 17,128 70 69 
Total 364' 640 334,175 239 236 
2 Savings Banks 358,399 325,995 590 590 
3 Central Giro Institutions 259,399 235,741 12 12 
4 Regional Institutions of 
Credit Companies 71,665 63,225 8 8 
5 Co-operative Banks 206,783 190,149 3,604 3,654 
Total Multi-purpose Banks 1,260,662 1,149,285 4,453 4,500 
B Specialist Banks 
1 Mortgage Banks 
Private 150,096 136,612 25 25 
Public 86,265 79,893 12 12 
Total 236,321 216,505 37 37 
2 Instalment Credit 
Institutions 19,984 16,850 85 89 
3 Banks with Special 
Functions 113,343 103,115 16 16 
4 Postal Giro and Postal 
Savings Banks 23,851 22,544 15 15 
5 Foreign Banks 68,958 112 
Total Specialist Banks 462,456 360,391 265 157 
c Total All Categories of 
Banks 1,654,161 1,509,677 4,606 4,657 
D Building Societies 75,128 72,992 30 31 
Private 50,926 49' 511 17 18 
Public 24,201 23,481 13 13 
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Key: 
A Total number of monthly reporting banks(1) 
B Less than ECU 4.56 million 
C ECU 4.56 million to less than ECU 11.39 million 
D ECU 11.39 million to less than ECU 22.79 million 
E ECU 22.79 million to less than ECU 45.58 million 
F ECU 45.58 million to less than ECU 113.95 million 
G ECU 113.95 million to less than ECU 227.89 million 
H ECU 227.89 million to less than ECU 455.79 million 
I ECU 455.79 million to less than ECU 2278.9 million 
J ECU 2278.9 million and over 
Source: Monthly Report of the Deutsche Bundesbank, val 38, no 4, 
April 1987 
Notes: 
1 Including banks in liquidation 
2 Deutsche Bank AG, Dresdner Bank AG, Commerzbank AG, and their 
Berlin subsidiaries 
3 Including other banks not organised in the form of a co-
operative but affiliated to the Bundesverband der Deutschen 
Volksbanken und Raiffeisenbanken eV. Up to December 1971 the 
figures for credit co-operatives (Schulze-Delitzsch) and 
credit co-operatives (Raiffeisen) were recorded and published 
separately 
4 Figures in brackets do not contain postal giro and postal 
savings bank offices 
5 Including private bankers whose business is not orgnaised in 
the form of a sole proprietorship or partnership 
6 Only banks organised in the form of a sole proprietorship or 
partnership, see footnote 5 
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Market Overview 
A Multi-purpose banks 
Commercial banks 
Savings banks 
Central giro institutions 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
Regional institutions of credit co-operatives 
Co-operative banks 
B Specialist banks 
1 Mortgage banks 
2 Instalment credit institutions 
3 Banks with special functions 
4 Postal giro and postal savings banks 
5 Foreign banks 
C Other institutions 
1 Building societies 
2 Investment companies 
3 Insurance companies 
Structure and Organisation of Markets 
Introduction 
Banking institutions in the Federal Republic of Germany can be 
classified into two main categories; multi-purpose banks and specialist 
banks. Multi -purpose banks 'are full service enterprises, providing 
all kinds of commercial banking activities and all sorts of business 
typical of investment dealers, brokerage houses, investment funds, and 
trust companies' (Bareham, 1985, p20). Although the multi-purpose or 
'universal' banks dominate the German financial system, there are also 
numerous specialist banks which provide various specific functions. 
Table 1 gives a breakdown of balance sheet totals for different 
bank categories and illustrates how the multi -purpose banks dominate 
the market. Over two-thirds of the banking system's assets are owned 
by the multi -purpose banks of which the commercial banks have the 
largest share, ECU 358,399 million slightly more than the savings 
banks. Table 2 shows the respective sizes of the reporting banks 
according to each category. Table 3 illustrates the balance sheet 
structure for all universal banks indicating that loans account for 
over 60 per cent of total asset and non-bank deposits account for the 
lions share of liabilities. It must be noted that this only provides 
us with a highly aggregated view of universal banking business. In 
addition, the recent rapid growth of off balance sheet items (which may 
account for a large proportion of business) such as foreign exchange 
dealings and options and futures trading is impossible to trace. The 
final table p~ovides us with a breakdown per sector. 
9 
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A Multi-purpose banks 
1 Commercial banks (Geschartsbanken) 
This groups represents Germany's three big banks; Deutsche Bank AG, 
Dresdner Bank AG and Commerzbank AG, together with their Berlin 
subsidiaries, 99 regional banks, private banks and subsidiaries or 
branches of various foreign banks. Typically the commercial banks 
provide a universal banking service. 'In principle, the •universal 
banks' in the Federal Republic of Germany are permitted to carry out 
banking business with domestic and foreign customers, ie with other 
banks as well as with enterprises, individuals and public authorities• 
(OECD, 1987, p 110). The commercial banks operate over the whole range 
of banking business offering their products and services to a wide range 
of customers. Their activities range from traditional deposit-taking 
and lending business, foreign trade financing, syndicated loans, to all 
types of securities business. 
2 Savings banks 
These are mainly municipal or district banks. Special savings laws 
still exist legislating the main objectives of these institutions to 
encourage •savings and giro transactions, to provide credit for low-
earners and the middle classes, and to fulfil the finance requirements 
'of their local communities• (Hendrie, 1985, p 5). Savings banks hold 
the lions share of non-bank deposits in the German financial system. 
'They usually specialise in the long-term and hold a substantial part of 
their assets and liabilities in the form of mortgage credit and savings 
deposits' (OECD, 1987, p 110). Although the savings banks sti 11 
maintain their traditional activities, in recent years they have 
diversified and have now virtually become universal banks. Savings 
banks participate in many forms of commercial banking activities 
although emphasis is on long term loans to their municipal owners, 
mortgage loans and medium to long-term commercial credits. They are not 
allowed to undertake certain types of investment, for example, holding 
company securities. Funds are predominantly obtained from savings and 
time deposits. The central giro institutions act as the central 
organisations of the savings banks. 
3 Central giro institutions (Landesbanken girozentralen) 
The 12 Girozentralen hold the liquid reserves of the savings banks, 
that is they serve as their clearing houses. In addition, they act as 
the state banks for the respective federal states. They are involved in 
all commercial banking activities and compete with the larger commercial 
banks. Funds are mainly obtained through bond issues and to a lesser 
extent from the money markets. 
10 
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4 Regional institutions of credit co-operatives (Zentralbanken) 
The Zentralbanken act as clearing houses to the credit associations 
enabling them to provide a universal banking service to their customers. 
They offer investment and credit facilities as well as securities and 
foreign exchange services. The regional Zentralbanken and their central 
organisation, the Deutsche Genossenschaftsbank compete with the 
commercial banks and central giro institutions for universal banking 
business. 
5 Co-operative banks 
The co-operative banks or credit associations, as they are 
sometimes known, were originally funded to provide banking facilities to 
their members. They now provide a universal banking service primarily, 
but not exclusively, to their members. Some operate in specific areas 
of the economy, for example, •industry, handicraft, agriculture and 
civil service• (OECD, 1987, p 110). 
B Specialist Banks 
1 Mortgage banks (Realkreditinstitute and Hypothekenbanken) 
These provide long-term housing finance and offer credit to public 
authorities (communal loans). Funds are mainly raised through mortgage 
and •communal• bond issues. Their main competitors for housing finance 
are universal banks. 
2 Instalment credit institutions (Teilzahlungsbanken) 
These offer a range of instalment credit facilities to individuals 
and businesses. Some of these institutions are owned by domestic or 
foreign banks or by major retailers. 
3 Banks with special functions 
These are either private or public banks that operate in clearly 
defined areas such as export finance or bill discounting. 
4 Postal giro and postal savings banks 
These are institutions of the Federal Post Office. They only 
accept deposits but offer no loans, apart from small overdrafts which 
can be arranged. The deposits are used for the internal financing of 
the Post Office. These institutions compete vigorously with the banks 
for sight and savings deposits. 
5 Foreign banks 
These provide services similar to the commercial banks. Tables 5 
and 6 i 11 ustrate their importance. By October 1986, 37.5 per cent of 
all foreign bank assets and 46 per cent of all liabilities were 
accounted for by mainly short term transactions with foreign business 
11 
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partners. Business is dominated by foreign business and interbank 
transactions. Subsidiaries of foreign banks do participate in more 
domestic related business than foreign branches. 
C Other Financial Institutions which Accept Deposits and/or Extend 
Credit 
1 Buildin societies/Buildin and loan associations/Buildin loan 
saving banks Bausparkassen) 
These institutions provide credit to their depositors after they 
have completed some form of contractual savings plan. All credit is 
granted exclusively for buildings- purchase, renovation, etc. Building 
and Loan associations play an important role in financing private 
housing. 
2 Investment companies 
These operate on a trust basis, investing the funds deposited. 
3 Insurance companies 
As well as offering traditional insurance services, these grant 
mortgages for private house financing. 
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2.2 France 
Statistical Overview 
Table 1 Balance sheet of large banks 1980-84 
Table 2 Balance sheet of all commercial banks and credit co-operatives 
1980-84 
Table 3 Banks• balance sheet (Banques d1affaires, banques de d~pets 
and banques de credit) at :he end of 1983 
Table 4 Breakdown by subgroup of the banque de d~pats sector 
Table 5 Mutual and co-operative banks - total assets 1983 
Table 6 Treasury and PTT -main assets and liabilities 1983 
Table 7 The top French banks (1985) 
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Table 3 Banks' balance sheet (Banques d'affaires, banques de dep~ts and 
banques de credit) at the end of 1983 
Billions of ECUs 
Assets 
Credits to treasury 
Credits to enterprises, households and local authorities 
Credits to credit institutions 
Fixed assets 
Other assets 
L i abilities 
Demand deposits 
Savings deposits 
Short-term deposits and certificates 
Borrowing from credit institutions 
Bonds issued 
Capital 
Other liabilities 
Source: Hendrie, 1985 
16 
468.925 
8.347 
218.218 
113.029 
10.902 
118.385 
468.925 
61.973 
24.853 
49.445 
137.432 
27.016 
16.390 
151.818 
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Table 4 Breakdown by subgroup of the banque de dep8ts sector 
At end of 1983 
No of No of Total 
banks branches assets 
National banks 3 5,587 217 
Rediscount houses 7 9 14 
Other banks with 
head office in 
Paris 75 1,069 101 
Regional banks 19 2,154 39 
Loca 1 banksl 66 321 51 
Banks under 
foreign control 119 464 74 
Total 289 9,604 497 
Source: Hendrie, 1985 
Notes: 1 Local banks, banks in French overseas territories and in 
Monaco 
2 Total assets are in ECU billion 
Table 5 Mutual and co-operative banks - total as.sets 1983 
Cr~dit Agricole 
Credit Mutuel 
Banques Populaires 
Cr~dit Co-operatif 
Source: Hendrie, 1985 
17 
ECU billion 
106.6 
21.6 
24.8 
1.9 
.; 
·I 
\ 
I 
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Table 6 Treasury and PTT - main assets and liabilities 1983 
ECU bi 11 ion 
Assets 
Credits to Treasury 
Liabilities 
Notes and coin 
Demand deposits 
Source: Hendrie, 1985 
Table 7 The top French banks (1985) 
French 
ranking World 
(by assets) ranking Bank 
1 6 BNP 
2 8 Credit Agricole 
3 10 Credit Lyonnais 
4 13 Soci~te Gen~rale 
5 29 Pari bas 
6 74 CIC Group 
7 78 Indosuez 
8 84 Banques Populaires 
9 98 BFCE 
10 110 Cr~dit Commercial de 
11 147 Compagnie Bancaire 
12 181 USAF 
France 
13 291 Fed~rative du Credit Mutuel 
14 343 Eurobank 
15 354 Banque Worms 
16 423 Sovac 
17 480 L'Afrique Occidentale 
18 493 Ban que Sudameri s 
Total 
Source: The Banker 
18 
18.71 
18.71 
1.54 
17.18 
Assets 
ECUm 
161,312 
161,063 
146,079 
127,952 
95,548 
46,231 
43,336 
39,666 
31,488 
28,199 
20,788 
15,140 
8, 710 
7,021 
6,819 
5,586 
4,463 
4,148 
953,548 
Capital 
ECUm 
3,198 
6,856 
1,801 
2,596 
3,467 
848 
917 
1,307 
401 
769 
1,397 
557 
606 
159 
164 
404 
51 
239 
25,737 
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Market Overview 
1 Traditional banks 
2 Foreign banks 
3 Mutual and co-operative banks 
4 Savings institutions 
5 Finance houses 
6 Non-bank institutions 
7 PTT and the Treasury 
8 Securities and property investment companies 
The banking law that came into force on 25th July 1984 extended 
supervisory control of the Commission Bancaire to all banking 
institutions operating in France: commercial banks, mutual or co-
operative banks, savings banks, finance companies and specialised 
financial institutions. Banks perform the whole range of banking 
operations and related financial services. Some of the larger banks own 
subsidiaries which specialise in various activities such as factoring, 
consumer credit and so on. These subsidiaries are usually finance 
houses. Nevertheless, banks can offer these services in their own 
right. 
1 Traditional banks (Bangues inscrites) 
A 1945 1 aw distinguished three types of banks: banques de de{ots, 
banques d'affaires and banques de credit) long et moyen terme. The 
above 1984 legislation abolished this distinction and subsequently any 
institution granted banking status is now allowed to undertake al 1 
banking activities: accepting deposits from the public, lending, fund 
management and related financial operations. The traditional banks 
include all the major commercial banks. They play an important role in 
securities trading and actively participate in the international 
wholesale markets. As well as offering short-term and medium to long-
term credit to commerce and industry, commercial banks have developed 
personal loan and mortgage schemes for private individuals. Hire 
purchase financing, venture capital and other specialised methods of 
extending credit are generally offered through subsidiaries. 
Traditional banks account for approximately 50 per cent of al 1 corporate 
lending. These banks dominate the securities issuing business where 
they act either as intermediaries or as sponsors and underwriters. 
Private individuals are offered a whole range of securities services, 
from enacting specific orders, registration, investment management, etc. 
This group's main banks are Banque Nationale de Paris, Cr~dit Lyonnais 
and Soci~t€ G'n~rale. 
2 Foreign banks 
A subset of the •traditional' banks, France had 142 foreign or 
foreign-controlled banks in 198~ These institutions do business either 
as branches, subsidiaries or representative offices. They account 'for 
19 
l 
t 
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almost 15 per cent of total assets, 12 per cent of new lendings and 8 
per cent of deposits• (Lebegue, 1985). With the current trend towards 
deregulation of financial markets and innovation, especially in the 
capital markets, this has encouraged more foreign banks to enter France 
(see section on brokerage and securities). 
3 Mutual and co-operative banks 
Mutual banks have special legal status in France but they are 
permitted to undertake a simi 1 ar range of operations as are the 
traditional banks. Their business has traditionally been more 
orientated towards the retail sector, personal lending accounts for 35 
per cent of the who 1 e market compared with 25 per cent for the 
traditional banks. However, this group only accounts for 9 per cent of 
total corporate clients. The agricultural credit banks, Credit Agricole 
network, are by far the most important mutual and co-operative 
institutions. Their business has traditionally focused on loans to 
individuals and organisations involved in the agricultural sector. 
Resources are obtained mainly by customer deposits and bond issues (see 
Table 5). 
4 Savings institutions 
Their main business is deposit taking. They have recently expanded 
their business to offer chequi ng facilities and persona 1 loans. They 
lend mainly for house finance purposes and are also allowed to grant 
loans to local communities. Ordinary savings banks (caisses d 1 ~pargne 
et de pr~voyance) are control led by the Centre National de Caisses 
d•Epargne et de prevoyance and compete vigorously with the national 
savings bank which provides services to savers through the post office 
network. 
5 Finance houses 
The business of these organisations is mainly geared towards 
1 end i n g and sec uri t i e s t r ad i n g. Leg i s 1 at i on does not a 1 1 ow them to 
collect short-term deposits. They control the dominant share of 
personal consumer credit in France, approximately 70 per cent compared 
with 30 per cent for the banks. 
6 Non-bank financial institutions 
They usually fulfil specific objectives to stimulate economic 
development in various economic sectors. Funds are usually obtained on 
the financial markets and credit is of a long term nature. 
20 
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7 PTT and Treasury 
They collect deposits through the Post Office. Lending business is 
very small. The Post Office also collects savings for the national 
savings bank through its offices. 
8 Securities and property investment companies 
Special 'financial entities' such as SICAVs (open-ended investment 
companies) collect funds which thP.y invest in securities. Their 
services are sold through banks to private investors or directly to 
institutions. Most of these companies are owned by the banks. Property 
investment associations are mainly managed by banks and/or bank holding 
companies, they offer their shares for sale through the banks. 
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Table 5 Banks and central banking institutions- combined balance 
sheet at 30th June 1984 
Assets 
Lire liquidity 
Obligatory reserves and compulsory deposits 
Loans 
short term 
medium term 
Bank acceptances 
Treasury bi 11 s 
Bond and debentures 
Shares and participations 
Interbank accounts 
Accounts with special credit 
Foreign assets 
Liablities 
Capital and reserves 
Savings deposits 
Certificates of deposit 
Customers• current accounts 
Other deposits 
institutions 
Due to Bank of Italy and Italian Foreign 
Exchange Office 
Interbank accounts 
Accounts with special credit institutions 
Foreign liabilities 
Balance other liabilities/other assets 
Source: Hendrie, 1985 
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Table 6 Italy's top ten banks 1985 
(billion ECU) 
Total Net 
Bank assets * profit * 
Banca Nazionale del Lavoro 66.230 0.167 
Banca Commerciale Italian 47.920 0.070 
Banco di Roma 41.612 0.032 
Istltuto San Paolo di Tornio 39.067 0.303 
Credito Italiano 38.239 0.065 
Cariplo 35.760 0.084 
Banco di Napoli 34.812 0.012 
Monte dei Paschi di Siena 30.201 0.124 
Banco di Sicilia 21.627 0.015 
Banca Naziona1e Agrico1tura 14.126 0.030 
Source: Financial Times, 22nd December 1986 
Note: All figures refer to main bank operating company and 
associates 
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Market Overview 
1 Public charter banks 
2 National interest banks 
3 Ordinary credit banks 
4 Co-operative banks 
5 Savings banks and first category pledge banks* 
6 Agricultural and craft industry banks 
7 Foreign banks 
8 Other financial institutions 
special credit institutions 
leasing and factoring companies 
By the end of 1985 90 per cent of Italy's banking system was state-
controlled. Italy had 1,096 separate banking institutions ranging from 
the smallest rural banks (casse rurali) to the big three national 
interest banks. The major trend over the 1 ast two years has been the 
growing significance of the securities markets in the corporate, federal 
and retail savings sector which has reduced the proportion of funds 
being deposited with the banks. 
'The most important development which has begun to change the 
behaviour of banks has been a series of deregulation measures 
••• the lifting by the Bank of Italy in two stages between 
June 1983 and January 1984 of individual credit restrictions 
on banks has been the key measure which has increased 
competition' (Friedman, 1985). 
In addition, foreign banks have also been given greater access to 
the Italian market, although by late 1985 there were only 34 foreign 
institutions in the country. Italian banks have also been given 
permission to open more branches overseas. 'Only 14 Italian banks have 
substantial operations' overseas. On a more esoteric note, one unusual 
feature of the Italian banking system is that the central authorities 
dictate where and when banks both domestic and foreign can establish 
branches. This procedure will change when Italy has to fulfil the 
criteria laid out by the European Community directive on bank 
establishment. This will come into being in 1989. Another important 
point is that banks are not allowed to establish merchant banking 
companies (Mediobanca is the only true investment bank in Italy). On 
the other hand, banks have recently placed a lot of emphasis on selling 
mutual funds and government debt to the general public. 
1 Public charter banks (Istituti di Diritto Pubblico) 
These six banks operate in Italy through over 1,700 branches. They 
are: Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, Banco di Sardegna, Istituto Bancario 
San Paolo di Torino, Monte dei Paschi di Siena, Banco di Napoli and 
Banco di Sicilia. They are owned by the government and executive staff 
appointments are made by the state. At the end of 1984 they held over 
19 per cent of total domestic deposits, and undertook 18 per cent of 
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domestic lending. The largest public charter bank, Banca Nazionale del 
Lavoro, is also Italy's largest bank. All of these banks offer a full 
range of banking services: deposit taking, lending - secured and 
unsecured, guarantee business, acceptance and/or encashment of bills of 
exchange, credit cards, treasury services, security transactions and so 
on. 
2 National interest banks (Banche di Interesse Nazionale) 
The three banks in this group are Banca Commerciale Italiana, 
Banco di Roma and Credito Italiano. They are state-owned but have a 
minority private sector shareholdings. Their business is similar to the 
public charter groups. 
3 Ordinary credit banks 
There are approximately 120 of these 'private' banks which have 
over 2,900 branches. Most of the branch networks are localised and few 
have national coverage. At the end of 1983 they held 24.2 per cent of 
market share in domestic deposits and were the 1 argest lire lending 
group, having nearly 25 per cent of the market. They offer a ful 1 range 
of banking services - see above. 
4 Co-operative banks (Banche Popolari) 
These banks are co-operative joint stock companies. There are 145 
co-operative banks which have nearly 2,400 branches. Although they 
operate a full range of banking services, the co-operative banks 
business is localised with emphasis being placed on small business 
1 o ans. 
5 Savings banks and first category pledge banks (Casse di Risparmio) 
The savings banks (and first category pledge banks) are non-profit 
making organisations. There are 89 savings banks which have 3,510 
branches. Traditionally their business concentrated on the acceptance 
of retail savings deposits but they nov1 offer chequing facilities and 
all other services that commercial banks are allowed to undertake. 
6 Agricultural and craft industry banks (Casse Rurali ed Artigiani) 
These are 691 small co-operative banks. They perform most banking 
operations but their business is very localised. Most of their lending 
is to their members. 
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7 Foreign banks 
By late 1985 there were only 34 foreign banks established in Italy. 
They are mainly involved in corporate and wholesale money market 
business. Their funds are predominantly from the interbank market, but 
some deposits are made by large industrial companies and public 
institutions. They lend mainly to subsidiaries of foreign firms based 
in Italy and large scale corporations. They can offer Italian 
customers the services provided by their parent companies, namely 
foreign currency loans and other financial and capital market 
facilities. •Between 1970 and 1980 foreign banks increased their share 
of the Italian market and their balance sheet assets rose from 0.8 per 
cent to 1.5 per cent of the national total• (Flenda, 1984). With the 
continued deregulation of financial and capital markets within Italy 
this trend will undoubtedly continue. 
8 Other financial institutions 
Special credit institutions (Istituto di Credito Speciale) - There 
are some 90 of these institutions that are authorised to offer medium 
and long-term credit. The Italian banking system distinguishes between 
institutions that are authorised to offer short, medium and long-term 
credit. •ordinary• or short term credit (up to 18 months) has 
traditionally been the preserve of the banks. •special• or medium and 
long-term credit operations are classified according to the final users 
of this credit, for example: 
Mobil i are credit 
Immobiliare credit 
medium and long term credit to industry, 
mining, shipbuilding, public utilities 
med i urn and long-term credit to real estate 
companies and the hotel and tourist industry 
•Public work• credit and •credit for agriculture and fisheries• are 
other categories. Specific institutions or departments within banks 
provide these different credit facilities. These institutions raise 
funds by issuing bonds, borrowing on the euromarkets and from term 
deposits. Most of the lending is secured. Commercial banks have 
recently entered the medium-term loan market and so pose a competitive 
threat to these organisations. 
Leasing and factoring companies - a large number of firms 
undertake leasing activities, 41 of them accounted for 85 per cent of 
the market in 1983. The total value of contracts was less than 10,000 
billion lire. Factoring business is already wel 1-established in Italy. 
•In 1983 the turnover of the companies operating in the factoring field 
was 6, 500 billion lire (ECU 4,815.2 million); more than five times the 
turnover of 1980 1 (Hendrie, 1985). The major leasing and factoring 
companies are owned by banks. 
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2.4 United Kingdom 
Statistical Overview 
Table 1 Reporting banks balance sheet totals at 31st December 1986 
Table 2 Monetary sector institutions 1984-86 
Table 3 Comparative statistics. Total liabilities/assets. Main 
financial groups 1975-85 
Table 4 Clearing banks and UK merchant banks post big bang 
Table 5 Top 20 UK building societies- profile of services (excluding 
mortgages) 
Table 6 Total balance sheet of London clearing banks 1980-84 
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Table 1 Reporting banks balance sheet totals at 31st December 1986 
(ECU million) 
Balance sheet total % 
Retail banks 300,309 24.1 
Accepting houses 44,223 3.5 
Other British banks 102,017 8.2 
US banks 136,671 11.0 
Japanese banks 332,347 26.6 
Other overseas banks 307,516 24.6 
Consortium banks 24,535 2.0 
Total 1247,620 100.0 
Source: Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, 1987 
Notes: 1 Retail banks are those banks which have extensive branch 
networks in the UK or participate directly in a UK 
clearing system- 19 in total. 
2 Accepting houses are members of the Accepting Houses 
Committee and certain Isle of Man and Channel Island 
subsidiaries. 
3 Other British banks are al 1 other UK registered 
institutions. 
4 Consortium banks are UK registered institutions owned by 
banks or financial institutions, but in which no one 
institution has a shareholding of more than 50 per cent, 
and in which at least one shareholder is based overseas. 
35 
- 331 -
Table 2 Monetary sector institutions 1984-86 
Mid-February 
1984 1985 1986 
Number of institutions(a) 663 673 661 
of which: 
Recognised banks 290 290 291 
Licensed deposit-takers 308 315 304 
Channel Island and Isle of Man 
institutions(b) 66 66 66 
London and Scottish banks and their monetary 
sector subsidiaries 41 40 47 
Accepting houses 16 16 16 
Discount houses 10 10 9 
Foreign banks 301 330 332 
of which: 
Licensed deposit-takers 81 124 118 
Source: Abstract of Banking Statistics, 1986 
Notes: (a) Not including Trustee Savings Banks and the Banking 
Department of the Bank of England which are also part of 
the monetary sector 
(b) Those institutions (including branches of some UK banks) 
which have opted to join the UK monetary sector. 
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Table 3 Comparative statistics. Tot a 1 liabilities/assets. Main 
financial groups 1975-85 
(ECU million) 
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 
London and Scottish Banks Group 
Bank of Scotland 2,234 2,281 2,562 2, 982 3, 705 
Barclays 33,136 31' 018 33,684 35,845 46,767 
L loyds 17,606 18, 911 20,665 22,221 26,990 
Midland 18,508 19,053 20,473 23,428 31,244 
National Westminster 26,177 27,462 29,357 33,434 44,782 
The Royal Bank of Scotland 5, 973 5, 917 5,940 6,695 8,006 
Standard Chartered 
Co-operative Bank Group 591 589 636 691 925 
Gi robank 282 328 335 443 698 
Trustee Savings Banks Group na 7' 170 7,323 8,064 8,996 
Yorkshire Bank Group 614 626 662 795 1,016 
Building Societies 43' 219 45,372 52,452 59,553 70,838 
1930 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
London and Scottish 
Banks Groups 
Bank of Scotland 4, 613 6,451 7' 773 9,104 10.401 12,253 
Barclays 61,983 80,007 95,486 98,859 113,361 110.684 
L loyds 33,175 49,986 61,436 65,472 74,516 74,377 
f~idland 42,316 74,146 85,630 89,630 104,102 98,598 
National Westminster 57, 759 78,293 97 '211 102,244 120,864 123,036 
The Royal Bank of 
Scotland 10,271 14,035 16,578 18,871 22,665 25,520 
Standard Chartered 35,838 43,367 81,410 48,088 48,952 
Co-operative Bank Group 1,148 1' 515 1' 745 1,813 2,040 2,083 
Gi robank 926 1,238 4,515 1,540 1, 847 2,192 
Trustee Savings Banks 
Group 10,556 12,097 15,500 16,383 18,290 20,839 
Yorkshire Bank Group 1,287 1,551 1,905 2,266 2,594 2,866 
Building Societies 89,880 111,760 130,300 146,283 173,872 205,314 
Source: CSLB Abstract of Banking Statistics, 1986 
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Key 
A UK equities market·making 
B International equities market making 
C Gilts primary dealing 
D Futures, options and swaps 
E Eurobond market making 
F Eurobond underwriting 
G Eurocommercial paper 
H Sterling commercial paper 
I US treasuries market making 
J Equity issues 
K Retail stockbroking 
l Retail banking 
M Wholesale banking 
N Foreign exchange 
0 Mergers and acquisitions 
P Commodities 
Q Bullion 
R Consumer finance 
S Unit trusts 
T Fund management 
U Private client investment 
V Estate agents 
W Mortages (£) 
X Commercial property 
Y Venture capital 
Z Insurance 
Notes: 
(C) commercial bank 
(D) discount house 
(E) estate agent 
(J) jobber 
(M) merchant bank 
(S) stockbroker 
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Table 5 Top 20 UK building societies - profile of services (excluding 
mortgages) 
Services (excluding mortgages) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
Ha 1 if ax X X X X X 
Abbey Nation a 1 X X X X X X X v 
Nationwide X X X X X X X X X X A X 
Alliance & Leicester X X X X X X X X X 
Leeds Permanent X X X X X X X 
Woolwich Equitable X X X X X X X 
Anglia* X X X X X X X X X X X 
National & Provincial X X X X X X X X X X X X 
Bradford & Bingley X X X X X X X 
Britannia X X X X X X X X X X v 
Cheltenhan & Gloucester X v 
Bristol & West X X X X 
Yorkshire* X X X 
Gateway* X X 
Northern Rock X X X 
Town & Country X X X X X v X 
Midshires X X X X X X X X 
Coventry X X X X X X 
Guardian* 
Skipton X X 
Source: Retail Banker International, 1987 
Notes: Several societies are expected to announce new services 
1987 
* to be announced 
v Visa 
A Access 
Key: 1 PEPs (Personal Equity Plans) 
2 Unit trusts 
3 Share dealing 
4 ATMs 
5 Cheque book 
6 Personal loans 
7 Travellers cheques 
8 Direct pay of wages 
9 Standing orders 
10 Foreign exchange 
11 Direct debit 
12 Personal pensions 
13 Credit card 
14 Overdraft 
15 Estate agency· 
16 Insurance 
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Market Overview 
1 Statistical banks 
clearing banks 
accepting houses 
other merchant banks 
foreign banks 
consorti urn banks 
2 Other deposit-taking institutions 
finance houses and leasing companies 
building societies 
trustee savings banks 
government savings institutions 
special financial agencies 
Over 650 institutions provide data for the Bank of England 
statistics. The main types of financial institutions 'not 1 isted as 
statistical banks are the discount houses ••• , the building societies, 
the finance houses and the special financial agencies• (Hendrie, 1985). 
Both the foreign and retail banks dominate the banking sector accounting 
for approximately 90 per cent of total assets. In 1986 there were 19 
retail banks and over 300 foreign banks operating in the UK. The recent 
liberalisation of the UK securities market has heralded a new era for 
British banks. Banks, money brokers and foreign institutions can 
participate relatively freely in the financial markets. UK and overseas 
banks have acquired wholly-owned braking and jobbing firms to enact 
securities business for their clients and on their own account. 'The 
result is that London is becoming one of the most liberalised and 
broadly based financial markets of the world' (Arthur Andersen, 1986). 
There are many ways to classify the UK banking and credit sectors 
as can be seen from the breakdowns in the statistical overview. This 
paper will adopt the classification according to Hendrie (1985). 
1 Reporting banks 
This group includes the clearing banks, accepting houses, •other 
British banks', the foreign banks and the consortium banks. 
Clearing banks -this group is so-called because they have 
traditionally dealt with the majority of the country's cheque and credit 
clearing. Six London and Scottish clearing bank groups dominate this 
sector; Barclays, Lloyds, Midland, National Westminster, The Royal Bank 
of Scotland and the Bank of Scotland. The first four have extensive 
branch networks throughout England and Wales (they are known as the 'Big 
Four• London clearing banks) whereas the latter's branch network is 
predominantly based in Scotland. The London clearing banks accounted 
for '65 per cent of sterling· advances to UK residents in 1983 compared 
with the Scottish clearing banks' seven per cent• (Hendrie, 1985). 
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They also have much larger branch networks, approximately 10,500 in 1985 
compared with the Scottish clearing 1,785. The National Girobank, the 
state-owned organisation established in 1968 to offer money transmission 
services through post offices as well as the Trustee Savings Bank and 
the Co-operative banks are also members of the Bankers Clearing House in 
London. 
The 'Big Four' London clearing banks offer the whole range of 
banking products and services to the general public and dominate the 
money transmission facilities within the UK. 
'Their subsidiary companies, many of which are themselves 
recognised banks or licensed deposit takers, concentrate on 
offering specialised services and facilities many with a 
bias towards the requirements of their parents' larger 
corporate domestic and overseas customers. Some foreign 
subsidiaries, however, provide a wide range of banking 
services through branch networks in the territories in which 
they operate akin to the operations of their parents in the 
United Kingdom' (OECD, 1987). 
Clearing banks offer traditional current and deposit account 
facilities and in recent years have introduced interest-bearing 
chequing accounts. The clearing banks also play a large role in the 
market for wholesale deposits. The majority of their funding comes from 
these two sources. These banks a 1 so dominate the ret a i 1 and corporate 
1 ending markets in the UK. Retail customers have access to overdraft 
and short-term unsecured lending. Since 1980, the banks have also made 
major inroads in the longer-term mortgage finance market accounting for 
approximately one-sixth of building society and bank mortgage lending at 
the end of 1984. Corporate banking facilities have been traditionally 
provided by the banks' merchant banking subsidiaries. These 
subsidiaries allow the clearers to 'offer a wide range of services, 
including corporate advice, mergers, new issues and equity 
participation' (Hendrie, 1985). Up to three years ago, corrmercial banks 
dominated the bank-1 oan market, merchant banks 'were the pri rna donnas 
of corporate finance, stockbrokers acted as agents for debt and equity 
investors, and jobbers had a monopoly on market making in securities' 
(Economist, 30th August 1986}. Since the liberalisation of the UK 
financial markets on the 27th October 1986, the four big clearing banks 
have expanded their brokerage and securities business. Through their 
merchant banks arms, together with the purchasing of jobbing and braking 
firms, banks now undertake business ranging from equities markets making 
and primary dealing in gilts to more traditional lines of business (see 
Table4). 
Acce~ting houses - members of the Accepting Houses Committee form 
the 'top che 1 on' of the merchant banking sector. By the end of 1984 
there were 16 members. These banks have a special relationship with the 
central banking authorities in that their sterling acceptances are 
eligible for rediscount at the Bank of England. 'Their businesses 
include acceptance credits and other banking services, as well as 
corporate finance and inve·stment management ..• ' (Hendrie, 1985). They 
are heavily involved in the new issues of securities and mergers and 
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acquisitions business. The accepting houses also have investment 
subsidiaries that manage mutual funds (unit trusts), investment trusts 
and large securities portfolios for private as well as institutional 
investors. •other services provided by accepting houses and related 
companies include leasing, export finance, insurance braking, bullion 
dealing and the provision of venture capital• (Hendrie, 1985). 
Other merchant banks - this group is dominated by the subsidiaries 
of other banks, for example, County Bank (National Westminster) and 
Barclays Merchant Bank, as well as British overseas banks and merchant 
banks that are not members of the Accepting Houses Committee. Some 
perform the same functions as the accepting houses but do not have the 
•speci a 1• re 1 ati onshi p with the central banks. 
Foreign banks- at 31st December 1986 foreign banks held over sixty 
per cent of the UK banking systems•s total assets. There are 
approximately 400 foreign owned banks now operating in London. •These 
banks have tended to concentrate on commercial 1 ending, trade finance 
and trading on the money markets• (Arthur Andersen, 1986}. Both the 
American and Japanese as well as the European banks are very active in 
the UK capital markets and offer the range of services similar to the 
merchant banks. Many purchased stockbrokers and jobbers prior to the 
reorganisation of the UK securities market on 27th October 1986. 
Typically the foreign banks have been involved primarily with wholesale 
and corporate banking services, although they do provide rather limited 
retail facilities. •rn addition a number of US banks own finance houses 
subsidiaries and savings institutions ••• • (Arthur Andersen, 1986). 
Consortium banks - these are banks owned by other banks, •where no 
one institution has a shareholding of more than 50 per cent, and in 
which at least one shareholder is based overseas• (Bank of England, 
1983}. 1The major activity of consortium banks is the provision of term 
lending in foreign currency, mostly to overseas borrowers. They are 
also active in syndicated loans and international bond issues• (Hendrie, 
1985}. 
2 Other deposit taking institutions 
Finance houses and leasing companies - at the end of 1984 
approximately 80 to 90 per cent of total finance house business was 
undertaken by the 42 members of the Finance Houses Association. A few 
of the largest finance houses are subsidiaries of the main clearing 
banks, eg Forward Trust (Midland Bank}. Their main business includes 
medium-term instalment credit which includes hire purchase, leasing and 
lending to household and companies. It is noted (Hendrie, 1985} that 
the clearing banks had over 50 per cent of the UK leasing market through 
their subsidiaries. 
Building societies- at the end of 1985 the UK had 167 building 
societies with total assets exceeding ECU 205,314 million. 
Traditionally this group has obtained funds from consumers through share 
and deposit balances and used these mainly for financing home purchases. 
•The two largest UK building societies would rank by total deposits 
among the worl d•s largest 100 banks• (Arthur Andersen, 1986}. The 1986 
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Building Societies Act extended the traditional role of the building 
societies and now they are able to offer a whole range of banking, 
investment, insurance and non-financial products. Out of the top 20 UK 
building societies, 19 offer insurance products through their extensive 
branch networks. Most of the larger groups offer cheque books and 
personal loans. Securities transactions can be carried out through the 
Anglia, National and Provincial, Britannia and Bristol and West building 
societies. 
Trustee Savings Bank (TSB) - the TSB Group had assets amounting to 
ECU 20,839 million by the end of 1~84. It is one of the largest 
personal banking groups in the UK. Since the 1976 Trustee Savings Bank 
Act the TSB has developed as a broad retail banking organisation. Prior 
to 1976 the TSB raised funds through ordinary and investment retail 
accounts through its substantia 1 regional network. 'They have expanded 
their savings, investment and current account facilities, and now offer 
personal loans introduced in 1977, mortgage loans (1979) and corporate 
finance (1980)' (Hendrie, 1985). As well as these services, they also 
offer other retail services like insurance, travellers cheques and unit 
trusts. The TSB owns an insurance subsidiary as wel 1 as one of the main 
finance houses. 
Government savings institutions - this group includes the National 
Savings Bank and the National Girobank which offer their services 
through the Post Office. The National Savings Bank offers deposit and 
cash withdrawal facilities mainly for retail customers. It is involved 
with the issuing of National Savings Certificates. Funds raised by the 
government through the National Savings Bank are usually invested in 
government securities. The National Girobank offers a broader range of 
banking facilities through the Post Office network. It is a member of 
the London Bankers' Clearing House, and offers a broad range of banking 
services ranging from traditional retail services to credit facilities 
for companies, international money transmission, money market deposits 
and specialist investment services. 
Special financial agencies - Like the 3 'i's (Investors In 
Industry), these institutions specialise in providing finance to 
companies at less onerous rates than the banks. They mainly provide 
venture capital and/or development finance to commercial companies. 
Funding is through the domestic and international money markets. 
Investors in industry offers loans and equity finance. 
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2.5 Belgium 
Statistical Overview 
Table 1 Main financial intermediaries in Belgium 1970-85 
Table 2 Percentage share of the different intermediaries in the whole 
financial sector at 31st December 1985 
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Table 4 Balance sheet structure of private savings banks 1980-84 
Table 5 Belgian banks, disaggregated balance sheet, 31st December 1983 
Table 6 General savings and pension banks, disaggregated balance 
sheet, 31st December 1983 
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Table 1 Main financial intermediaries in Belgium 1970-85 
Private Public credit Societies 
Year Banks savings banks institutions de Credit Total 
Number (units) 
1970 78 36 6 44 164 
1980 83 31 6 25 145 
1985 84 29 6 16 135 
Balance sheet total (ECU million) 
1970 15.188 2.888 11.154 .460 296.899 
1980 101.133 14.690 45.833 1.815 163.470 
1985 197.214 25.057 65.515 1.294 289.080 
Deposits 
1970 7. 613 2.567 9. 908 0.215 20.303 
1980 36.333 12.980 40.665 1.165 91.143 
1985 58.078 20.011 55.242 0.659 133.990 
Source: Association Belge des Banques, Annual Report, 1986, p 100 
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Table 2 Percentage share of the different intermediaries in the whole 
financial sector at 31st December 1985 
Private Public 
Year Banks savings banks credit institutions Total 
Balance sheet total 
1970 51.9 9.9 38.2 100 
1980 62.6 9.1 28.3 100 
1985 68.5 8.7 22.8 100 
Total deposits 
1970 37.9 12.8 49.3 100 
1980 40.4 14.4 45.2 100 
1985 43.6 15.0 41.4 100 
Credit to private sector 
1970 35.8 13.4 50.8 100 
1980 42.9 13.8 43.3 100 
1985 44.2 13.8 42.0 100 
Source: Association Belge des Banques, Annual Report, 1986, p 100-
various tables 
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Table 5 Belgian banks, disaggregated balance sheet, 31st December 1983 
Assets 
Due from banks 
Credit to the private sector (residents)1 
Foreign credit 
Credit to the Belgian public sector 
short-term bi 11 s 
long-term bills 
Securities and participations 
Fixed assets 
Total 
Li abilities 
Bankers• deposits 
Customers• deposits 
demand deposits 
term deposits 
savings deposits 
bonds 
Capita 1 and reserves2 
Total 
Source: Hendrie, 1985 
Notes: 1 
2 
including rediscounted bills 
including subordinated loans 
ECU billion % 
66.780 42.9 
25.422 16.3 
21.762 14.0 
12.249 7.9 
16.079 10.3 
4.842 3.1 
0.757 0.5 
155.624 100.0 
93.505 60.1 
10.686 6.9 
20.185 13.0 
9.287 6.0 
7.666 4.9 
3.562 2.3 
155.624 100.0 
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Table 6 General Savings and Pension Banks 1, disaggregated balance 
sheet, 31st December 1983 
Assets 
Housing credit 
Credit to undertakings 
Credit to public sector 
Total 
Li abi 1 ities 
Deposits by private persons 
ordinary savings books 
savings bonds 
Institutional deposits 
Total 
Source: Hendrie, 1985 
ECU bill ion 
6. 752 
2.785 
4.648 
18.594 
15.939 
7.871 
4.602 
18.594 
% 
36.3 
15.0 
25.0 
100.0 
85.7 
42.3 
24.8 
100.0 
Notes: 1 Savings banks only; the consolidated balance sheet 
(savings bank, life assurance and industrial accidents 
fund) totalled BF 933.5 billion at the same date 
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Market Overvi~ 
1 Banks 
Money market banks 
Customer banks 
Diversified banks 
2 Private Savings Banks 
3 Public Credit Institutions 
General Savings and Pension Bank 
National Industrial Credit Corporation 
Communal Credit of Belgium 
Other public credit institutions 
4 Post Office Giro 
5 Other financial institutions 
1 Banks 
Belgian banks can be divided into three main categories: 
1 Money market banks 
2 Customer banks 
3 Diversified banks 
Money market banks are quantitatively the largest category and 
consist of organisations that typically have only one or a few branches. 
Funds come mainly from bankers' deposits. The majority of their 
business is concerned with international activity, namely overseas 
transactions and foreign exchange business. They are mainly branches or 
subsidiaries of foreign banks. This group can be subdivided between 
those banks that provide a broad range of credit activities and others 
involved mainly in investing on the interbank market, ie eurocurrency 
business. 
Customer banks are small and medium-sized banks that focus their 
operations at households and foreign exchange business. These 
institutions can also be split up into two categories - those that focus 
deposit collection on households and those that concentrate in the 
business sector. Most of the organisations concentrating on retail 
deposit-taking have local or regional branch networks. They lend 
primarily to small and med·ium-sized commercial organisations and to 
consumers. 
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Diversified banks are mainly large institutions that carry out a 
whole range of banking services. This category includes Belgium's three 
largest banks, Soci~t~ Generale de Banque, Banque Bruxelles Lambert and 
Kredietbank. Their business covers both the retail and corporate sector 
including most types of eurobusiness. These institutions have 1 arge 
branch networks and substantial deposit bases. They undertake 
substantial international and foreign exchange business as well. 
. Finally, this third category includes a few medium sized 'wholesale 
banks' that have very small branch networks and deal almost exclusively 
with the commercial sector. 
• • • • b a n k s m ay no t h o l d s h a r e s or par t i c i p a t i o n s i n 
commercial or commercial-type companies nor in partnerships, 
ex c e p t i n the f o l 1 ow i n g cas e s : i f they are s hares or 
participations in credit institutions, banks or savings 
banks; if the banks have acquired these securities with a 
view to offering them for sale • (Hendrie, 1985). 
2 Private savings banks 
The main function of private savings banks is to receive and manage 
funds taken mainly from private individuals. The majority of their 
lending is focused on mortgage lending although some savings banks, 
especially the larger ones, have begun to reduce their specialisation 
and are focusing more on a wider range of commercial banking activities. 
Assets are principally mortgages and government securities. Typically, 
savings banks do not participate as much as the banks in international 
business and their clientele is mainly retail. 
3 Public credit institutions 
The main public credit institutions; the General Savings and 
Pensions Bank, the National Industrial Credit Corporation and the 
Communal Credit of Belgium, provide specific financial services 
throughout the Bel gi urn fi nanci a 1 system. 
The General Savings and Pensions Bank is one of the world's largest 
savings banks, it raises its funds mainly from savings deposits, a huge 
pool of which enables it to undertake various banking business (see 
Table 6). On the assets side, it lends mainly for residential housing 
finance and provides credit to the public sector mainly by purchasing 
government securities. Commercial credit usually takes the form of 
medium to long-term loans as wel 1 as purchasing National Industrial 
Credit Corporation notes and bonds. This organisation also undertakes 
export finance through its part i ci pat ion in the Cred i texport poo 1. In 
1980 the General Savings and Pension Fund became a public bank (on the 
savings collection side of its business) and this has encouraged it to 
diversify even further. It now caters for pensions, 1 ife insurance and 
mortgage business. 
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National Industrial Credit Corporation was originally established 
to provide medium or long-term loans to domestic, industrial, commercial 
and agricultural companies. The Belgian government holds approximately 
half of its capital. The main line of business is in long and medium 
term investment credits to the aforementioned groups. The main source 
of funding is the issue of bonds. 
Communal Credit of Belgium acts as banker for the provinces and 
municipalities. Long term loans constitute the major portion of its 
assets. These are funded predominantly by the issue of medium-term 
notes. It has virtually become a full bank providing chequing and 
various credit facilities for its customers. 
Other public credit institutions 
National Fund of Professional Credit- this institution specialises 
in medium and long-term loans to small and medium-sized firms and 
various self-employed craftsmen. 
National Institute of Agricultural Credit- specialises in medium 
and long-term credit to the agricultural sector. 
Central Mortgage Credit Board - the main business is granting 
mortgage credits. 
4 Post Office Giro 
The Post Office does not lend and only accepts non-interest 
bearing deposits in current accounts. Its main function is funds 
transfer. This organisation is usually perceived as being the banks• 
main competitor for funds transfer. 
5 Other Financial Institutions 
Mortgage companies ) 
Finance companies ) 
Leasing and factoring companies ) 
56 
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2.6 Luxembourg 
Statistical Overview 
Tab 1 e 1 Tot a 1 b a 1 an c e s he e t s an d number of ban k s an d s a v i n g s 
institutions in Luxembourg, 1960-85 
Table 2 Geographic origin of banking and savings institutions 
established in Luxembourg, 1980-85 
Table 3 Luxembourg banks - assets and 1 i abi 1 iti es at 31st December 
1984 
Table 4 Luxembourg euromarket liabilities by currency and eurocurrency 
assets by country of borrower - third quarter 1985 
Table 5 Luxembourg banks' balance sheet totals 1980-85 
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Table 1 Total balance sheets and number of banks and savings 
institutions in luxembourg, 1960-85 
Situation at Number of Sum total of banks' balance-
year-end banks sheets (billion ECU) 
1970 37 4.617 
1975 76 32.434 
1976 78 39.592 
1977 90 51. 734 
1978 97 62.629 
1979 108 80.991 
1980 111 96.478 
1981 115 123.056 
1982 115 133.907 
1983 114 145.070 
1984 115 161.334 
1985 119 
Source: Treasury, 1986 (adapted) 
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Table 2 Geographic or1g1n of banking and savings institutions 
established in luxembourg, 1980-85 
A B c D E F G H I J K 
December 1980 111 12 29 6 5 7 14 11 4 12 11 
December 1981 115 13 29 7 6 7 14 11 4 12 12 
December 1982 115 13 30 8 7 8 14 10 4 12 9 
December 1983 114 12 31 8 7 7 14 11 4 13 7 
December 1984 115 12 28 8 8 7 15 10 5 15 7 
December 1985 119 12 29 8 7 6 16 12 5 16 7 
Source: Treasury, 1986 (adapted) 
Key: A Number of institutions 
B Luxembourg-Belgium 
c Germany ( FR) 
D France 
E Italy 
F Switzerland 
G Scandinavia 
H USA 
I Japan 
J Other countries 
K Multinational joint ventures 
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Table 3 Luxembourg banks- assets and liabilities at 31st December 
1984 
Assets 
deposits with banks 
loans 
bills and bonds 
other assets 
Tota11 
Liablities 
deposits from banks 
other deposits 
(bill ion E CU) 
capital, subordinated loans, reserves 
other liabilities 
82.932 
59.785 
15.788 
4.973 
163.477 
112.947 
35.255 
8. 674 
6.601 
Total1 163.477 
Source: Luxembourg Monetary Institute 
Note: 1 Proportion of balance sheets denominated in foreign 
currencies: about 89 per cent of total assets 
61 
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Table 4 Luxembourg euromarket liabilities by currency and eurocurrency 
assets by country of borrower - third quarter 1985 
US$ 
OM 
Swfr 
Western Europe 
Eastern Europe 
North A mer i ca 
(% of total: third quarter 1985) 
Banks in BIS reporting areal 
68.7 
12.1 
6.0 
Luxembourg 
47.2 
30.2 
9.4 
68.1 
5.6 
5.1 
Latin America and Caribbean 
t~iddle East 
46.6 
3.5 
14.0 
12.7 
3.1 
12.5 
7.6 
11.2 
1.3 
3.1 
5.6 
Far East, etc2 
Other 
Source: Blanden, 1986 
Notes: 1 Germany, Be 1 gi urn, France, Ita 1 y, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, UK, Sv-1eden, Switzerland, Austria, Denmark, 
Ireland, Spain, Finland, Norway 
2 Japan, Singapore, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa 
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Market Overview 
1 Main domestic banks 
2 Specialised banks 
3 Foreign banks 
4 Financial institutions of the EEC 
On 31st December 1985 there was a total of 203 credit institutions 
of which 119 enjoyed full bank status. In addition, 22 non-bank 
financial institutions, which mainly perform specialised operations such 
as leasing and factoring or granting farm credits to the agricultural 
sector, were also resident in the Luxembourg market. Up until the mid-
1960s, the majority of banks in Luxembourg 'existed principally to serve 
the needs of the local community' (Hendrie, 1985), but over the last 
twenty years developments in European financial and capital markets have 
helped Luxembourg to become one of the major centres for eurobanki ng. 
The Grand Duchy's share of euromarket business was approximately 9 to 
9.5 per cent in 1986 (see Financial Times, 1986). This helps to explain 
why nearly 90 per cent of banks and savings institutions operating in 
Luxembourg are foreigners. In addition: 
'A special characteristic of the Luxembourg banking business 
is that ••. Luxembourg banks are incorporated as 'banques 
mixtes'. No distinction is made between clearing banks, 
merchant banks and investment banks. No legal provision 
prevents them from exercising the activities of all of them, 
but for obvious reasons each operates on a selective basis' 
(Hendrie, 1985). 
Approximately two thirds of the domestic commercial business is 
undertaken by a relatively small number of banks, mostly the 
agricultural co-operatives as well as branches of French banks that 
have been established in Luxembourg for a long time. As Luxembourg was 
one of the forerunners in developing the eurobond market and the 
'holding company status was found to be perfectly suited as a vehicle of 
raising capital in the international market' (Arthur Andersen, 1986), 
this encouraged foreign banks to enter the market, primarily undertaking 
international banking business in the euromarkets. As would be 
expected, most local business is undertaken by the domestic banks 
whereas international business is dominated by foreign financial 
institutions. Typically, a universal banking system prevails. 
1 Main domestic banks 
Domestic banks only accounted for just over ten per cent of total 
banking assets in 1985. The 1 argest domestic institution is the state-
owned savings bank 'Caisse d'Epargne de l'Etat. Three other Luxembourg 
banks also play an important role in domestic banking business: Banque 
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G~n~ra 1 e du Luxembourg (BGL}, Ban que Internationa 1 e ~ Luxembourg (BIL) 
and Kredi etbank SA (Luxembourgeoi se (KBL). A 11 these are affiliated to 
the three main banking groups in Belgium. These three banks offer a 
broad range of retail products through their branch networks within the 
Duchy. Their main source of funds is from retai 1 deposits and 
substantial deposit accounts registered in the name of Belgian 
residents. They compete mainly with the state savings bank, the Caisse 
d'Epargne de l'Etat, which held over 60 per cent of the total savings of 
Luxembourg banks by the end of 1984. These institutions' traditional 
business has been to obtain savings deposits from residents and to 
channel these funds back into medium and long-term lending to the public 
and private sector, especially for housing finance. As the Caisse 
d'Epargne is the only institution which is governed by public 1 aw, it 
undertakes certain central bank functions, for example, it acts as a 
clearing centre for other banks. Recently it has begun to develop its 
international business, although most of its business is with the non-
bank resident sector. The three 1 arge private banks offer a fuller 
variety of services ranging from traditional retail businesss to 
international/eurobanks facilities and bullion transactions. 
2 Specialised banks 
This group includes consumer credit institutions, Central 
Agricultural Co-operative Bank (Caisse Centrale Raiffeisen) and the 
National Credit and Investment Company. The consumer credit 
institutions offer hire purchase faci 1 ities for consumers, a type of 
business that is not usually offered by the banks. Nevertheless, banks 
either own or have a cantrall ing interest in these organisations. The 
Central Agricultural Co-operative whose members are predominantly 
individuals involved in the agricultural industry offers preferential 
lending faci 1 ities to its clients. Finally the National Credit and 
Investment Company (a public group) concentrates on medium to long-term 
lending to industry, export credits, guarantees and equity 
participation. 
3 Foreign banks (mainly Eurobanks) 
Foreign banks account for approximately 90 per cent of the banking 
systems' total assets in 1985. The majority of these banks 'hold their 
capita 1 in currencies other than the Luxembourg franc' (OECD, 1987). 
Their operations concentrate almost exclusively on eurobanking business. 
They operate in al 1 areas of international banking and in 1986 had over 
nine per cent of tot a 1 euromarket business. All Luxembourg banks are 
governed by the same legal system, which enables them 'to un~ertake al 1 
the usual banking transactions' (OECD, 1987). This has encouraged 
domestic banks to offer private banking services (mainly portfolio 
management services for private customers). An important point to note 
is that the classification for the Luxembourg financial system varies 
considerably. Arthur Andersen breaks the group into three; commercial 
banks, eurobanks and Cede l (an i nternat ion a l clearing house for 
eurobonds), whereas Hendrie {1985) and OECD (1987) have quite different 
categories. The above classification is our own. 
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4 Financial institutions of the EEC 
Two main financial institutions of the EEC are based in Luxembourg; 
the European Investment Bank and the Directorate General of Credit and 
Finance. These add, • .•. a further dimension to the financial centre, 
in both the eurobond and eurocurrency markets, they play a significant 
ro 1 e• (Arthur Andersen, 1986). 
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2.7 Netherlands 
Statistical Overview 
Table 1 Netherlands banking system: balance sheet totals of registered 
credit institutions and mortgage banks, 30th December 1985 
Table 2 Number of financial institutions registered with the Central 
Supervisory Authority 
Table 3 Balance sheet of banks in the Netherlands 1980-84 
Table 4 The top ten banks in the Netherlands 
Table 5 Savings banks in the Netherlands 
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Table 1 Netherlands banking system: balance sheet totals of registered 
credit institutions and mortgage banks, 30th December 1985 
( m i 11 i on E CU ) 
Total % 
Universal banks, banks organised on a 
co-operative basis and their central 209,020 90.7 
credit institution (Rabobanks) 
Security credit ins tit uti ons 459 0.2 
Savings banks 13,847 6.0 
Mortgage banks 7,089 3.0 
Total 229,606 100.0 
Source: De Nederlandsche Bank NV Quarterly Bulletin, 1986 
Note: The Quarterly Bulletin does not provide an institution 
breakdown for the largest category 
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Table 2 Number of financial institutions registered with the Central 
Supervisory Authority 
Description 
Universal banks 
Banks organised on a co-operative basis: 
-
banks organised on a co-operative basis 
-
affiliated savings banks 
Total 
Security credit institutions 
Associated savings banks 
Non-member savings banks 
Total 
Central credit institutions 
r~ortgage banks 
Other capital market institutions 
Total 
Grand Total 
End-1984 
85 
949 
950 
1,899 
17 
54 
13 
67 
1 
8 
2 
10 
2,079 
Source: De Nederlandsche Bank NV, Annual Report, 1985 
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End-1985 
83 
938 
939 
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18 
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66 
1 
8 
2 
10 
2,055 
.. 
Ta
bl
e 
3 
B
al
an
ce
 s
he
et
 o
f 
ba
nk
s 
in
 t
he
 N
et
he
rla
nd
s 
19
80
-8
4 
Vo
l 
(EC
U 
m
ill
io
n)
 
o
-
V
1 
%
 of
 y
ea
r-
en
d 
to
ta
l 
B
al
an
ce
 s
he
et
 
19
80
 
19
81
 
19
82
 
19
83
 
19
84
 
19
80
 
19
81
 
19
82
 
19
83
 
19
84
 
A
ss
et
s 
Ca
sh
 a
nd
 b
al
an
ce
 w
ith
 
19
08
 
21
84
 
18
23
 
16
69
 
18
23
 
1.
42
 
1.
44
 
1.
08
 
0.
92
 
0.
92
 
c
e
n
tr
al
 b
an
k 
In
te
rb
an
k 
de
po
si
ts
 
39
42
8 
48
21
8 
50
67
6 
52
83
5 
63
02
9 
29
.3
6 
31
.7
1 
30
.1
4 
29
.0
2 
31
.8
6 
Lo
an
s 
80
51
9 
86
29
4 
96
56
3 
10
27
34
 
10
71
51
 
59
.9
6 
56
.7
6 
57
.4
3 
56
.4
4 
54
.1
6 
Se
cu
ri
ti
es
 
76
72
 
93
23
 
11
90
8 
14
41
5 
16
54
1 
5.
71
 
6.
13
 
7.
08
 
7.
92
 
8.
36
 
O
th
er
 a
ss
e
ts
 
47
61
 
60
18
 
71
60
 
10
38
3 
92
96
 
3.
54
 
3.
96
 
4.
26
 
5.
70
 
4.
70
 
-
.
.
J 
Li
ab
i 1
 it
ie
s 
0 
C
ap
ita
l 
an
d 
re
se
rv
e
s 
41
69
 
47
95
 
55
73
 
61
91
 
68
75
 
3.
10
 
3.
15
 
3.
31
 
3.
40
 
3.
47
 
Bo
rro
w
in
g 
fro
m
 c
e
n
tr
al
 
21
56
 
31
32
 
19
33
 
26
31
 
21
91
 
1.
 61
 
2.
06
 
1.
15
 
1.
45
 
1.
11
 
ba
nk
 
In
te
rb
an
k 
de
po
si
ts
 
44
74
1 
52
50
2 
55
57
3 
58
21
1 
61
25
8 
33
.3
2 
34
.5
3 
33
.0
5 
31
.9
8 
30
.9
6 
N
on
-b
an
k 
de
po
si
ts
 
62
29
9 
69
49
0 
79
27
5 
84
01
0 
94
29
3 
46
.3
9 
45
.7
1 
47
.1
5 
46
.1
5 
47
.6
6 
Bo
nd
s 
12
03
7 
11
97
6 
13
11
8 
14
76
4 
15
72
0 
8.
96
 
7.
88
 
7.
80
 
8.
11
 
7.
 95
 
O
th
er
 l
ia
bi
li
ti
es
 
88
87
 
10
14
3 
12
65
7 
16
23
0 
17
50
3 
6.
62
 
6.
67
 
7.
53
 
8.
92
 
8.
85
 
B
al
an
ce
 s
he
et
 t
o
ta
l 
En
d-
ye
ar
 t
o
t a
 1 
13
42
88
 
15
20
38
 
16
81
30
 
18
20
36
 
19
78
39
 
A
ve
ra
ge
 t
o
ta
l 
12
51
97
 
14
28
00
 
16
47
67
 
17
76
35
 
19
04
43
 
Nu
mb
er 
o
f 
in
st
it
ut
io
ns
 
86
 
90
 
91
 
92
 
86
 
1.
18
 
4.
65
 
1.
11
 
1.
10
 
-
6.
52
 
So
ur
ce
: 
OC
ED
, 
19
87
 
N
ot
e:
 
Ba
nk
s 
in
cl
ud
e 
•
u
n
iv
er
sa
l 
ba
nk
s•
 
an
d 
ba
nk
s 
o
rg
an
is
ed
 o
n 
a 
c
o
-o
pe
ra
tiv
e 
ba
si
s 
.
.
.
.
.
.
, 
.
.
.
.
.
.
 
Ta
bl
e 
4 
Th
e 
to
p 
si
x 
ba
nk
s 
in
 t
he
 N
et
he
rla
nd
s 
Ba
la
nc
e 
sh
ee
t 
to
ta
ls
 
Ne
t 
in
co
m
e 
Am
ou
nt 
Am
ou
nt 
19
76
/8
0 
19
83
 
19
84
 
19
85
 
19
85
 
19
76
/8
0 
19
83
 
19
84
 
19
85
 
19
85
 
(% 
in
cr
ea
se
) 
( EC
U 
bl
) 
(% 
in
cr
ea
se
) 
(EC
U 
b l
) 
Am
ro 
17
.1
 
9.
6 
1.
9 
7.
2 
53
.2
86
 
10
.0
 
28
.4
 
19
.1
 
34
.9
 
13
5.
40
4 
AB
N 
18
.1
 
7.
0 
10
.9
 
-
3.
2 
56
.6
71
 
10
.8
 
7.
1 
4.
5 
19
.2
 
19
0.
36
2 
N
ed
er
la
nd
sc
he
 M
id
de
ns
ta
nd
sb
an
k 
21
.1
 
6.
6 
7.
7 
2.
7 
27
.9
57
 
22
.3
 
14
.1
 
8.
9 
22
.1
 
67
.3
04
 
N
ed
er
la
nd
sc
he
 C
re
di
et
ba
nk
 
19
.2
 
1.
5 
1.
4 
-
13
.9
 
5.
25
7 
11
.7
 
21
.6
 
-
21
.1
 
9.
9 
3.
10
6 
C
re
di
t 
Ly
on
na
is 
N
ed
er
la
nd
 
16
.4
 
-
4.
2 
24
.3
 
17
.6
 
6.
41
2 
-
16
.0
* 
Ra
bo
ba
nk
 
17
.7
 
7.
4 
7.
7 
3.
4 
52
.4
49
 
24
.8
 
15
.6
 
9.
4 
8.
1 
26
6.
02
9 
So
ur
ce
: 
Fi
na
nc
ia
l 
Ti
m
es
, 
16
th
 J
ul
y 
19
86
 
N
ot
e: 
*
 
A
ft
er
 t
ax
 p
ro
fi
ts
 h
av
e 
be
en
 a
ll
oc
at
ed
 t
o 
th
e 
ge
ne
ra
l 
c
o
n
tin
ge
nc
y 
pr
ov
is
io
ns
 s
in
ce
 1
98
3 
w
he
n 
Sl
av
en
bu
rg
's 
Ba
nk
 w
as
 
w
ho
lly
 a
cq
ui
re
d 
by
 C
re
di
t 
Ly
on
na
is 
- 367 -
Table 5 Savings banks in the Netherlands 
1 Verenigde Spaarbank, UTRECHT 
2 Nutsspaarbank te's Gravenhage, the Hague and 
Bondsspaarbank NOORDWIJK (merger announced) 
3 Bondsspaarbank Midden Noord en Oost Nederland 
AMERSFOORT 
4 Gelders-Utrechtse Spaarbank, WAGENINGEN and 
Spaarbank Limburg, MAASTRICHT (merger announced) 
Total assets 
end-1985 
( E CU m i 11 ion) 
3785 
1479 
1379 
1268 
5 Centrale Volksbank/Algemene Spaarbank voor Nederland, 
UTRECHT 1049 
6 Cooperatieve Vereniging van Bondsspaarbanken WA 
UTRECHT 902 
7 Nutsspaarbank West Nederland, HAARLEM 820 
8 Bondsspaarbank Centraal en Osstelijk Nederland, 
APELDOORN 539 
9 Other savings banks (20) 1108 
Total 12330 
.... I cant 
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Joint Balance Sheet 
Liabilities 
Due to depositors 
Various liabilities 
Reserve 
1985 
10,870 
358 
1,101 
12,330 
( ECU mi 11 ion) 
Assets 
Cash on hand, PO, cheques 
and transfer accounts, Bankers 
Loans to individuals 
Securities 
Mortgages 
Long term loans 
Various assets 
1985 
8,395 
197 
2,978 
4,618 
3,076 
622 
12,330 
Joint Profit and Loss Account 
( ECU mi 11 ion) 
Expenditure 1985 Income 1985 
Salaries, social taxes 137 Interest earned 404 
etc 
General costs 129 Commission 17 
Depreciation 21 
Pro visions and 
extraordinary lasses 13 Extraordinary profits 19 
Company tax 15 
Net profit 124 
439 439 
Source: Euromoney, 1986 
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Market Overview 
1 Universal retail banks 
2 Merchant/investment banks 
3 Co-operative banks 
4 Savings banks 
5 Government savings institutions 
6 Mortgage banks 
7 Finance houses 
8 PPMs 
9 Security credit institutions 
10 Foreign banks 
11 Other capital market institutions 
Under Dutch law, credit institutions and capital market 
organisations are classified into six main groups: 
universal banks 
banks organised on a co-operative basis 
security credit institutions 
savings banks 
mortgage banks 
other capital market institutions 
The 1 arge universal banks operate in a similar fashion to their 
West German counterparts and offer a whole range of financial services. 
Banks organised on a co-operative basis (sometimes ca 11 ed agri cul tura 1 
credit banks) also offer a wide range of services. The other groups are 
more specialised and concentrate on specific aspects of financial 
service provision. Classification of the Dutch financial system appears 
to differ considerably (see Hendrie, 1985; Arthur Andersen, 1986 and 
OECD, 1987). This paper wi 11 adopt the Arthur Andersen (1986) 
classification. The Netherlands has approximately 90 banks, of which 
half are foreign owned or are branches of foreign banks. 
1 Universal retail banks 
As has already been mentioned, this group provides a whole range of 
financial services from commercial banking, investment banking, 
stockbroking to insurance business. Traditionally, these institutions 
have had a markedly different business focus, recently the distinctions 
have become less clear and they now offer comparable services. These 
institutions areAl gememe Bank Nederl andsche NV (ABN Bank), Amsterdam 
Rotterdam Bank NV (Amra Bank), Neder 1 andsche Bank, Co-operative 
Raiffeisen Boerenleenbank (Rabobank). (The Rabobank is sometimes 
classified with the co-operative bank category.) The three major banks 
in this category are Amro, ABN and the Rabobank. Amra concentrates its 
business mainly on the Dutch market whereas ABN has substantial overseas 
interests. These banks offer all the usual credit facilities to the 
business sector; overdrafts, ·short-term and medium-term loans (up to 10 
years), leasing and factoring. They also provide cheap credits to small 
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businesses, especially to firms operating in the retail sector. The 
banks• consumer lending ranges from overdraft facilities to house 
finance loans. Funding comes mainly from time and savings deposits as 
well as resources raised on the public and private capital markets. It 
is important to note that this group is the main subset of commercial 
banks in the Nether 1 ands. Although there are some 90 commercia 1 banks 
in the Netherlands, the •universal• banks dominate this section. 
2 Merchant/Investment banks 
Arthur Andersen {1986) is the only source of information that 
specifically classifies this group. The most important firms being, 
Pierson, Hel ding and Pierson NV (AMRO), Bank Mees and Hope NV (ABN) and 
F van Lanschat Bankiers NV (RABO-Nat West). •Although these banks do 
not differ much other than in size from the retail banks, their business 
emphasis is directed to corporate and portfolio management clientele• 
(Arthur Andersen, 1986}. 
3 Co-operative banks (Agricultural credit banks) 
The co-operative banks were initially set up in order to provide 
savings and credit facilities for the agricultural community. They are 
organised on a co-operative basis and are centra 1 i sed in the RABO bank. 
At the end of 1983 there were 964 banks of this type in the Netherlands. 
Traditionally their business has been retail (consumer) orientated but 
in recent years they have increasingly directed their services towards 
large corporate clientele. Overall, the activities they are permitted 
to undertake are the same as for the commercial banks. 
4 Savings banks 
After sever a 1 ama 1 gamat ions by mi d-1986 there were 1 ess than 30 
independent savings banks in the Netherlands and they are now all 
members of the Netherlands Association of Savings Banks (Nederlandse 
Spaarsbankbond). Nine savings banks have total assets of more than Dfl 
1 bill ion. Savings deposits form the main proportion of total assets. 
In mid-1984 savings banks had 17 per cent of the savings markets. 
Because of the •social character• of these institutions they have always 
been 1 imited in their business operations. Over the 1 ast decade they 
have concentrated on providing a wider range of retail financial 
services. On the lending side, savings banks have concentrated on 
mortgage business. Seven of the largest savings banks have recently 
obtained permission from the Dutch central bank to offer commercial 
loans. •smaller savings banks can grant such loans on an indfrect way 
through co-operation with the universal bank owned by the joint savings 
ban k1 ( Euromoney, 1986). 
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5 Government savings institutions (Rijkspostspaarbank-Postgiro) 
Up to 1st January 1986 this group included the Postal Giro Service 
and the Post Office Savings Bank. The 1 atter traditionally offered 
savings facilities for retail customers but in recent years it has 
widened its scope and is now quite acti ve in the mort gage 1 ending and 
consumer credit markets. On 1st January 1986 the two organisations 
merged to form the Postbank. Prior to the merger these two institutes 
were operating as a single commercial unit under the name Postgiro/RPS. 
Although essentially a retail bank, the new Postbank has received 
limited powers to enter the commercial market. 
6 Mortgage banks 
These banks' activities 'concentrate on the financing and, to a 
minor extent, on the developing of real estate projects' (OECD, 1987). 
There are 40 mortgage banks registered in the Netherlands, 'However, the 
number .•• is realistically less than ten. None of these banks are 
really independent since all have large banks or insurance companies as 
major shareho 1 ders' (Arthur Andersen, 1986). 
7 Finance houses 
Finance houses offer mainly consumer credit services, numbering 
about 100 in total, they are mostly owned by banks or insurance 
companies. 
8 PPMs (Particulive Participatie Maatschappij) 
These are venture capital institutions. As banks in the 
Netherlands are not allowed to hold direct stocks in companies (holdings 
greater than 5 per cent need central bank authorisation), the government 
introduced PPMs to fill the gap for venture capital funding. 
'The Government guarantees the ret urn of 50 per cent of the 
losses incurred by these institutions (most of which are 
owned by the general banks) or special projects in which they 
invest. Currently there are over 20 PPMs operating' (Arthur 
Andersen, 1986). 
Other Institutions not covered in Arthur Andersen classification: 
9 Security credit institutions 
These are stockbrokers operating in the Dutch market. Their 
business is mainly to act as intermediaries for securities transactions 
on the stock exchange. They attract funds, usually on current accounts 
and lend against securities. There were 17 security credit institutions 
at the end of 1983 all under the supervision of the central bank. 
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10 Foreign banks 
Over fifty per cent of the commercial banks in the Netherlands are 
foreign. By the end of 1983 they represented nearly 19 per cent of the 
commercial banks' balance sheet total. The majority of their business 
is directed towards corporate clientele. Recent deregulation in the 
Dutch capital market has enabled foreign banks to lead-manage guilder 
bonds and note issues (see French, 1986). This, however, has not led to 
a 1 arge influx of foreign banks into the Dutch market. Corporate 
finance is still dominated by the four major universal banks. 
11 Other capital market institutions 
These •consist of two companies: one is directed at financing the 
activities of municipalities, while the activities of the others consist 
for a significant part of being an executive institution for the 
Government in lending money to companies for economic development• 
(OECD, 1987). 
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2.8 Spain 
Table 1 Concentration of the commercial banking system 1972-82 
Table 2 Total balance sheet for the Spanish banking system 1980-84 
Table 3 Total balance sheet for all private banks 1980-84 
Table 4 Total balance sheet for the 'Big Seven• banks 1980-84 
Table 5 Total balance sheet for savings banks 1980-84 
Table 6 Total balance sheet for credit co-operatives 1980-84 
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Table 1 Concentration of the commercial banking system 1972-82 
(percentages of total resources) 
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 
Seven large groups 
Parent banks 60.98 61).29 59.46 58.52 58.88 
Subsi diaries 11.86 12.03 12.59 13.61 17.32 
Group total 72.84 72.32 72.05 72.13 76.21 
Other banks 27.16 27.68 27.95 27.87 23.79 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Source: Revell, 1984 
Note: Total resources = total deposits + cash certificates in hands 
of public+ endorsed bills 
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Market Overview 
1 Private banks 
National banks 
Regional and local banks 
Commercial or mixed banks 
Industrial banks 
Foreign banks 
2 Savings banks 
3 Credit co-operatives 
4 Public banks 
5 Other financial institutions 
On 1st January 1986 Spain entered the EEC and subsequently is 
allowed a seven year 'transition' period when all restrictions on 
foreign banks entering the domestic market wil 1 be lifted. By 1986, 37 
foreign banks had already established in Spain, including 19 from other 
EEC countries. Of these new entrants, only those that have been 
permitted to buy up troubled Spanish banks have been allowed full access 
to the retail banking market. Only six of the foreign banks have 
adopted this approach and the Spanish authorities have not allowed 
foreign banks to take over healthy Spanish concerns. The majority of 
foreign banks concentrate on wholesale banking business which in fact 
has proved to be more profitable than those that have undertaken 
substantial retail activities (see Euromoney, 1986). The largest 
Spanish banks are relatively small compared with their foreign 
competitors. By 1986, Spain had only two banks in the world's top 100 
and only five among the top fifty in Europe. A survey commissioned by 
the Banco di Bilbao in 1985 (see Situaci6n, 1985) indicated that the 
main Spanish banks are smaller than their European counterparts and less 
geared to international business. A major feature of the Spanish 
banking system is that private and savings banks have to maintain 
compulsory investments and deposits which the government imposes on 
banking. These 'coefficients' as they are known reached 50 per cent of 
bank assets in early 1980. 
1 Private banks 
National banks- There are five official types of private banks 
operating in Spain; national banks, regional banks, local banks, 
industrial and foreign banks. The national banks are those banking 
groups with a countrywide branch network. This group is dominated by 
the 'Big Seven•- Banco Espanol de Credito (Banesto), Banco de Bilbao, 
Banco Central, Banco Hispano Americana, Banco Popular Espanol, Banco de 
Santander and Banco de Vizcaya. This group together with the state-
controlled Banco Exterior controlled nearly 90 per cent of total bank 
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deposits by the end of 1984. These banks produce a broad range of 
banking services from payments facilities, deposit taking, issuing of 
savings instruments, money market business, lending to the private and 
commercial sector, insurance business, securities busines and portfolio 
management (securities transactions have to be carried out before a 
public notary); to foreign exchange trading and the renting of computer 
and other equipment. 
Regional banks and local banks both perform the same types of 
business as their national counterparts but their activities have 
traditionally been restricted by geographical coverage. Regional banks 
are predominant in a region and local banks are restricted to one 
specific area. Arthur Andersen (1986) noted that this classification 
has •lost much of its meaning• in recent years and it is probably easier 
to categorise national, regional and local banks merely by size. 
Commercial or mixed banks •offer a wide range of banking services 
including current accounts, deposit accounts, loans and overdrafts, bil 1 
discounting and international business• (Peat, Marwick, Mitchell, 1980). 
Certain restrictions that were introduced in 1962 stipulate that their 
investment portfolios must be made up predominantly of government 
securities. Banks that have concentrated their business mainly on 
short-term transactions are known as the co11111erci a 1 banks whereas those 
that have held stakes in industrial companies are known as mixed banks. 
Revell (1984) notes that in 1981 the seven 1 arge national banks •have 
not far short of three-quarters of the assets of al 1 commercial and 
mixed banks•. 
Industrial banks were traditionally established to provide long 
term finance to industry. They obtained most of their funds from term 
deposits and from the issue of COs and cash certificates. These 
distinctions have become blurred over the 1 ast two decades and 
industrial banks participate in many lines of business similar to the 
co11111ercial and national banks. The Arthur Andersen (1986) study refers 
to this category as industrial/merchant banks. 
Foreign banks - as has already been stated, at the end of 1985, 37 
foreign banks had already been established in Spain of which six had 
full access to the retail banking market. This group has •captured over 
15 per cent of the loan market since 1978 1 (Euromoney, 1986). Spanish 
banks have responded by placing more emphasis on developing their 
corporate banking business as well as introducing new technologies into 
their retail branch networks. 
2 Savings banks (Cajas de ahorro) 
Like savings institutions in other European countries these are 
non-profit organisations •administered by boards whose members receive 
no remuneration for their services• (OECD, 1987). The main function has 
been to collect retail savings deposits and grant loans to the consumer 
market, in addition •they are required to purchase fixed-income 
securities of 1 arge enterprises• (OECD, 1987). Legislation passed on 
27th August 1977 permitted savings banks to perform the same services as 
private banks. In 1984 80 savings banks held approximately 25 per cent 
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of all bank deposits. Their assets accounted for more than one third of 
the whole banking system. Recently savings banks have begun to expand 
their business offering a wider range of banking services similar to the 
private banks. 
3 Credit co-operatives 
In 1984 the 148 credit co-operatives constituted approximately 
three per cent of the banking systems• assets. Their funds mainly came 
from retail deposits and their business is concentrated in the consumer 
market. They are represented mainly b~ rural savings banks. A •recent 
agreement between Banco de Cr~dito Agn co 1 a and a 1 arge number of rura 1 
savings banks wil 1 foster the strengthening of these institutions• 
(Arthur Andersen, 1986). 
4 Pub 1 ic banks 
This category comprises the state-owned banks and the Post Office 
Savings Banks. The state-owned banks obtain their funds mainly from the 
Institute of Official Credit and this is supplemented by borrowing on 
the national and eurocurrency markets. They lend at preferential rates 
to certain industrial sectors, public authorities and to a lesser degree 
to individuals. State-owned banks include: 
Bank of Industrial Credit (BIC) 
Bank of Construction Credit (BCC) 
Bank of Agricultural Credit (BCA) 
Bank of Local Credit (BCL) 
Spanish Mortgage Bank (BHE) 
Spanish Export Bank 
The Post Office Savings Bank offers consumer products simi 1 ar to 
the savings banks but has the advantage of having a large national 
branch network. 
4 Other financial institutions 
Other financial institutions include money market brokerage, 
companies, finance companies, group investment companies, leasing 
companies, factoring companies and so on. These groups operate in •very 
specific market segments, many of them are linked to banks and they have 
yet to develop a demand for their products and services in the Spanish 
market • (Arthur Andersen, 1986). 
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Table l(a) Key figures of private insurance 
Gross premium income 
Direct business 
(ECU million) 
of which (as %) 
Life assurance 
Health insurance 
Non-life insurance* 
Employment(2) 
Number of employed 
(in 1000) 
Field service 
of which 
Independent full-time 
agents 
Part-time agents 
Insurance companies(2) 
Under federal 
supervision 
Total number 
of which 
Life assurance 
companies 
Health insurance 
companies 
Non-life insurance 
companies* 
Reinsurance companies 
For information 
Establishments of 
foreign insurance 
companies 
Investments (million ECU) 
Investment portfolio 
Net new investments 
Investment income 
1970 
7403.2 
36.4 
14.6 
45.1 
189.5 
494 
107 
67 
289 
31 
50 
23548.2 
2268.8 
1980 
31268.9 
38.9 
12.5 
44.9 
202.3 
536 
108 
51 
344 
33 
1984 
45783.2 
37.1 
12.8 
46.1 
198.1 
app 300 
app 45 
app 250 
526 
109 
52 
333 
32 
114 112 
1985 
48607.4 
36.5 
12.5 
47.0 
197.3 
535 
110 
54 
389 
32 
110431.5 190821.4 212910.6 
10872.0 17267.3 21344.1 
8240.4 15152.6 
Source: Statistical Yearbook of German Insurance, 1986 
Notes: 
* 1 
2 
3 
all insurance classes except life and health 
estimated from operating results of GDV member companies 
without 237 pension and funeral expenses funds accounting 
for premium income of 1809.1 million ECU {1984) 
provisional result, BAV (Federal Supervisory Office), 
Quarterly Reports 4/86 
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Table l{b) Key figures of private insurance (continued) 
Payments(2)(4) 
for the benefit of 
policy holders 
Total (million ECU) 
of which 
Life assurance 
Health insurance 
Non-life insurance* 
Profit position(2) 
Profit for the year 
(after tax) 
as % of premiums 
Dividends paid to 
shareholders 
(million ECU) 
Economic reference figures 
Premium incomes as % 
of the gross 
national product 
Month 1 y expenditure as an 
employee's household(6) 
on private insurance 
and social security (ECU) 
of which 
Expenditure on private 
insurance cover 
Expenditure on social 
security 
Premium income of the 
German insurance industry 
as % of the world 
premium income(?) 
1970 
805.6 
2652.4 
4.1 
57.90 
10.15 
47.74 
6.6 
1980 
26644.9 
11743.9 
3557.7 
11343.4 
1.4 
148.6 
5.3 
236.74 
48.07 
188.67 
9.3 
1984 1985 
42386.7 
20018.8 21952.7 
5661.2 5867.0 
16706.7 
1.6 
245.3 
5.8 5.9 
343.92 369.1 
74.20 80.2 
269.72 288.9 
6.5 
Source: Gesamtverband der Deutsche Versicheringswirtschaft eV (German 
Insurance Association), 1986, Cologne 
Notes: 4 
5 
6 
7 
expenditure in respect of claims, expenditure in respect 
of bonuses (ie partial refund of premiums and profit 
allocation to policyholders), allocation to provisions 
estimated from the operating results of PKV (Private 
Health Insurance Association) member companies 
4 persons employee's households with an average income 
calculated from dollar amounts 
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Table 2 Number of insurance companies by class of business 
End of companies under federal supervision 
year A B c D E* F G 
19541 864 95 340 100 295 34 8284 
1960 939 102 352 101 350 34 9853 
1970 810 107 316 67 289 31 7390 
1975 765 113 298 53 274 27 6299 
1976 737 111 284 52 260 30 6290 
1977 777 108 282 53 302 32 4778 
1978 791 107 277 51 323 33 4031 
1979 810 107 273 51 346 33 3688 
1980 809 108 273 51 344 33 3343 
1981 817 109 274 55 347 32 3230 
1982 764 109 240 53 330 32 3090 
1983 763 107 241 52 328 32 3021 
1984 763 109 237 52 333 32 2979 
1985 770 110 235 54 339 32 
Source: Federal Supervisory office for Insurance Companies (BAV), 
Annual Reports, tables 010 and 020 from 1975 (previously 
tab 1 es 1 and 5) 
Notes: * see Table 1 
Key: 
1 inc 1 ud i ng marine insurance companies 
2 as per 31.3.1954 
A total number of insurance companies 
B life assurance companies 
C pension funds and funeral expenses insurance 
D health insurance companies 
E non-life insurance companies 
F reinsurance companies 
G tot a 1 of insurance companies under federa 1 and Lander 
supervision 
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Table 3 
End of 
year 
1954 
1960 
1970 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
Source: 
Notes: 
Number of insurance companies under federal supervision by 
legal form 
(number) 
Joint Mutual Insurance Foreign 
stock insurance institutions Total insurance 
companies associations under public law number companies 
A B(1) c ( 2) 
135 675 24 838 26 
153 707 25 891 48 
170 564 23 760 50 
198 494 23 717 48 
208 455 23 688 49 
222 455 23 703 74 
228 441 22 694 97 
230 437 22 692 118 
233 438 22 695 114 
240 437 23 701 116 
242 381 25 649 115 
239 385 25 650 110 
245 380 26 651 112 
Federal Supervisory Office ( BA V), Annual Report, Tables 011 
and 010 
1 
2 
including small mutual associations registered under para 
53 Insurance Supervisory Law (VAG) 
inc 1 ud i ng other 1 ega 1 forms such as GmbH ( 1 i mi ted 
liability company) and eGmbH (registered co-operative 
society with limited liability) 
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Table 4 Gross premium income by class of business 
( ECU mi 11 ion) 
Life Health Non-life insurance For information 
assurance insurance companies** reinsurance 
Year Total companies2 companies Total3 Motor companies! 
1970 7403.2 2692.3 1079.9 3335.2 1547.0 1509.3 
1975 16113.5 5874.2 2114.8 7499.9 3346.4 3517.5 
1976 18937.9 6963.1 2542.2 8725.7 3844.2 4207.7 
1977 22336.4 8311.0 2964.3 10246.7 4581.6 5012.9 
1978 25310.7 9521.1 3328.2 11501.9 5064.2 5790.9 
1979 28540.3 10804.0 3576.8 13135.3 6017.4 6646.5 
1980 31268.9 12157.5 3896.6 14044.2 6124.5 7727.1 
1981 34389.3 12934.7 4327.8 15552.1 6609.6 8710.1 
1982 38859.3 14483.5 5017.5 17732.4 7101.3 9525.8 
1983 42960.6 16433.2 5575.4 19183.9 7788.5 
1984 45783.2 16968.9 5883.0 21122.2 8332.2 
19854 48607.4 17758.3 6019.6 22848.2 9204.9 
Source: Federal Supervisory office (BAV), Annual Reports, tables 040, 45205 
and 5501 from 1975 (previous 1 y 7.57, 124, motor insurance unti 1 1982 
table 4530) statistics of Insurance Association 
Notes: * direct business of insurance companies under federal and Lander 
supervision 
** see Table 1 
1 gross premiums including additional charges for total insurance 
business, accounting peiod different from calandar year 
2 life assurance including non-life classes (property and accident) 
written by a restricted number of life assurance companies 
3 without life assurance companies writing property and accident 
insurance classes as secondary classes 
4 estimated on the basis of operating results of member companies 
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Table 5 Breakdown of gross premiums by legal form 
Year 
1970 
1975 
1975 
1978 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1975 
1978 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
Total of Joint Mutual Insurance 
insurance stock insurance i nsti tut ions 
companies companies associations1 under pub l aw 
ECU mill i on3 market shares4 as % 
under federal supervision 
7005.2 64.0 28.0 4.2 
15131.5 63.7 28.0 4.5 
under federal and Lander supervision 
16113.5 
25310.7 
34387.9 
38859.3 
42960.6 
45783.2 
984.7 
1500.4 
2079.6 
2133.6 
2166.4 
2397.6 
59.6 
59.6 
59.3 
59.0 
59.3 
59.5 
26.6 10.2 
26.5 10.3 
26.3 10.7 
26.8 10.5 
26.3 10.7 
26.0 10.8 
under Lander supervision 
97.8 
98.7 
98.9 
98.4 
98.6 
98.0 
Foreign 
insura~ce 2 compan1es 
3.8 
3.8 
3.6 
3.6 
3.7 
3.7 
3.7 
3.7 
Source: Federal Supervisory Office (BAV) Annual Reports, tables 040, 
150, 151, 251, 350, 451 from 1975 (previously table 9), own 
cal cu lations 
Notes: 1 
2 
3 
4 
including small mutual associations registered under para 
53 Insurance Supervisory Law (VAG) 
domestic business of insurance companies having their 
head office abroad 
premium income (total direct business) 
percentages of gross premium income derived from direct 
business in all classes 
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Table 6 Market share of foreign insurance companies* in the Federal 
Republic of Germany by class of business 
Life assurance Health insurance 
Country of origin 1975 1980 1984 1975 1980 1984 
market shares as % 
Switzerland 4.88 5.02 5.45 13.58 14.83 15.20 
United Kingdom 0.87 0.83 0.90 1.25 1.27 1.56 
Italy 2.15 1. 78 1. 58 
USA 0.13 0.15 0.08 0.70 0.63 
Austria 0.08 0.09 0.10 
France 0.03 0.11 0.32 0.25 0.23 
Netherlands 0.22 0.19 
Sweden 
Total of foreign 8.36 8.06 8.22 15.87 16.99 16.99 
companies 
total of all 
non-life insurance** insurance classes1 
Country of origin 1975 1980 1984 1975 1980 1984 
Switzerland 
United Kingdom 
Italy 
USA 
Austria 
France 
Netherlands 
Sweden 
7.32 
2.94 
1. 55 
1. 02 
0.43 
0.13 
0.07 
market 
7.25 6.92 
2.63 2.62 
1. 58 1.68 
0.83 1.05 
0.36 0.34 
0.10 0.30 
0.06 
0.12 0.10 
shares as % 
7.30 7.36 7.46 
1. 95 1. 75 1.81 
1. 55 1.46 1. 41 
0.65 0.54 0.53 
0.24 0.21 0.20 
0.12 0.08 0.22 
0.08 0.07 0.03 
0.04 0.06 0.05 
Total of foreign 
companies 
13.46 12.88 13.07 11.94 11.53 11.71 
Source: Versi cherungsreport, Federal Supervisory Office (BAV} Annual 
Reports. Taken from Farny, 0, •oie deutsche Versi cherungs-
wirtschaft•, Karlsruhe, 1985, own calculations 
Notes: 
* 
** 
1 
branches of foreign insurance companies and German 
insurance companies in which foreign insurance 
undertakings hold a majority market. Market shares in 
terms of gross premiums (direct business and business 
reinsured) 
see Table 1 
Tot a l of l if e. assurance , he a 1 t h i n sur an c e , non- l if e 
insurance 
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Table 7 Number of branches of foreign insurance companies in the 
Federal Republic of Germany by class of business and country 
of origin 
1975 1980 1984 
by class of business 
%1 %1 %1 Number Number Number 
Life assurance 12 9.1 9 7.1 8 6.3 
pension/funeral 
expense funds 
Health insurers 1 3.4 1 3.4 1 3.1 
Non-life insurers* 352 16.32 104 33.7 103 32.7 
All insurers 482 11.92 114 23.0 112 22.1 
numbers by country of origin 
United Kingdom 12 46 42 
France 7 16 16 
Switzerland 11 13 14 
Italy 3 7 8 
USA 5 7 6 
Belgium 2 7 7 
Netherlands 3 6 6 
Austria 3 4 4 
Sweden 1 3 3 
Source: Federal Supervisory Office (BAV), Annual reports, Tab 1 es 010, 
011, 010, own ca 1 cu 1 at ions 
Notes: * see Table 6 
1 share in the number of all insurance companies subject to 
supervision including reinsurance companies (whether 
sma 11 mutua 1 associations re9 is tered under para 53 
Insurance Supervision Law {VAG) and other legal forms 
whose activity is restricted to a specified business 
sector, territory or to specified persons 
2 without companies underwriting marine insurance only, 
which in 1975 were exempted from the supervision and in 
respect of which no precise figures are available 
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Table 8 Market shares of foreign insurance companies in the Federal 
Republic of Germany by country of origin and by form of 
undertaking 
Country of origin 
Switzerland 
United Kingdom 
Italy 
USA 
Austria 
France 
Netherlands 
Sweden 
Total of foreign 
companies 
(%) 
Total 
of market share 
1984 for insurance 
companies in terms 
of gross premium 
7.46 
1.81 
1.41 
0.53 
0.20 
0.22 
0.03 
0.05 
11.71 
' 
German insurance 
companies in which 
foreign insurance 
companies ho 1 d a 
majority interest 
98 
4. 91 
1.68 
1.34 
0.29 
0.01 
0.18 
8.41 
Branches 
of foreign 
insurance 
companies 
2.55 
0.13 
0.07 
0.24 
0.19 
0.04 
0.03 
0.05 
3.30 
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Market Overview 
Every organisation wishing to undertake insurance activities in 
Germany must be incorporated and have an establishment except 
unsupervised insurers writing unsupervised classes, i.e. reinsurance' 
(International Insurance Report, February 1985). Insurers are 
supervised and are not allowed to conduct any types of business other 
than insurance, 
' ... nor can they write simultaneously: property insurance and 
sickness insurance, life insurance and sickness insurance, 
sickness insurance and accident insurance, credit insurance and 
any other class whatsoever' (International Insurance Report, 
February 1985). 
Foreign insurers are only allowed to conduct business in Germany 
through a locally authorised organisation. 
In 1986 there were 2941 insurers writing direct insurance 
business. Of these, 2216 are small organisations which account for 
only 5.2 per cent of the total premium income. The 385 members of the 
German Insurance Association (Gesamtverband der deutschen 
Versicherungswirt schaft (GDV) dominate the market with 94.3 per cent 
of premiums. 
The German market is the largest in the EEC accounting for over 33 
per cent of premium income. Foreign insurers share of the German 
market was approximately 12 per cent in 1986. Foreign companies have a 
larger market share in the health insurance sector: 17 per cent, 
compared with 8 per cent of the life assurance and 13 per cent of the 
non-life assurance market. 
References 
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3.2 France 
Statistical Overview 
Table 1 The French insurance share in world's and EEC's direct premium 
income 1960-82 
Table 2 French insurance in 1985 
Table 3 French average propensity to insure 1951-82 
Table 4 Number of companies in the French insurance market 1968 and 
1982 
Table 5 French insurance companies• market share according to 
legal classification 
Table 6 Course of average costs in 1985 
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Table 1 The French insurance share in world's and EEC's direct premium 
income 1960-82 
percentages 
1960 1970 1975 1979 1980 1981 1982 
World 1.15 3. 92 5.25 5.62 5.20 4.62 4.49 
EEC 16.9 18.3 20.3 19.6 
Source: International Insurance Report, April 1985 
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Table 3 French average propensity to insure 1951-82 
1951 
1.53 
1960 
2.42 
direct premiums as %of GOP 
1970 
3.18 
1980 
3.70 
Source: International Insurance Report, April 1985 
1981 
3.85 
1982 
3.96 
Tab 1 e 4 Number of companies in the French insurance market 1968 and 
1982 
No of domestic companies No of foreign companies Totals 
1968 1982 1968 1982 1968 1982 
335 308 206 168 541 476 
Source: International Insurance Report, April 1985 
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Table 5 French insurance companies• market share according to legal 
classification 
National companies 
Limited companies 
For-profit federal mutual 
insurance companies 
Foreign companies 
Total of for-profit companies 
Not-for-profit federal mutual 
insurance companies 
Local and professional mutuals 
Farming mutua 1 s 
Total of not-for-profit 
Total of companies 
Price growth (yearly average) 
percentages 
1984 
21.34 
28.30 
10.20 
4. 71 
65.55 
27.77 
1.49 
6.19 
35.45 
100.0 
Source: Insurance Research Letter, 1987 
1985 
21.13 
27.60 
10.24 
4.10 
63.07 
28.76 
1.48 
6.69 
36.93 
100.0 
104 
Earned premi urns 
1985/1984 
+2.4 
+0.9 
+3.8 
-9.9 
+1.0 
+7.1 
+2.9 
+l1.8 
+7.8 
+3.4 
+5.8 
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Table 6 Course of average costs in 1985 
percentages 
Of which: 
Total Bodily Property Total 
cars pub liab pub 1 i ab pub l i ab 
National companies +9.5 +6.4 +12.4 +6.7 
Limited companies +30.3 +30.6 +23.6 +28.9 
Federal mutual insurance 
companies with middlemen +13.4 +11.6 +12.2 +12.5 
Foreign companies +10.6 +9.7 +5.9 +6.3 
Federal mutual insurance 
companies without 
middlemen +27.3 +6.7 -3.3 -0.7 
Local and professional 
mutuals +12.3 +7.3 +19.2 +14.6 
Farming mutuals +10.2 -20.4 +63.7 -4.5 
Total of companies +20.8 +9.2 +10. 9 +8.7 
Source: Insurance Research Letter, 1987 
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Market Overview 
Direct insurance companies in France are supervised by the 
'Direction d'Assurances' (part of the Ministry of Finance), reinsurers 
are supervised by the Ministry of Commerce. Up to 1978, the domestic 
insurance industry was heavily regulated mainly due to an onerous 
tariff system which required prior approval of insurance premium rates. 
Since this has disappeared, increased competition in the insurance 
industry has heralded a decline in the overall financial performance of 
the insurance sector. 
There are many compulsory insurances under state control, for 
example, transport insurance, professional liability, agricultural 
risks and the like. These are more common in France than in any other 
EEC country. Limited insurance companies have the largest share of the 
for-profit direct business, over 27 per cent in 1985, with the 
nationalised companies following close behind with 21 per cent of the 
market. Market share has been reversed since 1980 when the 
nationalised companies had the lions share. For-profit companies earn 
over 60 per cent of premiums in the domestic market, the remaining 
business being undertaken by the not-for-profit mutual organisations. 
Typically the life insurance business is dominated by the nationalised 
insurance companies. 
In the world league of insurers, France ranks fifth behind the US, 
Japan, Germany and the United Kingdom. 'In general insurance France 
is fourth; in life business sixth, as state pensions and social 
security schemes are highly developed in the republic' (Saltie, 1987). 
Total market turnover in 1986 was ECU 33. 82 billion. There are 420 
general insurers and 100 life companies in the French market. 
Viewing the main sector, the larger mutual organisations 
traditionally directed their business towards specific market segments 
such as civil servants, teachers, farmers, etc. They are at present 
expanding their motor insurance business. By 1985 they had insured 
over fifty per cent of the private cars in France. Foreign insurance 
companies account for approximately 5 per cent of market share, motor 
premiums account for half of their total business. 
Throughout the 1980s there has been considerable growth in life 
business, mainly brought about by poor expectations about state pension 
schemes. New products such as savings 
bonds and personal pension plans are being aggressively marketed by 
the larger French companies. 'In 1985, for the first time ever in 
France, life premiums totalled more than motor premiums' (Saltie, 
1987). In addition, the denationalisation of the insurance sector is 
presently on the current government agenda (Assurances Generales de 
France will return to the private sector in 1987), and this should help 
boost the market premium share on life business. 
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3.3 Italy 
Statistical Overview 
Table 1 The Italian share in the world's and EEC's total direct 
premiums 1960-82 
Table 2 Average propensity to insure in Italy 1950-82 
Table 3 Direct premiums of Italian insurers 1950-83 
Table 4 Breakdown of Italian premium income 1984 by business class 
Table 5 Number of insurance companies, domestic and foreign 1968-82 
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Table 1 The Italian share in the wor 1 d•s and EEC•s tota 1 direct 
premiums 1060-82 
percentages 
1960 1970 1975 1980 
World 1.1 1.6 1.9 1.7 
EEC na 9.0 7.7 6.1 
Source: International Insurance Report, 1985 
Table 2 Average propensity to insure in Italy 1950-82 
(direct premiums as % of GNP) 
EEC total 
Italy 
1950 1960 1970 1971 1982 
2.67 3.27 4.09 4.65 
0.9 1.4 1.9 2.3 1.9 
Source: International Insurance Report, 1985 
Table 3 Direct premiums of Italian insurers 1950-83 
(billion ECU) 
1981 
1.6 
6.3 
1970 
1831.13 
1975 
3450.09 
1980 
5673.81 
1981 
6661.12· 
1982 
7593.63 
Source: International Insurance Report, 1985 
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1982 
1.6 
6.7 
L983 
8833.99 
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Table 4 Breakdown of Italian premium income 1984 by business class 
Market premium income 
1984 (estimated) Growth Market share 
(ECU million) % % 
Motor liability 4, 135.66 17.8 40.3 
Motor hull 907.05 16.6 8.9 
Credit 94.83 35.9 0.9 
Bonding 197.63 20.8 1.9 
Fire 892.57 13.2 8.7 
Theft 337.34 12.7 3.3 
Pecuniary 1 oss 8.69 6.7 0.1 
Hai 1 152.02 14.6 1.5 
General liability 487.19 18.5 4.7 
Legal expenses 10.50 10.9 0.1 
PA & Sickness 1,027.94 18.0 10.0 
Marine/Transport 474.16 18.5 4.6 
Aviation 56.46 21.9 0.6 
Mi see 11 aneous 78.54 10.3 0.8 
Life & Annuity 8,860.58 17.2 86.4 
1,397.13 28.6 13.6 
Total 10.257.71 18.6 100.0 
Source: ROA Bulletin, 1986 
Table 5 Number of insurance companies, domestic and foreign 1968-82 
Italy 
Rest of Europe 
Domestic 
companies 
119 
3831 
1968 
Foreign 
companies 
48 
1532 
Source: International Insurance Report, 1985 
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1982 
Domestic 
companies 
159 
3351 
Foreign 
companies 
49 
1204 
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Market Overview 
The Italian insurance market contains: state corporations, large 
i nternationa 1 companies and sma 11 companies focusing on specific 1 i nes 
of business, for example, automobile insurance. The market is fairly 
concentrated, in 1981 the ten largest companies had over fifty per cent 
of the direct market and • the home 50 companies were grouped into nine 
large concerns• (International Insurance Report, 1985). Nevertheless, 
the market is reasonably open and the number of firms, both foreign and 
domestic, expanded between 1968 and 1982. The opposite trend has taken 
place in most other European countries. Viewing the composition of 
business written in the Italian market, motor business dominates, 
accounting for 40.3 per cent of premium income in 1984. Life and 
annuity business was the second largest category accounting for only 
13.6 per cent of the market. Total market premium income was estimated 
to be over ECU 10.13 bi 11 ion in 1984. One of the most significant 
features of insurance business over the last two decades is the 
remarkable decline in market share of the 1 ife business. In 1970 it 
accounted for 23.1 per cent of total premiums, whereas by 1984 market 
share had fallen to a meagre 13.6 per cent. Inflationary pressures 
experienced throughout the 1970s together with Italy•s extensive social 
security system are the reasons usually put forward to explain the 
decline of private life insurance. 
•The Italian insurance industry is still relying on its 
domestic market and showing only a 1 imited interest in 
Europe, with Latin America and the US being its focal 
points. • 
On the reinsurance side, Italy has one of the world•s main 
companies, Unione Italiana di Riassicurazione. Nevertheless, the 
majority of Italian reinsurance business is undertaken by German, Swiss 
and UK concerns. 
References 
Federici, Alfredo (1986), •Italian insurance booming•, International 
Insurance Monitor, December 1986, p 10 
International Insurance Report, May 1985, •Italy - insurance survey, pp 
16-20 
ROA Bulletin, No 2/86, April 1986, •Italy market report•, 1984 
Sigma, November-December 1984 
111 
- 407 -
3.4 United Kingdom 
Statistical Overview 
Table 1 Worldwide premium income of the members of the Association of 
British Insurers 1984-85 
Table 2 Worldwide premiums of British companies in 1983 
Table 3 Proportion of all company premiums controlled by larger 
companies 
Table 4 Structure of industry. British-controlled companies, foreign-
controlled UK companies and the UK branches of foreign-based 
companies 
Table 5 The Big Four clearing banks in insurance braking 
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Table 1 Worldwide premium income of the members of the Association of 
British Insurers 1984-85 
Worldwide premium income 
Ordinary life 
Industrial life 
Total 1 ife 
Motor 
Fire and accident 
Marine, Aviation and Transport 
Total General 
Total invested assets 
Life 
Genera 1 
Total 
Invisible earnings 
Insurance 
( ECU mi 11 ion) 
UK 
23,278 
2,034 
25,312 
3,735 
7,896 
1, 593 
13,224 
Overseas 
3, 975 
3, 975 
4,110 
8,922 
560 
13,593 
113 
1985 1984 
27,253 24, 741 
2,034 2,012 
29,287 26, 752 
7,845 7,682 
16,818 14,661 
2,153 1,895 
26,817 24,238 
242,098 199,758 
48,905 45,130 
291,003 244,888 
5,633 3, 718 
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Table 2 Worldwide premiums of British companies in 1983 
All business General Long-term 
% to all 
ECUm companies ECUm ECUm 
Commercial Union 3,892.7 9.2 3,209.9 682.8 
Prudential 3,804.3 8.9 1,176.0 2,628.3 
Royal 3, 711.6 8.7 3,254.0 457.6 
General Accident 2,620.1 6.2 2,376.5 243.6 
Guardian Royal Exchange 2,327.4 5.5 1,774.9 552.5 
Sun A 11 i ance 2,008.7 4.7 1,507.3 501.4 
Leg a 1 & Genera 1 1,685.9 4.0 325.6 1,360.3 
Eagle Star 1,509.4 3.5 973.9 535.5 
Norwich Union 1, 429.0 3.4 444.1 984.9 
Phoenix 1,156.7 2.7 861.5 295.2 
Source: Carter and Godden (1984) 
Note: Long term business refers to life, annuity, pension fund 
management. General is non-life 
Table 3 Proportion of all company premiums controlled by larger 
companies 
percentages 
1974 1980 1981 1982 1983 
5 1 argest companies 44.9 40.7 41.3 40.4 38.5 
Next 5 companies 19.6 20.5 19.7 18.9 18.3 
10 largest companies 64.5 61.2 61.0 59.3 56.8 
Source: Carter and Godden, 1984 
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Table 4 Structure of industry. British-controlled companies, foreign-
controlled UK companies and the UK branches of foreign-based 
companies 
number of companies 
Genera 1 Long-term 
Total Composites business only business only 
British-controlled 
companies 172 27 94 51 
Foreign-controlled 
companies 161 15 121 25 
Foreign companies• 
UK branches 113 5 89 19 
Total 446 47 304 95 
Source: Carter and Godden, 1984 
Table 5 The Big Four clearing banks in insurance braking 
(ECU 000) 
Turnover Profit Average annual growth 
1983 1983 in turnover % 
(2 years to 1983) 
Barclays 34,547 18,325 70 
National Westminster 24,126 13,405 39 
Lloyds 20,859 15,204 53 
Midland 21,250 8,697 57 
Source: Retail Banker International, 1985 
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Market Overview 
In 1985 the British Insurance Association reported that its 
members earned total worldwide premium income of ECU 26,817 million. 
The Association has over 340 members (including UK members with head 
offices overseas) and their reported figures account for approximate 1 y 
95 per cent of the domestic and international business of the British 
insurance company market. The UK insurance market is relatively 
concentrated. In 1983 the five largest companies wrote 38.5 per cent of 
total premiums whereas the ten largest had a 56.8 per cent share of the 
market. Nearly two-thirds of the insurance companies operating in the 
UK are either foreign-controlled or foreign companies• UK branches. The 
majority of these foreign companies• business is concentrated in the 
general (non-life) business category. Viewing the British-controlled 
companies, out of a total of 172 only 27 transact composite business 
(both general and life). Table 2 illustrates that the top ten companies 
in the UK insurance market are all composites. 
The breakdown of premium income in the UK insurance market is 
markedly different from certain other EEC countries. Domestic life 
premiums account for the lion•s share of total worldwide life premium 
income (86.4 per cent), whereas overseas companies• general premiums 
have an equal share with their domestic counterparts (see Table 1). 
That is, non-life insurance is far more dependent on foreign markets 
than life insurance. Viewing total worldwide premium income, ordinary 
life has the largest share (48.5 per cent), followed by fire and 
accident (30 per cent) and motor (14 per cent). Overseas premium income 
accounts for over 30 per cent of tot a 1 wor 1 dwi de premi urn income. 
(Zajdlic (1985) notes that Lloyds• contribution to the total of 
worldwide premium income on top of BIA members would account for 12 per 
cent of the market in 1983. The B IA figures quoted do not correspond 
with those in Association of British Insurers (1986)). 
Over the last two years the barriers between banking and insurance 
business have been significantly eroded. In early 1985: 
•An informed understanding between the Bank of England and 
the Department of Trade prohibiting inter-locking ownership 
between major insurance companies and banks has been 
scrapped. The Bank of England•s readiness to allow the 
Scottish mutual insurer Standard Life to buy Barel ays Bank•s 
35 per cent stake in the Bank of Scotland is an indication of 
the new liberal climate• (Retail Banker International, 1985). 
On the 19th November 1984 the Bank of Scotland became the first 
major clearing banks to offer comprehensive motor insurance. Building 
societies were originally restricted to selling insurance related to 
their mortgage business, but since the 1986 Building Society Act they 
can offer a much broader range of services. Most of the major clearers 
presently sell the full range of insurance products. A recent survey 
undertaken by Arthur Andersen (1986) stated that UK banks view the 
insurance business as •a principal area of diversification ... v1hich is 
be 1 i eved to hold sound prospects for growth and profi tabi l i ty•. 
Respondents to this survey also concluded that the insurance braking 
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operations of clearing banks will grow very rapidly, as greater use is 
made of their large branch networks as sales outlets. As early as 1985 
the TSB had an insurance sales force of 280 assigned to various branches 
throughout the country. 
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3.5 Belgium 
Statistical Overview 
Table 1 
Table 2 
Table 3 
Table 4 
Table 5 
Table 6 
Table 7 
Table 8 
Belgium•s share in the world•s and EEC•s direct total premiums 
Belgium•s total insurance premiums 1955-83 
Belgium•s average propensity to insure 
Life premiums as a percentage of total premiums 
Number of domestic and foreign insurance companies 
Domestic premium income 1984-85 
Structure of Belgian portfolio 1970-78 
Total OECD portfolio in 1981 
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Table 1 Belgium's share in the world's and EEC's direct total premiums 
percentages 
World's share 
EEC's share 
1960 
0.8 
na 
1970 
0.8 
4.3 
1975 
1.1 
4.4 
Source: International Insurance Report, December 1985 
Table 2 Belgium's total insurance premiums 1955-83 
(mill ion ECUs) 
1980 
1.1 
4.1 
1970 
868.296 
1975 
1905.023 
1980 
3517.423 
1981 
3631.225 
1982 
3599.521 
Source: International Insurance Report, 1985 
Table 3 Belgium's average propensity to insure 
direct premiums as % of GOP 
1955 
2.5 
1960 
3.0 
1970 
3.3 
1975 
3.6 
1980 
3.9 
Source: International Insurance Report, 1985 
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1981 
3.9 
1982 
3.9 
1983 
0.7 
3.2 
1983 
3663.953 
1983 
3.8 
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Table 4 Life premiums as a percentage of total premiums 
1980-83 annual average 
Belgium 
Rest of EEC 
Source: International Insurance Report, 1985 
27.6 
38.0 
Table 5 Number of domestic and foreign insurance companies 
Domestic companies 
Foreign companies 
1982 
167 
147 
Source: International Insurance Report, 1985 
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1968 
222 
304 
% change 
-25 
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Table 6 Domestic premium income 1984-85 
( ECU mi 11 ion) 
Premi urn I nco me 1985 Market 
Class 1984 1985 Increase % Share % 
Life 1,053 1,135 6.6 27.8 
Workmen's comp 284 303 5.6 7.4 
Motor 1,309 1,408 6.4 34.6 
Other liability 177 198 10.8 4.9 
Bodily injury 146 155 4.9 3.8 
Legal assistance 9 9 ( 2. 9) 0.2 
Fire 631 670 4.8 16.4 
Transport 67 62 ( 9. 8) 1.5 
Credit 50 53 5.1 1.3 
Health 71 86 19.3 2.1 
Total 3,797 4,079 6.2 100.0 
Source: Insurance in Belgium 1985-86 
Report of the Belgian Insurance Association 
Notes: Rate of inflation in 1985 was 4.87% 
Table 7 Structure of Belgian portfolio 1970-78 
percentages 
Life Motor Accident/liability Fire Marine Rest 
1970 28.5 35.1 18.9 12.8 1.5 3.2 
1978 26.0 34.6 19.8 13.1 1.3 5.2 
Source: International Insurance Report, 1985 
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Table 8 Total OECD portfolio in 1981 
percentages 
Life Motor Accident/liability Fire Marine Rest 
1981 42 20 17 8 2 11 
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Market Overview 
Insurance companies in Belgium are regulated by the Insurance 
Control Office in the Central Ministry of Economic Affairs. Regulations 
have been introduced for life and non-life business since 1979. These 
regulations correspond to EEC Freedom of Establishment Directives of 
1973. A major feature of the Belgian market is the considerable number 
of compulsory insurances, for example, 'of employers of conscientious 
objectors, carriage of school children, cycle races, etc' (International 
Insurance Report, December 1985, p 18). 
Between 1968 and 1982 Belgium saw a drastic decline in the number 
of domestic and especially foreign insurance companies undertaking 
business in their country. The number of domestic companies fell by 25 
per cent, whereas the number of foreign companies declined by over 50 
per cent. This is generally explained by the decline in demand for 
insurance products in Belgium over this period, especially in the late 
1970s and early 1980s. Although this trend is more marked for Belgium 
than any other EC member countries, only the UK (170), France (168) and 
Hall and (157) had more foreign companies writing insurance business in 
their domestic markets. 
Belgian insurers can be classified into four types: 
r~arket share ( %} 1982 
1 Stock companies 78.5 
2 Co-operatives 4.7 
3 Mutuals 14.5 
4 Mi see 11 aneous 2.3 
If we view the foreign insurance companies, over 80 per cent originate 
from within the EEC. Overall, market concentration is high, the ten 
main insurance groups in 1980 accounted for approximately 55 per cent of 
total premiums (60 per cent in the reinsurance market). 
Comparing the types of business within the Belgian insurance market 
(see Tables 7 and 8) with that within the whole of the OECD countries, 
it can be seen that life business is constantly lower and motor business 
is higher within the Belgian markets. The former is partly offset by 
the high levels of social insurance in the country. 
Viewing more recent premium income figures (Table 6) life a~surance 
and motor insurance business still dominate market share, with 
substantial growth in health and other liability insurance between 1984 
and 1985. Nevertheless, these two latter groups only account for a 
small (approximately 7 per cent) of the overall market. 
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3.6 Luxembourg 
Statistical Overview 
Table 1 Total premiums, European Economic Community, 1983 and 1984 
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Table 1 Total premiums, European Economic Community, 1983 and 1984 
Country 
Germany 
Belgium 
Denmark 
France 
Greece 
Holland 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
United Kingdom 
Total 
Spain 
Portugal 
Total 
(thousand million) 
Currency 
Mark 
Francs 
Kroner 
Francs 
Drachma 
Guilder 
£ (Eire) 
Lire 
Francs 
£ Sterling 
Peseta 
Escudo 
1983 
Local 
Currency 
92' 123 
161,032 
19,178 
159,960 
30,921 
23,000 
1,265 
11.945,511 
5,462 
19,050 
438,687 
61,980 
ECUs 
41,31 
3,49 
2,34 
23,18 
0,37 
9,05 
1,73 
8,69 
0.12 
33,42 
123,70 
3,37 
0.56 
127,63 
Source: International Insurance Monitor, 1986 
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1984 
Local 
Currency 
94,940 
164,252 
21,000 
179,000 
37,106 
23,200 
1,500 
14.170,000 
5,570 
21,550 
516,649 
75,021 
ECUs 
42,57 
3,67 
2,63 
26,20 
0,40 
9,20 
2,09 
10,35 
0.13 
35,32 
132,56 
4,19 
0,62 
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Market Overview 
At the end of 1983 there were 42 insurance companies operating in 
Luxembourg of which 11 were domestically based. During the year these 
companies earned over ECU 121 mi 11 ion premi urn income. A new 1 aw went 
into effect on 1st March 1984 which aimed to boost insurance business in 
the Duchy, mainly by trying to attract insurance companies writing non-
1 ife business. The 1 ife market in Luxembourg is relatively small due to 
the population size; 365,000 in 1984. The new law specifically aimed to 
attract, 'insurance undertakings which operate directly out of 
Luxembourg; the so-ca 11 ed 'captive' insurance undertakings; reinsurance 
undertakings; insurance undertakings specialising in coverage of 
transportation risks and insurance brokers' (Captive Insurance Company 
Review, 1985). Unfortuantely, the only data we were able to obtain on 
the Luxembourg insurance market was for 1983 and 1984 (International 
Insurance Monitor, 1986) so we cannot tell if the legislation has had 
its desired effect. 
References 
Captive Insurance Company Review (1985), 'Luxembourg - an update', 
February 1985, pp 13-15 
Fi nanc i a 1 Times Survey ( 1983), 'Luxembourg', 22nd November 1983 
International Insurance Monitor (1986), 'The European Economic 
Community, and now there are twelve', January-February 1986, pp 4-5 
127 
- 423 -
3.7 Netherlands 
Statistical Overview 
Table 1 Gross premium income of domestic companies 1983 
Table 2 Insurance groups 
Table 3 Gross premium income per class of business 1983 
Table 4 Domestic life insurance companies 
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Table 1 Gross premium income of domestic companies 1983 
(mi 11 ion ECUs) 
Gross premiums Deve 1 opment Development GNP 
gross (market 
Year Life Non-life Total premiums (%) prices in%) 
1970 685.3 860.2 1545.2 14.8 11.9 
1971 819.1 1004.0 1823.1 16.6 12.5 
1972 937.8 1215.6 2153.4 16.3 13.2 
1973 1037.8 1459.5 2497.3 10.4 14.4 
1974 1281.6 1759.7 3041.3 13.7 13.5 
1975 1943.6 2017.9 3961.5 27.5 9.1 
1976 1793.1 2393.8 4186.9 -0.4 14.8 
1977 2022.4 2809.5 4831.9 9.4 9.2 
1978 2140.4 3369.2 5509.6 12.2 7.7 
1979 2397.5 3751.3 6148.8 11.4 6.4 
1980 2639.6 4146.3 6785.9 10.8 6.4 
1981 2834.9 4351.2 7186.1 6.5 4.7 
1982 3355.1 4636.0 7991.1 4.7 4.2 
1983 3722.9 4919.2 8642.1 5.0 2.7 
Source: Informatica Statistica, 1985 
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Table 2 Insurance groups (1983) 
(million ECUs) 
Premiums Income 
from other 
Life Non-life activities 
Nationale 
Neder 1 and en 2,408 1, 985 399 
AEGON 1,250 999 
AMEV 749 803 191 
Delta-Lloyd 364 318 
Income 
from 
investments Revenue 
1, 739 6, 531 
1,730 3,979 
534 2, 277 
345 1,026 
Capital Staff emelo~ed (numbers} 
and surplus Nether 1 ands Other countries Total 
Nationale 
Neder 1 an den 1,998 9,593 11,503 21,096 
AEGON 939 4, 776 2,518 7,294 
AMEV 704 3,381 5,189 8,570 
Delta-Lloyd 532 3,105 3,105 
Source: Informatica Statistica, 1985 
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Table 3 Gross premium income per class of business 1983 
(million ECUs) 
Life Non-life 
Sickness Transport 
and Persona 1 Miscel- and 
Year Individual Group Fire accident 1 aneous Aviation 
1970 154.0 311.6 321.3 73.2 
1971 422.7 396.4 180.2 369.6 371.0 82.8 
1972 459.7 478.1 205.0 467.2 459.7 83.6 
1973 506.0 531.4 240.9 595.3 534.0 89.3 
1974 626.1 655.5 289.8 722.6 647.0 100.2 
1975 1174.5 769.4 348.7 807.0 756.6 105.6 
1976 861.5 931.6 405.4 954.6 905.9 127.9 
1977 904.6 1118.2 472.1 1083.9 1107.1 146.4 
1978 1012.3 1127.8 584.9 1241.8 1383.3 159.0 
1979 1131.8 1265.7 654.5 1370.1 1556.4 170.3 
1980 1238.6 1400.9 738.7 1531.2 1675.2 201.4 
1981 1349.5 1485.4 806.5 1619.4 1687.1 238.2 
1982 1627.8 1726.9 897.9 1837.1 1617.5 283.5 
1983 1827.7 1895.2 967.3 1962.9 1683.5 305.9 
Source: Informatica Statistica, 1985 
131 
- 427 -
Table 4 Domestic life insurance companies 1983 
(thousand ECUs) 
Capital and 
Net Market Net Capita 1 surplus in % 
premium share premium and of net premium 
income (%)* reserve surplus reserve 
Nationale-Nederlanden 1023055 29.20 8052074 760817 9.45 
AGE ON 675821 19.29 6074450 450383 7.41 
Delta-Lloyd 355484 10.14 2963039 181685 6.13 
AMEV 330248 9.42 2872221 280810 9.78 
Centraa 1 Beheer 286574 8.18 2654280 95796 3.61 
Amfas 206183 5.88 1567368 162575 10.37 
I nterpo 1 is 98450 2.81 751309 57948 7. 71 
Stad Rotterdam 96252 2.75 640260 54421 8.50 
Source: Informatica Statistica, 1985 
Note: * Market share defined as: net premiums of domestic 
companies belonging to an insurance group, divided by 
total net premiums of all domestic companies 
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Market Overview 
Insurance companies in the Netherlands are under the supervision of 
the Insurance Chamber, the national supervisory authority. In 1983 
there were 74 life assurance companies, of which 62 were domestic 
concerns and the remainder foreign. Total domestic life premi urns 
amounted to ECU 3,727 mill ion in 1983. In addition, there were 363 
supervised non-1 ife insurers writing ECU 4,923 mil lion premium business. 
Another 412 non-life insurers, not subject to supervision, were also 
present in the Dutch market. Unsupervised companies either have low 
premium income or only participate in specific lines of business. The 
official statistics deal with the super~ised insurers. 
In the early 1980s the Dutch insurance market was characterised by 
merger activities between major insurers. By 1983 the largest Dutch 
company, Nationale-Nederlanden earned over 50 per cent of gross domestic 
premium income. Four major companies dominate the market, Nationale 
Nederlanden, AEGON, AMEV and Delta-Lloyd. Nationale-Nederlanden and 
AEGON control over 50 per cent of the domestic life insurance market. 
The total gross premium income for Dutch domestic companies 
amounted to ECU 9,003 million in 1984. 'In addition, foreign companies 
wrote a gross premium of ECU 730 mil lion of which 27.9 per cent were in 
respect of life business and 72.9 per cent non-1 ife business' {ROA 
Bulletin, 1986). It is expected that insurance companies will soon be 
able to offer specific banking facilities within the Netherlands. 
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3.8 Spain 
Statistical Overview 
Table 1 Spanish insurance groups, ownership and premium income 1984 
Table 2 Market structure of Spanish insurance industry 1978-84 
Table 3 The Spanish percentage share in the world's and EEC's direct 
total premiums 1960-83 
Table 4 Total direct insurance premiums and the average propensity to 
insure 
Table 5 Portfolio structure of Spain and 14 main countries 
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Table 2 Market structure of Spanish insurance industry 1978-84 
Foreign Top 5 
Total number Number of insurers % of groups % of 
Year of insurers foreign insurers market premi urns market premiums 
1978 687 40 9.2 17.29 
1979 680 39 9.0 17.05 
1980 640 33 8.6 17.40 
1981 631 33 8.5 17.80 
1982 625 33 8.7 17.87 
1983 618 33 9.1 18.04 
1984 ( *) (*) (*) ( *) 
Tot a 1 market % % growth of r~arket premi urns 
Year premi urns ECUs Growth consumer prices as % of GNP 
1978 187' 546 22.0 16.6 1. 63 
1979 238,435 20.0 15.6 1. 67 
1980 268,215 22.0 15.2 1. 76 
1981 304,118 16.8 14.4 1.80 
1982 329,348 13.4 14.0 1. 78 
1983 314,877 13.3 12.2 1.77 
1984 375,110 18.3 9.0 1.84 
Source: Doubell, 1985 
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Table 3 The Spanish percentage share in the world's and EEc•s direct 
tota 1 premi urns 1960-83 
World's share 
EEC's share 
percentages 
1960 
0.3 
na 
1970 
0.6 
3.6 
Source: International Insurance Report, 1985 
1975 
1.0 
4.1 
1980 
0.08 
2.9 
1983 
0.05 
2.5 
Table 4 Total direct insurance premiums and the average propensity to 
insure 
1970 1975 1980 1981 1982 1983 
Total direct insurance premium (in Pesetas billion) 
725 1845 2683 3041 3339 3146 
Spanish average propensity to insure (total premiums as % of GNP) 
2.0 2.2 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 
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Market Overview 
'Banks have dominated the market in the past. Though Spain's 
insurers are not all owned by banks, almost all banks own or have a 
strong interest in an ins urer• (International Insurance Report, 1985). 
Of the top five Spanish insurance groups in 1984, two were linked with 
major banks and the third was 40 per cent owned by Banco de Bilbao 
(Corporacid'n General Aseguradora). One can see from Table 1 that the 
type of ownership varies considerably between different insurance 
companies. By the beginning of 1984 there were 618 insurance companies 
in Spain of which 33 were foreign. Although this seems a rather large 
amount, relatively few insurance companies play a major role. Nearly 
two thirds of a 11 business is undertaken by the top forty groups. The 
main five companies transacted business in 1984 which only accounted for 
18 per cent of the total market, compared with a •norm• of 50 per cent 
for market con cent ration in other EEC countries. The market does not 
have any companies with global general insurance operations and there is 
no 'significant market to write international reinsurance•. 
One major feature of the Spanish insurance industry is the 
•relatively small percentage occupied by the life business in the 
Spanish portfolio' (International Insurance Report, 1985). Conversely, 
motor insurance appears to dominate the scene, taking 35 per cent of 
market share in 1978, well above the EEC average. On the reinsurance 
side, which took approximately 28 per cent of total market premiums, in 
1983 (see Deubel 1, 1985) most of the business is written by foreign 
reinsurers. Spanish reinsurers only play a very smal 1 role in the 
reinsurance market and a large percentage of domestic 1 ife insurance is 
reinsured overseas. 
The current trend appears to be that banks are reducing their 
shareholding in domestic insurance companies, •to allow foreign 
investors to take an interest and introduce the technical expertise 
necessary to make profit from underwriting• (Doubell, 1985). 
Nevertheless, there are still only a few foreign insurance companies 
with small market penetration. 
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4 BROKERAGE AND SECURITIES 
4.1 Germany 
Statistical Overview 
Table 1 The capital market 1983 to 1985 
Table 2 Stock exchange transactions 1974 to 1986 
Table 3 Number of public limited companies and market value of listed 
shares 1981-85 
Table 4 Number of listed shares and debentures 1980-84 
Table 5 The largest listed companies on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange, 
end-December 1985 
Table 6 Share and bond turnover for domestic and foreign companies on 
the German exchanges, 1980-86 
Table 7 Number of shares traded and new capital raised on the semi-
official market 1981-85 
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Table 1 The capital market 1983 to 1985 
ECU billion 
Fixed securities 
Gross sales of domestic bonds+ 
of foreign DM bonds 
Net sales of domestic bonds+ 
Outstanding at year end 
including DM foreign bonds 
Yield at year end* 
Officially quoted shares 
Total market value at year-end 
Dividend yield++ 
Commerzbank index (changes) 
Capital increases (cash proceeds)** 
Stock exchange trading 
Investment funds for small investors 
Net sales 
including: bond funds 
equity funds 
real estate funds 
Total assets at year end 
Source: Financial Times, 7 July 1986 
Notes: + nominal 
++ including tax credit 
1983 
99.8 
7.5 
38.6 
381.1 
38.6 
8.3% 
39.4 
3.3% 
+36.5% 
1.2 
37.0 
1.68 
0.76 
0.25 
0.67 
17.52 
* domestic securities outstanding 
** according to Commerzbank statistics 
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1984 
101.7 
8.5 
32.2 
422.8 
43.0 
7.0% 
110.2 
3.6% 
+6.4% 
1.1 
37.8 
1.86 
2.03 
-0.50 
0.34 
20.73 
1985 
117.3 
14.0 
35.7 
470.2 
52.7 
6.6% 
197.1 
2.5% 
+76.1% 
3.0 
94.7 
3. 72 
3.81 
-0.43 
0.34 
26.40 
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Table 3 Number of public limited companies and market value of listed 
shares 1981-85 
Year-end Number Market value (ECU billion) 
1981 456 56.1 
1982 450 69.0 
1983 442 99.4 
1984 449 110.2 
1985 451 197.1 
1986 467 225.7 
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank 
Table 4 Number of listed shares and debentures 1980-84 
Shares Fixed-interest securities 
Year-end Total Domestic Foreign Total Domestic Foreign 
1980 406 224 182 4929 4439 490 
1981 416 229 187 5203 4690 513 
1982 405 223 182 5375 4809 566 
1983 408 227 181 5445 4847 598 
1984 420 240 180 5604 4969 635 
Source: Frankfurt Stock Exchange 
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Table 5 The largest listed companies on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange, 
end-December 1985 
Ranking 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
Company 
Daiml er-Henz 
Siemens 
Deutsche-Bank 
A 11 i anz 
Allianz-Lebensversicherung 
Hoechst 
BASF 
Munchener Ruckversicherung 
Bayer 
Volkswagen 
VEBA 
Dresdner Bank 
RWE (Pref) 
Bayerische Motoren-Werke 
t~annesmann 
Commerzbank 
Bayerische Hypo-u Wechsel-Bank 
Thyssen 
Mercedes-Automobil-Holding 
Bayerische Vereinsbank 
Lufthansa (Pref) 
Schering 
AEG 
Hochtief 
Linde 
Source: Frankfurt Stock Exchange 
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Market value 
( ECU mill ion) 
18,964.8 
15,898.1 
13,563.7 
11,212.8 
9,460.9 
7,462.1 
6,814.6 
6,599.5 
6,273.3 
5,304.6 
4,397.0 
4,006.7 
3,838.0 
3,070.1 
3,013.0 
2,930.0 
2,809.5 
2,398.8 
2,164.1 
2,153.1 
1, 843.8 
1,610.6 
1,474.3 
1,437.6 
1,234.0 
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Table 6 Share and bond turnover for domestic and foreign companies 
on the German exchanges~ 1980-86 
( E CU m i 11 i on ) 
Domestic issuers Foreign issuers 
Year Total Bonds Shares Bonds Shares 
1980 32,952 16,058 10,980 3,870 2,041 
1981 34,509 16,723 12,289 3, 794 1,705 
1982 54,202 31,230 14,798 6,005 2,168 
1983 81,720 30,340 37,044 7,668 6,668 
1984 104,713 49,321 37,849 10,027 7,519 
1985 195' 868 75,477 94,658 13,971 11' 764 
1986 283,151 111,660 138,474 17,495 15,523 
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank 
Tab 1 e 7 Number of shares traded and new capita 1 raised on the semi-
officia·l market~ 1981-85 
Year Shares traded (million) New issues ( ECU mi 11 ion nominal value) 
1981 20 3.3 
1982 23 0.7 
1983 24 1.7 
1984 33 41.0 
1985 34.7 
Source: Frankfurt Stock Exchange 
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Market Overview 
In the Federal Republic there are eight stock exchanges: 
Frankfurt, Dusseldorf, Hanover, Munich, Stuttgart, Berlin, Hamburg and 
Bremen. The Frankfurt stock exchange accounts for 70 per cent of total 
turnover. German banks play a dominating role in the country's 
financial markets and own a large share of German industry. In 
general, the banks hold between 15 and 20 per cent of the equity share 
holdings in listed German companies (see Euromoney, June 1986). In 
addition, all stock market transactions in fixed interest securities 
and equity securities must be arranged through a commercial bank. 
'Banks serve as the customers' agents on the stock market, purchasing 
and selling securities in their own names for the accounts of the 
customer' (Hildeburn, 1986, p91). Overall, only banks may be members 
of the stock exchanges and because of the 'universal' nature of German 
banking business they undertake a whole range of securities business. 
'In Germany about 50 per cent of the total volume of business is 
done through public corporations (savings banks and their clearing 
houses), 30 per cent through private commercial banks and 20 per 
cent through co-operative credit institutions' (Hildeburn, 1986, 
p91). 
It must be noted that private individuals, companies or insurance 
companies must use the services of commercial banks and/ or savings 
banks if they want to undertake stockmarket transactions. There are 
over 100 private and public banks which belong to the Frankfurt 
Exchange, the three largest of which are the big banks, Deutsche Bank, 
Dresdner Bank and Commerzbank. There are no direct foreign members. 
Nevertheless, an Arthur Andersen ( 1986) study suggests that 
'Stockbrokers (mostly subsidiaries of foreign brokers) are competing 
with banks in the market for the braking of and dealing with 
securities' (p106). 
The main investors in equities in the German market are as 
follows: 
Approximate holdings of equities (1984) 
Foreign investors 
Domestic companies 
Domestic private individuals 
German and foreign banks 
Insurance companies 
Public sector 
Investment companies (mutual funds) 
Source: Hildeburn, 1986, p91 
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20 
26 
20 
15 
6 
5 
5.5 
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Insurance companies do not play a major role in the equity market, their 
major investments are in fixed income bonds. 
In the marketp 1 ace, the arri v a 1 of American and Swiss banks with 
their experience of worldwide securities business 'is unlikely to 
impinge on the activities of the larger German banks. However, for the 
private banks, the future could be less secure' (Euromoney, 1986). 
American Express has eight branches in Germany offering a range of 
banking services, it aims to introduce Shearson Lehman's securities 
activites into the German market. Domestic commentators believe foreign 
banks and brokers wil 1 make major inroads in secondary market activities 
over the next few years, but the primary market wi 11 be dominated by 
domestic players. 
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4.2 France 
Statistical Overview 
Table 1 Market structure - French official and second market 1985 
Table 2 Share turnover on the Paris Stock Exchange, official, second 
and over-the-counter markets 1981-85 
Table 3 The most actively traded shares, Paris Stock Exchange 1985. 
Table 4 Number of listed companies, Paris Stock Exchange official 
market 1981-85 
Table 5 Market capitalisation of French securities, Paris Stock 
Exchange, official and second markets, 1981-85 
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Table 1 Market structure - French official and second market 1985 
Number of issues 
Number of issues listed 
Market capita 1 i sat ion (1) 
French shares 
French bonds 
Trade volume * (1) 
Shares 
Bonds 
New issues (1) 
French shares 
French bonds 
Change in price 
French shares 
French bonds 
Foreign shares 
Yield (2) 
French shares 
French government bonds 
Source: Paris Bourse, 1985 
Notes: (1) Millions of ECU 
(2) P/E at year end 
ECU 
Change 
1985 1985/1984 
1, 047 +6% 
3,113 +7% 
318,264.3 +31% 
95,601.3 +57% 
222,663.0 +23% 
129,585.0 +75% 
23,969.7 +76% 
105,515.3 +75% 
56,572.9 +30% 
10,065.8 +52% 
46,507.1 +26% 
+46% 
+5% 
+2% 
3.70% 
10.50% 
* All transactions figures take only sales into account 
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Table 2 Share turnover on the Paris Stock Exchange, official, second 
and over-the-counter markets 1981-85 
(ECU million) 
Year Share trading value Domestic companies Foreign companies 
1981 10,516 7,561 2,954 
1982 9, 771 7,178 2,593 
1983 14,106 9,393 4, 713 
1984 13,435 10,254 3,181 
1985 24,431 21,191 3,240 
Source: FIBV, Paris Stock Exchange 
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Table 3 The most actively traded shares, Paris Stock Exchange 1985 
Ranking 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
Company 
Michelin 
Thomson CSF 
BSN 
Peugeot 
Ciel du Midi 
Moet-Hennessy 
Lafarge Copp~e 
Carrefour 
Air Liqui de 
El f-Aquitai ne 
Total 
Club Mediterranee 
Gle des Eaux 
Pernod-Ricard 
Source Perrier 
L'Or~al 
Chargeurs 
Navigation Mixte 
Sanofi 
Accor 
T~l~mecanique Electrique 
Essilor 
Parisienne de R~escompte 
Bouygues 
Merlin Gerin 
Source: Paris Stock Exchange 
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Average daily volume 
(ECU 000} 
2,205 
2,101 
2,038 
1,941 
1,927 
1,856 
1,677 
1,486 
1,383 
1,341 
1,214 
1,130 
1,064 
1,015 
1,002 
971 
830 
797 
781 
766 
756 
735 
683 
664 
652 
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Table 4 Number of listed companies, Paris Stock Exchange official 
market 1981-85 
Company 
French 
Foreign 
Franc Zone 
Total 
1981 
568 
162 
13 
743 
1982 
535 
164 
12 
711 
1983 
518 
165 
14 
697 
1984 
504 
166 
13 
683 
Source: FIBB, Paris Stock Exchange 
Table 5 Market capitalisation of French securities, 
Exchange, official and second markets, 1981-85 
(ECU billion) 
1981 1982 1983 1984 
Shares 36.3 31.0 48.4 60.2 
Bonds 96.1 121.1 144.4 179.2 
Total 132.4 152.1 192.9 239.4 
Source: Cr~dit Commercial de France, Paris Stock Exchange 
152 
1985 
489 
177 
12 
678 
Paris Stock 
1985 
95.6 
222.7 
318.3 
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Market Overview 
The Paris Stock Exchange accounts for well over 95 per cent of 
business volume in all the seven French stock exchanges. There are 
three markets within the French stock exchange system; the official 
1 i st, the second market (Second March~), and the over-the-counter 
market. Total market capitalisation of both domestic and overseas 
securities listed on the official and second markets exceeded Ffr 2 
trillion, by the end of 1980; approximately 30 per cent of which 
accounted for equities. Share turnover is still dominated by domestic 
companies 86 per cent of total turnover in 1985). 
Up until 1st September 1986 brokers (agents de change) had a legal 
monopoly to trade in securities on and off the exchanges. A broker 
could not under any circumstances trade on his own account but was 
allowed to hold accounts in favour of clients; therefore they were 
allowed to manage portfolios and provide safekeeping of securities. 
Since September, this long protected monopoly has been broken. Banks as 
well as brokers are now •allowed to deal in the most active contract on 
the futures exchange (the MATIF). Banks are also all owed to make bond 
prices within 50 basis points of the Bourse•s daily fixing• (Shirreff, 
1986). Agents de change are •being forced to become more investment 
bank like•. 
Nearly 80 per cent of stock exchange orders are processed through 
banking institutions. Banks play the major role as intermediaries 
between clients and brokers in France through their large branch 
networks. The other major type of stock exchange intermediaries are 
known as •Remisiers•. Usually they just give advice to investors but 
they can a 1 so execute discretionary orders through brokers. They are 
licensed by the Professional Association of Brokers. 
In 1985 about 50 per cent of trading is undertaken by institutions, 
20 per cent by foreign investors and 30 per cent by French individuals. 
The majority of personal investors own shares directly although 
significant trade takes place through SICAVs (SICAV•s are open-ended 
funds managed on behalf of companies which allow employees to partake in 
profit-sharing schemes). They are mainly managed by banks and other 
financial institutions. 
Various capital market reforms s i nee 1984 have encouraged 1 arge 
foreign financial institutions to consider establishment in Paris. 
Shearson Lehman Brothers has set up an investment bank within its parent 
American Express in Paris. Credit Suisse First Boston is looking for a 
•French vehicle to buy• (Shirreff, 1986) and Morgan Stanley and Goldman 
Sachs, securities houses, •strong in international equities are poised 
to move into France•. These institutions wish to undertake business in 
three main areas: 
1 Mandates to place newly privatised issues overseas 
2 Capital and money market business 
3 Domestic anG cross-border investment banking 
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4.3 Italy 
Statistical Overview 
Table 1 Number of listed companies and shares, and market value, Milan 
Stock Exchange 1981-85 
Table 2 Market value, Milan Stock Exchange, by sector 1984 and 1985 
Table 3 Share turnover, Milan Stock Exchange 1981-85 
Table 4 Percentage of total trading volume, by sector 
Table 5 Italian mutual funds by investment objectives 1984-85 
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Table 1 Number of listed companies and shares, and market value, Milan 
Stock Exchange 1981-85 
( ECU) 
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
Shares: 
Number of companies listed 
(excluding suspended shares) 132 138 139 143 147 
Number of shares (excluding 
suspended shares) 169 180 191 199 211 
Market value (ECU million) 22,758 20,622 25,704 36,045 67,814 
Source: Milan Stock Exchange 
Table 2 Market value, Milan Stock Exchange, by sector 1984 and 1985 
(ECU million) 
Sector 31st December 1984 7th August 1985 
Food and groceries 608.65 968.67 
Insurance 6,285.43 9, 571. 29 
Banking 4,935.83 5,917.23 
Paper and printing 154.46 306.74 
Cement, ceramics etc 693.59 1,199.85 
Chemicals 2,548.46 4,309.81 
Silos and stores 523.74 903.18 
Communications 2,963.21 3,799.65 
Electrical engineering 702.09 1,084.12 
Investments 9,402. 90 9,906.93 
Building and property 550.85 719.16 
Engineering and motors 5,700.93 8,485.98 
Mining and metals 428.91 574.41 
Textiles 228.96 302.09 
Miscellaneous 317.64 453.91 
Total 36,045.43 48,503.02 
Source: Milan Stock Exchange 
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Table 3 Share turnover, Milan Stock Exchange 1981-85 
( ECU mi ll ion) 
Year Trading value 
1981 9,764 
1982 2,848 
1983 4,356 
1984 5,171 
1985 18,173 
Source: Milan Stock Exchange 
Table 4 Percentage of total trading volume, by sector 
Investor 
Mutual funds 
Banks, money managers 
Private individuals 
Insurance companies 
Foreign institutions 
Mediobanca 
Total 
Source:· Hildeburn, 1986 
Percentage 
35 
20 
15 
15 
10 
5 
100% 
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Table 5 Italian mutual funds by investment objectives 1984-85 
(net assets in ECU million) 
December 1984 March 1985 June 1985 September 1985 
Income 506.73 1,818.37 3,104.28 3, 821.82 
Balanced 162.88 884.67 1,785.91 3,029.01 
Equity 173.01 776.24 1,375.69 2,412.29 
Total 842.62 3,479.28 6,265.88 9,263.12 
Source: Buchan, 1985 (adapted) 
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Market Overview 
Italy has nine stock exchanges the most important being Milan which 
accounts for 90 per cent of total equity volume and approximately 80 per 
cent of the turnover in fixed interest securities. The Mi 1 an bourse, 
however, is •relatively the smallest of any industrialised country• 
(Hindle, 1985). Tur1over amounted to lire ECU 18,173 million in 1985. 
Total market capitalisation at the end of 1985 was ECU 67,814 million, 
of which over fifty per cent was provided by the banking, insurance and 
finance sectors. Nearly 75 per cent of the market is accounted for by 
only 20 quoted companies (Friedman, 1986). Foreign holdings of shares 
account for approximately 4 per cent of market capitalisation. 
Stockbrokers (Agenti di Cambia) have an exclusive monopoly over 
fixing daily prices in bonds and shares on the Stock Exchange floor. 
Banks are not permitted to de a 1 on the Exchange but they have to de a 1 
through stockbrokers. It is permitted, however, to 1 et banks and other 
financial institutions, as well as the brokers, to match cl ients• 
orders. An interesting feature of the Italian market is that a 1 arge 
part of trading is listed and unlisted equities take place off the floor 
of the exchange. Given the present regulatory structure, • ..• around 98 
per cent of bond trading and 52 per cent of share trading (at present 
running officially at around Lire 100 billion (ECU 68.4 mil lion) a day) 
goes on well away from the official stockmarket; (Friedman, 1987). On 
29th January Banca Nazionale del Lavoro began round-the-clock electronic 
trading, this swiftly led to a reaction from CONSOB the I tal ian stock 
market regulatory authority who proposed full day share trading open to 
brokers, groupings of brokerage firms and new brokerage house 
subsidiaries of banks. This would be ratified by legislation in the 
future. 
Trade has been boosted over the last five years by the increased 
interest.of foreign and domestic institutional investors as well as the 
introduction of new mutual funds (unit trusts). As there are virtually 
no private pension funds in Italy and the insurance companies invest 
their funds mainly in government stock, the mutual funds have brought 
institutional investors back into the equity market. Legislation passed 
in 1983 gave preferential tax treatment to this form of investment and 
the first one was launched in June 1984. By December 1984 ECU 723.9 
mil lion had been invested in mutual funds and by February 1986 they had 
attracted one mi 11 ion savers. By 30th November 1986 the total funds 
held by 58 Italian unit trusts was ECU 44,643 million, holding 12.3 per 
cent of the total capitalisation of the Milan bourse. One of the major 
reasons for the rapid growth of these types of investment was that since 
1985 Italian banks have aggressively marketed them through their branch 
networks. Most of the major banks in Italy are selling funds managed by 
themselves, or, in a few cases, other institutions• funds. The two 
largest insurance companies in Italy are also selling these funds. The 
main types of Italian equity investors are •private indivi.duals, 
insurance companies, investment funds, investment companies, overseas 
investors, one merchant bank (Mediobanca, which is mainly a medium to 
long term merchant bank), one pension fund and banks which, by law, are 
not allowed to hold securities on their own behalf but only on behalf of 
private and/or institutional investors•. 
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Total market capitalisation has risen from 12.5 per cent of GOP in 
1983 to approximately 24.5 per cent in 1986. The Italian securities and 
brokerage business is no longer considered to be something of a 
'sideshow'. Nomura and Daiwa, Japan's largest securities houses have 
just opened offices in Milan. 
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4.4 United Kingdom 
Statistical Overview 
Table 1 Nominal and market value of all listed securities at 31st 
December 1986 
Table 2 New issues for cash 1984-85 
Table 3 Turnover in UK fixed interest and equities, January to 
December 1986 
Table 4 Share ownership by investor type 
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Table 1 Nominal and market value of all listed securities at 31st 
December 1986 
Valuation 
No of Nominal Market 
Securities ECUm ECUm 
Total public sector (bonds 
and gilts) 617 209,709.3 202,395.4 
Eurobonds 
UK companies 109 9,529.7 8, 281.6 
Overseas companies 1,092 136,533.6 161,871.7 
Irish companies 5 428.3 409.3 
Sub-total eurobonds 1,206 146,491.6 170,562.6 
Company securities 
Banks and discount houses 111 15,124.4 110,333.9 
Breweries and distilleries 194 3,009.5 32,213.5 
Building societies 16 454.2 452.4 
Commercial, industrial 2,665 64,394.3 907,272.1 
Financial trusts, land 473 3, 116.0 66,263.7 
Insurance 57 2,140.5 64,593.4 
Investment and unit trusts 474 5, 541.2 37,867.1 
i~i nes 133 1,604.1 37,746.1 
Oil 70 9,378.2 195,010.5 
Plantations 47 533.6 2,207.5 
Property 276 3,789.6 16,873.2 
Railways 16 228.3 8,150.3 
Shipping 28 667.2 3,639.7 
Utilities 43 5,085.6 135,333.7 
Waterworks 318 587.5 509.2 
Sub-total company securities 4,921 115,654.1 1,618,480.0 
Overall total 6,744 471,855.1 1,991,328.1 
Source: Stock Exchange Quarterly, 1986 
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Table 2 New issues for cash 1984-85 
( ECU mi 11 ion) 
1984 1985 
British government 23,867.4 29,285.2 
Irish government 2,624.1 3,059.2 
Local authorities and public boards 1' 317.3 593.7 
British companies 
fixed interest 2,679.3 15,402.0 
equity 12,208.9 8,105.3 
Total UK and Irish issues 42,697.1 56,445.5 
Total overseas companies 39,936.3 41,197.5 
Grand total 82,633.4 97' 643.0 
Source: Hildeburn, 1986 
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Table 3 Turnover in UK fixed interest and equities, January to 
December 1986 
Company fixed interest 
Debentures and loans 
Convertibles 
Preference and preferred ordinary 
Total company fixed interest 
Equities 
Building materials 
Contracting and construction 
Electricals 
Electronics 
Mechanical and engineering 
Metals and metal forming 
Motors 
Other industrial materials 
Capital goods total 
Beers, wines, spirits and tobacco 
Food manufacturing 
Food retailing 
Health and household products 
Leisure 
Publishing and printing 
Packaging and paper 
Stores 
Textiles 
Consumer group total 
Chemicals 
Office equipment 
Shipping and transport 
Mi see 11 aneous 
Other groups total 
Total commercial and industrial 
Oils and gas 
Banks, discount and merchant banks 
Insurance 
Property 
Other financial 
Financial group total 
Investment trusts 
Mining finance 
Overseas traders 
Grand total ordinary shares 
No of Bargains 
120.627 
132,003 
49,489 
302,119 
169,693 
157,997 
91,554 
565,772 
358,251 
81,869 
197,025 
139,330 
1,761,491 
326,862 
224,995 
136,847 
209,196 
258,534 
53,747 
63,956 
399,433 
181,844 
1, 855' 414 
188,061 
36,896 
76,040 
397' 534 
698,531 
4,315,436 
511,568 
702,663 
165,422 
180,694 
143,012 
1,191,791 
183,560 
53, 797 
81, 727 
6,337,879 
Source: Stock Exchange Quarterly, 1986 
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Value ECUm 
5,355.6 
4,375.1 
411.0 
10,141.8 
7,785.7 
4,625.3 
2,135.4 
15,773.9 
10,599.7 
1, 741.9 
6,794.2 
5,172.3 
54,628.4 
22,708.4 
10,324.9 
6,001.5 
12,007.3 
7,225.5 
3,291.9 
2,302.8 
15,593.1 
4,665.8 
84, 121.4 
6, 776.0 
1,530.5 
2,889.4 
16,387.6 
27,583.5 
166,333.3 
14,962.2 
13,724.8 
10,027.3 
6, 451. 2 
5, 531.0 
35,734.3 
7,574.2 
2,737.3 
2,830.2 
230,171.4 
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Table 4 Share ownership by investor type 
Pension funds/insurance/unit 
trusts/investment trusts 
percentages 
Charities/industrial/commercial 
government/overseas 
Individuals 
Source: Hildeburn, 1986 
1963 1984 
27.8 60.0 
13.5 18.0 
58.7 22.0 
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Market Overviet~ 
The United Kingdom's stock exchange is the third largest in the 
world. Most of the transactions are carried out on the London exchange 
although there are a few relatively small regional exchanges. During 
1986 the market for securities in the UK was considerably reorganised 
involving new investor protection legislation, a dramatic change in the 
ownership and operations of the London exchange, plus developments in 
the over-the-counter (OTC) market. An investigation of the exchange's 
activities during the 1970s (under the aegis of the Restrictive Trade 
Practices Act of 1956) was called off when the exchange agreed to 
abolish fixed commissions on securities transactions. In addition, 
traditional methods of trading whereby only jobbers were allowed to take 
positions in securities and only brokers were allowed to buy and sell 
securities, from the jobbers for the clients, was abolished. Single 
capacity, where jobbing and brokerage business was clearly separated 
was rep 1 aced by dual capacity. From 27th October 1986, fi nanc i a 1 
companies could undertake both braking and jobbing functions. 'Big 
Bang• also blew away restrictive practices in the gilts markets where 
two jobbers previously dominated the markets. In 1 ate 1986 there were 
27 firms listed as official primary dealers, making markets in gilts. 
Prior to the 'Big Bang• 'Financial groups seeking to acquire British 
securities firms on the stock exchange were allowed to take full control 
on 1st March 1986' (Hilde burn, 1986). This 1 ed to a flood of purchases 
by both domestic and foreign banks for firms operating on the exchange. 
The market is now dominated by 33 leading players including the largest 
American banks and Japanese securities houses (see Economist, 1986a). 
For the majority of institutions operating in this market, their 
business is truly global, ranging from UK and international equities 
market-making, through the whole gamut of investment banking products 
right down to traditional retail banking business. 'Today, fewer than 
20 British institutions of any size are still there ••• The leviathans 
are six British firms that wil 1 take on the larger American and Japanese 
investment banks in providing the full range of global financial 
services• (Economist, 1986b). They are Barclays de Zoete \.Jedd, NatWest 
Investment Bank, Midland Montagu, Morgan Grenfell, Kleinwort Benson and 
Mercury International. The Economist (1986b) identifies two other 
groups, the second-leaguers (specialists) and the spectators (those that 
are sticking to traditional 1 ines of business). 
The total market capitalisation of the UK market stood at ECU 477.6 
billion at the end of 1986. Turnover in the equity market rose from ECU 
179.3 billion during 1985 to ECU 269.8 billion during 1986. Gilt market 
turnover increased by about one-third from ECU 444 bill ion in 1985 to 
ECU 519 billion in 1986. Considering the types of investor, the number 
of private shareholders has markedly increased over the last three years 
mainly as a result of the government's privatisation programme. 
Nevertheless, share ownership is dominated by institutional investors; 
pension funds, insurance companies, unit and investment trusts. They 
account for sixty per cent of total turnover in 1984. Although this 
proportion of market share has probably diminished since then, because 
of the privatisation programme, they undoubtedly still are the main 
investors. 'A breakdown of stock exchange turnover in 1983 by value 
showed that institutions accounted for 68.5 per cent of the turnover, 
individuals 14.4 per cent, agents (mostly on behalf of individuals) 14.6 
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per cent, and member firms 2.5 per cent' (Hildeburn, 1986). The figure 
for member firms is probably much higher now. 
As has already been mentioned, 'commercial, merchant and foreign 
banks now own broker-dealers and many members of overseas stock 
exchanges have established broker-dealers in the UK' (ISSA, 1986). 
This, however, does not explain the strength of the foreign banks and 
overseas securities houses in the London market. The main reason why 
London has attracted over 550 foreign banks is because it is the capital 
of the Euromarkets. The Euromarket refers to a variety of markets 
'ranging from bonds to swaps and deposits- where financial instruments 
are bought and sold with eurocurrencies' (Economist, 1986c). The market 
includes trade in a whole range of financial instruments from bonds to 
swaps and deposits. In 1985 eurobond 'turnover was $2.25 trillion ... , 
(ECU 2.95 trillion) against £367 billion (ECU 623 billion) for equities 
and gilts on the London exchange' (Economist, 1986b). The eurocurrency 
deposit market is even larger, 1985 turnover totalled $2.75 trillion. 
Other markets include the eurocommercial paper and euro-equity market. 
Most of the activity in the markets is wholesale and subsequently the 
players are typically large organisations, whether they be banks, 
securities houses, institutional investors or commercial companies. 
Given the new regulatory climate and the importance of the 
euromarkets in London, most large domestic and foreign banks offer a 
broad range of financial services from international and eurobusiness to 
retail broking services. Clearing banks as well as some building 
societies can now sell shares through their branches as well as offer 
integrated investment management services. The four main clearers all 
offer private client investment and retail stockbroking facilities. All 
but Midland offer unit trust business through their branch networks. In 
general, because of the above developments, demarcation between 
commercial banks, savings banks, building societies, insurance companies 
and other financial institutions will continue to break down. It is 
expected that a whole range of financial institutions will offer 
comprehensive securities and brokerage business in the not too distant 
future. 
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4.5 Belgium 
Statistical Overview 
Table 1 Number of listed shares and market value, Brussels Stock 
Exchange 1981-85 
Table 2 Total equity turnover, Brussels Stock Exchange 1981-85 
Table 3 Public issues in Belgium 1982-86 
Table 4 The most actively traded shares, Brussels Stock Exchange 1985 
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Table 1 Number of listed shares and market value, Brussels Stock 
Exchange 1981-85 
{ ECU) 
Number of listed shares Domestic market value 
Year Total Domestic Foreign (ECU million) 
1981 368 218 150 7,795.2 
1982 351 212 139 8, 988.7 
1983 342 204 138 13,197.6 
1984 337 197 140 17,077.5 
1985 336 192 144 23,997.7 
Source: FIBV, Brussels Stock Exchange 
Table 2 Total equity turnover, Brussels Stock Exchange 1981-85 
(ECU million) 
Year Domestic companies Foreign companies Total 
1981 578.57 827.18 1,405.75 
1982 1,085.47 869.15 1, 954.62 
1983 1,610.87 1,373.83 2,984.70 
1984 2, 002.66 1,492.50 3, 495.16 
1985 2,539.84 1,709,41 4,249.25 
Source: FIBV, Brussels Stock Exchange 
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Table 3 Public issues in Belgium 1982-86 
(ECU million) 
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 
Shares 485.56 1285.65 368.18 
Convertible loan stock 19.81(1) 
403.25 
2.89 
26.05 
897.03 
65.53 
17.12 Real estate certificates -
Private sector bonds 209.07 
Belgian central 
government bonds 3936.35 7097.27 6448.06 
Other public sector 2460.22 3670.77 2112.68 
Bonds issued by 
international 
institutions 67.10 66.02 209.07 
9541.13(2) 6563.93(3) 
4008.02 2630.14 
300.60 
Total 6949.22 12328.78 9157.79 14282.12 
205.48 
10379.22 
Source: BBL Bulletin, 1987 
Notes: (1) Including an ECU-denominated issue by CO'te d 1 0r 
(2} Including ECU 1.044.31 million converted into bonds from 
treasury certificates 
(3) Including ECU 596.8 mi 11 ion converted into bonds from 
treasury certificates 
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Table 4 The most actively traded shares, Brussels Stock Exchange 1985 
Ranking Company Trading value (ECU million) 
1 Petrofina 349.31 
2 G~nE!rale de Be 1 gi que 239.78 
3 GBL 205.67 
4 Intercom 203.84 
5 Ebes 152.63 
6 Solvay 149.88 
7 G~n~rale de Ban que 74.50 
8 Philips 73.80 
9 Arbed 70.99 
10 Unerg 70.77 
11 !nco 62.41 
12 Royal Dutch 62.40 
13 Volkswagen 59.04 
14 Delhaize 58.33 
15 TDK 54.28 
16 Ville Montagne 54.13 
17 Electrobel 52.75 
18 IBM 51.98 
19 Bakaert 51.94 
20 Sony 51.54 
21 Unifonds 46.86 
22 GB Inno BM 45.77 
23 UCB 43.92 
24 Stil fontei n 40.53 
25 Tractionel 39.98 
Source: Brussels Stock Exchange 
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Market Overvi ett 
Up unti 1 1982 the Belgium stock market had been one of the EEC's 
less active markets. In 1982 the De Clerq law was passed which provided 
the 'Monory-Bis' incentive, geared to promote equity investment. The 
provision allowed for income tax deductions for investments by company 
personnel in their company's own shares. Although the law of 1982 
expired on 31st December 1985, the aforementioned provision is still 
applicable. This helped revitalise the market in the early 1980s. It 
is estimated that Bfr ECU 1,559 mill ion came into equities from over 
half a mil lion households. In 1985, three new markets were brought into 
being on the Brussels Stock Exchange; a futures market, options market 
and second market for smaller companies not requiring a full listing. 
Further legislation that came into being at the end of 1986 provides the 
preferential treatment for designated savings-pension schemes. 
There are four stock exchanges in Belgium, Brussels handles 
approximately 90 per cent of transactions. At the end of 1985 there 
were 192 domestic and 144 foreign companies listed on the Brussels 
exchange. Share turnover in 1986 approached BFr ECU 6,849 mi 11 ion of 
which approximately two-thirds accounted for domestic shares. Total 
stock market capitalisation exceeded BFr 1,500 bi 11 ion. Banks, 
financial companies and trust companies comprise over 30 per cent of 
market va 1 ue. 
Stockbrokers (agents de change) monopolise trading in the exchange. 
Brokers are allowed to act individually or in partnership but are not 
allowed to be organised as joint stock companies. Banks are permitted 
to receive orders for securities business but they must do their 
business through stockbrokers. No breakdown of the scale of this type 
of business is available. 
Virtually all shares issued in the Belgium market are in bearer 
form; it is very difficult to estimate who the main investors in the 
market are. Commercial banks transact most of their business in the 
bond market, intervention on the stock market is very small. Banks are 
subject to legislation which prevents them building up shareholdings in 
non-bank companies. Banks are allowed to have shareholdings in other 
banks, savings banks and in certain credit institutions. Various other 
criteria exist (see Abraham, 1985). 
Insurance companies also play an important role in the bond market. 
They are not allowed to invest more than 25 per cent of their assets in 
equities, in fact the estimated figure for 1983 was below half this 
ceiling. Pension funds like insurance companies are more involved in 
the bond markets, but they are quite a small group, as the 1 ion's share 
of pensions are paid out by the government. In general, private 
domestic individuals and foreign investors dominate transactions in the 
equity markets. 
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4.6 Luxembourg 
Statistical Overview 
Table 1 Listings on the Luxembourg Stock Exchange 1981-85 
Table 2 Market value, end-1985 
Table 3 Market value of new equity shares, 1985 
Table 4 Securities turnover, 1984-85 
174 
- 470 -
Table 1 Listings on the Luxembourg Stock 
Listed shares 
domestic companies 
foreign companies 
Investment funds listed 
domestic 
foreign 
New share listings 
domestic shares 
foreign shares 
New investment funds listed 
domestic funds 
foreign funds 
Source: Hildeburn, 1986 
Table 2 Market value, end-1985 
Domestic shares 
Foreign shares 
Share certificates 
Domestic investment funds 
Foreign investment funds 
Total 
Source: Hildeburn, 1986 
numbers 
1981 
139 
29 
110 
82 
54 
28 
35 
4 
31 
6 
3 
3 
Exchange 1981-85 
1982 
154 
32 
122 
94 
60 
34 
20 
4 
16 
14 
6 
8 
175 
1983 1984 
162 173 
34 37 
128 136 
117 149 
73 102 
44 47 
10 14 
2 4 
8 10 
26 36 
16 30 
10 6 
( E CU m i 11 ion) 
3,139.90 
83,242.89 
60.63 
11,098.91 
27,926.30 
117' 007.30 
1985 
187 
41 
146 
178 
142 
36 
19 
5 
14 
42 
42 
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Table 3 Market value of new equity shares, 1985 
Domestic shares 
Foreign shares 
Domestic investment funds 
Total market value 
Source: Hildeburn, 1986 
Table 4 Securities turnover, 1984-85 
(ECU million) 
1984 
Bonds 291.45 
Shares 51.07 
Investment 24.60 
Total 367.11 
Source: Luxembourg Stock Exchange 
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94.23 
157.89 
4,096.97 
4,349.14 
1985 
351.07 
57.36 
31.01 
439.44 
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Market Overview 
As with the banking sector, the Luxembourg Stock Exchange is 
'characterised by a strong international orientation ..• foreign 
securities represent 90 per cent of all quotations and a staggering 96 
per cent of bonds' (Hendrie, 1985). In addition, the Luxembourg 
exchange has one of the largest trading lists in the world, by the end 
of 1985 nearly 3,500 stocks and bonds were quoted. 'Bonds predominate, 
accounting for more than 3,000 listed counters with the remainder of the 
market made up of 187 stocks and shares and 178 investment funds' 
(Hildeburn, 1986). Bond turnover accounted for nearly 80 per cent of 
total turnover during 1985, whereas shares only accounted for 13 per 
cent. The reason for the predominance of bond business is because 
Luxembourg undertakes a substantial proportion of official eurobond 
dealing. Bonds denominated in foreign currencies ranging from the 
dollar and yen to the ECU (European Currency Unit) are widely traded on 
the exchange. 
The majority of the Luxembourg exchange's members are domestic and 
foreign banks although there are a few stockbroking firms. As a 
universal banking system exists in Luxembourg, banks offer a whole range 
of domestic and international broking and securities services. These 
include: brokerage in securities, settlement of securities, custodian 
business, investment advising and trust business, portfolio management, 
underwriting of new securities issues and the financial servicing of 
securities. A very important point to note is that 'Members do not have 
to trade securities on the exchange floor and over 95 per cent of 
trading occurs off the floor. This explains the small reported turnover 
for exchange transactions' (Hildeburn, 1986). Hence it is very 
difficult to get a 'true' picture of business in the Luxembourg market 
place. In addition to the official market trading is allowed in 
unlisted securities but volume is not very 1 arge. Over-the-counter 
business in foreign stocks and bonds is widely undertaken by many banks. 
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4.7 Netherlands 
Statistical Overview 
Table 1 Number of listed companies, Amsterdam Stock Exchange 1981-85 
Table 2 Securities officially listed, number of issues 1984-85 
Table 3 Trading volume on the Dutch capital market in 1985 
Table 4 Supply and demand in the Dutch capital market 1981-85 
Table 5 The stock exchange in the Dutch capital market 1981-85 
Table 6 Issues on the Dutch capital market 1985 
Table 7 Balance of foreign transactions on the Amsterdam Stock 
Exchange, 1981-85 
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Table 1 Number of listed companies, Amsterdam Stock Exchange 1981-85 
Domestic 
Foreign 
Total 
Source: FIBV 
1981 
202 
286 
488 
1982 
216 
260 
476 
1983 
215 
256 
471 
1984 
213 
255 
468 
1985 
232 
242 
474 
Table 2 Securities officially listed, number of issues 1984-85 
Official market Para 11 el market 
End-1984 End-1985 End-1984 End-1985 
Dutch bonds 1,312 1,308 3 1 
Foreign bonds 151 156 2 
Dutch shares 204 278 26 32 
Foreign shares 283 335 1 2 
Total 1, 950 2, 077 30 37 
Source: Amsterdam Stock Exchange 
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Tdble 3 Trading volume on the Dutch capital market in 1985 
( ECU mill ion) 
1984 1985 % change 
Dutch bonds 23,652.4 30,321.8 +27.5 
Dutch convertible bonds 304.7 798.3 +160.7 
Dutch mortgage bonds 1,975.2 1' 984.1 
Dutch savings certificates 1,302.9 1,355.5 +3.5 
Foreign bonds 1, 801.0 1,992.0 +10.1 
Total bonds 29,036.2 36,451.7 +24.9 
Dutch shares 30,299.6 43, 591. 9 +43.2 
Foreign shares 287.1 285.0 -1.2 
ASAS shares 293.9 211.5 +28.4 
Claims and warrants 919.5 1,020.0 +10.6 
Total shares 31' 800.0 45,110.4 +41. 2 
Parallel Market 239.4 752.1 +313.2 
Tot a 1 vo 1 ume 61,075.5 82,314.3 +34.1 
Source: Amsterdam Stock Exchange 
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Table 4 Supply and demand in the Dutch capital market 1981-85 
percentages 
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
Net supply 
Institutional investors 59 57 56 60 54 
(Private placements) 65 55 46 45 41 
Savings banks 7 11 6 3 4 
Mortgage banks -3 -1 -3 -2 0 
Genera 1 banks 24 23 26 29 30 
Househo 1 ds and companies 8 11 12 8 4 
Total domestic 95 95 97 98 92 
Total foreign 5 5 3 2 8 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 
Net demand 
Public sector 60 66 68 68 52 
Mortgage banks -2 -5 -2 -2 -1 
General banks 4 2 5 
Househo 1 ds and companies 40 31 21 23 28 
Total domestic 98 92 91 91 84 
Total foreign 2 8 9 9 16 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 
Scope: 
Total supply/demand 41.6 48.5 50.2 46.3 58.2 
(billion guilders) 
In % of Net 31.1 14.8 14.9 13.1 15.7 
Nation a 1 Income 
Source: Amsterdam Stock Exchange 
181 
- 477 -
Table 5 The stock exchange in the Dutch capital market 1981-851 
percentages 
1981 1982 1983 1984 19852 
Stock market, of which 24 38 48 54 46 
shares -1 2 -2 5 
bonds 25 38 46 56 41 
Private 1 oans 51 50 38 31 37 
r~ortgage bonds 16 4 10 9 14 
Real estate 9 8 4 6 3 
Total supply/demand3 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: Amsterdam Stock Exchange 
Notes: 1 calculated on the basis of figures supplied by De 
Nederlandsche Bank NV 
2 estimate 
3 foreign and domestic 
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Table 6 Issues on the Dutch capital market 1985 
( ECU mi 11 ion) 
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
Bonds 
Public loans 
- government and local 4,072 7,116 9,381 10,107 8,350 
government 
- other domestic bonds 721 918 946 793 1,600 
- foreign 432 727 867 1,189 992 
- convertible bonds 72 639 119 329 
and warrants 
Tot a 1 pu b 1 i c 5,297 8, 761 11,234 12,208 11,270 
Private sector 
- mortgage bonds 793 344 355 555 568 
- bank certificates 252 536 631 634 487 
and other 
Tot a 1 private 1, 045 880 985 1,189 1,055 
Shares 
Public 144 11 355 277 726 
Private sector 
- converted shares 144 0 512 0 86 
- investment company 0 191 709 951 875 
shares 
- other 396 77 946 436 1,487 
Total Private sector 541 268 2,168 1,387 2,448 
Total Genera 1 6,883 9,908 14,387 14,784 14, 773 
Source: Amsterdam Stock Exchange 
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Table 7 Ba 1 ance of foreign transactions on the Amsterdam Stock 
Exchange, 1981-85 
( ECU mi 11 ion) 
Transactions in foreign securities 
Stocks 
Bonds 
Total 
Transactions in Dutch securities 
Stocks 
Bonds 
Total 
Source: Amsterdam Stock Exchange 
1981 
250 
-29 
221 
192 
1,119 
1, 311 
1982 
41 
-300 
-260 
427 
1,243 
1,670 
1983 
-17 
-194 
-211 
479 
1, 061 
1, 541 
1984 1985 
783 -130 
-713 -1,534 
69 -1,663 
-94 
1, 528 
1,434 
1, 037 
2,138 
3,175 
Note: a negative sign indicates payment on account of net purchase 
(and redemption) by residents 
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Market Overview 
One of the main features of the Dutch capital market is that there 
exists an 'important private market alongside the public market' 
(Hendrie, 1985). Corporate customers from both the public and private 
sector can get long-term finance from institutional investors, with the 
banks and security credit institutions acting as intermediaries. This 
peculiar Dutch phenomenon is essentially a long-term market. A private 
placement is basically a fixed interest loan which has a maturity up to 
twelve years. These loans are offered predominantly by institutional 
investors like savings banks and pension funds, it has helped maintain 
the relatively high level of institutional savings within the 
Netherlands. This market accounted for over 40 per cent of net supply 
and demand for securities in 1979. 
The Amsterdam Stock Exchange is the only exchange in the 
Netherlands. At the end of 1985 the official 1 ist was comprised of 
2,077 securities, of which 70 per cent were domestic and foreign bonds, 
the remaining 30 per cent being Dutch and foreign shares. The official 
exchange has more US stock listings than any other exchange outside the 
United States. Direct trading in US stocks began in 1980 and the 
development of the American Shares Amsterdam System (ASAS) helped foster 
greater European interest in investing in US stocks. Over forty per 
cent of foreign equities traded on the exchange are American. 
Securities turnover for 1985 amounted to ECU 82.4 billion, over half of 
which was traded in equities. Foreign shares, however, accounted for 
approximately 0.6 per cent of total turnover and only one per cent of 
share turnover. 
There are three categories of members of the Stock Exchange 
Association: 
commercial banks (credit institutions) 
brokers not registered as credit institutions 
hoeklieden 
'Banks and stockbrokers maintain the contact with the public and 
act as agents for the execution of their clients' orders' (ISSA, 1986). 
Banks in this case include a small number of savings banks, the 
commercial banks and Rabobank Nederland. These institutions are 
involved in the issuing business, either by acting as intermediaries for 
the issuing companies or by underwriting and placing issues. They are 
also involved in other aspects of securities business such as trading, 
safe custody and the like. Some of these financial institutions, 
especially the large universal banks are prominent in the market for 
international issues. Hoeklieden are members of autonomous firms who 
act as intermediaries between banks and stockbrokers, they have no close 
business relationship with the investors. 
'Although no precise figures for the percentage of equity holdings 
by investor groups are published, the following estimates can be given: 
foreign investors 50 per cent, domestic individuals 35 per cent and 
institutional investors 15 per cent• (Hildeburn, 1986). 
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On 1st January 1986, the Dutch authorities introduced certain 
regulations that aimed to liberal i se the Amsterdam Stock Exchange and 
capital markets in general. The new legislation enabled banks to issue 
COs (certificates of deposit), and also allowed foreign banks to lead 
manage guilder bonds and euro-guilder notes (as long as reciprocal 
arrangements exist for Dutch banks operating abroad). Foreign banks are 
now also allowed to obtain funds from the guilder markets, as long as 
the reciprocity principle applies. Although this was seen as the move 
towards a more liberal market place, foreign banks and securities houses 
have not flooded into Amsterdam. The four major Dutch banks, AMRO, 
Algemene Bank Nederland (ABN), Pierson Heldring and Pierson, and Bank 
Mees and Hope still dominate most of the new issues business. The 
structure of the savings market, with over 60 per cent of all national 
savings being controlled by domestic institutional investors makes it 
more difficult for foreign companies to place paper (see banking and 
credit section for role of banks in brokerage business). 
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4.8 Spain 
Statistical Overview 
Table 1 Number of listed companies and total market value, Madrid 
Stock Exchange 1981-85 
Table 2 Market value by sector, Madrid Stock Exchange, end-1985 
Table 3 New shares issued by sector, Madrid Stock Exchange, 1985 
Table 4 Madrid Stock Exchange turnover, 1980-84 
Table 5 Trading by foreign investors, Madrid Stock Exchange, 1981-85 
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Table 1 Number of listed companies and total market value, Madrid 
Stock Exchange 1981-85 
Year 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
Number of companies 
498 
448 
394 
375 
347 
Source: Madrid Stock Exchange 
Market value (ECU million) 
15,829.8 
13,048.5 
13,347.5 
18,128.3 
23,283.5 
Table 2 Market value by sector, Madrid Stock Exchange, end-1985 
Sector 
Banks 
Electricals 
Agriculture and food 
Construction and property 
Investment trusts 
Metal and engineering 
Chemicals and textiles 
Corrrnuni cations 
Miscellaneous 
Total 
Source: Madrid Stock Exchange 
ECU million 
7,212.5 
5,579.0 
731.8 
1,679.6 
1,214.5 
1,000.0 
1,324.6 
3,532.0 
1,009.8 
23,283.8 
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Table 3 New shares issued by sector, Madrid Stock Exchange, 1985 
( ECU mi 11 ion) 
Sector 
Banks 
Electricals 
Agriculture and food 
Construction and property 
Investment trusts 
Metal and engineering 
Chemicals and textiles 
Communi cations 
Mi see 11 aneous 
Total 
Source: Madrid Stock Exchange 
Market va 1 ue 
33.2 
486.4 
18.3 
12.2 
10.1 
38.5 
7.6 
527.1 
32.5 
1,165.9 
Table 4 Madrid Stock Exchange turnover, 1980-84 
(ECU million) 
1980 1981 1982 
Public stocks 131.1 119.7 119.3 
Debentures 24.8 19.3 18.4 
Bank bonds 230.4 274.1 385.7 
Shares 559.9 1,148.8 1,166.9 
Documented discount 
notes 93.4 338.6 462.2 
T-bills 147.6 
C-pa per 24.9 
Promissory notes 
Total 1, 039.7 1,900.5 2,325.0 
Source: Madrid Stock Exchange 
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1983 1984 
220.6 351.1 
18.0 126.3 
418.7 564.1 
1,076.4 2,259.6 
151.5 10.1 
569.5 3,518.1 
137.1 214.1 
2.7 0. 7 
2, 594. 5 7' 044.0 
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Table 5 Trading by foreign investors, Madrid Stock Exchange, 1981-85 
( E CU mi 11 ion) 
Year Purchases Sales Sal ance Turnover as % of total 
1981 93.5 37.4 56.1 11.4 
1982 41.8 39.8 2.0 7.0 
1983 68.8 39.7 29.0 9.7 
1984 206.1 105.6 100.5 13.8 
1985 619.3 229.6 389.7 15.7 
Source: Madrid Stock Exchange 
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Market Overview 
Spain has four stock exchanges, Madrid, Barcelona, Bilbao and 
Valencia; the latter being purely a local market. Madrid is 'the most 
active and the most international, accounting for nearly 50 per cent of 
tot a 1 market capita 1 i sati on of both bonds and stocks' (Hi 1 de burn, 1986). 
In 1985 total trading on the Madrid Stock Exchange (Balsa) was Ptas 
ECU 13.14 bi 11 ion {$12 bi 11 ion) of which government bonds accounted for 
more than half, shares for slightly less than a third, with the 
remainder being made up of dealings in other commercial paper. 
Approximately four-fifths of all Madrid's turnover is in three sectors, 
commercial banking, electronic utilities and Telefonica, the state-
controlled telecommunications firm. Over fifteen per cent of equities 
traded on the Madrid Exchange are done by foreign investors. Security 
brokers dominate the trading of financial securities on the Exchange. 
(Brokers do not have a monopoly over Treasury bill trading and business 
can be free 1 y en ac-ted over the te 1 ephone .) 'Most of the orders come 
from banks, on behalf of their customers, for their own accounts. Each 
time a trade is made it requires a broker's stamp to make the transfer 
of ownership 1 ega 1' (Euromoney, 1986). Brokers do not have sufficient 
capital to make markets and do not provide any research facilities. 
Both the banks and the government have been airing their discontent with 
the system over the last eighteen months. The government would like 
brokers to have access to 1 arger sources of capital (see Euromoney, 
1986) but the banks wanted a majority shareholding in any bank/broker 
association. It seems likely that the Madrid Exchange will follow in 
the deregulatory footsteps of London and Paris in the not too distant 
future. 
Business on Spain's stock exchanges is dominated by the banks, 
savings banks, large investors, wholesale private business or 
institutional investors such as insurance companies and investment 
funds. Most of the trading is done through the banks. In addition, 
'Most of the larger banks have within their groups investment divisions 
which handle portfolio management and investment counselling' 
(Hildeburn, 1986). The trend in Spanish banking is for this type of 
business to increase over the next decade. 
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